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EU - REPUBLIC OF KOREA RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
AXEL MARX 
JAN WOUTERS 
WOOSIK MOON 
YEONGSEOP RHEE 
SUNHEE PARK  
KISHIL YANG 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of the European economy in terms of employment and growth is to a large extent sustained by 
exports. Having in mind the benefits of external trade for European companies, the Member States of the 
European Union (EU) have authorized the European Commission to negotiate new free trade agreements with 
Asian countries. India, the Republic of Korea (hereafter: ‘Korea’) and ASEAN countries were set as priorities. 
Korea is the EU’s fourth trading partner outside Europe. In terms of both economic growth and strategic position, 
Korea represents the EU’s best trade and political partner in Asia. In addition, the EU registers a trade surplus for 
several products such as auto parts, industrial machinery, medical equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
and Korea represents one of the most important markets for EU agricultural products. From the political point of 
view, Korea can be considered as a key partner for important issues ranging from security (countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; combating illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; combating 
terrorism) to economic issues (trade and investment; economic policy dialogue; business cooperation), 
environmental issues (climate change and chemical policy) and cooperation in regional and international 
organizations. 
Relations between the two partners have been developing since 1960s, based on a market economy 
and on democratic values. This has resulted in the conclusion of two bilateral agreements: the Agreement on Co-
operation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (entered into force in 1997) and the 
Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation (entered into force on 1 April 2001). In April 2007, based on 
the positive output of decades of collaboration, the European Commission was authorized by the Member States 
to start negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Korea. Since then, eight rounds of formal 
negotiations have taken place and on 6 October 2010 the FTA was signed during the EU-Republic of Korea 
Summit in Brussels. The EU-Republic of Korea FTA, being the first of the new generation of FTAs under the 
‘Global Europe’ initiative, represents not only a showcase but also a tool for addressing the EU’s competitiveness 
and sustainability in light of the Lisbon Strategy. Meanwhile both the Union and Korea committed themselves to 
upgrading the 2001 Framework Agreement to a strategic partnership. 
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Against this background, the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (University of Leuven) and 
the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University, building on their longstanding 
cooperation, formed a partnership to jointly conduct a research project on EU-Korea cooperation which was 
generously funded by the European Commission under its Public Diplomacy programme. The goal of the project 
was to create an EU-Korea interdisciplinary and international project team that explored the possibilities for 
further cooperation between the EU and Korea on a set of interrelated policy issues. A central objective of this 
project was to investigate and promote additional opportunities for regulatory cooperation, learning, and 
emulation between the EU and Korea by providing state of the art information and analysis on key issues for EU 
and Korea.  
 The project drew upon the expertise of faculty from European and Korean universities.  The current 
report brings together the papers and recommendations which were developed in the context of the project and 
which were discussed during two workshops, organized in Leuven and Seoul. This introduction further elaborates 
the development of EU-Korea relations and briefly introduces each contribution. 
 
2. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EU –KOREA RELATIONS 
 
Since its establishment in 1948 Korea’s economic and political development has been remarkable (Cumings, 
2005). Identified as one of the ‘Four Asian Tigers‘ (along with Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong) it has been 
promoted as the quintessential example of what many authors refer to as the developmental state. The 
developmental state refers to the role played by state-planning and regulation in macroeconomic planning. In this 
model the state has a strong influence on macro-economic policy but also develops strategies for private sector 
development. Recent academic research has given significant attention to the role of the state and state-society 
relations for economic development (Altenburg; 2011; Amsden, 2001; Evans, 1995; Lin & Chang, 2009). Many of 
these studies feature Korea as a leading example. The remarkable rise of Korea is best illustrated by its steady 
economic growth exemplified by its impressive growth in GDP per capita.  
Also internationally Korea has taken on a prominent role. Partially due to its export led economic growth, 
Korea has established itself as one of the leading international trading partners. In December 2011 Korea 
crossed the 1 trillion USD threshold in trade. In the last two decades trade has grown from 50% of GDP to 90% of 
GDP, which is much higher than other countries and regions such as China, EU, Japan and the US (Stangarone, 
2011). Not only from an economic perspective but also from a political perspective Korea is enhancing its 
international position. One way to capture this is to look at its evolution on the KOF political globalization index 
(Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008).  The KOF political globalization index captures the membership in 
international inter-governmental organizations, the number of international treaties which are signed and ratified 
by a country, the number of embassies across the world and participation in UN Security Council missions. 
Scores range from 0 to 100, 100 indicating a very high degree of political globalization and political international 
integration. Figure ** shows the evolution for Korea over the last 4 decades indicating a clear upward trend.  
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As a result of these developments it is not surprising that Korea is 1 of the 10 strategic partners of the 
EU. Although there is no clear definition of a strategic partnership and the idea grew out of ad hoc decisions, 
strategic partnerships are now the key conceptual framework for the  EU’s relations with the leading powers of 
the twenty-first century (Kundani, 2012). These strategic partnerships take place in an international context which 
is characterized by new forms of international network governance and regulation. These new forms of 
sometimes bilateral network governance are gaining increasing attention in the international literature (Slaughter, 
2004; Martinez and Woods, 2011; Marx et al., 2011; Marx et. al, 2012). 
The emergence of this strategic partnership is rooted in half a century of diplomatic relations between 
the EU and Korea. Diplomatic relations between the EU (then the EEC) and Korea were established in July 1963 
and the permanent mission of Korea to the EEC was opened in November 1965.1  Entering into the 1990s, the 
close cooperative relationship between the EU and Korea expanded and notably advanced with a rapid increase 
in trade and economic exchanges. For example, the EU and Korea signed a Framework for Trade and 
Cooperation (which was ratified in 2001) and a Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue in October 1996 under 
which a formal system for regular economic and political cooperation have been established.  Further, the EU 
became an executive board member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1997, 
broadening the bilateral cooperation into regional issues.  In the first decade of the new millenium the relationship 
between the EU and Korea strengthened and intensified further, especially in economic terms, as trade and 
investment between them expanded remarkably. The EU has become the largest foreign investor to Korea, and 
the second largest trade partner of Korea.  In order to further encourage trade and investment exchanges, the EU 
and Korea began negotiating for a bilateral FTA in 2007 and officially signed the FTA in October 2010 during the 
fifth bilateral summit held in Brussels.  The FTA provisionally entered into force on 1 July 2011.2  The EU and 
Korea also signed a new political framework agreement in May 2010 which will replace the 1996 framework as an 
effort to provide a legal and systemically framework to further encourage cooperation in all areas of bilateral and 
global issues, including, but not limited to, politics, society, culture, education and administration. 
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The remarkable expansion of cooperation between the EU and Korea may be attributed in part to the 
strong mutual governmental dedication that has been continued over the years.  The  EU and Korea have held 
summits six times since 2002 (Copenhagen in 2002, Hanoi in 2004, Helsinki in 2006, Seoul in 2009, Brussels in 
2010 and Seoul in 2012). The meeting usually took place during the biennial ASEM meeting, except in 2008 
when they did not have a summit.  Instead, the EU and Korea had a summit in Seoul in May 2009.  This fourth 
summit was significant because it was held for the first time on a stand-alone basis. In addition, the leaders met in 
Cannes at the G20 summit on 3 November 2011 and agreed during the meeting to further advance the existing 
strategic bilateral partnership.3 A subsequent sixth summit was held on 28 March 2012. Each of these summits 
further advanced EU-Korea relations as is exemplified in the press releases following the summits. 
During the fourth summit on 23 May 2009, leaders had in-depth discussions on the future aims and 
vision of their bilateral relationship. They expressed their interest to upgrade the existing bilateral cooperative 
relationship into a level of a strategic partnership by concluding the FTA and the new Framework Agreement.4  
They also participated in the signing ceremony of an agreement on cooperation in the field of competition policy 
and had an opportunity to review the progress of implementation of the agreement on scientific and technological 
cooperation. Further, the leaders agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of education and culture in 
order to increase mutual understanding and promote exchanges. Regarding regional and global issues, the 
leaders noted that they share fundamental values, and expressed determination to set up joint efforts to further 
strengthen cooperation and to respond to global challenges.  
EU and Korean leaders again agreed to upgrade their bilateral relations at their fifth summit on 6 
October 2010.5 They expressed their satisfaction with the positive development of the overall relationship based 
on shared values and common interests and agreed to further develop their relationship into a strategic 
partnership. They welcomed the signing of both the EU-Korea FTA and the new Framework Agreement and 
noted that the two agreements will provide a basis for strengthening EU-Korea cooperation on bilateral as well as 
regional and global challenges, including global economic recovery, climate change, non-proliferation and 
disarmament of nuclear weapons. 
During the sixth summit on 28 March 2012, leaders stressed that the full implementation of the EU-Korea 
FTA is necessary in order to further facilitate bilateral economic cooperation and emphasized the value of laying 
solid foundations for practical cooperation in the fields of education, science, research and innovation. They also 
agreed to actively explore possibilities for closer cooperation to deal with continued regional and global 
challenges including regional conflicts, climate challenges and global economic challenges. 6  
This brief overview shows the many different policy areas in which further collaboration is explored. In addition to 
the summit meetings, there have been bilateral meetings held at different levels of government over the years.  
First, at a ministerial level, a Korea-EU Troika foreign ministers’ meeting has been held annually in the margins of 
the UN General Assembly and ASEAN regional forum since 1990.  In 2008, Korean and EU Troika ministers 
discussed about bilateral issues such as the bilateral FTA and framework agreement, as well as measures to 
mutually respond to and cooperate against regional and global challenges including North Korea’s nuclear 
programme.7  In May 2010, the EU and Korean foreign ministers agreed in Brussels to actively cooperate to 
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realize the early signing of the EU-Korea FTA.8  In addition, the ministers exchanged opinions on the global 
support measures for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and discussed the challenges faced by Korean peninsula 
and the advancements of harmonization efforts of the EU. In December 2011, the EU and Korean foreign 
ministers exchanged opinions on issues of mutual interest, and agreed to further enhance economic and trade 
cooperation to maximize the effects of the bilateral trade in the future.9  In addition, they agreed to hold high level 
political talks regularly and to strengthen the cooperation in the areas of humanity and development.  
In line with the effort to upgrade the relationship to a strategic partnership as agreed at the 2010 bilateral 
summit, high-level political talks led by vice-ministerial-level officials have been held annually since 2011 to 
exchange views on bilateral political issues and global challenges.  The first high-level political talks were held on 
21 November 2011 in Seoul and were led by the Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action 
Service and the First Vice Minister of MOFAT.10 The two delegates discussed several bilateral, regional and 
global issues including expansion of high-level officer exchanges and cooperation for the final ratification of the 
FTA and the early ratification of the new framework agreement. They also agreed to establish a channel to 
enhance cooperation in human rights and development cooperation issues. The second high-level talks were 
held on 12 October 2012 in Brussels.11  The two delegations had in-depth discussions on ways to further develop 
the bilateral strategic partnership, and other bilateral, regional and global issues including cyber security, non-
proliferation and disarmament, and piracy eradication.  
Furthermore, on 12 October 2011 the first trade committee meeting under the bilateral FTA was held. 
Under the FTA, the committee meeting is to be held annually with the trade EU Commissioner and Korea trade 
minister as head delegates. The trade committee has seven specialized committees, seven working groups and 
an intellectual property dialogue under its umbrella.12  The holding of the first trade committee meeting was 
significant in that it signaled the mutual readiness and dedication to fully implement the bilateral FTA.  The 
second trade committee meeting was held in Brussels on 16 October 2012.13  The two trade representative 
agreed to continue to cooperate for the full implementation of the bilateral FTA and evaluated the effects of the 
FTA and the activities of the 15 sub-committees for the past first year.  They also discussed the measures to 
facilitate customs and trade, and other issues related to implementation of the FTA.  
 
3. OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
 
The emergence and development of EU-Korea relations shows the importance of economic and trade relations 
between the EU and Korea. It also shows that the partnership is not limited to economic issues and covers a wide 
range of policy issues. In this project and report we aimed to capture and cover this breadth of cooperation. As a 
result, the contributions discuss in depth the FTA, different policy areas (security (arms trade, chemical 
regulation, environmental regulation, education, development co-operation and industrial policy) and inter-
regional and international issues. Consequently the report consists out of three parts. Each contribution ends with 
a discussion of possible policy recommendations following the analysis. 
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 3.1. EU-Korea cooperation: the Free Trade Agreement 
 
A first set of papers deals with the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which was labeled by H.E. Karel De 
Gucht, current European Commissioner for Trade, as “the most ambitious trade agreement ever negotiated by 
the EU”.  
The first papers discuss in depth the EU-Korea FTA. The paper by Chang-Sang Cho ’Korea – EU FTA : 
a blueprint for co-prosperity‘ provides an extensive and in-depth discussion of the FTA, its structure and its 
provisions. The paper by  Eugenia Laurenza and James Mathis on ’Regulatory cooperation for trade in services 
in the EU and US trade agreements with the Republic of Korea: How deep and how compatible?’ focuses on 
trade in services in the EU-Korea FTA and compares it to the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement which was signed 
in 2011. The paper examines the subjects of transparency, regulatory cooperation, competition law and policy, 
and their institutional context, to assess the depth of integration generated and the resulting level of compatibility 
that results between the agreements. The paper by Nicolas Croquet on ‘The climate change legal framework 
under the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement: interaction between various levels of normativity‘ focuses specifically 
on the provisions in relation to climate change and provides a critical reflection on these provisions and their soft 
law nature. The paper describes the legal and policy context within which environmental and climate change 
provisions have permeated the EU-Korea FTA. Subsequently it distinguishes the main differences between hard 
and soft law under legal theory. This distinction is then applied to a detailed analysis of the EU-Korea FTA and its 
climate change provisions. The paper by Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan on ‘The EU-Korea FTA and the 
relaxation of regulatory measures in the mechanical engineering industry’ analyses a specific case study on the 
regulatory implication of the EU-Korea FTA. The FTA aims at dealing with a number of subtle non-tariff regulatory 
barriers. Of particular significance to the case of the mechanical engineering industry are regulatory obstacles 
such as technical regulations and standards, restrictions to access raw materials, and intellectual property rights 
issues. The objective of this paper is therefore to assess the extent and impact of these regulatory obstacles in 
the mechanical engineering industry. The rationale for focusing on the mechanical engineering industry stems in 
particular from its relative importance in terms of two way trade between the two entities. Last but not least, the 
paper by Bart Kerremans, Johan Adriaensen and Yf Reykers ’The power to know is the power to affect. Tariff 
concessions in the FTA between the EU and Korea‘ opens up the black box of trade negotiations and analyzes 
the role of trade administrations in the negotiations of trade agreements. They aim to better understand how 
specific policy outcomes in the EU-Korea FTA came about and the role of trade administrations herein. In order to 
analyze this empirically they focus on a specific aspect of the FTA, namely the tariff implementation schedules.  
 
3.2. EU-Korea cooperation: regulatory and policy issues 
 
A second set of papers focuses on different areas for political and regulatory cooperation with a focus on the 
areas of security (arms trade and control), chemical regulation, environmental regulation, education, development 
co-operation and industrial policy. 
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The paper by Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Shin Dongmin on ’The European Union and the Republic of 
Korea: Regulatory approaches to arms trade and control and to counterterrorism’ analyzes arms trade and 
control and counterterrorism. For decades, European Union and Korea have been developing their regulatory 
approaches to establish domestic frameworks conductive towards better regulation of arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism. The paper discusses at length the emergence, development, convergence and divergence of 
these regulatory approaches. The paper by Katja Biedenkopf  ‘Assessing possibilities for enhanced EU-South 
Korea cooperation on chemical regulation‘ investigates chemicals regulation in the EU and Korea. Both 
jurisdictions have shown an increased level of regulatory activity in recent years with the EU developments 
preceding the Korean by only a few years. Both regulatory approaches have commonalities but also differences. 
This paper argues that EU chemicals regulation had effects on policy developments in Korea and it explores 
opportunities for enhanced, mutually beneficial EU-Korean cooperation. The paper by Stefan Niederhafner and 
Chan Song Lee ’Different paths towards the same goal? Comparing the implementation and performance of CO2 
emissions reduction regulations in the EU and South Korea’ looks at environmental policy. The paper compares 
the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) and South Korea’s Target Management System (TMS). The paper 
explores the regulatory framework of both regulatory settings, explains the decisions that lead to the different 
approaches against the backdrop of their institutional, political and cultural contexts, and evaluates overall 
performance. The paper by Sang-Duk Choi ’CAMPUS Asia and its implications for university cooperation in Asia 
and EU: Korean perspective‘ focuses on educational policy and describes a major new initiative in the context of 
higher education.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the Korean experiences in the recent formation of the 
CAMPUS (Collective Action for Mobility Programme of Universities Students) Asia as a trilateral- university 
cooperation between Korea, Japan and China and assesses the potential for a possible expansion of similar 
programs to other regions such as the EU. The paper  by Axel Marx and Jadir Soares on ’The Republic of 
Korea’s development cooperation policy: Assessing opportunities for European Union collaboration in a new 
global development cooperation architecture‘ analyses Korean development cooperation and compares it to the 
EU in order to identify complementarities and differences. This analysis is framed in the broader post-Busan 
context of triangular cooperation and the OECD agenda on the division of labour in development co-operation. 
The paper by Wolfgang Pape  ‘EU-Korea relations to promote regulatory cooperation in economic policies, in 
particular industrial development policies’ compares regulatory approaches to industrial development in Europe 
and Korea.  It provides a general and historical overview of developments with regard to industrial policy within 
the context of the literature on distinct forms of capitalism. The paper argues that regulatory approaches to 
industrial development policies differ not only over time but also considerably in concept and practice between the 
EU and Korea. In order to understand this, the paper analyzes their divergent socio-cultural backgrounds and 
evolutions to date. 
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3.3. EU-Republic of Korea cooperation: regional and international issues 
 
The paper by Christoph Bluth and Neil Winn on ’The European Union and Security on the Korean Peninsula : 
Collective security, confidence-building and arm control‘ focuses on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) as a security threat.  It assesses the actions taken since the 1990s, mainly by the United States and 
Korea, to mitigate the perceived threat through multilateral negotiations to achieve disarmament in return for 
political and economic support for the DPRK. The paper argues that these different efforts have failed and that 
one of the key problems of efforts to engage with North Korea is the preoccupation with the nuclear programme 
and security in which coercive means dominated. The concept of “normative power” that a significant body of 
literature has identified with the EU offers the potential for an alternative form of engagement with North Korea.  
The paper by Deok Ryong Yoon on ’North Korea’s Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) on the EU Market 
and its implications‘ examines North Korea’s trade patterns and analyzes whether or not North Korea’s trade 
recovery is based on changes in economic fundamentals as demonstrated by other transition economies. The 
research measures North Korea’s comparative advantage using Bela Balassa’s indices of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) to measure its structural change in trade. The paper provides a review of North Korea’s current 
trade structure. It calculates and analyses the RCA indices of North Korean trade to the world market and the EU. 
It discusses the implications of the RCA indices and the possible role of the EU in North Korea’s reform policies. 
Finally, the paper by Sunhee Park on ’Enlargement of ASEM : Focused on the Russian accession and its 
implication for Korea‘ explores the ASEM’s enlargement policy centered on the implication of 2010 enlargement 
with special emphasis on the Russian accession to ASEM and Korea’s position on this issue. The paper argues 
that the 2010 enlargement was not aimed at changing ASEM’s working process but needs to be understood in a 
wider geo-political context in which China and the US play an important role. In addition, the paper analyzes the 
outcomes of Russia's accession to ASEM in relation to stabilized energy supply by the Russia-North Korea-South 
Korea natural gas pipeline and the easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula. 
The report ends with an extensive conclusion and discussion of the different contributions by Axel Marx 
and Jan Wouters. On the basis of the different contributions the authors aim to draw some more consolidated 
and general recommendations. 
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available at http://bel.mofat.go.kr/english/eu/bel/bilateral/eu/index.jsp  
2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:168:0001:0001:EN:PDF  
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“MFAT“), “Local Information of Europe“, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/countries/europe/local/index.jsp?menu=m_40_50_10 in The Republic of Korean 
4 Joint Press Statement, available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/the Republic of Korea_south/docs/summit_jps_2009_en.pdf  
5 Joint Press Stateement, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116900.pdf  
6 Joint Press Statement, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-140_en.htm  
7MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=315103 
8MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=327793 
9 MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=9795&seqno=338584 
10 MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=337976 
11 MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=302&seqno=311772&c=&
t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=; 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=344498 
12 European Commission, Bilateral Relations with South The Republic of Korea, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/the Republic of Korea/  
1313 MOFAT, Press Release, available at 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=344571&c=&t=
&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&px=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du  
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KOREA-EU FTA: A BLUEPRINT FOR CO-PROSPERITY 
CHANG-SANG CHO 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 1 July 2011, the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter “the Agreement”) entered into force, marking 
the beginning of a new era in Korea-EU trade relations. More than 16 months have passed since the Agreement 
entered into force. Although Korea and the European Union (hereinafter “both Parties”) had been able to 
commence official negotiations in May 2007 when Korea and the US had been in the endgame for a deal, the 
Agreement took effect earlier than the Korea-US FTA (hereinafter “the KORUS FTA”) which passed congresses 
of both sides in November 2011. It was originally assumed in Korea that the ratification of the Agreement would 
take a great deal of time as the EU consists of 27 member countries, thus will go through a long and time-
consuming process in the parliaments for decision making. The EU side, however, completed its process much 
more quickly than expected. Meanwhile, the Korean side expedited its internal process for the ratification, 
although unexpectedly it had to spend some three months for correcting the mistranslation of the text of the 
agreement. Considering other FTAs which Korea has already sealed, the ratification of the Agreement was done 
extraordinarily fast. Especially, there was stark contrast between the Agreement and the KORUS FTA in the 
ratification. The KORUS FTA took such a long time of more than six years while the Agreement spent almost four 
years finishing the process, even if the Agreement and the KORUS FTA have little difference in the contents of 
both agreements, as is elaborated in Chapter 2 of this paper. It was largely due to not only all-out efforts by the 
EU, but mutual trust based on clear vision for everlasting cooperation as well. 
As both Parties share common values of democracy and free markets, the Agreement will be a reliable 
platform for bringing bilateral relationship between both Parties to a higher level. This sets in the same vein with 
what Jean Monnet put it earlier, “nothing is lasting without institutions.” As the first FTA the EU has concluded 
with an Asian partner, the Agreement is expected to support the EU in securing a foothold in this part of the world 
and serve as EU’s springboard to the rapidly growing Asian market.1 The Agreement can be compared to a 
highway constructed for comprehensive cooperation between Both Parties, not just a typical FTA for trade and 
investment. The strategic values of the Agreement extend far beyond the sphere of trade and investment: along 
with the Korea-EU Framework Agreement signed in May 2010, it will lay a solid institutional framework to the new 
relationship between both Parties and contribute to the establishment of a “strategic partnership” as was declared 
upon at the Korea-EU Summit held in Brussels in October 2010. The FTA also sends a timely signal to the rest of 
the world that Both Parties are unwaveringly committed to the ideals of trade liberalisation, even in times of global 
economic difficulties. 
 
 This paper addresses what trade policies have encouraged both parties to reach the deal and ratify the 
Agreement within a short period of time in the chapter 2. Additionally, in the chapter 3, what benefits the 
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Agreement is able to bring to Europeans companies is dealt with, followed by how the Agreement can 
substantially contribute to much closer economic cooperation between the two parties in the chapter 4. 
 
2. TRADE POLICIES IN KOREA AND THE EU 
 
Both Korea and the EU make good use of trade policy to pioneer overseas markets and to arrange investment 
protection mechanisms for their companies, coming up with appropriate policies to adapt changing global 
economic environment. This chapter sees how trade policies in Korea and the EU have altered to date, and what 
trade and FTA policies of both sides have made the Agreement possible to be born. 
 
2.1 KOREA’S TRADE POLICY 
2.1.1 OVERVIEW 
Korea became the 9th country in the world in December 2011 which has achieved the trade volume of US$1 
trillion, now targeting US$2 trillion. Strategic trade liberalisation and pioneering overseas markets have been a 
key factor making Korea develop its economy for the last 50 years. In addition, its successful liberalisation 
policies played a pivotal role for Korea to recover quickly from the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 
global financial crisis of 2008.  
A close look at Korean trade policies since the 1960s reveals that Korea’s export promotion policies 
were first formed in the early 1960s through the comprehensive export promotion programme2 rather than free 
trade, and this stance was maintained until the early 1980s. Export subsidies were provided to each industry on a 
neutral basis. However, growing export volumes made it hard for the government to bear the fiscal pressure, and 
export-oriented policies dependent on subsidies became unsustainable. Furthermore, export subsidies were the 
key target of countervailing duties from developed countries, especially the U.S. As a result, most export subsidy 
measures having been carried out until the early 1980s were abolished as the mid-1980s approached, and this 
period marked the transition to export-oriented trade policies facilitating free trade. Also, import regulation 
measures that the Korean government had put in place to protect infant industries were met with structural issues 
such as the inefficient protection of domestic industries, and this led to a shift towards liberalisation in the 1980s, 
mainly through relaxed import control and boosted competition in domestic markets. Korea was incorporated into 
the global economy by joining GATT in 1967, and set the multilateral GATT/WTO system as a basis for 
reinforcing policies initiated in the 1980s, related to opening markets, deregulation and trade liberalisation. 
Recently, however, Korea puts its focus not only multilateral trade policies but FTAs as well. This is partly due to 
the increasing recognition that FTAs can be a proper policy instrument for upgrading the nation’s overall system3 
and pursuing qualitative growth in the Korean economy. 
 
2.1.2 FTA POLICIES 
Korea is one of the most energetic countries seeking FTAs. Eight FTAs, including the Agreement, have already 
entered into force since 2004 and one or two more FTAs are expected to take effect in 2012. Another eight FTAs 
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are under negotiation. Moreover, Korea is doing joint studies for eight FTAs. What has led Korea to strive actively 
after FTAs? 
 
RATIONALE FOR KOREA’S FTA DRIVE 
First of all, FTA is in high fashion in a global-wide manner. In particular, as its competitors such as China and 
Japan are indulged in FTAs to increase their export volume, Korea also has put the top priority on concluding as 
many FTAs with countries, that China and Japan are having talks with, as early as possible so that it could keep 
ahead of China and Japan. In this respect, Korea has made every effort to reach as many FTAs as possible in a 
multiple spontaneous manner, based on the FTA Roadmap of 2003, the first-ever FTA policies. FTA is one of the 
most effective means for Korea to secure overseas markets since its economy is heavily dependent on goods 
export and imported energy and resources, which is demonstrated by the dependency ratio of 87.9 percent in 
2010 and the WTO DDA negotiations have been in a stalemate for the past 10 years although Korea has been 
one of the most active members for the successful conclusion of it. Moreover, facing the lack of domestic demand 
with the prolonged global financial crisis, countries are recognising the importance of boosting export and are 
rushing into FTA as a strategy for market expansion. In particular, as developed economies in general remain in 
recession due to the global financial crisis and sovereign debt problems, increasing demand from emerging 
markets is expected to compensate for decreased demand from developed countries. Particularly, the need for 
FTA as a way to go in rapidly growing Chinese or Indian markets is increasing. According to the IMF, the share of 
emerging markets in global trade considerably grew from 33.4 percent in 2005 to 40.5 percent in 2009. However, 
Northeast Asia is the only region where any regional economic integration or bloc has not been formulated 
despite its huge potential, considering other blocs' economic integration. In particular, the need for the 
institutionalisation of economic cooperation through FTA has increased to facilitate market-driven economic 
integration resulted from interdependence in industrial structure among Korea, China and Japan. In this regard, 
Korea plays a facilitating role by converging different views of China and Japan. Furthermore, securing resources 
and energy through FTAs with resource and energy-rich countries is most critical to Korea's sustainable 
economic growth.   
Secondly, Korea has made use of FTAs to improve its economic system in general. Trade agreements 
concluded in the past generally dealt with market access, including measures on tariff cuts, rules of origin and 
customs procedure. Since the 1990s, however, trade agreements have not only aimed for wider market access 
by easing and lifting trade barriers but have also become more comprehensive in their coverage of most of the 
trade sector, including services, investment, intellectual property rights, competition policies and government 
procurement. Such comprehensive, high-quality FTAs increase efficiency and competitiveness in industrial 
structures, and bring about positive ripple effects such as vitalised investment or advanced systems and 
regulations. These are the goals that Korea hopes to achieve through its FTAs. Therefore, under the recognition 
that FTAs are a critical policy instrument for boosting industrial and national competitiveness, the Korean 
government is actively pursuing the conclusion of more FTAs to establish an efficient trade system that will put 
the nation at the very center of Northeast Asia in the 21st century. 
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Lastly, as more and more FTAs took effect, Korean SMEs' export to Chile, ASEAN countries, India has 
showed a steady increase, which has improved recognition on FTA by the public and industries, subsequently 
has contributed to growing demand for FTAs. 
 
CURRENT STATUS OF KOREA’S FTAS 
As shown in Table 1, so far total nine FTAs with 46 economies have been concluded and eight out of them have 
gone into effect since the effectuation of the Korea-Chile FTA in 2004. Korea has concluded FTAs with its three 
out of five major trading partners, including ASEAN, the EU and the US. Once deals with China and Japan are 
reached, Korea will become the first country to complete bilateral FTAs with major economies in the world such 
as the EU, the US, China, Japan, ASEAN and India. In terms of trading volume in 2011, the share of preferential 
trade accounted only for 34 percent, which is expected to soar to 66.7 percent through the FTAs with China and 
Japan. Once both the ongoing FTAs with Australia, Columbia and Canada and the suspended FTAs with Mexico, 
GCC and New Zealand are all concluded, the share will rise to approximately 80 percent.  
 
Table1: Korea’s current status of FTAs (as of the end of May 2012) 
Concluded 
(8 FTAs effectuated of 
9 FTAs signed) 
Chile (effectuated in April 2004); Singapore (effectuated in March 2006); EFTA 
(effectuated in September 2006); ASEAN (goods trade: effectuated in June 2007, 
service trade: effectuated in May 2009, investment: effectuated in September 2009); 
India (effectuated in January 2010); EU (effectuated in July 2011); Peru (effectuated 
in August 2011); US (effectuated in March 2012; Turkey (to be effectuated in 2012) 
Under negotiation Canada (begun in July 2005); Mexico (begun in February 2006), GCC (begun in July 
2008); Australia (begun in June 2009); New Zealand (begun in June 2009); 
Columbia (begun in December 2009); Indonesia (begun in March 2012); China 
(begun in May 2012) 
Under examination or 
joint study 
Japan (begun in December 2003, suspended in November 2004; Korea-China-
Japan (joint study ended in May 2012); Vietnam (joint study ended in October 2011); 
MERCOSUR (under joint study); Israel (under joint study); Mongol (under joint 
study); Central American countries* (under joint study); Malaysia (under joint study) 
*Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
 
 
KOREA-US FTA 
The KORUS FTA was the first FTA that Korea has concluded with a large and advanced economy. With the 
announcement of launching negotiations on February 3, 2006, the original Korea-US FTA was signed on June 30, 
2007, after eight rounds of negotiations and two rounds of additional consultations. Through the additional 
negotiations held upon request by the US, both sides agreed on several issues concerning tariff concessions for 
autos, pharmaceutical product approval and patent linkage, tariff concessions for pork, and then signed an 
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additional agreement. Both the original agreement and additional agreement considered as the same with the 
original one were passed the legislative bodies of the US and Korea on October 12, 2011 and on November 22, 
2011, respectively, and entered into effect in March 2012. 4 The KORUS FTA is quite similar with the Agreement 
in that it is both high- leveled and comprehensive trade deal encompassing various areas including goods, 
services, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property rights. No significant difference in terms 
of economic effects is expected between the Agreement and the KORUS FTA.  
 
FUTURE POLICY DIRECTIONS 
First of all, Korea puts focus on making FTA deals with China and Japan to seek economic integration within 
Northeast Asia. China is by far South Korea's number one trading partner and Japan is the second largest one. 
Korean companies have heavily invested in both countries. If China continues to grow at the current pace of 
nearly nine percent, its GDP will biennially increase by the volume of Korea’s annual GDP. This huge increase of 
its GDP will annually create new domestic demand worth more than US$ 300 billion, presenting a huge 
opportunity to Korea, a closest neighboring country. Therefore, it is deemed crucial for Korea to make an FTA 
deal with China to secure sustainable growth and not to lag behind in the global economy. A Korea-China FTA is 
expected to provide Korea more leverage in addressing diplomatic issues with North Korea. Once the bilateral 
relationship is further improved between Korea and China by reaching a comprehensive trade deal, it would not 
be easy for China to support North Korea, at the cost of relationship with South Korea, in a unilateral manner as it 
has done since the establishment of its government in 1949.  
Meanwhile, given closely interlinked industrial structures of Korea and Japan, the need for a bilateral 
trade pact between the two economies is even greater in the context of facilitating supply chains of companies in 
both countries.  
It could be envisaged to launch a trilateral FTA among Korea, China and Japan, given that the three 
countries have already completed a joint study where both Korea and Japan were much interested in a market-
driven system to a great extent in areas including services, investment, government procurement, rules and 
regulations while China showed interest in opening agricultural markets of Korea and Japan. In 2010, the size of 
the three economies combined accounted for 19.6 percent of the global economy, and their exports accounted for 
18.6 percent. The share of intra-regional trade volume out of total increased from 12.3 percent in 1990 to 22.5 
percent in 2010. The share of intra-regional trade of the total trade among the three Northeast Asian economies 
has been significant in terms of increase but considerably meager in terms of the absolute figure, compared with 
that of NAFTA and the EU, 40.5% and 56.3 percent, respectively. Paradoxically, this hints a high potential for 
trade increase through regional economic integration. It is highly likely a trilateral FTA, compared with any 
bilateral FTA, could be less ambitious due to its sensitivity. China and Japan do not even consider starting a 
bilateral joint study for a FTA to date. 
At the same time, Korea expects that FTAAP, which aims for trade liberalisation at the pan-Asia Pacific 
level, will create a numerous opportunities, and is paying keen attention to ongoing discussions by TPP and 
ASEAN+3/ASEAN+6. 
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Secondly, equally important is to seek FTAs as a means to secure resources and energy. It is natural for 
Korea, suffering from lack of resources and energy, to set a priority to make a FTA deal with resource and 
energy-rich countries such as Russia. In particular, it is quite recommendable for Korea to start negotiations with 
Russia, given that Russia is Korea’s neighboring country with a complementary trade relationship, and that it has 
just joined the WTO. The benefit of an FTA with Russia, however, would not be confined only to an economic 
aspect for Korea. An improved relationship between Korea and Russia could be extended to a trilateral 
relationship among Korea, Russia and North Korea, considering Russia is one of the closest allies of North Korea. 
Thirdly, it is necessary for Korea to establish customised FTAs with developing countries, given that they would 
be Korea's major trade partners in the future. It is deemed appropriate to focus more on issues such as 
development cooperation, and industrial cooperation.5 
Last but not least, Korean companies need to take full advantage of the FTAs already in effect. To this end, it 
is necessary to provide more information as well as seminars or programmes to promote private sector's 
understanding on FTA and build capacity of human resources. What is also required is offering companies more 
opportunities to present their views to the FTA Implementation Committee in order to address difficulties and 
grievances they face in taking advantage of FTA. Efforts should also be made to build a database on market 
entry barriers by constantly identifying private sector's areas of interest. 
 
2.2 EU’S TRADE POLICY (COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY) 
2.2.1 OVERVIEW 
Trade policy is an exclusive power of the EU – so only the EU, and not individual member states, can legislate on 
trade matters and conclude international trade agreements. Trade policy is set down in Article 207 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)6. The EU, as a community, has implemented the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) by adopting a unilateral trade policy since January 1970, stipulated in the article 131 of 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.7 The CCP, coupled with the 
Common Agricultural Policy8, was under the purview of the EU since the launch of the EU, built on the Customs 
Union, and was a natural consequence of the Customs Union. 
EU trade policies and the environment in which they are applied have fundamentally changed since the 
coming into being of the EEC in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s the CCP was focused on tariffs and other border 
measures and trade in goods. During this period the EU embraced both multilateral and bilateral liberalisation. 
The common external tariff of the EU for industrial products has declined from an average of over 15 per cent in 
the early 1960s to around 3 per cent today. At the same time the EU became notorious for establishing a pyramid 
of trade preferences with different groups of countries in different tiers of market access. Thus, the level of formal 
trade protection in the EU is now generally very low. There are, however, some exceptions with high tariffs 
remaining in particular sectors, primarily agriculture and textiles and clothing. The CCP nowadays is much more 
diverse. It is no longer just policies affecting trade in goods which are on the agenda. The policy environment 
affecting trade in services and conditions influencing foreign direct investment have become increasingly 
important. In addition, as tariffs and quantitative restrictions have declined in importance attention has turned 
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much more to a whole range of non-border policies, captured under the term of regulatory issues, which affect 
trade flows. These include technical standards and regulations and rules on intellectual property rights. The EU is 
addressing these issues at the multilateral level in the WTO, in regional trade agreements and in bilateral 
agreements on specific regulatory issues, such as the mutual recognition of testing and conformity assessment.9 
 
2.2.2 EU’S NEW TRADE POLICY10 
BACKGROUND 
In 2005, the renewed Lisbon Strategy set out the steps to take to deliver growth and jobs. It underlined that an 
open market with high quality internal rules, effectively enforced, in areas such as competition, innovation, 
education, research and development, employment, social and cohesion policy is essential in helping European 
companies compete globally. And it highlighted the need to ensure open markets around the world.11 And lifting 
the growth potential of the EU’s economies is a major challenge taken up by the EU 2020 Strategy for smart, 
inclusive and sustainable growth.12 Two communications by the EU on the new trade policy, ‘Global Europe: 
competing in the World – A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy (Global Europe Strategy)’ of 2006 
and ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ of 2010, aimed to give shape to the Lisbon Strategy and the EU 2020 
Strategy in the area of trade. EU’s trade policy seeks to create jobs, investment opportunities and growth for 
European companies by increasing their opportunities to trade with the rest of the world. The trade policy helps to 
open new markets for European exports through trade agreements with other countries which reduce the tariffs 
and other barriers to the markets of potential trading partners.13 The trade policy also focuses measures to 
facilitate market competitions such as deregulation and creating a competitive market through labour market and 
social policy reforms improve the competitive edge of the European industries and create jobs. In order to cope 
with the structural shift in the international trade from conventional to hi-tech industry, adding high values to 
overall industries and fostering specialised industries are strongly required.  
Meanwhile, it is long perceived that emerging countries like China, India and Brazil, despite the massive 
benefits earned through the trade liberalisation by pursuing export-driven growth, maintain their protectionist 
stance and that in many cases they are passive to comply with international rules, including anti-competition 
domestic economic policy. Consequently, a desirable solution is to encourage their market opening and to foster 
an environment where they are required to follow fair trade rules so as to boost exports. The new trade policy 
also highlights the need for new FTA policy based on practical benefits as well as self-examination of 
conventional regionalism. Although the EU for a long time has maintained preferential regional trade agreements 
that accompanies aid with its past colonial countries such as the Cotonou Agreement, most of them are still 
underdeveloped and the performance of RTAs are far below the expectation of the EU member states.  
 
POLICY TOOLS 
 
Trade defense instruments: These policy tools are used with an aim to regulate unfair prices, anti-competition 
trade practices or government subsidies, and are mainly related to goods trade. Since early 2007 the EU has 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
18 
newly introduced several trade defense instruments such as anti-dumping tariffs, subsidies and countervailing 
measures by accepting opinions of stake holders within the region.     
Market Access Strategy: Having been in place since 1996, this strategy seeks to remove barriers in goods, 
services, IPRs and trade sectors through multilateral as well as bilateral trade negotiation. It adopts international 
rules and regulations including WTO process to address disputes, TBT's pre-notification process, competition 
rules and ISO rules. The key and innovative part of this strategy is strengthening public-private cooperation. 
Market Access Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from the EU member states and businesses, 
convenes on a regular basis to review trade disputes and select best practices.  
 
MAJOR TRADE AGENDAS 
 
Alleviation of Non-Tariff Barriers: The biggest trade agenda for the EU is non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers 
highlighted in the new trade policy relate to the actual cases that specifically impede international trades. The EU 
has long identified the actual impediments to intra-regional trade in pursuing market integration. The EC-1992 
Plan is the outcome of such practical approach. Taking this approach, the EU chose to remove distortions by 
categorising non-tariff barriers by each characteristic. It cites limited practices in government procurement, policy 
that distorts market competition, excessive request for sanitation inspection and suitability evaluation of goods or 
customs administration as examples of non-tariff barriers. Regulatory barriers existing in many developing 
countries related to trade and investment in services, food, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, constructions materials, 
electric communication devices, medical equipment and automobile sectors also cause transaction cost increase. 
Non-tariff barriers for sensitive items such as chemical products, textiles, tires and electric engineering are also 
high.  
Intellectual Property Rights: The EU's geographical indications on food and beverage hold great significance in 
IPR protection policy. It has designated 'priority countries' and promoted, with an aim to protect IPRs, various 
policies such as technology assistance, improving awareness, political dialogues and partnerships. Entrepreneurs, 
including representatives from SMEs holding IPRs are involved in intergovernmental consultations and 
negotiations. With respect to developing countries like China, Russia and Chile, the EU's primary focus is put on 
providing necessary technology for IPR protection and improving awareness.  
Services: As its services industry has a globally competitive edge in a wide range of sectors such as finance, 
professional business, transportation, ITCs, distribution, environment and construction, the EU's expectation is 
largely on considerably increasing services exports in order to promote growth and create jobs. The EU views 
that the opening of the services market will contribute to the economic development by improving productivity of 
developing countries where services sector accounts for around 50 percent of their GDP. 
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Investment: There are no strategies for the investment sector newly adopted in the new trade policy. The EU is 
focusing its efforts on improving internal and external conditions to attract foreign-invested companies in line with 
the globalization of production.  
Government Procurement: Additional opening of the government procurement market is one of the agendas the 
EU is strongly pushing for. The EU is of view that major economies , much less developing countries, do not open 
their domestic procurement market to an appropriate level, and that there are many cases of not only de jure but 
also de facto limited and discriminatory treatment against EU companies.   
Competition Policy: The EU implements a common competition policy at a whole EU level to regulate 
competition-restrictive transaction practices that undermines the purpose and functions of common market. This 
is helpful for the EU in playing a leading role in the competition policy sector. The issue raised by the EU is that 
preferential government support for companies or anti-competition practices in developing countries, which is 
incompatible with the WTO-related agreements/treaties, constraint the business activities of EU companies. In 
particular, as will be followed below, one of the key agendas in the EU's new FTA policies is policy cooperation or 
coordination in the competition policy sector. 
 
2.2.3 EU’S NEW FTA POLICIES 
The EU, according to the "Global Europe Initiative" adopted in 2006 (hereinafter “the Initiative 2006”), seeks to set 
out how, in a rapidly changing global economy, the EU can build a more comprehensive , integrated and forward-
looking external trade policy that makes a stronger contribution to Europe’s competitiveness, under the sense of 
crisis that changing global economic environment, while it can create unprecedented opportunities for growth and 
development, can also put new pressures on natural resources and on traditional industries and livelihoods, and 
has eroded old certainties and aroused new fears.14 The FTAs should be comprehensive in scope, promote 
liberalisation of substantially all trade and be compatible with bilateral relations and the WTO, which means 
fulfilling the requirements stated in Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS. The new FTA policy as 
well, in the same context with the new trade policy, focuses on applying to the upper-mentioned major trade 
agendas to the countries that can bring substantial economic and trade benefits to the EU in terms of market size 
and growth potential to boost exports and investment of the member states. In a passive sense, it stresses the 
expected opportunity cost of not signing an FTA with these economies. In particular, if the US or Japan concludes 
an FTA with them; the European economy will be affected by possible trade diversion. In this respect, the new 
FTA policy also seeks to prevent these countries in advance from taking a protectionist stance against the EU. 
The FTA signed with Mexico is the case in point. Meanwhile, the EU selects its FTA partners by taking into 
account the accessibility to the source of supply of primary commodities such as energy, leather and metal. In 
both aspects, Korea, ASEAN, India, MERCOSUR, GCC, China and Russia met the EU's criteria for signing an 
FTA. FTA has WTO-plus elements which narrow down the scope of agendas that cannot be addressed through 
multilateral WTO negotiations and help parties seek solutions. Based on this fact, the EU suggests a 
comprehensive range of options on areas of preferential treatment (non-tariff barriers, IPRs, services, investment, 
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government procurement, competition policy, MRA, etc.) depending on partner country's economic development 
and openness. It also suggests including labour standards and environmental protection to free trade agreements 
for the cause of 'sustainable development' as the US does in concluding FTAs. 
Current Status of EU’s FTA: The EU used to focus on multilateralism and trades with the Mediterranean 
countries and former colonies within and around the region. But it has actively engaged in bilateral negotiations 
through FTAs since the deadlock in the WTO DDA negotiations. As shown in Figure 1, by promoting FTAs with 
individual ASEAN economies, preliminary consultation with Japan and Canada, concluding the negotiations with 
Latin American countries such as Peru and Columbia, the EU is expanding its influence towards Asia and North 
and Latin America. As intra-regional trade takes up a large share in the EU trade, trades with FTA partners 
accounting for more than 70% in total, and has reached 74.5% with the effectuation of FTAs with Serbia and 
Korea.  
Figure 1: Current status of EU’s FTA15
 
3. KOREA-EU FTA 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The negotiations of the Agreement were officially launched with the announcement by trade ministers of both 
Parties on May 6, 2007. After eight rounds of negotiations, the initialing of the pact was carried out between the 
both Parties on July 13, 2009, followed by the official signing of the deal by trade ministers on the occasion of the 
Korea-EU summit meeting on October 6, 2010. It was provisionally effectuated on July 1, 2011 upon the 
ratification by the National Assembly of Korea in May 4, 2011. 
The Agreement is of great significance in that it embodies the spirit of the renewed trade policies of both Parties. 
It aims to establish a free trade area for goods, services, establishment as well as the corresponding associated 
rules. Basically, the main objective is to liberalise and facilitate trade in goods and services, in conformity with 
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Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS respectively.16 The Agreement is the most ambitious trade 
agreement ever negotiated by the EU in that it is unprecedented both in its scope and speed at which trade 
barriers are to be removed. 
By the end of the transitional periods, virtually all import duties between the two economies will have 
been removed. Exporters and importers of all industrial products and almost all agricultural products can trade 
without duties. Additionally, the FTA breaks new ground in tackling significant non-tariff barriers to trade, with a 
specific focus on the automotive, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and electronics sectors. The Agreement also 
creates new opportunities for market access in services and investments, and lead to major advances in areas 
such as intellectual property, government procurement and competition policy. The Agreement is also the EU’s 
first trade deal with an Asian country. The Agreement is expected not only to boost bilateral trade and economic 
growth in both Korea and the EU, and is heralded as an agreement that generates mutual economic benefits and 
offer enormous business opportunities both to Korea and the EU. The Agreement also has a wider impact in Asia 
and elsewhere by signalling the EU’s openness to doing business with third countries and its commitment to free 
trade.17 
 
3.2 MAJOR CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT18 
3.2.1 TARIFF ELIMINATION FOR INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL GOODS 
The schedule for the elimination of tariff is extended over a maximum of 20 years commencing from the time the 
agreement takes effect. Overall, customs duties for almost 80 percent of total imports from Korea are supposed 
to be abolished by the EU once the Agreement enters into force. Korea eliminates its tariffs for some two thirds of 
its imports originating from the EU immediately after the effectuation of the Agreement as well. Moreover, the 
Agreement is expected to eliminate almost all tariffs on industrial goods within five years. By year 7, both sides 
are expected to have achieved 98 percent duty elimination in terms of tariff lines. A limited number of highly 
sensitive agricultural and fisheries products are provided a grace period longer than 7 years. A few agricultural 
products including rice are excluded from the Agreement. Table 3 and Table 4 show tariff schedules of both 
sides. 
On the Korean side, almost all imports from the EU are covered by tariff elimination. More specifically, 
Korea is supposed to eliminate customs duties on 90.7 percent of industrial products from the EU upon the entry 
into force of the Agreement, 95.8 percent within three years, and ultimately tariffs on all industrial products is 
destined to be removed with seven years. The eight percent tariff on cars produced by EU car manufacturer and 
exported to Korea will be eliminated. For agricultural products, almost all imports are supposed to be liberalised 
finally by the Agreement, compared to only two percent before the implementation of the Agreement. The full 
elimination of customs duties will take up to 20 years for some fruit (apple, pears) with safeguard clauses; up to 
18 years for some oil seeds and oleagineous, green tea, sesame oil; up to 15 years for some vegetables, meat, 
products of animal origin or the milling industry, preparation of vegetables, beverages; up to 10 years for some 
dairy products, live trees and other plants, cereals and sugar. Besides, some agricultural products such as rice 
and rice products are excluded from the Agreement, whereas tariffs rates on specific products such as some fish 
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products, pepper, barley, soya beans, onion, Korean citrus fruit, garlic, etc. are expected to remain unchanged. 
Finally, some fish products, grapes, dairy products, honey, oranges, malt, etc. are in distinct concession by 
granting special schedule or special treatment like tariff rate quotas.  
Table 1.4: Korea-EU trade in goods and services: breakdown by category 
        EU exports to Korea Korean exports to the EU 
    mn USD % mn USD % 
GOODS:   24 903 75,5% 43 312 92,4% 
1. Animal, of which:         
  Meat: cattle.sheep.goats.horse 15 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Meat products nec 346 1,0% 1 0,0% 
  Animal products nec 58 0,2% 0 0,0% 
 
2. Dairy products, of which:         
  Raw milk 1 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Dairy products 120 0,4% 0 0,0% 
3. Oth Agr. Prod, of which:         
  Paddy rice 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Wheat 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Cereal grains nec 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Vegetalbes. fruit. nuts 5 0,0% 2 0,0% 
  Oil seeds 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Sugar cane. sugar beet 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Plant-based fibers 8 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Crops nec 56 0,2% 18 0,0% 
  Cattle.sheep.goats.horses 5 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Wool.silk-worm cocoons 1 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Forestry 6 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Fishing 4 0,0% 3 0,0% 
  Vegetable oils and fats 80 0,2% 0 0,0% 
  Processed rice 0 0,0% 1 0,0% 
  Sugar 4 0,0% 0 0,0% 
4. Other food products 737 2,2% 140 0,3% 
5. Beverages and tobacco 387 1,2% 8 0,0% 
6. Primary, of which:       
  Coal 1 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Oil 3 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Gas 3 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Mineral nec 42 0,1% 3 0,0% 
7. Metals, of which:       
  Ferrous metals 825 2,5% 539 1,1% 
  Metals nec 730 2,2% 141 0,3% 
  Metal products 536 1,6% 657 1,4% 
8. Chemicals, rubber, plastics 4 150 12,6% 2 729 5,8% 
9. Textile   597 1,8% 1 791 3,8% 
10. Leather, clothing, of which:       
  Wearing apparel 387 1,2% 394 0,8% 
  Leather products 439 1,3% 170 0,4% 
11. Other Man. Products, of which:       
  Wood products 300 0,9% 41 0,1% 
  Paper products. publishing 402 1,2% 118 0,3% 
  Petroleum. coal products 131 0,4% 43 0,1% 
  Mineral products nec 535 1,6% 198 0,4% 
  Manufactures nec 303 0,9% 491 1,0% 
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12. Machinery 8 613 26,1% 7 119 15,2% 
13. Cars Trucks 2 031 6,2% 8 213 17,5% 
14. Transport equipment 721 2,2% 3 550 7,6% 
15. Electronic equipment 2 319 7,0% 16 939 36,1% 
          
SERVICES:   8 084 24,5% 3 582 7,6% 
16. Trade   778 2,4% 383 0,8% 
17. Sea transport 1 991 6,0% 359 0,8% 
18. Air transport 1 476 4,5% 608 1,3% 
19. Other transports 437 1,3% 169 0,4% 
20. Communication 143 0,4% 89 0,2% 
21. Finance   180 0,5% 373 0,8% 
22. insurance 174 0,5% 34 0,1% 
23. Business services 2 252 6,8% 1 358 2,9% 
24. Tourism   412 1,2% 102 0,2% 
25. Public services 209 0,6% 77 0,2% 
26. Other services, of which:       
  Electricity 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Gas manufacture. Distribution 4 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  Water 5 0,0% 1 0,0% 
  Construction 23 0,1% 30 0,1% 
TOTAL   32 987 100,0% 46 894 100,0% 
Source: own calculations from GTAP 6 (base year 2004); Note: the shaded figures correspond to the most 
significant flows. 
Table 3: Korean tariff schedule for the main import products originating from the EU 
Import 
rank Designation Base rate Staging category 
1 Air-coolers, Air Purifiers of Other Machines and M 5,7% 7 
2 Electronic integrated circuits 0,0% 0 
3 Medicaments 7,8% 3 
4 Motor car (Cylinder<3000 cm3) 8,0% 5 
5 Motor car (1500<cylinder<3000 cm3) 8,0% 3 
6 Ferrous waste and scrap 0,0% 0 
7 Part of combustion piston engines 7,6% 3 
8 Pork (Meat) 27,4% 10 
9 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles 8,0% 0 
10 Valves, taps, cocks and traps 8,0% 7 
11 Other chemical products 6,5% 3 
12 Turbo-compressors 8,0% 3 
13 Aeroplanes 0,0% 0 
14 Whisky 20,0% 5 
15 Uranium enriched 0,0% 0 
16 Gear boxes and parts thereof 8,0% 0 
17 Switch boards 8,0% 0 
18 Measuring or checking instruments 7,3% 0 
19 Internal combustion engines 5,9% 3 
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20 Cobalt oxides 5,5% 0 
21 Semi-finished products of iron or steel 0,0% 0 
22 Parts of compressors 8,0% 0 
23 Beauty or make-up preparations 8,0% 5 
24 Electric integrated circuits 0,0% 0 
25 Pumps for piston engines 8,0% 5 
Source: own computation from European Commission (2009a) 
On the EU side, the majority of products are fully liberalised once the agreement enters into force. 
Agriculture and food products are the major sectors which are partly exempt from the elimination of customs 
duties. For instance, bovine meat is expected to be duty-free after five years. Some seafood products are 
liberalised after three or five years depending on the product considered. The other products such as milk, honey, 
some fruit and vegetables, prepared fish and crustaceans, sugar, some prepared cereals and tobacco fall into 
category to be liberalised after three to five years. Some particular products such as clementines, grapes and 
some other fruits are liberalised after 10 years (up to 17 years), while tariff on the most sensitive products such as 
fresh tomatoes, oranges and rice are not abolished. With respect to manufactured products, most duties are 
expected to be removed immediately after the agreement enters into force, except pneumatic tires, some leather, 
wood and wool products (up to five years), car trucks and small aeroplanes (up to 5 years) as well as some 
electrical machinery equipment (monitors and projectors). It can be observed that the highest base rates concern 
monitors and projectors (12.3 percent), motor cars (10 percent) as well as pneumatics (4.5 percent). For these 
products, tariff removal is expected within 5 years at the latest. The other key products, essentially mechanical 
and electrical machinery as well as ships, face zero or very low tariffs which are expected to be removed at the 
time the agreement enters into force. 
Table 4: EU tariff schedule for the main import products originating from Korea 
Import 
rank Designation Base rate Staging category 
1 Television, sound recording, camera 0,0% 0 
2 Parts suitable for television, radio, radars… 2,3% 0 
3 Other vehicles (1500<cylinder<2500 cm3) 10,0% 3 
4 Other vessels 1,1% 0 
5 Tankers 0,9% 0 
6 Monitors and projectors 12,3% 5 
7 Electronic integrated circuits 0,0% 0 
8 Motor car (1500<cylinder<3000 cm3) 10,0% 3 
9 Part of data processing machines 0,0% 0 
10 Motor car (1000<cylinder<1500cm3) 10,0% 5 
11 Other devices, appliances and instruments 1,6% 0 
12 Machinery with 360 degrees Revolving 0,0% 0 
13 Data processing machines (other) 0,0% 0 
14 Pneumatics used on motor cars 4,5% 3 
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15 Electronic integrated circuits 0,0% 0 
16 Other vehicles (cylinder>2500 cm3) 10,0% 3 
17 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles 3,5% 0 
18 Motor car (cylinder<1000cm3) 10,0% 5 
19 Data processing machines (other) 0,0% 0 
20 Discs, tapes, solid-state non-volatile storage device 3,5% 0 
Source: own computation from European Commission (2009a) 
How is it possible to benefit from the tariff elimination? It is in the nature of an FTA that only products 
originating in one of the parties can benefit from the preferences granted under the Agreement: rules of origin are 
an important aspect. The relevant provisions for trade between Korea and the EU are stipulated in the chapter on 
Rules of Origin. The following conditions have to be met for goods exported from the EU to benefit from 
preferential treatment at the Korean border. 
Goods must: 
! ‘originate’ in the EU; 
! fulfil certain additional requirements; 
! be accompanied by an ‘origin declaration’.19 
3.2.2 TACKLING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS (NTBS) 
As a WTO-plus element, the Agreement has set independent disciplines on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) with regard 
to automobiles, consumer electronics, pharmaceutical products and medical devices, and chemicals. The 
Agreement is the first FTA, Korea has concluded, introducing disciplines on NTBs, and addressing a considerable 
number of outstanding issues previously raised by EU companies in this respect. Concerning consumer 
electronics, widespread use of international standards and flexible approval procedures are key elements for the 
electronics industry in making best use of global supply chains, economies of scale, and fast-paced innovation. 
Korea and the EU apply generally similar requirements, largely based on international standards, and the 
Agreement stresses the need for international standardization and simplification of certification as a means of 
reducing trade costs. NTBs on automobiles are also expected to be abolished, notably because the FTA provides 
for a wide-ranging recognition of international standards by Korea. With regard to pharmaceutical products and 
medical devices, the Agreement addresses the need to strengthen the transparency in pricing decision. Finally, a 
bilateral cooperation intending to ensure more transparency in the laws, the regulations and their implementation 
for chemicals has been introduced in the Agreement. 
Furthermore, the Agreement introduces a specific chapter to tackle the problem of technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs), as a means of reinforcing the cooperation on standards and regulatory issues to secure 
transparency in making rules, the use of international standards, etc.. In particular, the Agreement includes 
comprehensive provisions to address issues which have been identified by EU automobile manufacturers as 
major obstacles in their operation in Korea. The Agreement eliminates the need to produce specific cars for the 
Korean market or conduct expensive tests in Korea to show compliance with a wide range of safety standards. 
For core safety standards, Korea accepts the UNECE regulations in the application of domestic standards for 32 
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out of 42 items by recognizing six more UNECE standards. Equivalence with European standards on OBDs also 
represents a major cost saving, since Korean standards for gasoline cars are based on US Californian standards. 
Finally, special accelerated dispute settlement ensures compliance with the rules negotiated for the sector. 
Monitoring the implementation of commitments is also undertaken through a working group on motor vehicles and 
parts, which will meet at least once a year. 
In the same context, a chapter on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures is included in the FTA as 
a means of facilitating trade in animals and animal products, plants and plant products while maintaining a high 
level of human, animal and plant health. Finally, trade facilitation provisions such as customs cooperation and 
simplification of border procedures are incorporated into the Agreement. For that purpose, a customs committee 
has been in place. 
 
3.2.3 TRADE IN SERVICES 
The Agreement has significantly upgraded Korea’s WTO commitments. The level of liberalisation in the Korean 
side with respect to services in the Agreement is regarded as the highest of all, compared to the previous FTAs 
which Korea has concluded to date. The scope of the FTA includes diverse services sectors: 
telecommunications, environmental, transport, construction, financial, postal and express delivery, professional 
services such as legal, accounting, engineering and architectural services, and a large variety of other business 
services.  
Table 5 and Table 6 elaborate liberalisation of trade in services of both sides. More specifically, Korea 
has made commitments in additional 11 sectors such as waste water services and satellite broadcast 
transmission services, apart from 104 sectors out of all the WTO155 sectors which Korea had already offered its 
commitments. For telecommunications, removal of foreign ownership requirements in Korea, direct operation of 
EU satellite broadcasters into Korea, etc. are set out in the Agreement. The Agreement also stipulates 
environmental services (cooperation on non-industrial waste waters) shipping (full market access and non 
discriminatory treatment in the use of port services and infrastructure in Korea), financial services (improvement 
of market access), express delivery services, air transport services (improved market access for EU services into 
Korea, etc). Korea allows European law firms to open offices in Korea to advise foreign investors or Korean 
customers on non-Korean law. The services which fall into full liberalisation or few restrictions includes some 
business services, such as computer and related services, R&D (except restriction for services in natural 
sciences), telecommunication (equipment rental, etc…), advertising, market research and consulting, packaging, 
printing and convention services, as well as – for Korea only – technical testing and translation services. 
Communication services also show a high liberalisation level (postal and telecom services), as well as 
construction services and environmental services (except mode 3).  
On the other hand, some service sectors still remain more protected despite some improvement in 
market access. These are: some professional services (legal accounting, auditing services), distribution services, 
education, health and social services, tourism and travel, recreational, cultural and sporting activities as well as 
transport (except a favorable market access for the EU concerning shipping and aircraft services into Korea) and 
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energy services20. Financial services also remain protected despite some liberalisation for specific activities. For 
Mode 1, these activities concern insurance services for maritime shipping and goods in international transit as 
well as specific banking services, such as transfer of financial information and data processing. With regard to 
Mode 3, there is a medium level of liberalisation of insurance services, with still some restrictions in terms of 
authorisation, registration, etc.. Banking services remain protected in Korea, especially with regard to credit 
unions, mutual saving banks, specialized capital finance companies, etc. despite an improvement in market 
access for the other banking services. Into the EU, banking establishment is also restricted to a certain extent in a 
large number of Member States. 
The other provisions of the agreement cover free capital movement (Chapter 8), Government 
procurement (chapter 9), intellectual property (Chapter 10), competition and transparency (chapters 11 and 12), 
dispute settlement (chapter 14) as well as specific provisions concerning sustainable development (chapter 13). 
In addition, specific protocols cover the problems of rules of origin, especially in the car sector, mutual 
administrative assistance in customs matters as well as cultural cooperation. 
 
Table 5: Restrictions applying into the EU for Korean services 
  Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Remarks 
Agriculture, Forestry     ***   
Fishing and aquaculture     ***   
Mining and Quarrying     ***   
Manufacturing     n (0) 
Production, transmission and distribution of energy     ***   
Business services, of which:         
          Professional services, of which:         
                    Legal services *** *** ** (1) 
                    Accounting services ** n *   
                    Auditing services *** n ***   
                    Architectural services ** n *   
                    engineering services ** n ***   
                    medical services including retail sales *** n ***   
                    Veterinary *** n **   
          Computer and related services n n n   
          R and D services * n n   
          Real Estate services *** n *   
          Rental/Leasing services, of which:         
                    Ships ** n ***   
                    Aircraft ** *** ***   
                    Other transport equipment ** n n   
                    Other machinery and equipment ** n n   
                    personal and household goods *** *** *   
                    Telecom equipment rental n n n   
          Other Business services, of which:         
                    Advertising n n n   
                    market research n n n   
                    management consulting n n n   
                    technical testing ** ** n   
                    Consulting * n n   
                    placement and supply services of personne *** *** ***   
                    maintenance and repair *** *** *   
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                    investigation and security *** *** ***   
                    building cleaning services *** n n   
                    photographic services * n n   
                    packaging services n n n   
                    printing and publishing n n **   
                    convention services n n n   
                    translation services * n **   
                    telecom consulting n n n   
Communication services, of which:         
          Postal and courier services n n n n 
          Telecom services, of which:         
                    transmission and reception of signals n n n   
                    satellite broadcast transmission services * * * (3) 
Construction services n n n   
Distribution services, of which:       (4) 
          Commission agents' services ** * n   
          Wholesale trade services *** *** **   
          Retail service *** *** ***   
          Franchising n n n   
Educational services, of which:       (5) 
          Primary education ** ** ***   
          Secondary education ** ** **   
          Higher education services ** ** **   
          Adult education services ** * ***   
          Other education services *** *** **   
Environmental services, of which: *** n n   
Financial services, of which:         
          Insurance *** *** ** (8) 
          Banking and other financial services *** * **   
Health and social services, of which: *** * *** (5) 
Tourism and travel *** n *   
Recreational, cultural and sporting services *** *** *** (6) 
Transport services, of which:         
          Maritime transport n n ***   
          Internal Waterways transport ** ** ***   
          rail transport *** n ***   
          Road transport *** n ***   
          Pipeline transport *** *** * (7) 
Services auxiliary to transport, of which:         
          Maritime transport *** n *** (9) 
          Internal Waterways transport *** n *** (9) 
          rail transport ** n **   
          road transport *** n **   
          Pipeline transport *** n n   
Energy services *** n ***   
Source: own calculations from Annex 7-A-2 and 7-A-3 of the agreement 
 
Remarks: 
n: no restriction; *: limited restrictions; **: medium restriction level, ***: high restriction level 
(0) except manufacture of refined petroleum products 
(1) excluding legal advisory and legal documentations and certification services provided by legal professionals 
entrusted with public functions, such as notaries, "huissiers de justice" and other "officiers publics et ministeriels" 
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(2) with some restrictions for handling and express delivery services 
(3) excluding the selling of television programme package as well as domestic links 
(4) excepting arms and munitions 
(5) excluding public-funded services 
(6) excluding audio-visual services 
(7) other than fuel 
(8) for mode 1, no restriction for consulting services 
(9) except national cabotage transports 
 
Table 6: Restrictions applying into Korea for EU services 
  Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Remarks 
Agriculture, Forestry         
Fishing and aquaculture     ***   
Mining and Quarrying     **   
Manufacturing     n   
Production, transmission and distribution of energy     ** (1) 
Business services, of which:         
          Professional services, of which:         
                    Legal services ** ** **   
                    Accounting services ** ** **   
                    Auditing services ** ** **   
                    Architectural services n n n   
                    engineering services n n n   
                    Veterinary n n n   
          Computer and related services n n n   
          R and D services n n *   
          Real Estate services n n n   
          Rental/Leasing services, of which:         
                    Ships n n **   
                    Aircraft n n **   
                    Other transport equipment n n n   
                    Other machinery and equipment n n n   
                    personal and household goods n n n   
                    Telecom equipment rental n n n   
          Other Business services, of which:         
                    Advertising n n n   
                    market research n n n   
                    management consulting n n n   
                    technical testing n n n   
                    Consulting n n n   
                    placement and supply services of personne n n ***   
                    maintenance and repair *** ** n   
                    investigation and security *** n ***   
                    building cleaning services *** n n   
                    photographic services *** *** n   
                    packaging services n n n   
                    printing and publishing n n n   
                    convention services n n n   
                    translation services n n n   
                    telecom consulting         
Communication services, of which:         
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          Postal and courier services h (1) n **   
          Telecom services, of which: * n *   
Construction services *** n n   
Distribution services, of which:         
          Commission agents' services *** n n   
          Wholesale trade services *** n *   
          Retail service *** n *   
          Franchising n n n   
Educational services, of which:       (2) 
          Primary education *** *** ***   
          Secondary education *** *** ***   
          Higher education services *** n ***   
          Adult education services ** n **   
          Other education services *** n ***   
Environmental services, of which: ** n n   
Financial services, of which:         
          Insurance ** ** **   
          Banking and other financial services ** ** ***   
Health and social services, of which: *** *** ***   
Tourism and travel ** (3) n n   
Recreational, cultural and sporting services, of which: *** n **   
Transport services, of which:         
          Maritime transport * n * (4) 
          Internal Waterways transport *** n ***   
          rail transport *** n **   
          Road transport n n n   
          Pipeline transport *** *** n   
Services auxiliary to transport, of which: *** n n (5) 
Energy services ** ** **   
Source: own calculations from Annex 7-A-4 of the agreement 
Remarks: 
n: no restriction; *: limited restrictions; **: medium restriction level, ***: high restriction level 
(1) except nuclear energy 
(2) excluding public-funded services 
(3) free access except Hotel restaurants 
(4) excluding cabotage 
(5) excluding services for agriculture, fishery, and livestock products 
 
3.2.4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Building on the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO, the Agreement provides a legal framework to basic rules in both 
Parties for the protection of intellectual property rights and enforcement of such protection. Mechanisms for 
exchange and cooperation are also set up in the Agreement. It sets standards of protection for intellectual 
property rights such as the protection of authors’ work for duration of 70 years after the death of the author and 
the right to a single equitable remuneration for performers and producers of phonograms. The Agreement 
ensures that procedures for registering trademarks in both Parties follow certain rules, such as the possibility of 
opposition by interested parties and the availability of a public electronic database of applications and 
registrations. It details the rights conferred on registered and unregistered designs. The Agreement guarantees 
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the protection of data submitted to obtain marketing authorisation for pharmaceutical and for plant protection 
products, and provides protection for a number of Korean and European geographical indications (GIs). 
Moreover, the Agreement furnishes both Parties with enforcement measures to be applied to ensure 
effective action against infringement of the protection granted to intellectual property rights. This includes 
minimum rules on civil and administrative proceedings, and criminal procedures and penalties in certain cases. 
The Agreement provides that online service providers are not liable, under certain conditions, where services of 
intermediaries are used by third parties for infringing activities. The Agreement also foresees that measures can 
be taken at the border, upon request or by the authorities, where it is suspected that goods infringing an 
intellectual property right may be imported, exported or placed under other customs procedures mentioned in the 
Agreement. Both Parties will hold regular dialogue on intellectual property, during which implementation of the 
Agreement will be monitored and any other relevant issue may be addressed. 
 
3.2.5 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Korea and the EU already had substantive mutual commitments on government procurement in the framework of 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). In the framework, both Parties agreed to apply 
substantial transparent and non-discriminatory procedural rules to conducting certain tenders for goods and 
services (including construction services) by central and (certain) sub-central entities. The Agreement expands 
these mutual commitments to an additional area, not covered in the GPA, which has significant business 
opportunities in both regions: in EU public works concessions and in Korean ‘build-operate-transfer’ (BOT) 
contracts. Such contracts, for example key infrastructure projects such as the construction of highways, are of 
significant commercial interest to European suppliers, who are recognised as global leaders in this area. 
Guaranteeing the practical and legal accessibility of such tenders to European suppliers will secure substantial 
new opportunities. 
 
3.3 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT21 
The effects of the Agreement on GDP growth are positive for both the EU (0.08 percent) and Korea (up to 0.84 
percent). Welfare gains are also positive and significant for Korea (up to 1.12 percent). These gains are mainly 
due to terms of trade improvement, capital accumulation through increased investment as well as variety gains, 
for instance increase in the number of varieties available to the consumer due to the FTA. On the other hand, the 
EU welfare gain is smaller (+0.02 percent). The higher welfare gains expected for Korea are essentially due to its 
initial higher level of protection as well as to its smaller economic size relative to the EU. Both Parties show 
positive and significant effects on bilateral exports and imports. In fact, the increase in Korean bilateral exports to 
the EU amounts to up to 38.4 percent, whereas EU bilateral exports to Korea increase even more (up to 82.6 
percent), as a result of the initial high protection in Korea. 
With regard to effects on aggregate bilateral trade in value, the increase in EU exports to Korea amounts to a 
minimum of EUR 33 billion and a maximum of EUR 41 billion depending on the baseline considered. In addition, 
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EU imports from Korea increase by up to EUR 34 billion. This makes it possible to improve the EU trade balance 
with regard to Korea by up to EUR 10.1 billion. Sectoral bilateral trade effects are generally significant22: 
- The most important export increase from the EU to Korea concerns cars and trucks (about 400 percent, 
i.e. EUR 8 billion).  
- Similarly, a significant increase in EU meat and dairy product exports and more generally other 
agricultural and food products is also due to the liberalisation of the Korean market in the FTA. 
- The EU is also in a position to significantly increase its exports of other industrial products (up to 84 
percent). In particular, machinery and electronic equipment exports, which currently account for one-
third of EU’s overall exports to Korea, are expected to grow by more than 65 percent in the most 
favorable scenario. As a result of this export increase, intra-industry trade may also develop, since EU 
producers will enjoy a better market access in Korea, especially in consumer electronics.  
- Korea also increases its bilateral exports of manufactured products, especially textiles, leather/clothing 
as well as cars, other transport equipment, chemicals and other manufactured products. For these latter 
products, an increase in intra-industry trade is also expected. However, Korean exports of services to 
the EU are expected to decline slightly. 
- The analysis of sectoral bilateral trade in value provides the following results: EU exports to Korea 
significantly exceed imports regarding chemicals, machinery and other manufactured products. This 
leads to an improvement of the EU bilateral trade balance by about EUR 15 billion for these industries 
taken together. The other sectors with positive effects on the EU bilateral trade balance include 
agriculture and food products (meat, dairy and other food product for about EUR 5 billion) as well as 
services (up to EUR 2 billion). On the other hand, the rise in EU bilateral imports of cars exceeds that of 
exports. Consequently, the EU trade balance regarding the car industry deteriorates by EUR 5 billion (up 
to EUR 13 billion depending on the baseline considered). Other EU trade balance deterioration concerns 
textiles (EUR 3 billion). It should be noted that the increase of Korean exports of textiles and cars may 
be overestimated since the model cannot take in account of the impact of rules of origins or the recent 
increase of the Korean car production in Europe or in third countries for exports to the EU. 
The Agreement generally has small production effects in the EU. Small positive effects may be found in some 
animal and food products (meat, dairy products, beverage and tobacco and other food products), chemicals, 
machinery as well as other manufactured products. Transport services (sea and air transports) also exhibit a 
small production expansion. Conversely, any decrease in production can occur in textiles, leather and clothing as 
well as cars and other transport equipment. However, it is worth mentioning that this reduction is calculated, 
compared to the baseline. Consequently, given the EU’s growth trends, production may not decrease in absolute 
terms, compared to today. The same reasoning is valid for other variables, such as employment. Korea shows to 
some extent a reverse picture, although the magnitude of the production effects is more significant. In this regard, 
significant increases can be observed for textiles, cars/trucks, leather/clothing as well as other transport 
equipment to a lesser extent. Conversely, negative production effects are recorded for dairy products and meat 
as well as metals, machinery, electronic equipment, other manufactured products and transport services to a 
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lesser extent. Finally, the study shows very small employment effects for the EU. With regard to Korea, sectoral 
employment effects are more significant, with positive effects for textiles, leather/clothing as well as for cars. 
Finally, the consideration of trade facilitation slightly increases the trade growth due to the implementation of the 
Agreement. 
 
3.4 OTHER BENEFITS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The Agreement carries great significance for both sides. Firstly, the Agreement will considerably expand trade 
and investment not only between both Parties but between the EU and Northeast Asia as a whole as well. From 
the EU’s perspective, the Agreement is the first of the so-called “new generation” FTAs pursued under the Global 
Europe Strategy of the EU adopted in 2006. This Agreement fulfills the mandates of the Initiative by guaranteeing 
access to Korea’s dynamic market in which European businesses can compete on equal standings against local 
and other foreign businesses. As the first FTA the EU has concluded with an Asian partner, the Agreement is 
expected to support the EU in securing a foothold in this part of the world and serve as EU’s springboard to the 
rapidly growing Asian market. In particular, once Korea successfully brings its FTA with the US into effect and 
signs agreements also with China and Japan, the EU will be able to substantially expand its overseas markets 
through the Agreement. Secondly, the Agreement will connect Korea and the 27 EU member states, including 
advanced as well as emerging markets, thereby promoting economic cooperation at a various level. Last but not 
least, the Agreement is another win-win solution for both Parties. Korea's overall economic system will be 
improved as the pact will upgrade Korea's institutions and practices to the EU level, thereby enhancing Korean 
economy's transparency and predictability. As for the EU, the deal is in accord with its new trade policy direction 
aiming to promote internal economic growth and job creation.  
 
4. DIRECTIONS OF COOPERATION FOR CO-PROSPERITY 
 
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
The agreement is designed to facilitate trade, investment and economic cooperation between Korea and the EU. 
However, since the FTA itself does not automatically guarantee increase in economic exchanges, to faithfully 
fulfill the Agreement, the Trade Committee of the Agreement needs to play a pivotal role for seamless 
implementation of the Agreement by consistently monitoring the implementation and providing solutions to the 
companies facing problems. Equally vital is for the implementation to be carried out transparently by both Parties. 
To institutionalise dialogues between both sides should be prioritized as well. The Trade Committee and other 
lower level consultation groups should be run as defined in the Transparency Chapter of the Agreement. Sectoral 
committees and working level meetings are needed to be held at least once a year to consistently assess 
whether the FTA is implemented as agreed. The problems insurmountable in those working-level meetings 
should be resolved by the Trade Committee.  
In the wake of the Agreement, it became necessary for both Korean and EU companies to work together 
in entering the emerging markets such as China through joint investment. It is necessary for the EU to make 
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efforts to form strategic alliance with Korean companies to occupy large emerging markets in advance. 
Particularly, the EU will be able to enter the Chinese market effectively through Korea if the Korea-China FTA is 
concluded.  
Meanwhile, besides official channels or dialogues, Korea and the EU could come up with various 
opportunities, such as programmes for exchange of private sector personals, academic gatherings (workshops or 
seminars), and caravans for companies etc. to help understand each other better.  
4.2 MAJOR AREAS FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
It is observed that the demand for welfare is rapidly growing in Korea although the term ‘welfare’ is comparatively 
new and strange to Korean people. What makes policy makers worried about is that an all-out reform for 
universal and nation-wide welfare is being called for in a bipartisan manner. It is believed by many that free 
school meals, free childcare, free medical treatments, and free tuition fees are possible without tax increases. 
The EU has undergone numerous trials and errors to hammer out current welfare policies and system throughout 
its long history. Therefore, the EU can serve as a good example for Korea to benchmark such invaluable lessons, 
hence both parties are recommended to set up as many policy dialogues as possible. And these policy dialogues 
for sharing experiences can possibly bring up numerous opportunities for concrete cooperation. 
For green or environment –friendly economy, the EU members are predominant players in the global 
market, and EU’s renewable energy market, in particular, is expected to grow up to US$ 1 trillion in 2020. 
Globally, 80 percent and 40 percent of solar and wind power plants are located in Europe. In the meantime, 
Korea adopted green growth as a new development paradigm for the 21st century in 2008, and subsequently set 
up a 5-year strategic plan for green growth in 2009, followed by enactment of the Basic Act on Low Carbon Green 
Growth, the Act on Smart Grid, and the Green Architecture Law. Recently, the Act on Emission Trading Scheme 
was passed in the congress with bipartisan support and an ETS is supposed to be launched in 2015 in Korea. 
The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), which is a center for green growth research established by Korea and 
whose founding agreement has already been signed in the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil in June 2012, was launched 
as an official international organization in October 2012. The potential for cooperation is greater than ever since 
both feel the importance of creating jobs by economic growth, so it is important to exert efforts to come up with 
creative and practical areas or items for cooperation. In order to vitalise technical exchange and industrial 
cooperation at company level, active support from the governmental is essential. Particularly, Korea is willing to 
cooperate with the EU member countries in the next generation technologies of green growth. 
 
4.3 COOPERATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
As aforementioned, the EU has been focusing on opening up markets through WTO multilateral negotiations by 
adopting new trade policies. It also has been leading the WTO DDA negotiation. In particular, the EU has been 
playing a leading role in proposing WTO-plus issue in service, investment, government procurement, property 
rights, non-tariff barriers, customs procedures, etc. A significant part of the tariffs in goods have been eliminated 
by FTAs, so it is necessary to liberalise the areas of service, government procurement, and intellectual properties 
in markets. While it has been actively pushing FTAs forward, Korea also has been agilely participating in the 
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WTO negotiations, recognising the significant of market liberalisation by multilateral trade. In addition, Korea has 
been working consistently to prevent protectionism from spreading out. In this sense, Korea and the EU should 
stick to the principles of free trade, cooperate to reject protectionism, and put joint efforts to achieve early 
conclusion of WTO negotiation. 
Another front for international cooperation is the G20 summit. The G20, despite a plenty of criticism, is 
one of the premier intergovernmental congregations deciding global governance and solutions for global 
economic issues. Korea chaired the 2010 Seoul Summit, dedicating to play a bridging role between developed 
and developing nations to resolve issues global community now faces. Both parties share a number of topics for 
cooperation: financial stability, green growth, development cooperation, anti-terrorism etc. 
 
4.4 COOPERATION FOR EAST ASIA INTEGRATION 
FTA discussions and financial cooperation are actively taking place in East Asia. After ASEAN and Korea-China-
Japan agreed with ASEAN+1 type of market integration, the ASEAN+3/ASEAN+6 or the TPP led by the US are 
being discussed, eventually boiling down toward the FTAAP. There are struggles for hegemony among the 
countries within the region as well as the possible conflicts resulted from the return of the US to Asia, but 
generally it seems to be moving toward integration. The East Asian integration is expected to provide 
opportunities for Europe as well. The European integration aimed to maintain political peace and stability, 
creating a common market, and leading the reshaping of the global order. It has great implications to East Asia. 
Particularly, the Korean peninsula is surrounded by four competing super powers- the US, China, Russia, and 
Japan- who are fighting for hegemony. In addition, the tension on the Korean peninsula is mounting more than 
ever following the development of the North Korean nuclear programmes and leadership transition. With a view to 
reunifying the two Koreas, Korea needs to build relationships and to cooperate with four major countries and the 
North in creative and practical manners. The EU, the origin of democracy, market economy, human rights and 
constitutionalism, should briskly spearhead in maintaining peace and achieving economic development in the 
region. The EU can play a considerable role as a mediator for maintaining peace and creating prosperity in this 
region. It is no longer appropriate for the EU to act as a bystander. Experiences and lessons piled up during the 
period of the European integration are highly applicable to this region. This is the reason why the EU is requested 
to be deeply involved in the process of the East Asian integration. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
The Agreement is, no doubt, a historic monument and one of the best possible means ever for solidifying 
cooperation between both sides, coupled with the Korea-EU Framework Agreement. However, it does not 
necessarily guarantee a renewed and stronger relationship and co-prosperity. The destiny of the bilateral 
relationship depends on the willingness and efforts both Parties will make for the implementation of the 
Agreement in the future. 
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In addition, the Agreement is of great importance in that it embodies the new trade policies of both Parties by 
seeking comprehensive trade liberalization and high-quality trade deals. Accordingly it paves the way for 
sustainable economic development, enhancing competitiveness and job creation which both Parties should 
achieve to get out of a highly challenging situation the global community now faces. In particular, both Parties 
need to make ceaseless efforts to employment-friendly economic environment at home and abroad through 
opening markets in the bilateral and multilateral arenas. 
Meanwhile, the Agreement is of mutual benefit in that it can invigourate policy dialogues in the political 
and security areas, as well as in the economic fields. The EU should play a critical part for the geo-political 
stability in East Asia and the unification of two Koreas. 
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intergration. Currently, some 40 percent of the EU’s budget is being used for this policy. 
9 Paul Brenton, The Changing Nature and Determinants of EU Trade Policies, CEPS Working Document No. 150, October 
2000, p. 1 
10 Kim, Cae-one (2007), EU’s Global Trade Strategy, pp155-172 
11 European Commission (2006), Global Europe: competing in the world – A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy, p. 2 
12 European commission (2010), Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 
Strategy, p. 4 
13 European Commission (2010), What is Europe’s trade policy?, p. 3   
14 European Commission (2006), Global Europe: competing – A Contribution to the EU’s growth and Jobs Strategy 
15 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/august/tradoc_148181.pdf 
16 CEPII/ATLASS, The Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and Korea - 
Report for the European Commission, DG Trade (framework contract TRADE/07/A2: Korea II) p.21 
17 European Commission (2011), The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice,  
18 For more objective description on the economic impact, this part was composed by referring to ‘The Economic Impact of 
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and Korea’ - Report for the European Commission, DG Trade 
(framework contract TRADE/07/A2: Korea II) pp.22-31, ‘Fact about the EU-Korea FTA’ 10-28, pp, and ‘The EU-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement in practice’, 
19 For more information, see page 6-7 of The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice, 
20 For additional details, refer to Annexes 7-A-1 to 7-A-4 of the agreement 
21 For more objective description on the economic impact, this part was composed by citing the outcomes of ‘The Economic 
Impact of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and Korea’ - Report for the European Commission, 
DG Trade (framework contract TRADE/07/A2: Korea II) pp. 4-6, and ‘The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice’ 
22 For more information, please refer to ‘The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice’, 
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The total trade volume between Korea and the EU reached US$ 103.2 billion in 2011. Korea’s export to the EU 
amounted to US$ 55.7 billion, whereas the EU’s export to Korea was US$ 47.4 billion. Cars, wireless 
communication devices, ship equipments, etc. were main export items from Korea to the EU, while the EU 
exported semiconductor manufacturing devices, cars and components, medical stores, etc. to Korea. In 2011 the 
EU was the 3rd largest trading partner for Korea following China and Japan, and Korea was the 8th for the EU. 
 
Trade volume between Korea and the EU (US$ billion, %) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Trade Volume 78.5 
(10.6) 
92.8 
(18.2) 
98.4 
(6.0) 
78.8 
(-19.8) 
92.2 
(17.0) 
103.2 
(11.9) 
Export 48.5 (11.0) 
56.0 
(15.5) 
58.4 
(4.3) 
46.6 
(-20.2) 
53.5 
(14.8) 
55.7 
(4.1) 
Import 30.1 (10.1) 
36.8 
(22.5) 
40.0 
(8.6) 
32.2 
(-19.4) 
38.7 
(20.1) 
47.4 
(22.5) 
Balance 18.4 19.2 18.4 14.4 14.8 8.3 
* ( ): % of increase compared to the previous year, source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
Meanwhile, the EU is the biggest investor to Korea. The EU invested US$ 5.0 billion in Korea in 2011, 36.5 
percent of US$ 13.7 billion, the total investment in Korea in 2011. The accumulated amount of EU’s investment 
reached US$ 64.7 billion as of the end of 2011, 36.2 percent of US$ 178.6 billion, the total inbound investment in 
Korea. On the other hand, Korea invested around US$ 2.9 billion in 2011. 
Investment Trends between Korea and EU (US$ Bil l ion) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total (’62ං’11) 
EU → Korea 5.0 4.3 6.3 5.3 3.2 5.0 64.7 
Korea → EU 2.8 3.0 3.1 5.1 7.5 2.9 36.0 
    * Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Export -Import Bank of Korea 
The trade and investment between Korea and EU have been steadily increasing since the ratification of Korea-
EU FTA. Nonetheless, it is still far below the potential of Korea-EU cooperation. 
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REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND US TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA: HOW DEEP AND HOW COMPATIBLE? 
EUGENIA LAURENZA1 AND JAMES MATHIS2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper makes a comparative analysis of the approaches used for trade in services by the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US) in their respective economic integration agreements with the Republic of Korea. 
Both trade agreements have made commitments to eliminate barriers and provide national treatment for trade in 
cross-border, commercial presence, and professional services.  
Of particular interest are the approaches being developed in these agreements for the subjects of 
regulatory cooperation as these rules affect the delivery of a service and the ability of foreign firms and services 
providers to function in the market.  In our discussion, we subdivide this general theme of regulatory cooperation 
into two areas, transparency and domestic regulation. ‘Transparency’ includes publication and notice, rights to 
inquire and respond, and elements of administrative proceedings, such as the right to notice and to be heard. 
Within ‘domestic regulation’ we consider tests for assessing domestic rules in light of the trade objectives of the 
parties and convergence activities, such as references made to international standards. ‘Recognition’ is also 
included as a subject under domestic regulation where parties may develop approaches for accepting the 
equivalency of each other’s diplomas, licenses or certificates. In addition we also compare the agreements’ 
provisions for competition policies, as these can affect the ability of firms to function in the domestic market.  
Finally, we look at the larger context of the agreements’ institutional settings for maintaining processes of 
regulatory cooperation and their systems of recourse (dispute settlement).  
A number of these aspects were raised in the 2011 WTO Annual Report on preferential trade 
agreements, which found an increasing emphasis on ‘deep integration’ subjects, and documented the trend for 
trade agreements to concentrate on ‘behind the border’ barriers to trade and establishment.3  Since services 
trade is, by its nature, predominantly governed by domestic regulations - rather than by traditional border 
restrictions - it serves as a most appropriate subject area for identifying some the elements that may be occurring 
in these deeper integration trade agreements.  
Several points of methodology should be briefly noted. First is the selection of these two trade 
agreements by the EU and the US with Korea as a basis for our analysis and comparison. The agreements are 
both relatively recent EU and US trade agreements with a single common signatory that is also an economically 
developed service economy.4 All these parties have a continuing stake in the development of international trade 
and services via the GATS or otherwise.  The underlying assumption suggested by studying these agreements is 
that if there are new regulatory developments and/or cooperative approaches on the horizon for services trade, 
then one could expect to find them emerging in recent developed-country agreements like these.  If these 
innovations are present, then we can proceed to characterise and compare the provisions and perhaps see some 
implications that might flow from the commonalities and differences in each. 
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This raises a second question:  how to characterise whether a provision is ‘deep’ integration or not.  
While this is inevitably subjective, our preference is to move beyond a more narrow view of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law that 
relies only on an examination of whether the text says ‘shall’ or ‘may’, and consider other elements including the 
clarity of the provisions, the establishment of on-going systems and the possibility of recourse.5  This recognises 
that although many of the domestic regulation areas are treated in softer law fashion, they are nonetheless 
intended by the parties to achieve certain results in the form of on-going processes. 
A third consideration is how to assess the agreements’ compatibility. Here, we refer to the common 
signatory Korea and ask whether the resulting overall regulatory environment is rendered legally coherent while it 
engages these multiple agreements. This is subject to the understanding that Korea also has its own approaches 
to these subjects that could also be expected to be reflected in the some outcomes of its trade agreements. 
Finally, to the extent we see the development of common approaches, can we draw any implications in these 
developments for the multilateral trading system and for the course of deeper integration approaches among 
larger groups of countries over time?  
The paper begins by examining each agreement’s general regulatory provisions covering all trade (goods 
and services), and proceeds through the general services chapters and their more specific sectoral provisions. 
The subject areas examined in turn are as noted above: transparency (notification and publication); regulatory 
cooperation (harmonisation, recognition and their related mechanisms); related competition policies; and finally, 
institutional considerations including dispute settlement and recourse. We conclude that most areas surveyed 
show very compatible but relatively ‘light’ approaches by the parties to the two agreements. ’Light’ suggests that 
while most subjects reviewed do not display binding obligations, they do commence processes of regulatory 
cooperation, albeit with somewhat vague objectives for expected results.  The subject area of transparency 
demonstrates some stronger benchmarks that might also raise some regulatory compatibility issues for the 
common party, Korea. Each side of this ‘deep v. shallow’ coin presents its own implications for the multilateral 
trading system.  
 
2. THE US – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS) 
 
The formal title of this trade agreement is:  ‘Free Trade Agreement Between The United States Of America And 
The Republic Of Korea’.  It is commonly known as the ‘KORUS’ agreement. The agreement negotiations were 
substantially completed in the spring of 2007 and ratified by each party in October (US) and November (Korea) of 
2011.6 The agreement’s initial provision of Article 1.1 states that the parties are establishing a free trade area in 
accordance with GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  For international trade in services, the KORUS 
agreement has four separate chapters, one each for cross border trade in services (Chapter 12), Financial 
Services (Chapter 13), Telecommunications (Chapter 14), and Electronic Commerce (Chapter 15).  In addition 
there are annexes for nonconforming measures for services, investment and financial services. The agreement 
has a separate Chapter 11 for investment.  In this chapter, market access for cross-border investment, which 
includes aspects of the GATS mode for commercial presence, is found in its national treatment article which 
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extends to establishment and acquisition.7 Otherwise, the substantive provisions of Chapter 11 resemble a 
bilateral investment treaty.  
The cross border services chapter is the broadest of the KORUS agreement’s chapters dealing with 
services. Its definitional scope does not precisely mimic the GATS language of four modes of supply.  Here, 
elements of GATS modes 3 and 4 (commercial presence and temporary movement) are merged, i.e. ‘(c) by a 
national of a Party in the territory of the other Party’.8  The definitional scope of the cross border services chapter 
‘does not include the supply of a service in the territory of a Party by a covered investment…’ This is covered by 
the investment chapter, which defines ‘investment’ to include the commitment of capital in the form of an 
enterprise.9  To the extent that such an enterprise would deliver a service, the investment chapter appears to 
control that activity, at least to the extent of any inconsistency with the cross border services chapter.10  An 
additional level of hierarchy is established as the investment chapter also yields to the superiority of the financial 
services chapter for any measure covered there.11  
The Agreement has three sectoral chapters:  Financial Services (Chapter 13), Telecommunications 
(Chapter 14) and Electronic Commerce (Chapter 15).  Each of these chapters prescribes its own relationship to 
the other chapters of the agreement (including cross border and investment chapters) and to the agreement’s 
general chapters, through different methods of incorporation or exclusion.  Thus, the financial services chapter 
incorporates items from other chapters by specific article reference. The electronic commerce chapter 
incorporates all applicable provisions from the chapters on cross border and investment, but then provides its 
own exceptions and list of nonconforming measures.  The telecommunications chapter is overall silent on 
incorporation, suggesting that anything relevant from another chapter applies to the subjects in 
telecommunications.  Any peculiarities caused by these various relationships will be raised when pertinent in the 
regulatory subject area discussion, to which we now turn.  
 
2.1 TRANSPARENCY  
The KORUS agreement has its own general chapter (21) on transparency.  A publication article in the chapter 
applies to any matter covered by the agreement and commits each party to publish in advance its laws, 
regulations, procedures and administrative rules, and to provide interested persons and the other party a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposals.12 ‘Interested persons’ is not defined in the chapter and can 
certainly be read to include private parties (firms) as well as public entities.  For publishing proposals, in most 
cases there is an additional timing provision of not less than 40 days prior to the date public comments are due. 
This provides a benchmark for an open comment process, and for those proposals finally adopted, publication of 
them is to include an explanation of the purpose of and rationale of the regulation, which ‘shall’ address the 
‘significant, substantive comments received during the comment period…’.13  There is also a provision providing 
for a prompt response to a party request for information on any proposed or actual measure that might affect the 
operation of the agreement regardless of its notification. 
The agreement’s general transparency chapter also contains two articles on administrative proceedings 
and their appeals, which cover the same scope as the notification and publication provisions.14 These provide for 
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notification of proceedings and a reasonable right to be heard to persons of the other party that are directly 
affected by a proceeding.  Each party also has an obligation to provide for an impartial review of final 
administrative actions for matters covered by the agreement, and are also granted a reasonable opportunity to 
support or defend their positions.  
These KORUS agreement’s transparency provisions are interesting in that they extend notice and 
participation for administrative actions and reviews to ‘persons’ of the other party rather than to the other 
signatory party alone.  They set a fairly clear benchmark on the form and time of notice to the Parties and for 
responding, and create a general standard for the impartiality of those officers who govern the review.  Apart from 
these due process standards, the provisions otherwise rely on the ‘good faith’ of a party applying its own laws.  In 
this sense, the provisions could be characterised as a form of procedural national treatment for interested and 
affected private persons of each signatory party.  
The agreement’s chapter on cross-border trade in services provides its own Article 12.8 for 
‘Transparency in Developing and Applying Regulations’.  This requires each party to have a mechanism for 
responding to inquiries from interested persons regarding regulations that fall under the subject matter of the 
chapter.  This extends the scope of the general transparency chapter by establishing an on-going response 
system for inquiries made on the operation of existing regulations, and not just on proposals. 
 
Sector-specific provisions 
Additional provisions on transparency and notification are found in the agreement’s chapters on financial services 
and telecommunications.  As indicated in the introduction, the electronic commerce provisions incorporate all the 
applicable provisions from the other chapters on cross-border services and financial services, and of course, the 
agreement’s overall general provisions.  
Article 13.11 (Transparency) in the financial services chapter supplements the general transparency 
articles from Chapter 21.  It stipulates that a return address for comments be provided by the publishing party, 
with a further notation on the practice of the Korea Financial Supervisory Service.  The balance of the article 
deals with the handling of applications for the supply of financial services, including information on the status of 
applications, timely (120 days) decisions, and providing applicants with the reasons for denial.  This section is a 
fine-tuning exercise that tailors the provisions to applications.  
The approach in telecommunications reflects a similar fine tuning; the core components from Chapter 21 
are represented but with more direct reference to rulemaking by telecommunications regulatory bodies and their 
measures on tariffs, technical interface, conditions for attaching equipment to the network, and permit and 
licensing requirements.15 The telecommunications chapter also has a provision with elements of transparency for 
licensing in the criteria and procedures, periods of decision-making, and disclosing the terms and conditions of all 
licenses in effect.16 
Overall, these transparency provisions facilitate the underlying scheduling of services commitments and 
the process of foreign providers adapting to the local market.  They appear to proactively bring interested foreign 
services providers into the domestic process.  
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2.2 REGULATORY COOPERATION  
As noted, the KORUS agreement does not have a general chapter on regulatory cooperation or a regulatory 
framework.  Its chapter on institutional provisions (Chapter 22) establishes a joint committee for the governance 
of the agreement as a whole (Article 22.2), co-chaired by the US Trade Representative and the Korean Trade 
Minister.  The joint committee is the sole governing ‘institution’ established by the agreement.  There is no 
general provision directing the committee to develop any particular regulatory approach to the agreement’s 
subject matter.  
 
2.2.1 DOMESTIC REGULATION 
The KORUS agreement does not have a general chapter on regulatory cooperation.  The cross-border services 
chapter does have an article on domestic regulation (Article 12.7), which is directed at the process of obtaining 
authorisation when this is required as a condition for obtaining the legal right to supply in the market.  There are 
elements of transparency requiring authorities to inform the applicant of their decision within a reasonable time 
and to inform the applicant of the status of the application, subject to authorisation requirements set out in a 
party’s schedule to Annex II for nonconforming measures.  The balance of the article mimics some elements of 
GATS Article VI (Domestic Regulation) in providing that qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements, be based on objective and transparent criteria and not be themselves a 
restriction on the supply of a service.  These itemised conditions are formed ‘with a view’ that they ‘do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services’.  This phrasing suggests that a necessity test itself is not 
being applied as a legal criterion for assessing the restrictiveness of a requirement.  GATS Article VI.4 is the 
essential comparative point of reference here as it calls for disciplines that ‘shall aim to ensure that such 
requirements are … (b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service…’. 
One can conclude from this treatment that the KORUS agreement is not moving beyond the status of the 
GATS negotiations on this point, and is not seeking to develop any advanced approach on its own for assessing 
the trade restrictiveness of a domestic requirement for permission to supply.  This is confirmed when we see that 
any future results from the WTO GATS negotiations regarding Article VI are to be incorporated into the KORUS 
agreement and, in footnote 7, which indicates that nothing in the agreement shall bind a party’s positions or 
approach to that GATS discussion.17  Strikingly, with regards to the GATS Article VI comparison, there is no 
reference in the KORUS agreement to international service standards to be applied or considered between the 
parties, an improvement that one might think would be reasonably obtainable in a bilateral agreement between 
these two signatories.  
 
Sector-specific provisions  
The chapter for telecommunications appears to be the only one of three sectoral chapters that provides standards 
for regulation in its Article 14.21 titled, ‘Measures Concerning Technologies and Standards’.  The orientation here 
is to draw a balance (with some criteria) between the value of allowing service suppliers flexibility to choose their 
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technologies of supply, and the right of regulators to prescribe technologies for legitimate public policy objectives.  
The article uses some language recognisable from the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT 
Agreement), for example, that measures limiting technology serve a legitimate public policy and not be ‘prepared, 
adopted, or applied in a manner that creates unnecessary obstacles to trade’,18  or that technical requirements be 
based on performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.19 There are additional legal criteria to be 
applied when a party does choose to adopt a specific technology or standard, in that such a decision must be 
based on rulemaking with a determination that market forces cannot be expected to achieve the same public 
policy result, and that suppliers be allowed an opportunity, during and after rulemaking, to demonstrate that 
alternative technologies will also suffice for the same objective. Generally, the article sets out the kind of criteria 
that can be assessed by not only the rule-maker of a party, but by an arbitral body reviewing whether the 
domestic process has fairly limited a technology standard.  In this sense, the provisions are legally quite firm, 
more along the lines of a ‘hard law’ expression, even while the underlying notion is assessing what is inherently a 
point of regulatory balance.  A final ‘independent regulatory bodies’ provision is also found in the 
telecommunications chapter where the parties oblige themselves to ensure that their regulatory bodies in this 
sector do not own equity or maintain any operating or management role in a supplier.  Decisions made by the 
body are to be impartial to all market participants.  
 
2.2.2 RECOGNITION 
Recognition is a voluntary activity in the cross-border services chapter; a party ‘may recognise’ the other party’s 
standards or criteria for the authorisation or licensing of service suppliers.  Recognition can be accomplished by 
harmonisation (or otherwise) by agreement or autonomously.20 Where recognition has been granted by a party to 
a non-party, there is no obligation to extend it to the other KORUS agreement party (no MFN as otherwise would 
be provided by Article 12.3), but the excluded party does have a right to seek a negotiated accession to the 
existing agreement or to attempt to negotiate a comparable recognition arrangement.21 
This relatively soft recognition approach is additionally detailed in the professional services annex to the 
cross border services chapter.  However, the resulting recognition regime still retains a wholly voluntary approach 
to recognition.  As such, where the ‘Parties agree’ they then assume only an obligation to ‘encourage’ their own 
relevant bodies to develop mutual standards or develop recommendations to the Joint Committee on mutual 
recognition, or to develop procedures for temporary licensing.22 These activities can occur for professional service 
sectors upon which the parties may ‘mutually agree’ and they ‘may agree’ on the sectors listed by further 
appendix.  Three sectors are listed by Appendix 12-A-1, engineering, architecture and veterinary services.  The 
parties do not actually commit themselves to a process of commencing recognition for these listed areas, so they 
are being listed as potential areas where the parties may agree to go further. 
While this is certainly not a strong set of recognition provisions, the institutional follow-up aspects hold 
some additional promise.  This is because a working group is established for professional services with the remit 
to consider procedures for fostering recognition between relevant professional bodies, for developing model 
procedures for licensing and certification, and for dealing with inconsistent regional level measures that would 
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prevent recognition.  The follow-up activities for the working group require it to report to the Joint Committee of 
the KORUS agreement within two years of the date of the agreement.  The Joint Committee can then make its 
recommendations on the compatibility of the working group’s report with the overall agreement, and if it does 
make a positive recommendation, then each party thereafter ‘shall work with’ and ‘encourage’ its own respective 
bodies to implement the recommendations.  
This provides for some definite forward motion in the process of recognition, particularly with reference to 
the working group’s remit and the obligation of reporting within two years, presumably with a recognition 
approach identified for specific services in hand. The soft ‘encourage’ language in respect to the actual certifying 
bodies may be a reflection of the inherently subnational and often nongovernmental nature of many professional 
certification bodies, certainly the predominant model in US professional service qualifications.23 
 
Sector-specific provisions 
The chapter for financial services also provides recognition provisions for prudential measures.24 These closely 
mimic the character of the general provisions in the cross border chapter in their voluntary approach to either 
autonomous or agreement-based recognition.  As in those provisions, the parties have a right to attempt to 
secure the recognition that has been granted to a non-party.  
Overall, the KORUS agreement charts a relatively informal process for future action that relies strongly 
on the voluntary good will of the parties going forward.  While the Joint Committee has power to select the sectors 
for attention, there is no mechanism for ruling on requests and denials for recognition, and there is no legal 
structure for ‘acts’ to be promulgated for broader activities, such as vocational or medical certificates.  What the 
agreement does with its ‘identification and encouragement’ approach reflects a form of ‘going forward’ in the style 
of informal rulemaking.  
 
2.3 COMPETITION POLICY  
The KORUS agreement has a chapter for ‘Competition Related Matters’ (Chapter 16). The chapter does not 
establish independent regional legal criteria for monopolies or cartels, such as prescribing behaviour inconsistent 
with the proper function of the agreement.  Rather, the approach is to make reference to the establishment and 
maintenance of existing national competition laws.  There are provisions for designated monopolies and state 
enterprises which resemble the GATT and GATS Agreements on the same subjects.  State enterprises cannot 
act in a manner inconsistent with the obligations of the agreement or accord discriminatory treatment.   
Designated monopolies have additional obligations to act by commercial considerations, and may not engage in 
anti-competitive practices. 25  Other competition provisions deal with transparency and cooperation for both 
competition and consumer protection.  The competition cooperation provision is quite brief, referring simply to the 
instruments of mutual assistance, notification, consultation and information exchange.  In contrast, the consumer 
protection provision is more detailed.26 The obligations to maintain laws and for agency cooperation are exempt 
from dispute settlement.  The provisions on state monopolies and designated monopolies are not exempt from 
dispute settlement.  
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2.4 INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS / DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The KORUS agreement is governed by a Joint Committee.  Comprised of officials from each Party and co-
chaired by the United States Trade Representative and the Korean Minister for Trade, it operates entirely by 
consensus.  The Joint Committee is obliged to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to supervise 
its committees, working groups and other bodies, to seek to resolve disputes, and to consider any matter that 
affects the operation of the agreement.  The Joint Committee may establish additional bodies than those called 
for under the existing provisions, and may also consider amendments or modifications to the agreement and its 
commitments.  It also has the power to issue interpretations of the provisions.27 The frequency of meetings is 
dictated by a regular session each year to be held alternately in the territory of each party, and within 30 days 
upon a request by a party. 
The general dispute settlement provisions in Article 22 of the KORUS agreement follow an ad hoc panel 
model with additional procedures for adequacy of compensation or compliance.  The agreement requires 
consultations with and referrals to the Joint Committee when a measure is claimed to be inconsistent with a 
party’s obligations under the agreement, or has otherwise failed to carry out its obligations.  A cause of action is 
also provided for benefits reasonably expected to accrue.  This does not apply for cross-border services.  
Following consultations and a failure to resolve the matter by the Joint Committee, a party then has a right to refer 
the case to a three-person ad hoc panel which is to return a report within 180 days of the appointment of the 
panel chair.  Implementations of the panel’s recommendations are to be made by elimination of the party’s non-
conforming measure.  If a measure is not resolved within 45 days, then the responding party shall enter 
negotiations for compensation and failing that, a suspension of equivalent benefits by the complainant, which is 
also reviewable by a reconvened panel. The system also has a final procedure permitting a compliance review on 
the respondent’s request.  The agreement has a choice of forum clause between it and the WTO stating that the 
choice of forum by the complainant is exclusive. 
The Financial Services chapter of the agreement provides for additional expertise criteria for panel 
selection in a state to state case within this subject area, and limits suspension of benefits only to the financial 
services sector.28 Additional provisions for investment disputes defended by nonconforming measures under the 
financial services annexes are provided but beyond the scope of the discussion here. 
 
3. THE EU – KOREA FTA 
The free-trade agreement (FTA) between the EU and Korea (formally, the ‘Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part’) was 
implemented on 1 July 2011, after eight rounds of negotiations conducted between May 2007 and October 2009, 
and was signed on 6 October 2010.  It not only constitutes the first FTA signed by the EU with an Asian country, 
but is also the most comprehensive and far-reaching FTA concluded by the EU so far, inasmuch as it provides for 
commitments and obligations on aspects traditionally left outside the scope of FTAs, including investment 
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(through establishment), non-tariff barriers, competition and state aid, public procurement and intellectual 
property rights.  
Through the agreement, parties establish a free trade area on goods, services, establishment and 
‘associated rules’ (Article 1.1).  The aim of the agreement is to liberalise trade in goods and services, in 
accordance with, respectively, GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V (Article 1.2).  In addition, the objectives 
include promoting competition in the parties’ economies; liberalising government procurement; protecting 
intellectual property; and contributing to the expansion of world trade by, inter alia, removing barriers. 
Services are dealt with under Chapter 7, entitled ‘Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce’.  
This chapter provides the scope and definitions of the framework applicable to services, establishment and 
electronic commerce.  It also includes provisions on cross-border supply of services (Section B), establishment 
(Section C), and temporary presence of natural persons for business (Section D).  
The structure of the services and establishment chapter differs from the GATS template in a number of 
aspects.  However, the terminology employed by the parties is widely taken from the GATS, including those areas 
which are not currently covered by the WTO (establishment in non-services sectors).  Of specific interest here, 
Chapter 7 includes a section (Section E) on ‘Regulatory framework’, which aims, through a set of provisions of 
general application and sector-specific disciplines, to enhance regulatory cooperation by strengthened 
transparency provisions and regulatory dialogue, and regulatory convergence through mutual recognition or 
minimum harmonisation.  The provisions of general application cater for mutual recognition, transparency, 
domestic regulation and governance.  Sector-specific provisions are included for computer services (Sub-section 
B), postal and courier services (Sub-section C), telecommunications services (Sub-section D), financial services 
(Sub-section E) and maritime transport (Sub-section F).  Electronic commerce is dealt with in Section F of 
Chapter 7, with parties agreeing to promote the development of electronic commerce through regulatory 
cooperation (Article 7.49).  
Other chapters in the FTA touch upon the issues of competition, transparency and dispute settlement 
and are relevant to services trade as they apply horizontally throughout the whole agreement.  The relationship 
between the specific provisions contained in Chapter 7 and the other provisions of general application is, in most 
cases, clarified in Chapter 7. For example, the transparency obligation contained in Article 7.22 builds upon the 
transparency mechanism of general application established in Chapter 12 of the agreement, which is expressly 
recalled. Another example is provided by Article 7.45 on dispute settlement on financial services, according to 
which the general provisions on dispute settlement apply except as otherwise provided in the article.  
 
3.1 TRANSPARENCY 
The EU – Korea FTA includes a chapter devoted to transparency (Chapter 12) having general application.  In 
addition, a specific transparency article for services and establishment can be found in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 12 aims to create an efficient and predictable regulatory environment for economic operators, 
‘especially small ones’.  While reaffirming the parties’ commitments to the relevant WTO obligations, the 
provisions of Chapter 12 lay down a number of clarifications and improvements in terms of transparency, 
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consultation and a better administration of measures of general application, as they may have an impact on any 
matter covered by the FTA.  The scope of the general transparency mechanism covers ‘measures of general 
application’, which comprise any general or abstract act, procedure, interpretation or other requirement, including 
non-binding measures.  It does not however include rulings that apply to a particular person.29 A publication 
provision requires parties to ensure that such measures of general application are readily available to ‘interested 
persons’ in a non-discriminatory manner via an officially designated medium, and in such a manner as to enable 
interested persons and the other party to become acquainted with them; to provide an explanation of the 
objective of, and rationale for, such measures; and to allow for sufficient time between publication and entry into 
force of such measures, taking ‘due account’ of the requirements of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and 
proportionality. 30  ‘Interested persons’ are natural and legal persons that may be subject to any rights or 
obligations under measures of general application, which require that private parties and public utilities figure 
among the beneficiaries of this obligation.  
The general transparency mechanism contains no obligation for parties to ‘publish in advance’ measures 
of general application.  Parties are simply required to ‘endeavor’ to publish in advance proposed measures of 
general application.  When such advanced publication occurs, parties must provide opportunities for interested 
persons to comment, allowing, in particular, sufficient time for comments to be transmitted.  The softer language 
(i.e., endeavor) applies to the consideration that parties must take of the comments provided by interested 
persons on proposed measures.  
Chapter 12 requires the establishment and maintenance of appropriate mechanisms (such as enquiry or 
contact points) for responding to enquiries from interested persons.31 This obligation covers measures of general 
application which may have an impact on matters covered by the FTA, and which are both proposed or in force, 
as well as the way in which they would be applied. There appears to be no clear obligation to provide for answers 
to such enquires.  The relevant article clarifies that where responses are provided, they are for information 
purposes only, and are not definitive or legally binding.  There is an obligation for parties to promptly provide 
information and respond to questions pertaining to any actual or proposed measure that are transmitted by the 
requesting party (regardless of whether the requesting party has been previously notified of that measure). This 
obligation applies to parties only, thus establishing a double standard on this particular aspect of transparency 
(one for interested persons, and one for the parties to the agreement).  There is also an obligation to endeavor to 
identify or create contact points for interested persons of the other party, with the aim of seeking to ‘effectively 
resolve’ problems that may arise from the application of measures of general application.  Such a process should 
be ‘easily accessible, time-bound, result-oriented and transparent’.32 There is no further detail on the profile of 
such a mechanism, but the wording of Article 12.4 suggests that it may act as a non-judicial means for the swift 
solution of (technical) obstacles and hurdles created by the application of ‘measures of general application’. This 
represents a novelty in EU FTA’s, although comparable mechanisms have been seen in agreements between 
Asian countries.33  
The agreement’s transparency chapter includes two articles on administrative proceedings, and reviews 
and appeals of administrative action relating to matters covered by the FTA.  The administrative proceeding 
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provision34 requires parties to endeavor to provide interested persons notice of the initiation of a proceeding and 
afford such persons reasonable opportunity to present facts and arguments in support of their positions, in so far 
as time, the nature of the proceeding and the public interest permit.  Each party must also provide an impartial 
review of an administrative action relating to matters covered by the agreement, and must ensure that parties to 
the proceedings are provided with the right to (i) a reasonable opportunity to support or defend their respective 
positions and (ii) a decision based on evidence and submission of records or, where required by its law, the 
record compiled by the administrative authority.35  
As in the KORUS agreement, one of the most interesting aspects of the general regulation on 
transparency under the EU – Korea FTA is the extension of some transparency requirements to private persons.  
In addition, the inclusion of non-binding measures within the scope of the mechanism allows greater scrutiny and 
representations to be made over instruments such as governmental guidelines and ‘best practices’.  The 
provisions on administrative proceedings are generally aimed at ensuring consistency, impartiality and 
reasonableness of administrative action, but fail to set binding requirements on the notice to be given to 
interested persons.  More stringent are the provisions on reviews and appeals, which include a standard on the 
impartiality of the office in charge of reviews, other due process requirements and a provision on enforcement.  
A dedicated provision on ‘Regulatory quality and performance and good administrative behavior’ calls for 
cooperation in the promotion of regulatory quality and performance, including the exchange of information and 
best practices on the parties’ respective regulatory reform processes, and impact assessment.  This provision is 
of relevance inasmuch as it may de facto provide additional context for transparency and representations in the 
regulatory reform processes framework.  Finally, a non-discrimination standard requires parties to apply 
transparency standards to interested persons of the other party no less favorable than those accorded to its own 
interested persons, to the interested persons of any third country or to any third country, whichever is best.36 
An additional services and establishment-specific article on ‘transparency and confidential information’ is 
found in Chapter 7 of the agreement in the section devoted to ‘Regulatory Framework’.37 The provision clarifies 
the scope of transparency requirements in the area of services and establishment, and requires parties, through 
the general mechanism provided for in Chapter 12 of the agreement, to respond promptly to all requests by the 
other Party for specific information on: (i) international agreements or arrangements (including mutual recognition 
agreements), which affect matters falling within the services chapter; and (ii) standards or licensing and 
certification criteria to which services suppliers may be subjected.  The same article provides for enhanced 
transparency standards in case the supply of a service is subject to an application procedure.  Such disciplines 
are addressed to the relevant regulatory authorities, which must (i) make publicly available the requirements for 
completing applications relating to the supply of services; (ii) upon request, inform the applicant of the status of its 
application, and notify the applicant, without ‘undue delay’, of the need for additional information; and (iii) to the 
extent possible, inform the applicant for the reasons for denial.  Regulatory authorities are to take a decision on 
the application of an investor or a cross-border supplier within 120 days, and notify the applicant without undue 
delay when more time is needed for a decision to be to finalised. 
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Sector-specific provisions 
The agreement has one sector-specific transparency provision that can be found in the regulatory framework for 
financial services (Section E, Sub-section E).  A provision there requires parties to promote regulatory 
transparency in financial services.  The obligation follows on parties’ recognition of the importance of 
transparency in financial regulations and policies in facilitating access to each other’s markets.38 This provision of 
‘soft law’ does not appear to add any lex specialis to the general transparency framework as it applies only to 
financial services.  
Summarising, the transparency framework established under the EU – Korea FTA provides for an 
obligation to publish ‘measures of general application’, including making such measures readily available to 
interested persons, providing for an explanation of the objective of, and rationale for, the measure, and allowing 
for sufficient time between publication and entry into force.  One of the most innovative aspects of the framework 
can be found in the involvement of private parties within this mechanism, as well as the inclusion of non-binding 
rules within the scope of the transparency obligation.  Softer language is applied in relation to ‘advanced 
publication’ and the related opportunity to put forward comments and have them addressed.  This general 
framework affects trade in services and establishment, with the clarifications seen above.  Of particular relevance 
are the disciplines set forth for regulatory authorities evaluating cross-border suppliers’ and investors’ applications 
to provide services.  These establish clear standards of transparency and procedural fairness which benefit 
services suppliers and investors.   
 
3.2 Regulatory cooperation 
The provisions falling within ‘regulatory cooperation’ are one of the most interesting aspects of the EU – Korea 
FTA.  As mentioned above, Chapter 7 of the agreement devotes all of Section E to ‘Regulatory framework’.  
Through a set of general provisions and sector-specific disciplines, this framework aims to enhance regulatory 
cooperation through regulatory dialogue, and to foster regulatory convergence through mutual recognition or 
harmonisation of minimum common standards in specific sectors. 
 
3.2.1 DOMESTIC REGULATION 
While domestic regulation provisions are relevant for the category of regulatory cooperation, they also contain 
features which are important for transparency (i.e., paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7.23, which mirror, respectively, 
paragraphs 3 and 2(a) of GATS Article VI).  The relevant article frames the relationship between domestic 
regulation and services trade as it applies to the FTA, by requiring parties to ‘endeavor to ensure’, as appropriate 
for individual sectors, that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards 
and licensing requirements are ‘based on objective criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the 
service’; and ‘in case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of a service’. This ‘soft 
language’ follows the common intention to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade, as 
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well as the recognition that parties maintain the ‘right to regulate’ and to introduce new regulations on the supply 
of services in order to meet public policy objectives. 
No relevant body is established to develop common horizontal disciplines or minimum standards for 
specific sectors. The provision’s low level of ambition is linked to the results of the ongoing GATS negotiations 
under paragraph 4 of GATS Article VI, or of any similar negotiations undertaken in other multilateral fora. Any 
future deeper commitment on the domestic regulation framework between the EU and Korea appears conditional 
to the achievement of (meaningful) results within the multilateral context.  
The provisions of general application included in Section E on ‘Regulatory framework’ also contain a 
provision on ‘Governance’.  Parties are to ensure, to the extent practicable, that internationally agreed standards 
on the regulation of financial services sectors and on the fight against tax evasion are implemented and applied in 
their territory. The relevant article39 lists some of these internationally agreed standards, but the list is by no 
means exhaustive. The aim of this provision is to ensure that the relevant international framework is equally 
applied and implemented by the parties.  Although it represents a (further) form of harmonisation pursued by the 
EU and Korea, i.e., through reference to internationally agreed standards, the non-exhaustive nature of the list of 
internationally agreed standards raises questions as to the exact scope of this provision.  
 
Sector-specific provisions 
Sector-specific regulatory cooperation is anticipated in the EU – Korea FTA on computer services, postal and 
courier services, telecommunications services, financial services and maritime services. For electronic 
commerce, a separate section of the agreement lays out the principles, objectives and content for cooperation on 
regulatory issues. Regulatory cooperation in these areas takes different approaches, ranging from clarifications 
on the scope and content of the services (computer services; maritime services) to minimum regulatory 
convergence through the provision of sector-specific frameworks, whether to be developed in the future or 
already laid out in the agreement, containing regulatory principles, including pro-competitive clauses (postal and 
courier; telecoms). 
The aim of these regulatory frameworks appears to be that of including binding provisions on the 
regulatory environments affecting the concessions exchanged and avoiding their impairment by uncertainty as to 
the scope of the commitments, or by practices, restrictions and domestic regulations commonly regarded as 
affecting trade in the services sectors concerned. The relevant experience taken into account by the parties 
includes, notably, that offered by the WTO, in which the two signatories attempt to solve obstacles to trade in 
services by either reflecting sectoral plurilateral disciplines agreed within the multilateral fora, or taking stock of 
on-going debates and tabled negotiation proposals.  
For computer services, parties have clarified the classification and scope of such services incorporating 
elements of a tabled common proposal, together with other WTO Members in 2005,40 and, in particular, of the 
‘Understanding on the scope of coverage of CPC 84’,41 co-sponsored by the EU and other WTO Members, but 
not Korea.42  
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The sole article dealing with postal and courier services requires the Trade Committee, the governing 
body established under the agreement comprising the parties’ representatives, to set out the principles of the 
regulatory framework applicable to those services. The intention is to develop a framework that ensures that 
competition in postal and courier services is not restricted to a monopoly, following principles aimed at addressing 
anti-competitive practices, universal service, individual licences and the nature of the regulatory authority. The 
inclusion of pro-competitive and pro-regulatory principles in the postal and courier sector along the lines of what 
has been developed for the telecommunications services through the ‘Reference Paper on Telecommunications 
Services’ has been proposed by the EU in the context of the stalled DDA negotiations.43 The agreement on future 
inclusion of such disciplines in the EU – Korea FTA, to be developed within three years after its entry into force, 
shows a common approach by the two signatories on the sector’s regulation and identifies the scope for 
harmonisation through regulatory convergence on core issues.44 
The regulatory framework on telecommunications is quite detailed and furthers, in certain respects, the 
one provided by the WTO ‘Reference Paper on Telecommunications Services’, to which both parties are 
signatories.  For example, additional transparency requirements are anticipated for the ‘regulatory authority’ of 
telecommunications. New disciplines are included on the authorisation to provide telecommunications services.  
In particular, the relevant article stipulates that the provision of telecommunications services shall, to the extent 
practicable, be authorised following a simplified procedure. 45 It also provides a potential licensing requirement for 
attributions of frequencies, numbers and rights of way, but stipulates that the terms and conditions for such a 
license be made publicly available. Where a license is required, all the licensing criteria and the reasonable 
period of time required for a decision on the application to be made must be made publicly available; the reasons 
for a denial shall be made known in writing to the applicant upon request; and the license fees required must not 
exceed the administrative costs normally incurred in the management, control and enforcement of the applicable 
licenses. License fees do not include payments for auction, tendering or other non-discriminatory means of 
awarding concessions, or mandated contributions to universal service provision. 
A specific provision deals with number portability, requiring parties to ensure that suppliers of public 
telecommunications transport services provide number portability, to the extent that is technically feasible, and on 
reasonable terms and conditions. Lastly, Article 7.36 of the EU – Korea FTA deals with recourse and review and 
the applied standard for the resolution of telecommunications disputes. In particular, parties are required to 
ensure that service suppliers have recourse to a regulatory authority (or other relevant body) of the other party to 
resolve disputes between suppliers or between suppliers and users. Further standards are envisaged where 
disputes arise between suppliers of public telecommunications transport networks or services. Here parties must 
ensure (upon request of either party to the dispute) that a binding decision is issued to solve the dispute with the 
‘shortest delay possible’ and, in any case, within a reasonable period of time. Article 7.36 further provides for the 
appeal of such decisions of regulatory authorities (including the standard of impartiality of the appeal body in 
relation to specific disputes) and for judicial review.  
As in the telecommunications sector, the regulatory framework for financial services reflects, with some 
differences, the one agreed within the WTO framework.  For example, the definitions incorporate both those listed 
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in the Annex on Financial Services and the WTO Understanding on Financial Commitments. Other WTO 
elements have either been expanded or their scope has been clarified, such as the provision on self-regulatory 
organisation, which not only demands the anticipated WTO national treatment requirement but also an MFN 
obligation. The agreement also inserts new provisions such as, inter alia, the loose provision on transparency in 
financial regulations and on prudential carve-outs seen above. A set of specific exceptions are also anticipated for 
financial services.  
For international maritime services, the relevant regulatory framework provides a set of definition and 
principles, as well as a set of obligations concerning access to the parties’ international maritime markets and 
trades, the establishment of international maritime services suppliers for the other party (which must be granted 
under conditions no less favourable than those accorded to domestic services suppliers or those of any third 
party), and for non-discriminatory treatment in the use of port services.  
As mentioned above, electronic commerce is dealt with in a separate section (Section F). Here the 
approach chosen by the parties is that of cooperation on regulatory issues. In particular, the parties agreed on a 
common set of objectives and principles, including the applicability of the WTO to measures affecting electronic 
commerce.  Neither party is to impose customs duties on deliveries by electronic means. Regulatory cooperation 
continues through dialogue on regulatory matters, which are listed in Article 7.49 of the agreement and include, 
notably, issues concerning facilitation of trade through electronic commerce and the protection of consumers. 
 
3.2.2 MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
Article 7.21 of the EU – Korea FTA provides the institutional framework and the procedures for parties to 
negotiate mutual recognition agreements. The focus of the mechanism is on the criteria applied for the 
authorisation, licensing, operation and certification of services suppliers and investors in services sectors, 
particularly in professional services, the fulfillment of which is conditional for the provision of the service. The 
development of mutual recognition agreements relies on the parties’ initiative, and on action by the relevant 
representative professional bodies, which ‘shall be encouraged’ by the parties to jointly develop and provide 
recommendations to the Trade Committee. Once the Trade Committee receives the recommendations developed 
by the professional bodies, it will, within a reasonable time, review them to determine if they are consistent with 
the provision of the agreement. If the recommendations have been found to be consistent, and a sufficient ‘level 
of correspondence’ is found between the relevant regulations of the parties, they are then required to negotiate a 
mutual recognition agreement. A reference to the need to comply with the WTO Agreement (and, in particular, 
with GATS Article VII) suggests that the Council for Trade in Services must be informed of any mutual recognition 
agreement negotiated by the parties.  
A Working Group on MRA (mutual recognition agreements), operating under the Trade Committee and 
composed of the parties’ representatives, is established to consider, for services in general as well as for 
individual services, (i) procedures for encouraging the relevant representative bodies in the parties’ territories to 
consider their interest in mutual recognition; and (ii) procedures for fostering the development of 
recommendations on mutual recognition by the relevant representative bodies. Such procedures have not yet 
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been established.  And, there is no preliminary indication of the sectors that will be opened to mutual recognition. 
It is likely these will be agreed at a later stage, in the context of developing the ‘procedures’ referred to above, 
and when a clear indication is provided by the ‘relevant representative professional bodies entrusted to manage 
the process. 
The relatively soft approach of this mechanism, which relies on the initiative of the professional bodies, is 
balanced by an obligation upon parties to ‘encourage’ such bodies to jointly develop and provide 
recommendations for mutual recognition. The efficacy of the mutual recognition mechanism will depend on the 
modalities and procedures through which professional bodies are encouraged, as well as on the actual ‘level of 
correspondence’ between the relevant regulations of the parties, which must be judged by the Trade Committee 
to be ‘sufficient’. The agreement does not provide any criteria that would determine when the level of 
correspondence between relevant professional regulations is considered ‘sufficient’. There is, therefore, an 
element of discretion left entirely to the parties. 
The provision includes an obligation for a party, having entered into an agreement or arrangement on 
the recognition of prudential measures, to afford ‘adequate opportunity’ for the other party to negotiate its 
accession to such agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones with it, under circumstances in 
which there would be equivalent regulation, oversight, implementation of such regulation and, if appropriate, 
procedures concerning the sharing of information. Where recognition is accorded autonomously by a party, this 
must afford adequate opportunity for the other party to demonstrate that such circumstances exist. 46  The 
provision on recognition reflects an equivalent provision included in paragraph 3 of the Annex on Financial 
Services. 
3.3 COMPETITION POLICY 
The EU – Korea FTA has a chapter on Competition (Chapter 11). This contains provisions on competition (i.e., 
antitrust, public enterprises and state monopolies) and subsidies. Parties commit to a set of core principles, 
including: (i) to apply their respective competition laws, which are listed and defined for both parties;47 and (ii) to 
maintain comprehensive competition laws which effectively address restrictive agreements, concerted practices 
and abuse of dominant market positions by one or more enterprises, and which provide effective control over 
concentrations between enterprises.48 A list of activities restricting competition deemed incompatible with the 
‘proper functioning’ of the agreement is provided, and it includes agreements between enterprises, abuse of 
dominant position, and concentrations between enterprises which impede effective competition. Parties 
committed to maintaining an authority (or authorities) responsible for the implementation of their respective 
competition laws, and to make available, upon request from the other party, public information concerning 
competition law enforcement activities and legislation. A provision states that parties recognise the importance of 
applying their respective competition laws in a transparent, timely and non-discriminatory manner, respecting the 
principles of procedural fairness and the rights of defence of the parties concerned.  
Two provisions refer to, respectively, public enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special rights or 
exclusive rights49 and state monopolies.50 The agreement requires that, with respect to the former, neither party 
shall apply or maintain any measure contrary to principles of protection of competition laid out in Article 11.1, and 
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that they be subject to the parties’ competition laws, inasmuch as the application of these principles and 
competition laws does not obstruct the performance of the particular task assigned to them. In the case of state 
monopolies, the agreement requires each party to adjust state monopolies of a commercial character to ensure 
that no discriminatory measure – i.e., measures that do not comply with national treatment, as set out in the 
agreement – regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between natural or 
legal persons of the parties. 
An article on cooperation stresses the importance of cooperation and coordination between the parties’ 
competition authorities in furthering effective competition law enforcement.51 There is an obligation for parties to 
cooperate in their respective enforcement policies, and in the enforcement of their respective competition laws, 
including through enforcement cooperation, notification, consultation and exchange of non-confidential 
information based on the Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of 
Korea concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities that was signed in May 2009 (2009 Competition 
Cooperation Agreement). 
Compared to a number of free trade agreements, the provisions on competition are quite far-reaching. 
However, under the agreement, parties are prevented from resorting to the dispute settlement mechanism for any 
matter arising in relation to the provisions on competition described above. A consultation mechanism is provided, 
in the absence of more specific rules in the 2009 Competition Cooperation Agreement, for parties to make 
representations, foster mutual understanding, or address specific matters arising in competition provisions.   
The subsidies section does not apply, for the most part, to services. In this area, parties ‘shall use their best 
endeavours’ to develop rules applicable to services, taking into account developments at the multilateral level, 
and to exchange information at the request of a party. The first exchange of views on subsidies to services is to 
take place within three years after the entry into force of the agreement.  
 
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS / DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The EU – Korea FTA is managed by a Trade Committee, comprising representatives of the EU and Korea. The 
Trade Committee meets once a year (in Brussels or Seoul alternately) or upon either party’s request, and is co-
chaired by the Minister for Trade of Korea and the EU Trade Commissioner.52 The Trade Committee must, inter 
alia, supervise and facilitate the implementation of the agreement and the work of all specialised committees, 
working groups and established bodies, and seek appropriate ways to solve matters which might arise in areas 
covered by the agreement, or disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application of the agreement. 
The agreement also establishes a number of specialised committees and working groups, under the auspices of 
the Trade Committee. Of relevance here, an example of the former is the Committee on Trade in Services, 
Establishment and Electronic Commerce; an example of the latter is the Working Group on MRA. The Trade 
Committee may also decide to establish and delegate responsibilities to specialised committees, working groups 
and other bodies.  
The EU – Korea FTA has a dispute settlement mechanism which applies to any dispute concerning the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the agreement, unless otherwise specified53 and is provided in 
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Chapter 14 of the agreement. The mechanism is largely inspired by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
with a consultations phase, an arbitration procedure, provisions on compliance (including a ‘compliance 
arbitration’) and ‘temporary’ remedies in case of non-compliance. The time-limits that apply at various stages of 
the dispute are shorter than the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, and there is no appellate review. A 
provision allows for the review of ‘measures taken to comply’ after the suspension of obligations.   
The arbitration panel is an ad hoc panel composed of three arbitrators from a list of 15 individuals to be 
established by the Trade Committee. It interprets the provisions of the agreement in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Interestingly, it is specified that where an obligation is identical to 
an obligation under the WTO agreement, the arbitration panel is to adopt an interpretation which is consistent 
with any relevant interpretation established under WTO DSB rulings. The arbitration panel is to make every effort 
to reach a decision by consensus. When consensus cannot be reached, the issue is to be decided by majority 
vote. The rulings are binding on the parties.54 A specific provision deals with the relationship of this mechanism 
with recourse under the WTO dispute settlement.55 
A sector-specific dispute settlement mechanism applies to the settlement of disputes on financial 
services subject to the specific rules provided for in Chapter 7. These act as lex specialis over the general 
framework described above. The specific carve outs relate to the list of individuals that are to serve as panellists 
in disputes relating to financial services (a separate list must be established by the Trade Committee with experts 
on financial services) and the composition of the panels (which must be drawn from the mentioned specific list).  
They also provide specific rules for remedies in case of noncompliance in disputes on measures also affecting 
financial services.56 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
This study was drawn narrowly to consider only domestic regulatory issues as they apply to trade in services in 
only two trade agreements. This narrow approach allows more focus on the provisions at hand, and provides a 
more detailed description of what the FTA parties are attempting to achieve and how they are intending to 
achieve it in their regulatory approaches. Thus, to the extent that other regulatory mechanisms are specially 
tuned to other trade subjects of the agreement, such as trade in goods or technical barriers, this survey 
necessarily misses those innovations.  At the same time, there are general chapters in these agreements that are 
relevant to all (or most) of the subjects of the agreements.  For example, transparency and competition chapters 
are provided by both of these agreements, first generally but capable of being tuned somewhat in the services 
sections of the agreements. This ‘general to specific’ approach is not apparent in the ‘regulatory cooperation’ area 
where the frameworks for establishing mutual recognition are tuned to services trade from the outset.  
We also see the inclusion in both agreements of the same subject areas within larger fields of transparency and 
regulatory cooperation. For transparency, both agreements have provisions on publication, right to comment, 
right of inquiry and response, and the treatment of parties in administrative actions. For regulatory cooperation, 
both agreements provide for a type of assessment standard for domestic regulations, and both address mutual 
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recognition for service providers. With this as a basis, we note some of the subtleties in the different sections 
treated.  
 
4.1 TRANSPARENCY 
4.1.1 PUBLICATION AND RIGHT TO COMMENT 
Both agreements require that measures of general application be published and that an explanation of the 
objectives and rational be provided. Both also require a reasonable time between publication and entry into force. 
The KORUS agreement has a clear obligation for any matter covered by it to be published prior to adoption, 
together with an obligation to accord interested persons and the other party a reasonable opportunity to 
comment. It also sets a timing benchmark of 40 days prior to the date for receiving comments and lays out the 
burden on the party opting to address comments in its final decision. The EU – Korea FTA is less rigorous on this 
aspect, maintaining the obligation of publication only for measures adopted, with a ‘best endeavour’ provision for 
proposed measures. When a party does publish in advance, interested persons are entitled to comment and must 
be given sufficient time for comments to be transmitted. In this area, the KORUS agreement appears more 
dedicated to drawing foreign operators into the administrative process of rulemaking. While neither agreement 
allows discrimination between domestic and foreign operators, the KORUS agreement is more committed to the 
process of participation itself. 
 
4.1.2 RIGHT OF INQUIRY AND RESPONSE  
The EU agreement uses a ‘split approach’ on the right of inquiry and the obligation to respond. Whether or not a 
proposed or adopted matter has been published, a party has a right to request and receive information from the 
other. However, there is no obligation to respond to inquiries from interested persons. The KORUS agreement 
alternatively provides this right in the dedicated cross-border services chapter (not the general chapter) and, for 
subjects in that narrower scope, provides the obligation to respond to inquiries from interested persons. The EU 
agreement indicates that when a response is made, it is for information purposes and not legally binding on the 
party. The legal effect of a response is not stated in the KORUS agreement.  Other and subtler differences 
include some indicative benchmarking for time in the KORUS agreement, and some additional detailing on the 
making of a record in the EU agreement. This agreement also defines ‘interested person’ while the KORUS 
agreement does not.  
 
4.1.3 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS 
Both agreements detail rights of participation and due process in administrative actions including rights to notice, 
participation, and a right of impartial review.  
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4.1.4 SECTOR-SPECIFIC TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS 
The KORUS agreement has sector-specific transparency provisions in both telecommunications and financial 
services, the first emphasising rule making and both putting some focus on the treatment of licensing 
applications. The EU – Korea FTA has a softer provision encouraging transparency for financial services.  
 
4.1.5 TRANSPARENCY CONCLUSIONS 
While both agreements address the subject of transparency, there are small differences in rights and obligations 
established throughout. Some of these differences simply reflect an emphasis on one point or another, and some 
can be said to be in the realm of softer law, and therefore perhaps not easily made actionable or clearly 
interpreted. But not all the provisions in transparency subjects are that soft, and where there are some clear legal 
rights being accorded, one has to assume that these are intended to be actionable.  
This raises a question about how a party common to multiple agreements, in this case Korea, responds 
in its own domestic order to the different approaches in play with each separate signatory.  Does it result in a 
complex and possibly fragmented domestic regulatory environment, or in a somewhat unified regulatory 
approach?  One can imagine that the ‘easy’ way to obtain a more coherent result is to take the obligations from 
either agreement that set the higher thresholds of conduct and are also clear enough to be actionable, and then 
apply that process or standard through the domestic regulatory system and thereby extend the benefit to all, or at 
least to the signatory parties of the other agreement. For example, if one agreement sets a benchmark for a 
specific number of days between publication and closing for comments, this could be a standard fairly easily 
integrated into the overall regulatory approach, i.e., ‘we now use the 40 day indicator and consider that 
reasonable for all other agreements whether other agreements specify it or not.’ This would make a common 
regulatory regime.  
Some other aspects are not so easily transferred.  For example, these two agreements vary in 
designating the right to receive advance notice of a proposed rule and the obligation to respond to inquiries; in 
one, parties have a right to a response but interested persons do not. If one agreement does not provide that right 
for interested persons, then the common signatory (Korea) could arguably bifurcate its treatment of its responses 
since it has not bargained to take up the obligation to one of these other signatories. After all, why extend the 
treatment if the other side is not also taking on the same obligation? 
On this particular example the function of a specific MFN clause in the EU – Korea FTA, which is not 
provided as a general right in either agreement, would also appear to have an impact as it extends better 
treatment offered interested persons (not parties) of any third country in respect of transparency standards. 
However one might choose to interpret the scope of this clause, it would appear that both Korea and the EU 
assumed an obligation to screen all of their trade agreements in order to locate points of preferential regulatory 
treatment, and then to actively extend that treatment to the other party to the agreement, or at least be prepared 
to do so if and when the other party invokes the clause.  
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Whether MFN might apply to an agreement or not, one can sense the complexity of the subtle variations 
in regulatory approaches and note that the resulting environment is not limited to the three parties discussed 
here, since all of them have more than only one or two of these agreements including, of course, Korea. 
4.2 REGULATORY COOPERATION  
4.2.1 DOMESTIC REGULATION  
Both agreements treat standards for assessing domestic regulations in their respective services chapters, with 
the KORUS agreement less generalised in providing this only in the chapter for cross-border services. Both 
agreements provide that service requirements be based on ‘objective criteria’ and not be themselves ‘restrictions 
on the supply of a service’; both thus apply two of the criteria also provided in GATS Article VI. Both agreements 
pose these criteria ‘with a view’ to ensuring that service requirements are not ‘unnecessary barriers to trade’. 
Neither of them attempts to formulate a necessity test, i.e., a provision that would say, ‘requirements shall not be 
more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.’57 One can conclude from this that for 
general domestic regulatory treatment, these provisions are arguably ‘GATS minus’ in that they do not include the 
explicit use of a necessity test that would call for assessment of lesser restrictive measures as a means of either 
validating or invalidating the regulation.58 This more tentative construction is confirmed by provisions in both 
agreements that affirm the intent to translate any results from the GATS negotiations on Article VI into their 
respective FTA agreements.  Rather than forming a new approach irrespective of the GATS process, the 
agreements take a ‘wait and see’ approach to what happens in the GATS process.  
One might remark that if an FTA was going to go ‘deeper’ than applicable WTO regimes, then the 
provision of a test for assessing the balance point of a regulation should be an instrumental part of it. One the 
other hand, if such a test were refined in one these FTAs, then any dispute settlement issue arising from it would 
also not be presented in the dispute settlement forum of the WTO, since the WTO does not yet have such a test. 
That would leave the development of a key aspect of the developing regulatory trade law to be developed only 
within the confines of an ad hoc arbitral body system, and without the possibility of clarification of interpretation by 
a standing body on appeal. Given this, one can understand why the parties might prefer to wait and see how the 
GATS developments eventually emerge.59  
 
4.2.2 SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION PROVISIONS  
While both agreements use a very similar approach to general regulation, the EU agreement with Korea 
demonstrates a much more pro-active sector-specific agenda than does the KORUS agreement. The latter has 
three sectoral chapters of which only telecommunications sets out criteria for regulatory treatment, posing the use 
of a balancing test between the right of regulators to prescribe technologies and the need for service suppliers to 
choose their favoured technology of supply. In contrast, the EU agreement poses activities in regulation in 
telecommunications, e-commerce, computer services, postal and courier services, financial services and 
maritime services. These range from clarification of the scope of the service in question, to setting out goals for 
minimum regulatory convergence, to affirming pro-competitive approaches and non-discrimination. 
Telecommunications and financial services use the existing WTO GATS agreements on those subjects and add 
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to them. The treatment for postal and courier services draws principles from the existing WTO 
telecommunications framework and uses those for setting objectives for minimum regulatory convergence. 
Computer and maritime services both provide definitions of scope and classification that are in discussion but not 
yet settled in WTO law.  
Here, the integration style of the EU is apparent. While the general treatment of regulation may not be so 
advanced, the sector activities are not only ‘WTO plus’ but also reflect a bit of ‘EU minus’ in at least broaching the 
idea of common principles and minimum regulatory convergence, coupled with a process intended to move it 
along over time. In this sense the services treatment in this agreement can be characterised as ‘very regulatory’ 
in nature.  
 
4.3 MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
The provisions in each agreement for recognition of qualifications in professional services show a close, if not 
nearly identical, approach. Both rely on a voluntary system of developing recognition over time, with the 
establishment of a working group operating under the governing Joint Committee / Trade Committee with the 
power to recommend procedures for encouraging professional bodies and for fostering its development. In both, 
the governing committee can accept recommendations and approve them, which has the effect of the parties 
encouraging their own professional bodies to establish the basis for recognition. There are minor differences on 
display where, for example, the KORUS agreement lists three sectors targeted for further action, and the EU – 
Korea FTA’s reference to GATS Article VII and notification of recognition agreements. This otherwise high degree 
of alignment between the two systems is carried through in the financial provisions of each agreement which call 
for the possibility of recognising prudential measures.  
While there is nothing mandatory about the recognition provisions of the agreements, they do set out a 
way forward of an institutional character, albeit one that relies on voluntary acts. The potential firmness of such a 
system is enhanced somewhat by the procedures developed by a working group and the ‘decision’ to move 
forward that can be generated by the governing bodies of the agreement. Given the somewhat less than 
productive history of voluntary recognition systems, one can question whether this type of approach is robust 
enough to generate the gains that are possible for professional services recognition. At the same time, the 
process requires the participation of numerous regulatory participants and professional bodies both public and 
private. In such an environment it is easy to imagine how a more mandatory ‘top down’ system could be 
developed and how it could take hold at agency levels and function institutionally. If these more voluntary 
systems prove unsuccessful over time, there is the implication that recognition in free-trade agreements remains 
aspirational in the absence of stronger and on-going rulemaking and of enforcement authorities. 
 
4.4 COMPETITION  
With a few differences, this regime also displays a high degree of alignment, particularly given the EU’s history of 
emphasising competition in its trade agreements, with the US perhaps less so. This may be because the EU and 
Korea have an existing bilateral competition agreement and, arguably, not much can be added to this trade 
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agreement other than prescribing anti-competitive practices and linking them to the agreement as incompatible 
with its ‘proper functioning’.  The US agreement does not commit to this linkage, but it is a minor point in the 
absence of any formulation on regional competition policy.  Both agreements address some conditions for public 
enterprises and those having special or exclusive rights, or state and designated monopolies in the KORUS 
agreement’s terminology.  
The generally close alignment of the two agreements on this subject may also reflect the fact that all the 
parties have well developed and functioning competition laws and authorities. Thus, the EU – Korea FTA does 
not carry the types of provisions found in trade agreements with countries without developed competition 
authorities, in which the criteria for the national law is set and possible to inoke safeguards if the law is not 
enacted and made functional.60 The emphasis here is rather upon the maintenance of existing competition laws. 
Each agreement also has a cooperation provision with similar characteristics, both reciting the instruments of 
enforcement / mutual cooperation, notification, consultation and exchange of information , with the single 
difference that cooperation is stated as an obligatory activity in the EU – Korea agreement.   
Both agreements also treat, with some different terminology, public enterprises (EU) / state enterprises (US) and 
enterprises entrusted with special and exclusive rights (EU) / designated monopolies (EU and US). Both 
agreements prescribe a non-discrimination requirement for public / state enterprises. Both agreements refer 
designated monopolies to the operation of competition principles or law with only slight differences in the point of 
reference. The KORUS agreement is silent on the treatment of subsidies and the EU – Korea FTA exempts them 
from applying to services, both thus having the same effect of non-application. Similarly, matters falling under the 
competition chapter are exempt from dispute settlement in both agreements, except for a difference in the 
KORUS agreement which provides that provisions on state monopolies and designated monopolies are not 
exempt. Another difference between the agreements is the EU sector-specific provision for developing disciplines 
for postal and courier services and a reference to the WTO reference paper for the supply of telecommunications.  
One does not expect convergence on the details of competition law in assessing anti-competitive practices.  The 
emphasis is rather on cooperation among agencies in order to address practices which affect the markets of one 
or both of the parties. The provisions demonstrated by these two agreements do not go above (or below) what is 
normally seen in a modern free-trade area.   
 
4.5 INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS / DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
This is yet another area of very close alignment in the approach of both agreements. The governing committee of 
each (Trade Committee / Joint Committee) is composed at trade minister level and each has a quite similar, if not 
identical, set of powers, including the governance of other bodies established under the agreement and setting 
the point of reference for dispute settlement. Both meet yearly and in alternate locations. The dispute settlement 
sections for each agreement also have close alignment. Both use an ad hoc three-person panel procedure whose 
findings are given legal effect. Neither provides for an appeal process on questions of law. Both agreements 
provide for some additional criteria for panellists in disputes concerning financial services.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is such close alignment in the two agreements on the general approach to domestic regulation (i.e., the 
GATS Article VI subjects) - mutual recognition, competition law, and institutional matters - that one can imagine 
each signatory being quite comfortable with the provisions of the other parties’ agreement. Differences in 
scheduled commitments aside, one can imagine these elements extended to a plurilateral agreement between 
the three parties. This degree of convergence serves the common signatory Korea well, since what it engages on 
behalf of one party it engages on behalf of the other. These regimes then function as a single external ‘boiler 
plate’.  
A point in common on the substantive regimes listed immediately above is their overall lack of ambition 
in the sense of ‘deeper integration’. This is not to say that there are no elements present that provide for clear 
rights and obligations, but that the objectives set for results are set somewhat low or are non-prescribed. This is 
most apparent in the GATS VI (regulation) elements, in which both agreements avoid including necessity and (the 
possibility of) proportionality testing. For mutual recognition, the ‘process’ itself is more the point, and the ‘top 
down’ aspect of institutional motivation has a decidedly light touch. Whether this is effective for generating 
recognition agreements in the medium and longer term is another question. While the competition provisions are 
more or less typical of what one would expect to see in agreements among developed country signatories with 
functioning laws, there is an absence of effort to reach a deeper level of integration. No regional policy is 
attempting to be framed, there is no process of attempting convergence in the assessment criteria for anti-
competitive practices, and the cooperation mechanism, while provided as obligatory for one of the agreements, 
does not move beyond a recitation of common cooperation instruments. Aside from the application of dispute 
settlement procedures to the KORUS agreement’s categories of state monopolies and designated monopolies, 
the agreements preserve the discretion of national competition authorities.  
As a group (and institutional issues aside) we could say that these subjects are treated in a relatively 
‘shallow’ but ‘compatible’ manner. That said however, consider the nature of regulatory barriers. Agreements in 
these subject areas carry the tone of establishing an on-going relationship. The processes established, light as 
they are, reflect an approach to regulation that allows a cooperative relationship to develop over time and the 
parties to make of it what they choose. While this may not be ‘deep’ in the sense of binding common rules and 
procedures, this is not to say that it may not bear fruit. It depends on what the parties make of it over time. While 
one can be sceptical that multiple recognition agreements might emerge from these light provisions, one cannot 
discount the fact that a process is provided to allow them to emerge. 
  This leaves the subjects of transparency and sector-specific domestic regulation, the two areas where 
there is more detailing in the provisions, and consequently more apparent divergence between the agreements. 
For transparency, because these countries will not likely be adopting common standards or otherwise changing 
their own standards, enhanced transparency can be a means of limiting the impact of these regulatory 
differences. Together they lay out the ‘deeper’ in deep integration and also raise more questions of how domestic 
systems function to service different agreements. These two areas may be characterised as ‘deeper’ and 
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‘potentially less compatible’. The relationship element noted above is still present in these subject areas as well, 
but there is also a stronger reliance on clearer benchmarks.  
Finally, we look at the multilateral implications. For the softer areas, one can imagine these types of 
processes being engaged in larger groups of states in agreements designed to encourage ‘best practices’. 
However, the extent to which they succeed would have much to do with the same relationship aspect as noted 
above. Is this type of on-going cooperation possible in a larger and more disparate group of participants? 
Perhaps that is not a realistic expectation. For those deeper areas where some rules emerge, there may be a 
stronger argument for multilateral action. We have not chosen here to make a GATS most-favoured nation 
analysis of advanced transparency rules and regulatory sectoral treatments. But some of them may well affect the 
supply of a service and fall within the scope of the GATS general MFN obligation. More pertinent perhaps is the 
idea that regulatory systems are not that easily bifurcated for differential treatment. It may well be that when a 
regional party undertakes a transparency reform, this is likely to be extended to all as a matter of course. If so, 
then the larger trading system is benefitted. For those aspects that may be bifurcated, for example advance 
notice and the right to comment by private interested parties, such innovations could perhaps enter in to a larger 
discussion on generally enhancing GATS transparency. The same might be said for some of the advanced 
sectoral approaches, even while we acknowledge some of the sector approaches are built on GATS-annexed 
sectoral agreements.  Overall, that these agreements approach so many subjects in a similar manner may also 
have resonance. After all, repeated practice can be become custom.  
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THE CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE EU-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: INTERACTION BETWEEN 
VARIOUS LEVELS OF NORMATIVITY 
NICOLAS A. J. CROQUET*   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (‘EU’), its 27 Member States and the Republic of Korea signed a Free Trade Agreement 
(‘FTA’) on 6 October 2010 (‘EU-Korea FTA’) that is designed to have unlimited duration.1 This preferential trade 
agreement entered provisionally into force on 1 July 2011. Before the conclusion of the EU-Korea FTA, the EU 
had already signed several preferential trade agreements covering climate change per se. Their climate change 
provisions have fallen under an environmental protection heading, an energy heading or a combination of both, 
and have been accompanied by a dispute settlement mechanism ranging from a mere consultation procedure to 
arbitration proceedings.    
  Despite the EU-Korea FTA being presented as embodying a novel type of FTA by reason of its 
comprehensive nature,2 its direct climate change provisions still enjoy a low degree of normativity in soft law/hard 
law continuum due to their generality, looseness and conditional language, and given that their dispute 
settlement mechanism entails no judicial process and is limited to consultations and mediation. The soft law 
nature of the FTA’s direct climate change provisions stands in contrast with the higher degree of normativity 
attached to its indirect climate change provisions: (i) provisions on tariff schedules and the elimination of customs 
duties in import of goods; (ii) specific energy services commitments; (iii) general exceptions to the liberalization of 
trade in goods; (iv) general exceptions to trade in services, freedom of establishment and electronic commerce; 
(v) technical barriers to trade; and (vi) transparency standards and national procedural guarantees. The low level 
of normativity attached to the EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions is also counterbalanced by the 
medium level of normativity characterizing the Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the 
EU and its Member States and South Korea of 10 May 2010 (‘2010 Cooperation Agreement’) that is not yet in 
force.3 In short, the climate change relations between the EU and the Republic of Korea are tainted by different 
levels of normativity that revolve around the precision of their contractual arrangements and the judicialization of 
their dispute settlement mechanism.  
  These different levels of normativity in the soft law/hard law scale will influence the way in which the EU-
Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions, its indirect climate change provisions and the 2010 Cooperation 
Agreement normatively interact. The FTA’s direct and indirect climate change provisions as well as the 2010 
Cooperation Agreement have regulated climate change at different functional levels: (i) by setting the ground for 
a general policy framework; (ii) by treating climate change as an integral part of trade in goods, trade in services 
and freedom of establishment, in other words, as the object of international trade; (iii) by treating climate change 
as a ground for legitimizing restrictions on international trade, whether on the import of goods, on trade in 
services or as a technical barrier to trade (‘TBT’); and finally (iv) as a trigger of good governance and good 
administrative standards in the Contracting Parties’ respective laws, including therefore in their adoption and 
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enforcement of climate change legislation. The EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13 produces various spillover effects on 
the FTA’s indirect climate change provisions by informing the interpretation of those environmental goods that 
enjoy tariff concessions and of energy services commitments, shedding light on the meaning attached to 
derogations grounds from liberalization of trade in goods or services or from freedom of establishment and/or by 
triggering good governance and good administrative standards in areas of climate change governance. The 2010 
Cooperation Agreement, once in force, may in turn produce the same spillover effects on the EU-Korea FTA’s 
indirect climate change provisions as Chapter 13 thereof. Regarding the normative relation between Chapter 13 
and the 2010 Cooperation Agreement’s climate change provisions, the latter could end up absorbing the 
substance of Chapter 13’s direct climate change provisions by subjecting their underlying policy-oriented norms 
to a partly judicialized dispute settlement mechanism. In other words, given the overlapping nature of Chapter 
13’s and the 2010 Cooperation Agreement’s substantive climate change provisions and the higher level of detail 
enjoyed by the latter provisions, the former provisions may lose their normative identity and be governed in part 
by the Cooperation Agreement’s arbitral procedure.    
  In a first stage, the paper will describe the legal and policy context within which environmental and 
climate change provisions have permeated the EU-Korea FTA (Section II). In a second stage, the paper will point 
to the main differences between hard and soft law under legal theory (Section III). In a third stage stage, the soft 
law nature of the EU Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions will be discussed (Section IV). In a fourth 
stage, the hard law characteristics of the FTA’s indirect climate change provisions will be elaborated upon as well 
as Chapter 13’s spillover effects thereupon (Section V). In a fifth stage, the medium level of normativity attached 
to the 2010 Cooperation Agreement’s climate change provisions and their spillover effect upon the FTA’s direct 
and indirect climate change provisions will be described (Section VI). In a sixth stage, the implications of these 
various levels of normativity will be unfolded in more detail (Section VII).    
 
2. CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERNS PERMEATED THE EU-KOREA FTA 
 
In its 2006 renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the Council of the EU insisted on the need for the 
European Commission (‘Commission’) and EU Member States to increase efforts to use international trade as a 
means towards pursuing ‘genuine global sustainable development’.4  The Council encouraged the EU to make 
environmental standards more ambitious when concluding regional and bilateral trade or cooperation 
agreements with non-EU countries.5  
  In its Communication entitled ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’ (‘Global Europe 
Communication’), the Commission, whilst confirming its commitment to multilateral trade negotiations, also 
conveyed its interest in furthering international trade rules by addressing policy issues that are not yet conducive 
to multilateral negotiations (e.g., investment, public procurement, competition).6 The Commission insisted on the 
fact that, in order to be successful, FTAs had to be comprehensive in their scope, cover disciplines other than 
those already regulated by the WTO Agreements and call for the liberalization of substantially all trade in goods 
and services.7 For the Commission, ‘new competitiveness-driven FTAs would need to be comprehensive and 
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ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible degree of trade liberalisation including far-reaching 
liberalisation of services and investment’.8  The Commission announced that bilateral trade relations had to better 
reflect concerns for sustainable development, for instance, through the incorporation of ‘new co-operative 
provisions in areas relating to labour standards and environmental protection’.9 The Commission pointed to 
ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur as priority trade partners due to not just their market potential but also  their 
ongoing FTA negotiation with EU’s main competitors.10 In an Annex to the ‘Global Europe Communication’, the 
Commission also argued that ‘[t]rade in environmentally friendly products should be encouraged and the EU 
should promote the use of best available technologies both in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements’.11 
  Previous preferential trade agreements (e.g., customs unions, FTAs and hybrid forms of FTAs) 
concluded by the EU before the signature of the EU-Korea FTA have already expressly covered climate change 
topics such as those concerned with renewable energy, energy efficiency or the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Macedonia; Montenegro; Bosnia Herzegovina; Mexico, Chile; Morocco; Algeria; Tunisia; Egypt; South 
Africa; Palestinian Authority; Jordan; Israel and Caribbean States) under their environmental protection clause 
and/or energy cooperation clause(s). 12  Additionally, EU’s customs unions with San Marino, the European 
Economic Area and the preferential trade agreement which the EU concluded with Albania contain a heading 
dedicated to environmental protection and energy cooperation without expressly alluding to climate change or 
one of its pillars.13 Amongst the pre-existing preferential trade agreements concluded by the EU before the 
signature of the EU-Korea FTA and which contain express climate change provisions, an important number of 
them confer upon any Contracting Party the unilateral right to launch arbitration proceedings in case of dispute 
over the interpretation and/or application of the agreement’s climate change provisions. These arbitration clauses 
have concerned preferential trade agreements concluded by the EU with Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, 
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Chile, and the CARIFORUM States.14 Therefore, the EU-Korea 
FTA is not novel as regards the consideration of climate change and environmental concerns. 
  The EU-Korea FTA is ambitious in its scope by covering the following chapters: (i) Objectives and 
General Definitions; (ii) National Treatment and Market Access for Goods; (iii) Trade Remedies; (iv) Technical 
Barriers to Trade; (v) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; (vi) Customs and Trade Facilitation; (vii) Trade in 
Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce; (viii) Payments and Capital Movements; (ix) Government 
Procurement; (x) Intellectual Property; (xi) Competition; (xii) Transparency; (xiii) Trade and Sustainable 
Development; (xiv) Dispute Settlement; and (xv) Institutional, General and Final Provisions. 
 
3. HARD LAW VERSUS SOFT LAW 
 
It is helpful to briefly look at the main doctrinal definitions of soft and hard law in legal theory with a view to 
informing the different levels of normativity of the climate change framework prevailing in the bilateral relations 
between the EU and the Republic of Korea. Jan Klabbers argued that soft law refers to acts intended to 
‘influence behavior, but without creating law’.15 For Christine Chinkin, soft law covers three categories of norms: 
(i) non-binding  resolutions endorsed by international organizations (referred to as ‘non legal soft law’); (ii) 
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international treaties composed of soft obligations (referred to as ‘legal soft law’); and (iii) statements laying down 
international law principles and issued by individuals acting in a private capacity.16 Therefore the softness of the 
norm can derive from either the form of its instrument or its core content.17 Chinkin also took the position that, if 
an international treaty merely referred to the ‘gradual acquiring of standards’ or to ‘general goals and 
programmed action’, it would have to be treated as soft law.18 Chinkin concluded that soft law norms are not 
naturally conducive to an adjudicatory dispute settlement: they lend themselves better to non-judicial forms of 
dispute settlement and to ‘self-regulation between interested participants’.19  Oana Stefan defined soft law by 
reference to the absence of legally binding force and to its insistence on persuasion in lieu of ‘enforcement by a 
coercive authority’.20 Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner defined soft law as a set of norms that impact upon agents’ 
behavior without enjoying the status of ‘formal law’.21 Eilis Ferran and Kern Alexander viewed soft law as 
standards and statements which are apt to significantly influence States and private parties’ behavior whilst not 
being directly binding and enforceable due to ‘formal techniques of international law’.22 Both authors agreed that 
soft law norms tend to be ‘open-textured’ and ‘loosely worded’ whilst also aware that some soft law norms 
embody technical standards that are fairly detailed in their content. Francis Snyder defined soft law as ‘rules of 
conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects’.23 
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal distinguished between hard and soft law norms not as part of a binary 
opposition but within a continuum.24 The degree of softness and of hardness of a particular norm will hinge on the 
application of three benchmarks: (i) the level of legal obligation (the binding nature of the obligation); (ii) the level 
of precision of the obligation (looseness versus specificity); and (iii) the level of delegation to a third party (in 
terms of enforcement or dispute settlement mechanism). 25  Both authors see in ‘hortatory rules’ a typical 
illustration of rules enjoying a low degree of precision and of delegation whilst at the same time embodying 
general standards that may be used as benchmarks for assessing behavioral practices.26 They associate a high 
degree of delegation with rules involving judicial and arbitral institutions and a low degree of delegation with rules 
whose dispute settlement body involves political institutions.27 Similarly, Alan Boyle referred to three meanings of 
soft law that gravitate towards the form of a legal instrument, its substantive content and the dispute settlement 
accompanying it.28 Drawing upon Kenneth Abbott, Duncan Snidal and Alan Boyle, the following key criteria will 
be relied upon in order to underlie different levels of softness and hardness of EU-Korea FTA’s provisions 
concerned with climate change: (i) degree of precision; and (iii) degree of judicialization of the accompanying 
dispute settlement body. The first benchmark is three-dimensional and is informed by three principal criteria: 
clarity, detailed nature and self-sufficiency. The second benchmark points to the extent to which the dispute 
settlement body enjoys independence in addressing a dispute over the interpretation and/or application of a rule.  
 
4. EU-KOREA FTA’S DIRECT CLIMATE CHANGE PROVISIONS 
 
The EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions are fairly general and loose due to their reliance on pre-
existing international environmental law and the need for further cooperative arrangements. Their dispute 
settlement mechanism is furthermore political by nature, and devolves little independence upon the actors 
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involved in Chapter 13 consultation and mediation procedures. Chapter 13, contrary to Chapter 14, calls for a 
‘dejudicialization’ of the dispute settlement process. Therefore, Chapter 13, when read in isolation from the other 
chapters of the FTA, enjoys a low level of normativity: it is of a soft law nature with regard to both the degree of 
precision and the enforceability of its substantive provisions. Having said that, this low level of normativity is 
counterbalanced by the higher degree of normativity attached to the trade-related provisions and transparency 
standards that are informed by or triggered by Chapter 13’s direct climate change provisions. 
 
4.1 SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 
In the EU-Korea FTA, the contribution to sustainable development in the course of international trade has been 
presented as an objective of the FTA.29 Article 1(1) of the FTA adds that the parties shall ‘strive to ensure that 
this objective is integrated and reflected at every level of the Parties’ trade relationship’. This may mean that the 
trade-related provisions of the EU-Korea FTA need be interpreted in the most environmentally and climate 
change-friendly way in case they pave the way for multiple interpretations.   
  In Chapter 13 on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’, the parties acknowledge the interdependency 
of economic development, social development and environmental protection.30 Additionally, Chapter 13 contains 
a provision whose heading is entitled ‘Multilateral environmental agreements’.31 
  Under Chapter 13, the Contracting Parties ‘reaffirm their commitment to reaching the ultimate objective 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [‘UNFCC’] and its Kyoto Protocol’.32 This 
‘ultimate objective’ consists in the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.33 This objective should be 
reached ‘within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’.34 
Does the reference to the Kyoto Protocol35 mean that the Republic of Korea, albeit a non-Annex I party to the 
UNFCC, would as a result become bound by those general obligations placed upon Annex I parties and 
designed to promote sustainable development (e.g., reinforcement of energy efficiency in critical areas of the 
parties’ national economy; promotion of ‘sustainable forms of agriculture’; reduction of methane emissions; 
progressive diminution or elimination of market imperfections, subsidies and tax incentives in GHG emitting 
sectors that would be detrimental to the UNFCC’s ultimate objective)? Article 13.5(3) of the EU-Korea FTA does 
not have the effect of making the Republic of Korea an Annex I party through a regional agreement given that it 
uses the verb ‘reaffirm’: had it produced a new international environmental obligation, the FTA would have used 
the verb ‘affirm’ or ‘state’. This is confirmed by the reference in the Kyoto Protocol’s preamble to Article 2 of the 
UNFCC as the ultimate objective to be achieved by all parties to the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol. This is not 
to say that 13.5(3) of the EU-Korea FTA is redundant: it does have the effect of incorporating into a regional 
agreement equipped with its own dispute settlement mechanism (political by nature) a pre-existing multilateral 
environmental obligation. 
  The Contracting Parties also agree on ‘cooperating on the development of the future international 
climate change framework in accordance with the Bali Action Plan’.36 Annex 13 to the EU-Korea FTA specifies 
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that such cooperation should cover ‘issues relating to global carbon markets, ways to address adverse effects of 
trade on climate, as well as means to promote low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency’.37 The reference to 
the Bali Action Plan is a way for the Contracting Parties to reaffirm at a regional level their multilateral 
commitment to ‘long-term cooperative action’ extending beyond 2012 and premised on at least five parameters: 
(i) the need for a ‘long-term cooperative action’ for emissions reduction; (ii) reinforced action on climate change 
mitigation at the national and international levels; (iii) reinforced adaptation action; (iv) reinforced action on 
technology development and transfer in order to create a support basis for mitigation and adaptation actions; and 
(v) increase in the provision of financial resources and of investment so as to support mitigation and adaptation 
actions and technology cooperation.38 
  Article 13(1)(3) of the EU-Korea FTA clarifies that the Agreement places no obligation upon the two 
parties to harmonize their environmental standards. This is a clear sign that the Contracting Parties did not wish 
to turn environmental cooperation into regulatory or legislative harmonization. 
  The Contracting Parties must also ‘strengthen their trade relations and cooperation in ways that promote 
sustainable development’.39 This obligation constitutes an extrapolation from Article 1(1) objective described 
earlier in this subsection. 
  Each Contracting Party, whilst reserving its power to set its own level of environmental and labor 
protection and to ‘adopt or modify accordingly its relevant laws and policies’, must ‘seek to ensure that those laws 
and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental and labour protection (…)’.40  
  In no way, can the adoption of environmental standards serve any protectionist trade purpose.41 Put it 
differently, the invocation of environmental standards in the face of trade-related provisions must be genuine. 
  Finally, the Contracting Parties must seek to ‘facilitate and promote trade and foreign direct investment 
in environmental goods and services, including environmental technologies, sustainable renewable energy, 
energy efficient products and services and eco-labelled goods, including through addressing related non-tariff 
barriers’.42 This provision suggests that climate change matters act not just a constraint on international trade but 
also as an object of international trade. 
 
4.2 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
The EU-Korea FTA provides for the creation of a specialized Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development 
composed of senior officials of the parties’ respective administrations.43 This body is designed to oversee the 
implementation of Chapter 13.44 
  In addition, the parties to the FTA are required to each establish a Domestic Advisory Group on 
sustainable development composed of independent representatives of civil society, in particular representing 
environmental, labor and business organizations. These bodies are to advise on the implementation of Chapter 
13 at the national level.45 Members of these bodies are also expected to meet on a yearly basis at the Civil 
Society Forum with a view to engaging in a dialogue on the aspects of the parties’ trade relations concerned with 
sustainable development.46 
  Chapter 14, including its arbitration procedure, is not applicable to Chapter 13, which instead is 
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regulated by a sui generis two-fold procedure.47 In a first stage, in the event of a dispute over the implementation 
of this Chapter 13, the complaining party is required to seek government consultations with the other party via the 
latter’s contact point. The parties are to endeavor to promptly reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute in line with the activities of multilateral international organizations. If they find it to be appropriate, the 
parties are also free to request an opinion from these international organizations. The Committee on Trade and 
Sustainable Development may also intervene at the parties’ request if they deem the dispute to require further 
discussion, in which case the Committee may attempt to resolve the dispute itself with the advice of the Domestic 
Advisory Group(s).48 If the government consultations do not reach a satisfactory resolution and provided that the 
contending parties have not decided otherwise, any party to the dispute may request the establishment of a 
Panel of Experts within 90 days following the delivery of the original request for consultations. The experts on the 
Panel must be independent of the parties and of the organizations represented in the Domestic Advisory Groups, 
and be selected by each party from a list of 15 persons enjoying expertise in trade and sustainable development. 
The Panel shall receive submissions from the parties and may request additional advice and information from the 
parties, the Domestic Advisory Groups and/or international organizations.  The Panel has 90 days from the date 
of selection of the last expert to present a report to the parties. Noteworthy is the absence of formal requirement 
to comply with the Panel’s report: the parties must simply endeavor to ‘accommodate’ the Panel’s advice or 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development is tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the Panel’s recommendations.49 
  The dispute settlement mechanism applicable to the EU-Korea FTA’s climate change framework ranges 
from a negotiation phase (dialogue and consultation between the parties as facilitated by consultative and 
advisory bodies) to a mediation phase whereby a third party (‘the mediator’) in a non-formal setting puts forward 
to the disputants new proposals intended to achieve a compromise solution after relying on the parties’ 
respective information and thus without conducting an independent investigation.50 The only difference with a 
classic form of mediation is that the disputants, in the context of the EU-Korea FTA, must give due consideration 
to the mediator’s proposals and are thus not free to just dismiss them right at the outset. This dispute settlement 
mechanism therefore generates a low form of delegation to a third party entrusted with the task of facilitating 
dispute resolution by the parties but not of settling it in last resort: the parties are always free to depart from the 
Panel’s advice or recommendations. Chapter 13 dispute settlement mechanism may be said to reflect what Jan 
Klabbers qualifies as ‘an overtly political mode of dealing with conflicts’,51 albeit constrained by some formal 
procedures. 
 
4.3 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT  
These clauses therefore appear to embody rendez-vous, renvoi and standstill obligations. The first type of 
clauses call for more climate change commitments between the parties both bilaterally and multilaterally. The 
EU-Korea FTA’s climate change provisions may in this respect have the effect of ‘creating expectations 
concerning matters which must be taken into account in good faith in the negotiation of further instruments’.52 
The second type of clauses urge the parties to live up to their pre-existing multilateral climate change 
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commitments. The third type of clauses, by aiming for a high level of environmental protection, prohibit the 
parties to the Agreement from reverting back to less demanding environmental norms.  
  By using exhortatory and aspirational language in Chapter 13 of the EU-Korea FTA’s climate change 
provisions, the Contracting Parties have conceded to the softness of their climate change framework, which is 
tainted by its open-endedness, looseness, high degree of flexibility and lack of precise direction. This is in line 
with EU’s past preferential trade agreements that regulate climate change under an energy or environmental 
heading.53 The low level of precision attached to Chapter 13’s climate change clauses also transpires from their 
lack of self-sufficiency: they call for more cooperation at the bilateral, international and multilateral level and thus 
for further implementation measures that will require the use of discretionary powers.  Their specific dispute 
settlement mechanism is highly political by nature, which reinforces their soft law nature: any dispute over the 
interpretation and/or application of Chapter 13 is subject not to the arbitral procedure but instead to a consultation 
and ultimately a form of mediation procedure.  
 
5. EU-KOREA FTA’S INDIRECT CLIMATE CHANGE PROVISIONS 
 
The FTA’s indirect climate change provisions diverge from Chapter 13 climate change provisions in that the 
former, whilst not specifically concerned with it, govern climate change as an object of international trade, as a 
restriction on international trade or as a trigger of good governance and good administrative standards due to the 
generality of their terms. These indirect climate change provisions also diverge from the direct climate change 
provisions in that they are subject to the FTA’s default dispute settlement mechanism that entails the use of an 
arbitration procedure.  
 
5.1 SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 
The EU-Korea FTA’s indirect climate change provisions refer to the following types of clauses: (i) provisions on 
tariff schedules and the elimination of customs duties in import of goods; (ii) specific energy services 
commitments; (iii) general exceptions to the liberalization of trade in goods; (iv) general exceptions to trade in 
services, freedom of establishment and electronic commerce; (v) TBTs; and (vi) transparency standards and 
national procedural guarantees. 
1. Tariff schedules and elimination of customs duties on import of goods 
As far as the elimination of customs duties is concerned, the Contracting Parties are required to reduce or 
remove customs duties on goods originating from the other party in compliance with their respective ‘tariff 
schedules’.54 EU’s and South Korea’s respective tariff schedules cover a certain number of environmental goods 
that integrate or apply renewable energy technologies (e.g., solar collectors or photovoltaic cells) or that may be 
used as a materials for generating renewable energy (e.g., tallow, residues and waste).55  
Chapter 13’s spillover effect on Article 2.5(1) and the Contracting Parties’ Tariff Schedules is to encourage the 
widest possible interpretation attaching to these tariff concessions when they are targeted at environmental 
goods. Climate change is hereunder regulated as an object of international trade in goods. 
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2. Commitments with respect to energy services  
Annex 7-A-1, which contains EU’s List of Commitments on Cross-Border Supply of Services in Conformity with 
Article 7.7 of the EU-Korea FTA, covers ‘[w]holesale trade services of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related 
products’ and  ‘wholesale trade services of electricity, steam and hot water’ amongst other commitments for 
energy services.56  
 Chapter 13’s spillover effect on Article 7.7  and Annex 7-A-1 is to call for an interpretation of these energy 
services commitments as covering renewable energy services and not merely conventional energy sources. 
Climate change is hereunder regulated as an object of international trade in services.  
 
3. General exceptions to liberalization of trade in goods 
Chapter 2 of the EU-Korea FTA incorporates Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT 
1994’) by renvoi when recognizing the Contracting Parties’ power to provide for specific exceptions to the 
liberalization of trade in goods.57 Article XX of GATT 1994 stipulates that such exceptions need be ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health’ or to relate to ‘the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’, 
and may not be applied in a way that would constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’ (‘Article XX 
chapeau’).58  
  Article XX inevitably raises the question of which proportionality test ought to shape the justificatory 
methodology in case of prima facie breach of a GATT’s substantive provision. Proportionality broadly understood 
comprises three successive and cumulative steps: suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu (‘strict 
proportionality’ or ‘balancing’).59 The suitability test requires that those means not effective enough for pursuing 
the legitimate objective bearing in mind the factual possibilities of the case be disregarded. 60 Suitability is 
designed to rule out those measures that are blatantly irrelevant to achieving the competing value. 61  The 
necessity test requires that, between several equally suitable measures for achieving the legitimate objective, the 
one which limits least the exercise of a right be adopted by the public authority.62 The necessity test together with 
the suitability test do not imply weighing competing values against one another but instead imply relating the 
means (i.e., the interfering measure) to the end (i.e., the legitimate objective).63 They form part of the means-
test.64 Strict proportionality implies carrying out a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ by comparing the competing values 
themselves.65 In that respect, it constitutes a normative test.66 It asks whether the interference with a right entails 
‘a net gain’ when balancing the degree of non-satisfaction of a right with the degree of satisfaction of the 
legitimate objective.67 Strict proportionality involves two ‘laws of balancing’. The first one implies a positive 
correspondence between the intensity of the public interference with a right and the compelling nature of the 
legitimate objective advanced by the Contracting Party.68 The second one implies that the more important a 
public interference with a right is, the more convincing its foundational proposition must be.69 This second ‘law of 
balancing’ in turn affects the required degree of judicial review of the empirical basis underpinning the 
interference.70 
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 The WTO Appellate Body has taken the position that the expression ‘necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health’ raises the question of whether the Respondent Party to a dispute could not have 
opted for a less trade-restrictive measure that was reasonably available to it at the time of adoption of the 
contested measure. 71  This embodies a necessity test, in other words, the second prong of the broad 
proportionality analysis. A measure which is impossible to implement would not be deemed to be reasonably 
available to the respondent party whilst mere administrative difficulties in implementing an alternative measure 
would not preclude it from being considered reasonable.72 The Appellate Body has also ruled that the more 
compelling a public interest objective is, the easier the reasonable alternative measure threshold will be met, 
thereby introducing a balancing element into the necessity test.73 The term ‘necessary’ must be read within a 
continuum the opposite ends being ‘making a contribution to’ and ‘indispensable’ whilst being much nearer the 
latter end than the former.74  
 As for the exception based on the need for the public interest measure to relate to ‘the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources’, the WTO Appellate Body has suggested that the term ‘relate’ connotes a lower 
justificatory threshold than the term ‘necessary’ and asks whether the contested measure was ‘primarily aimed at’ 
the achievement of this environmental objective.75 This seems to reduce the proportionality test to a stringent 
form of ‘suitability’ requirement. 
 With respect to the Article XX chapeau, the Appellate Body has ruled that the criteria of ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’ and of ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ are designed to prevent the ‘abuse 
or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX’.76 In the Shrimp-Turtles case, the 
WTO Appellate Body unfolded the general rationale lying behind Article XX, which calls for a case-by-case 
assessment of the underlying conflict of values:  
 The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and 
marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the 
rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions (…) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the 
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and 
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as 
expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging: the line moves as the kind and the shape of the 
measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.77 
 It must be agreed with Joanne Scott that, in assessing Article XX chapeau in the Gasoline case, the 
Appellate Body has also applied elements of the necessity or a less-restrictive-means test after having found that 
the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule were primarily aimed at ‘the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’.78 
 It is worth pointing out that, under the EU-Korea FTA, any Contracting Party wishing to make use of 
these exceptions must appropriately inform the other Contracting Party in order to reach a mutually acceptable 
solution. 79  Only when ‘exceptional and critical circumstances’ make this prior notice infeasible, may the 
Contracting Party inform the other only after having adopted such a measure.80 This procedural obligation 
represents an addition compared to Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
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 The spillover effect of the FTA’s direct climate change clauses on its trade-related provisions may be 
that any climate change matter is presumed to constitute a legitimate objective aimed at the protection of human, 
animal/plant life or of health or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources for the purpose of Article XX of 
the GATT 1994 by reading Article 2.15(1) of the EU-Korea FTA consistently with Chapter 13 thereof. 
 
4.  Technical Barriers to Trade 
Certain measures regulating renewable energy and energy efficiency may be labeled ‘technical regulations’ and 
need to pass the proportionality test under the WTO Agreement on Trade Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’) 
since the latter is incorporated into Chapter 4 of the EU-Korea FTA by renvoi.81 Under the TBT Agreement, 
technical regulations may not be intended to or have the effect of entailing ‘unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade’: they may be ‘not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking into account the risk non-fulfilment would create’.82 Article 2.2. of the TBT Agreement, contrary to Article 
XX GATT, does not list public interest grounds which the technical regulations need to pursue in order to be 
justified. This provision appears to be an illustration of the necessity test unaccompanied by any suitability or 
balancing requirement.83 Compared to Article XX GATT exceptions, Article 2.2. of the TBT Agreement embodies 
a justificatory test that ‘moves the WTO beyond a discrimination based approach to the free movement of 
goods’.84 Chapter 4 of the EU-Korea FTA lays down a series of cooperation obligations in the area of technical 
regulations so as to facilitate private operators’ access to the Contracting Parties’ respective markets.85  
             The spillover effect of the FTA’s direct climate change provisions on Chapter 4 is that any climate change 
matter may implicitly be presumed to constitute a legitimate objective for the purpose of the TBT Agreement. 
5. General exceptions to trade in services, establishment and electronic commerce 
Chapter 7 of the EU-Korea FTA empowers the Contracting Parties to adopt measures derogating from its rules 
on ‘trade in services, establishment and electronic commerce’ provided that such derogatory measures are 
‘necessary’ to protect human, animal/plant life or of health or ‘relate to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, and are not be applied in a way that would constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on establishment or 
cross-border supply of services’.86   
 The FTA’s direct climate change provisions thus have a spillover effect on its provisions on trade in 
services and freedom of establishment since climate change action may implicitly be presumed to aim for the 
protection of human, animal/plant life or of health or to relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
under Article 7.50 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
 
6. Transparency standards and national procedural guarantees 
Chapter 12 on transparency is a chapter which, although not addressing climate change expressly, has some 
indirect repercussions by conferring upon individuals and private operators certain remedies in domestic courts 
and administrative bodies and by providing for good governance guarantees for all matters covered by the EU-
Korea FTA. Chapter 12 provides for the following clauses: 
' The right of review and of appeal before judicial or administrative courts/bodies;87 
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' Requirements concerned with the ‘regulatory quality’ of the Contracting Parties’ internal laws;88  
' Provisions on enquiries and entry points;89 
' Recognition of the principle of non-discrimination in the application of transparency standards; 90  
' Requirements concerning the publication and accessibility of measures of general application;91  
' Defence rights in administrative proceedings (e.g., opportunity for any interested party to present its 
views before closure of the administrative action).92  
Chapter 12 provisions, although not specifically targeting climate change, may impact upon the practical 
functioning of South Korea’ s, EU’s and EU Member States’ climate change legal framework. In other words, by 
virtue of legislating in those fields of climate change that are covered by Chapter 13 of the EU-Korea FTA, the 
EU, its Member States and the Republic of Korea are bound to apply good governance/administrative practices 
and to ensure that private operators enjoy certain defence rights in administrative and judicial proceedings. 
 
5.2 COMMON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM  
All EU-Korea FTA’s indirect climate change provisions are subject to Chapter 14 default dispute settlement 
procedure.93 Under this general dispute settlement procedure, the parties to a dispute over the interpretation 
and/or application of the Agreement must seek to resolve it through good faith consultations. This chapter 
regulates the time limit and the format for requesting the consultations, the determination of the consultation 
period and the location of these consultations.94 In case the parties have not managed to resolve their dispute 
through good faith consultations and within the time frames set forth in Article 14(3) of the EU-Korea FTA, the 
complaining party is entitled to request unilaterally the establishment of an arbitration panel.95 The complaining 
party must then notify the other party and the Trade Committee of the request for the establishment of an 
arbitration panel.96 As a general rule, the parties must agree on the composition of the arbitration panel within 10 
days from the date of submission of the request to the Trade Committee, failing which either party to the dispute 
may request the Chair of the Trade Committee to select by lot the three members thereof on the basis of a list of 
individuals proposed by the complaining party, a list of individuals proposed by the party complained against and 
a list of individuals agreed upon by both parties to become the chairperson of the arbitration panel.97 Both parties 
to the dispute must adopt measures allowing them to comply in good faith with the panel ruling within a 
‘reasonable period of time’ to be agreed upon by the parties.98 Should they disagree with the compliance 
deadline, the complaining party may request the arbitration panel to set the ‘reasonable period of time’.99 Very 
importantly, the arbitration panel must seek to adopt its award by consensus, failing which it may adopt it by 
majority.100 The arbitral award is binding upon the parties to the dispute, and may not confer any individual 
right(s) or obligation(s) upon natural or legal persons.101  
 
5.3 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
A high level of precision may be assigned to the provisions on the reduction or removal of customs duties with 
respect to environmental goods that integrate or apply renewable energy technologies or that may be used as a 
materials for generating renewable energy given their significant degree of clarity and self-sufficiency. The 
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principle of non-discrimination with respect to the energy services commitments also enjoys a high level of 
precision in that is equally clear and self-sufficient. When climate change acts as a constraint on international 
trade in goods (i.e., general exceptions to liberalization of trade in goods and Article XX GATT 1994; the 
application of the TBT provisions) or to trade in services, freedom of establishment and electronic commerce, the 
FTA’s indirect climate change provisions enjoy a low level of precision due to the lack of detail and of self-
sufficiency: the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘relate’ are not defined in the EU-Korea FTA even though their definition 
may be implicitly borrowed from the WTO Appellate Body’s case-law and the TBT Agreement itself. Furthermore, 
the proportionality test to be applied as part of Article XX chapeau has not been laid down in the EU-Korea FTA, 
even though it already constitutes a source of legal uncertainty under WTO law. Finally, the TBT Agreement, 
which is incorporated by renvoi through Article 4.1 of the EU-Korea FTA, does not list the legitimate objectives 
that may restrict free movement of goods across the Contracting Parties’ markets, and calls for further 
cooperation between the parties. Chapter 12 transparency and national procedural guarantees enjoy low to high 
levels of precision. The right of review and of appeal before judicial or administrative courts/bodies enjoys a low 
level of precision due to its lack of self-sufficiency: it presupposes the establishment of judicial or administrative 
appeals/bodies. The same can be said of the ‘regulatory quality and performance’ requirements, which call for 
cooperation between the parties in different ways, including through exchange of information. The provision 
concerned with enquiries and entry points presupposes the setting up of ‘appropriate mechanisms’ whose 
modalities are left to the Contracting Parties’ discretion. That requirement is equally not self-sufficient absent any 
definition of these appropriate mechanisms, and thus enjoys a low level of precision. By contrast the following 
Chapter 12 guarantees are tainted by a high level of precision due to their inherent self-sufficiency and clarity: (i) 
non-discrimination in the application of transparency standards; (ii) publication and accessibility of measures of 
general application; and (iii) certain defence rights in administrative proceedings. 
  Chapter 14 dispute settlement mechanism hardens the normative force of the EU-Korea FTA’s 
provisions due to its high degree of judicialization: it empowers the Contracting Parties to submit any dispute 
regarding the interpretation and/or application of the EU/Korea FTA to an arbitral panel after failure to reach a 
settlement in the course of good faith consultations. 
  The EU Korea FTA’s indirect climate change provisions enjoy a medium or a high level of hard law 
normativity depending on whether the high degree of judicialization of their dispute settlement is also 
accompanied by a high level (i.e., provisions on the reduction or removal of customs duties with respect to 
environmental goods; the principle of non-discrimination with respect to energy services commitments; specific 
Chapter 12 guarantees) or a low level of precision (i.e., exceptions to liberalization of trade in goods; exceptions 
to liberalization of trade in services, freedom establishment and to electronic commerce; TBT provisions and 
certain Chapter 12 guarantees).    
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6. THE 2010 COOPERATION AGREEMENT’S CLIMATE CHANGE PROVISIONS 
 
The 2010 Cooperation Agreement was signed on 10 May 2010 but has not yet entered into force. The EU-Korea 
FTA and the 2010 Cooperation Agreement were meant to be institutionally and legally connected.102 Although 
formally distinct treaties, the EU-Korea FTA need be interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the 2010 
Cooperation Agreement due to the similar context within which both treaties were adopted and given that the 
former was signed a bit less than five months after the latter. 
 
6.1 SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 
The 2010 Cooperation Agreement contains an autonomous climate change heading and specific climate change 
provisions regulated through the Agreement’s ‘Transport’, ‘Energy’ and ‘Environment and Natural Resources’ 
headings. Moreover, climate change has been turned into a basic cooperative objective of the Agreement. As a 
matter of general consideration, climate change has been listed as a global environmental challenge in the 
provision laying down the basis for cooperation between the parties.103 Climate change action is also mentioned 
as an aim of cooperation in respect of sustainable development.104  
Under its autonomous ‘Climate Change’ heading, the parties are required to ‘intensify dialogue and 
cooperation at political, policy and technical levels’.105 This climate change provision is without prejudice to 
developments taking place in such avenues as the UNCC and to their respective competences in this area of 
law. Their cooperative relation must be aimed at fighting climate change, promoting the efficient use of 
resources, exchanging know-how on trading schemes frameworks, improving public and private sector financing 
instruments that may support action against climate change, increasing collaboration on low-carbon technology 
research and at supporting developing countries’ mitigation and action via the Kyoto Protocol Flexible 
Mechanisms.106  
Under its ‘Energy’ heading, the 2010 Cooperation Agreement provides that the parties must endeavor to 
reinforce cooperation in the energy sector in such a way as to diversify energy supplies  through the development 
of sustainable and renewable forms of energy (e.g., biofuels, biomass, wind and solar energy and hydro power 
generation) and promote energy efficiency in the production, transportation, distribution and final consumption of 
energy.107  
Under the ‘Transport’ heading, the parties must endeavor to cooperate on the reduction of GHG 
emissions in this economic sector.108 This could be seen as a reflection of the importance which the EU has 
attached to this sector for the purpose of promoting climate change. 109 
Using the ‘Environment and Natural Resources’ umbrella, the parties have emphasized their duty to 
endeavor to maintain and deepen their environmental protection cooperation, in particular with respect to ‘climate 
change and energy efficiency’.110 
The Cooperation Agreement may have the same spillover effects as the EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate 
change provisions on its indirect climate change provisions. The Cooperation Agreement’s climate change 
framework may also have the effect, once in force, of subsuming the climate change policy framework set by the 
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EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13 since the former essentially mirrors the latter by substantiating it under various 
headings. This could mean that the substance of FTA’s direct climate change provisions could indirectly benefit 
from the more judicial dispute settlement mechanism set up under the 2010 Cooperation Agreement. 
 
6.2 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
The 2010 Cooperation Agreement provides that, in case of divergence of positions in the interpretation or 
application of any of its provisions, either party must refer the dispute to the Joint Committee Joint Committee 
composed of representatives of the members of the Council of the European Union and of the European 
Commission, and of representatives of the Republic of Korea.111 Whenever a party claims that the other party 
has breached its obligations, the former may adopt ‘appropriate measures in accordance with international law’ 
but only after  the parties have sought to resolve their dispute through consultations within the Joint Committee, if 
applicable, with the assistance of a mediator.112 This procedural requirement to seize the Joint Committee may 
be dispensed from in the event of ‘special urgency’,113 in which case the complaining party must immediately 
notify the other party of the ‘appropriate measure’ it has adopted. The party upon which the countermeasure is 
being inflicted (‘defaulting party’) may then require that consultations be held for a 20-day period at the expiry of 
which the measure becomes enforceable.114 The defaulting party is entitled to request the establishment of an 
arbitration procedure that would review the basis for or any other aspect of the said measure.115 The arbitration 
tribunal is composed of three arbitrators: one appointed by each party and the third one by the Joint Committee. 
The parties to the dispute shall take the requisite steps to implement the arbitrators’ decision.116 As it transpires 
from the above, the intervention of the arbitral body may be triggered unilaterally only in case of dispute over the 
unilateral measures taken by the complaining party in response to an alleged breach by another party: the 
arbitral body has no jurisdiction over disputes regarding the interpretation and/or application of the Cooperation 
Agreement. The arbitral body, therefore, acts not as a primary adjudicator but instead as a secondary adjudicator 
that arbitrates disputes over the legality and proportionality of countermeasures.  
 
6.3 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
The 2010 Cooperation Agreement contains more extensive climate change policy provisions (understood here as 
international public interests) than those stemming from the EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13 given the existence in 
the Cooperation Agreement of an autonomous climate change heading and of transport, energy and 
environmental protection headings that expressly regulate climate change from very specific angles. However, 
this level of detail is counterbalanced by the presence, as in the EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13, of rendez-vous 
clauses (obligation of further cooperation), standstill clauses (need to aim for increased efforts for GHG 
reduction) and of renvoi clauses (reference back to international and multilateral environmental developments). 
The 2010 Cooperation Agreement’s climate change provisions do not constitute self-standing obligations on the 
parties thereto. The level of precision of the Cooperation Agreement’s climate change provisions is thus medium 
but not of a high level. 
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The dispute settlement mechanism accompanying the EU-Korea FTA (consultation obligation and 
establishment of a panel of experts) is less institutionalized and judicialized than that transpiring from the 2010 
Cooperation Agreement given the intervention, by virtue of the latter Agreement, of an arbitral tribunal whose 
decision can be imposed on the parties to the dispute. However, this higher level of judicialization of the 
Cooperation Agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism need not be exaggerated since the arbitral procedure 
only gets triggered in case of dispute over the unilateral measures taken by the complaining party in response to 
an alleged breach of another party but not in case of mere dispute over the interpretation and/or application of 
the Agreement. In the latter case, the dispute shall be resolved politically through the Contracting Parties’ 
representatives within the Joint Committee. In other words, the arbitral procedure neither precludes nor 
conditions the adoption by one Contracting Party of countermeasures in response to alleged breaches of the 
Cooperation Agreement by another Contracting Party. The partial reach of the arbitration procedure points to a 
medium level of judicialization of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
In short, the medium level of precision of its substantive climate change provisions combined with the 
partial judicialization of its dispute settlement mechanism make the Cooperation Agreement’s climate change 
provisions of a medium level of hard law-making.  
 
7. IMPLICATIONS OF THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF NORMATIVITY 
 
The soft and hard law nature of the climate change provisions emerging from the EU-Korea FTA and the 2010 
Cooperation Agreement have a bearing on the way in which these provisions may be enforced before South 
Korean, EU and domestic courts, in other words on the direct effect analysis. Direct effect hereunder refers to the 
aptitude of an international legal norm to be enforced before a court of another legal system.117 The extensive 
meaning of direct effect has sometimes been referred to as the ‘invocability’ or ‘justiciability’ of a norm, and raises 
the question of whether the norm ‘is addressed to the judiciary rather than the legislature’.118 Under public 
international law, the question of whether an international legal norm produces direct effect, even if it can be 
inferred from the object, purpose and wording of the agreement, remains a matter to be ultimately decided by the 
party to the international agreement based on its monist, dualist or mixed tradition.119 The EU Courts have 
recognized their competence to ascertain whether an international treaty concluded by the EU with a third 
country is directly effective, absent any express determination by its drafters regarding its internal legal effects.120 
They have ruled that for an EU secondary act to be subject to its validity review (e.g., annulment action or 
request for a preliminary invalidity ruling) in case a direct conflict between the EU measure and a provision of an 
international treaty, the nature and broad logic of the treaty must not preclude such a review (first direct effect 
criterion), and the content of the treaty provision invoked must be sufficiently precise (i.e., second direct effect 
criterion) and unconditional (third direct effect criterion).121 The GATT and WTO cases suggest that the nature of 
the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism may impinge upon the direct effect analysis,122 even though in the Air 
Transport Association of America the Court of Justice was prepared to relax the importance of this factor when 
the dispute settlement mechanism relies on both a consultation/negotiation phase and an arbitral procedure.123 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
83 
These requirements conditioning the direct effect of an international treaty need not be satisfied for an EU 
secondary act to be subject to the EU Courts’ validity review when the secondary act is designed to implement 
an international treaty binding upon the EU (‘implementation’ exception) or when the former makes an express 
reference to the latter (‘express reference’ exception).124 Regardless of whether the direct effect criteria are met, 
EU secondary law need be construed, to the maximum extent feasible, consistently with an international treaty 
that binds the Union.125 This can be explained by the fact that the international treaty, by virtue of having been 
concluded by the EU, falls under EU primary law and, as such, prevails over inconsistent acts of EU secondary 
law.126 In the case of mixed agreements falling under the shared competence of the Union and of its Member 
States, the EU Courts have attributed themselves the power to determine whether the agreement enjoys direct 
effect in Member States’ national laws, including those provisions that fall under Member States’ competence 
and thus not regulated by EU secondary law provided that the latter provisions concern a subject-matter 
significantly regulated by EU legislation.127 Focus in this case-law has been on whether the treaty provisions were 
sufficiently precise and unconditional given the wording, purpose and nature of the treaty.128 
  Chapter 13’s climate change clauses are likely not to be held direct effective before the EU and Member 
States’ courts in light of the abovementioned direct effect criteria. As regards satisfaction of the first direct effect 
criterion, the fact that Chapter 13 is not subject to the arbitral procedure but rather to a political dispute settlement 
mechanism based on a consultation and a mediation procedure and that the Contracting Parties are not required 
to harmonize environmental standards may reflect the FTA drafters’ intent to preclude any validity review action 
that could result in a declaration of invalidity of an EU measure found to be inconsistent with Chapter 13. As 
regards satisfaction of the second direct effect criterion, the reference to the trading parties’ commitments to 
cooperate ‘on the development of the future international climate change framework in accordance with the Bali 
Action Plan’ and to achieve a high level of environmental protection is too unclear and ambiguous  as to satisfy 
the precision requirement. As regards satisfaction of the third direct effect criterion, Chapter 13 provisions call for 
more cooperation at the bilateral, international and multilateral level and thus for further implementation 
measures that would involve discretionary policy choices. In Demirel, the ECJ indeed ruled that a Treaty 
provision containing a ‘general obligation to cooperate in order to achieve the aims of the Agreement’ is not apt to 
produce individual rights.129 The absence of direct effect would indeed have the consequence that individuals and 
private entities would be precluded from invoking Chapter 13 provisions before the EU and Member States’ 
domestic courts whether against an EU institution, a Member State or another private party. However, the EU 
Courts are prepared to review the validity of EU secondary acts against the background of international treaties 
that are not directly effective provided that the former expressly refer to or are designed to implement the latter. 
This could be the case if an EU Directive or Regulation made mention of the EU-Korea FTA in its preamble or if it 
could be inferred from a Commission’s impact assessment report or proposal for a legislative act that the EU 
legal instrument purports to give effect to the EU-Korea FTA or its Chapter 13 climate change provisions. In any 
event, the EU Courts are still be required to interpret EU measures, as far as possible, in light of the EU Korea-
FTA, since the latter has formed part of EU primary law by virtue of being concluded by the EU and having 
entered into force (at least provisionally). 
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  As in the case of the EU-Korea FTA, the 2010 Cooperation Agreement’s climate change provisions, 
when they enter into force, would not satisfy the requirement of sufficient precision and unconditionality in order 
to be directly effective before the EU and Member States’ domestic courts: their language is too loose and leave 
much discretion to the Contracting Parties for further decision-making in the climate change area. This need for 
subsequent implementation measures can, in particular, be inferred from the reference to the duty to endeavor to 
cooperate or to reinforce cooperation in a particular climate change pillar. 
  Given their sufficient degree of precision and unconditionality (see considerations under Section V on 
their higher degree of normativity), and that the broad logic and nature of the EU-Korea FTA does not prevent 
any validity review of EU secondary acts since Chapter 14 dispute settlement mechanism evidences the FTA 
drafters’ intent to judicialize as much as possible those substantive provisions subject to this default arbitration 
procedure, the following provisions may be said to be directly effective and thus to be judicially enforceable 
before the EU and Member States’ domestic courts:  
' Article 2.5(1) and the Tariff Schedule of Korea and Tariff Schedule of the EU Party;   
' The principle of non-discrimination found in Article 7.7 of the EU-Korea FTA; 
' Specific Chapter 12 guarantees: (i) non-discrimination in the application of transparency standards; 
(ii) publication and accessibility of measures of general application; and (iii) certain defence rights in 
administrative proceedings. 
 The various levels of hard and soft law attached to EU-Korea FTA’s climate change provisions also point to 
normative interactions between the FTA’s direct climate change provisions, its indirect climate change provisions 
and the 2010 Cooperation Agreement. The general climate change policy framework set forth by the FTA’s 
Chapter 13 and the 2010 Cooperation Agreement have the effect of informing the scope of the environmental 
goods regulated by the provisions on tariff schedules and the elimination of customs duties on the import of 
goods as well as the scope of the services that fall under specific energy services commitments and of 
legitimizing measures derogating from the provisions on the liberalization of trade in goods and of trade in 
services. They may also have the effect of triggering transparency standards and national procedural guarantees 
with respect to climate change objectives that are translated into South Korea’s, EU’s and Member States’ 
respective legal systems. The low level of normativity attributed to the EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13 and its 
absence of direct effect before EU and domestic courts should not conceal the overall coherency which it can 
project into the FTA as a whole insofar as the balance between the need to further international trade within a 
regional forum and the consideration of legitimate international public interests is concerned. Climate change 
action can be part of either the first or the second branch of the balance depending on its function as an object of 
international trade or a constraint on international trade. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
It is undeniable that the EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions are formally binding upon the Republic 
of Korea, the EU and its Member States. In that respect, they form part of EU primary law. Its Chapter 13 reflects 
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a combination of rendez-vous, renvoi and standstill obligations constraining the parties to the treaty. These 
clauses, characterized by a low level of precision and inaptitude to produce direct effect before EU and Member 
States’ courts, may still have the effect of informing the scope of the FTA’s trade-related provisions or of 
triggering good governance practices. 
Direct climate change provisions (i.e., when they do not act as an object of or a constraint on 
international trade, or as a trigger of general good governance/administrative standards), are not vowed to 
remain of a soft law nature due to their insufficient degree of precision and low level of judicialization. An example 
of preferential trade agreement whose climate change provisions enjoy hard law characteristics by reason of their 
strong international dispute settlement mechanism is the Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member 
States and Colombia and Peru (‘EU-Colombia/Peru FTA’), which is not yet in force.130 This preferential trade 
agreement is characterized by the presence of provisions addressing climate change issues without structurally 
falling under an environmental or energy section or subsection (i.e., autonomous climate change provisions). 
Although the agreement (like the EU-Korea FTA’s Chapter 13) is loose in relation to its requirements to promote 
a particular climate change goal and to engage in further environmental cooperation, the EU-Colombia/Peru FTA 
nevertheless subjects its climate change framework to an arbitral procedure. 131 An international agreement 
binding upon the Union which has hard law characteristics based on the high level of precision (degree of clarity, 
detail and self-sufficiency) attached to several of its provisions and which may constitute a model for the drafting 
of future FTAs is the Aarhus Convention.132 These prospective FTAs, premised on the Aarhus experience, would 
comprise specific provisions on access to climate change information, private participation in domestic climate 
change decision-making and access to justice in climate change matters, which could be turned into directly 
enforceable procedural and due process rights, at least for most of their modalities.133 The Aarhus Convention 
has indeed been presented as a source of public rights, and intended to directly regulate the relationship 
between individual and private entities on the one hand and Governments on the other. 134 In other words, 
“[w]hereas most multilateral environmental agreements cover obligations that Parties have to each other, the 
Aarhus Convention covers obligations that Parties have to the public”.135  
Climate change provisions consisting in non-discrimination clauses or in stand-alone defence rights are 
likely to enjoy a high degree of normativity in future FTAs, especially if they are sanctioned by arbitral procedures 
covering disputes over their interpretation and/or application. 
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Annex I: express climate change provisions contained in the preferential trade agreements signed by the 
EU (other than the EU-Korea FTA) 
Non-EU countries 
involved 
Date of 
signature 
and of entry 
into force 
Nature of the 
trade 
agreement 
Climate change provision falling under an energy 
heading, an environmental protection or a political 
cooperation heading  
Europe 
Andorra 28/06/1990 
01/01/1991 
Customs Union Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
San Marino 16/12/1991 
01/04/2002 
Customs Union Energy cooperation clause: 
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 16) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Turkey 22/12/1995 
31/12/1995 
Customs Union  
(Decision 1/95 
of the 
Association 
Council based 
on the Ankara 
Agreement of 
Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
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12 September 
1963) 
Norway, Iceland and 
Lichtenstein 
 
2/5/1992 
1/1/1994 
European 
Economic Area 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 73) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Switzerland 22/07/1972 
01/01/1973 
FTA Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Faroe Islands 06/12/1996 
01/01/1997 
FTA Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
09/04/2001 
01/04/2004 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must cover the promotion of energy 
efficiency and of renewable energy (Article 99(2)) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Environmental cooperation may cover, as a priority area, the 
production and consumption of efficient, sustainable and 
clean energy (Article 103(2)) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Serbia 29/04/2008 
01/02/2010 
Interim Trade 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Albania 12/06/2006 
01/04/2009 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
General energy cooperation clause (Article 107) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 108) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Montenegro 15/10/2007 
01/05/2010 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation may cover the promotion of energy 
efficiency and of renewable energy (Article 109) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Environmental  cooperation may revolve around the setting 
up of initiatives for establishing a ‘framework for efficient, 
clean, sustainable and renewable production and 
consumption of energy’. The parties must also pay special 
attention to the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Article 111) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Croatia 29/10/2001 
01/02/2005 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must cover the promotion of energy 
efficiency and of renewable energy (Article 101) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Environmental cooperation must focus, amongst others, on 
the efficient and clean production/use of energy (Article 103) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 16/06/2008 
Date of entry 
into force still 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Energy cooperation clause: 
General energy cooperation clause (Article 107) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
97 
pending 
 
Agreement Environmental  cooperation may revolve around the setting 
up of initiatives for establishing a ‘system for efficient, clean, 
sustainable and renewable production and consumption of 
energy’. The parties must also pay special attention to the 
ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (Article 
108) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Latin America 
Mexico 08/12/1997 
01/10/2000 
Economic 
Partnership, 
Political 
Coordination 
and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
The parties must cooperate, amongst other means, through 
the conception of ‘more efficient energy generation 
processes’ and the promotion of alternative sources of 
renewable energy protective of the environment (Article 23)  
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 34) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Chile 18/11/2002 
1/03/2005 
Association 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Cooperation on energy is designed to strengthen economic 
relations in hydroelectricity, renewable energy and energy-
saving, amongst other key sectors (Article 22(1)) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Environmental cooperation must encourage the prevention 
of contamination and of degradation of ecosystems (Article 
28(1)) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Peru and Colombia 26/06/2012 
Date of entry 
into force still 
pending 
FTA Energy cooperation clause: 
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
The parties commit to effectively implement in their 
respective national laws the Kyoto Protocol (amongst other 
international environmental agreements) (Article 270(2))  
Autonomous climate change clause: 
Climate change heading falling under Title IX entitled ‘Trade 
and Sustainable Development’. 
The parties recognize the importance of encouraging and 
enhancing adaptation efforts. They also commit to promote 
trade in and an easier access to and use of best available 
technologies for the production and use of clean energy. The 
parties must also promote climate change and renewable 
energy measures in such a way as to limit technical barriers 
to trade (Article 275) 
Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras,  Nicaragua 
and Panama (Central 
America) 
29/06/2012 
 
Date of entry 
into force still 
pending 
FTA Energy cooperation clause: 
The parties must reinforce their energy cooperation so as to 
promote, amongst others, sustainable clean and renewable 
energy sources, energy efficiency and energy saving 
technology (Article 65) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Political dialogue in the environmental field must be aimed, 
amongst others, at the fight against the threat of climate 
change (Article 20(2)) 
Autonomous climate change clause: 
Title V ‘Environment, Natural Disasters and Climate Change’ 
is part of Part III entitled ‘Cooperation’ 
Cooperation must cover, amongst other global issues, 
climate change (Article 50(3)(c)). 
Cooperation measures may include: ‘transfer and use of 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
98 
sustainable technology and know-how’; the integration of 
environmental considerations in land-use management; 
reinforcement of environmental management; ‘assisting in 
the implementation and enforcement of those multilateral 
environmental agreements that the Parties are part of’ 
(Article 50(4)). 
Africa 
Morocco 26/02/1996 
01/03/2000 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must focus on the promotion of 
renewable energy and of energy efficiency (Article 57) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 48) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Algeria 
 
22/04/2002 
01/09/2005 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Reference to the aims of cooperation in the energy and 
mining sectors as including the development of renewable 
energies and of energy efficiency (Article 61) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 52) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Tunisia 17/07/1995 
01/03/1998 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must focus on the promotion of 
renewable energy and of energy efficiency (Article 57) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 48) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Egypt 25/06/2001 
01/06/2004 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must focus on the promotion of 
renewable energy and of energy efficiency (Article 53) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 44) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
South Africa 11/10/1999 
01/05/2004 
Trade, 
Development 
and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
The Agreement calls for further cooperation between the two 
parties with a view to promoting ‘new and renewable forms 
of energy’ and the use of ‘environmentally friendly 
technologies’, as well as to stimulating ‘the rational use of 
energy’ through energy efficiency systems (Article 57)  
Environmental cooperation clause: 
Reference to the parties’ duty to cooperate so as to aim for 
sustainable development through ‘the sustainable use of 
renewable natural resources’ (Article 84(1))  
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Ivory Coast 26/11/2008 
 
Date of entry 
into force still 
pending 
Interim 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Cameroon 15/01/2009 
Date of entry 
into force still 
pending 
Interim 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause but a clause 
covering environmental issues (Article 60) that falls under 
Chapter 5 on ‘Sustainable Development’  
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Middle East 
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Palestinian Authority 24/02/1997 
01/07/1997 
Interim 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must focus on the promotion of 
renewable energy and of energy efficiency (Article 48) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 50) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Jordan 24/11/1997 
01/05/2002 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must focus on the promotion of 
renewable energy and of energy efficiency (Article 74) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 65) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Israel 20/11/1995 
1/6/2000 
 
Association 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause: 
Energy cooperation must be designed to develop renewable 
energy sources and to promote ‘energy conservation’ 
(Article 51(1)) 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
General environmental protection clause (Article 50) 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Syria 18/01/1977 
01/11/1978 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Lebanon 17/06/2002 
01/04/2006 
Interim Trade 
Agreement 
(Euro-
Mediterranean 
Agreement) 
Energy cooperation clause:  
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
No general environmental protection clause 
Autonomous climate change clause: None 
Caribbean States 
Antigua,  Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Dominica,  Belize, 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Saint 
Christopher & Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Suriname 
and  Trinidad & Tobago 
(CARIFORUM States) 
 
15/10/2008 
Date of entry 
into force still 
pending 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Energy cooperation clause: 
No general energy heading 
Environmental cooperation clause: 
The parties must ease trade in renewable and energy-
efficient goods/services (Article 183(5))  
Autonomous climate change clause: 
Article 138 entitled ‘Cooperation on eco-innovation and 
renewable energy’ is part of Section 1 ‘Innovation’ of 
Chapter 2 ‘Innovation and intellectual property’ that falls 
under Title IV ‘trade-related issues’ that itself is part of Part II 
‘Trade and Trade-Related Matters’. According to Article 138, 
the parties agree to cooperate and facilitate support in 
projects concerning energy efficiency and renewable energy 
and in projects involving Clean Development Mechanism 
applications  
 
Annex II: Dispute settlement mechanisms applicable to climate change and environmental provisions of 
the preferential trade agreements signed by the EU (other than the EU-Korea FTA)  
Non-EU countries 
involved 
Negotiation and 
consultation procedure 
Mediation, conciliation 
and hybrid forms of 
dispute settlement 
mechanism  
Arbitral and judicial procedure  
Europe 
Andorra N/A N/A N/A 
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San Marino No Yes 
The Cooperation Committee 
may be seized by any party 
of a dispute regarding the 
interpretation of the 
Agreement (Article 24(1)) 
Yes 
Arbitration procedure in case of failure 
of the Cooperation Committee to 
settle the dispute (Article 24(2)) 
Turkey N/A N/A N/A 
Norway, Iceland 
and Lichtenstein 
 
No Yes 
EEA Joint Committee may 
be seized of a dispute 
concerning the 
interpretation or application 
of the EEA (Article 
111(1)(2)) 
Yes 
In case of failure of the EEA Joint 
Committee to settle the dispute over 
the interpretation or application of the 
Agreement, the two parties may jointly 
agree to request from the Court of 
Justice a ruling on the interpretation of 
the relevant rule of the EEA 
Agreement, provided that the latter  
provision is also mirrored in the text of 
the founding Treaties (Article 111(3)) 
Any Contracting Party may unilaterally 
launch arbitration proceedings in case 
of dispute regarding the scope or 
duration of safeguard measures 
adopted by the complaining party to 
the dispute (Article 111(4)) 
Switzerland N/A N/A N/A 
Faroe Islands N/A N/A N/A 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
Yes Yes 
The Stabilisation and 
Association Council may be 
seized by any party of a 
dispute regarding the 
interpretation or application 
of the Agreement. The 
Stabilisation and 
Association Council has the 
power to settle the dispute 
through binding decision 
(Article 111). 
In case of non-performance 
of its obligation(s) by one 
party, the other party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’ 
after having sought a 
mutually acceptable solution 
within the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. Such 
measures must be 
immediately notified to the 
Association Council,  should 
the parties fail to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable solution 
(Article 118(2)) 
No 
 
Serbia N/A N/A N/A 
Albania Yes 
Obligation of prompt 
consultation  on any 
Yes 
The Stabilisation and 
Association Council may be 
No 
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matter  regarding the 
interpretation or 
implementation of the 
Agreement (Article 127) 
seized by any party of a 
dispute regarding the 
interpretation of the 
Agreement. The 
Stabilisation and 
Association Council has the 
power to settle the dispute 
through binding decision 
(Article 119). 
In case of non-performance 
of its obligation(s) by one 
party, the other party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’ 
after having sought a 
mutually acceptable solution 
within the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. Such 
measures must be 
immediately notified to the 
Association Council, should 
the parties fail to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable solution 
(Article 126) 
Montenegro Yes 
 
Yes 
Obligation of good faith 
consultations within the 
Stabilisation and 
Association Council in case 
of dispute regarding the 
interpretation or 
implementation of the 
Agreement (Article 130) 
In case of non-performance 
of its obligation(s) by one 
party, the other party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’ 
after having sought to find a 
mutually acceptable solution 
within the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. The 
latter must be immediately 
informed about any 
appropriate measure 
adopted by the complaining 
party, should the parties fail 
to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution (Article 
129(4)) 
No 
Croatia Yes Yes 
The Stabilisation and 
Association Council may be 
seized by any party of a 
dispute regarding the 
interpretation of the 
Agreement. The 
Stabilisation and 
No 
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Association Council has the 
power to settle the dispute 
through binding decision 
(Article 113). 
In case of non-performance 
of its obligation(s) by one 
party, the other party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’ 
after having sought a 
mutually acceptable solution 
within the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. Such 
measures must be 
immediately notified to the 
Association Council,  should 
the parties fail to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable solution 
(Article 120) 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Yes 
   
 
Yes 
Obligation of good faith 
consultations within the 
Stabilisation and 
Association Council in case 
of dispute regarding the 
interpretation or 
implementation of the 
Agreement (Article 126(2)). 
The Stabilisation and 
Association Council may be 
seized by any party of a 
dispute regarding the 
application or interpretation 
of the Agreement (Article 
125(3))  
In case of non-performance 
of its obligation(s) by one 
party, the other party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’ 
after having sought to find a 
mutually acceptable solution 
within the Stabilisation and 
Association Council. The 
latter must be immediately 
informed about any 
appropriate measure 
adopted by the complaining 
party, should the parties fail 
to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution (Article 
125(4)) 
N/A  
Latin America 
Mexico N/A Yes 
Joint Council is to monitor  
implementation of the 
Agreement by the parties, 
and to determine the 
Yes 
Joint Council may determine the 
appropriate dispute settlement 
procedure applicable to a particular 
trade or trade related dispute (Article 
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appropriate dispute 
settlement procedure 
applicable to a particular 
trade or trade related 
dispute (Articles 45-49) 
50) 
Chile Yes Yes 
Requirement for good faith 
consultation (with or without 
the intervention of the 
Association Committee) 
(Article 183) 
Yes 
If the parties fail in their consultation 
efforts, any party to the dispute may 
initiate the arbitration procedure 
(Articles 184 through and 189) 
Peru and Colombia Yes 
Obligation of good faith 
consultations (Article 
301) 
 
No Yes 
In the event the consulting parties 
failed to solve their dispute through 
consultations, the complaining party 
may initiate the establishment of an 
arbitration panel (Article 302) 
Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras,  
Nicaragua and 
Panama (Central 
America) 
Yes Yes 
Obligation placed on a party 
to a dispute to inform the 
Association Council before 
the proposed adoption of 
‘appropriate measures’ in 
response to an alleged 
breach of the agreement by 
the other party (save in 
case of emergency) in order 
to arrive at a solution 
acceptable to both parties to 
the dispute  (Article 355(2)) 
No 
Africa 
Morocco Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 86) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 86) 
Algeria 
 
Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 100) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 100) 
Tunisia Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 86) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 86) 
Egypt Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
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regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 82) 
dispute (Article 82) 
South Africa Yes 
 
Yes 
The Cooperation Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 104) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Cooperation Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 104) 
Ivory Coast N/A N/A N/A 
Cameroon N/A N/A N/A 
Middle East 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Yes Yes 
The Joint Committee may 
be seized by each of the 
parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 67) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 67) 
Jordan Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 97) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 97) 
Israel Yes Yes 
The Association Council 
may be seized by each of 
the parties of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation 
or application of the 
Agreement (Article 75) 
Yes 
Either party may launch arbitration 
proceedings in case of inability of the 
Association Council to settle the 
dispute by decision (Article 75) 
Syria N/A N/A N/A 
Lebanon N/A N/A N/A 
 
Caribbean States 
Antigua,  Barbuda, 
Bahamas, 
Barbados, 
Dominica,  Belize, 
Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Saint 
Christopher & 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines, 
Suriname and  
Trinidad & Tobago 
(CARIFORUM 
States) 
 Yes Yes Yes 
In case the parties to a dispute have 
failed to solve it through either the 
consultation procedure or mediation, 
the complaining party is entitled to 
launch arbitration proceedings 
(Articles 202 through 223) 
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THE EU-KOREA FTA AND THE RELAXATION OF REGULATORY MEASURES 
 IN THE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
 
BERNADETTE ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN1 
 
During the preparation to the signing of the EU-Korea Free Trade Area Agreement, the mechanical engineering 
and transport sector (SITC 7, Revision 3; NACE 26-30 Revision 2) was highlighted as a potential major 
beneficiary of the agreement, particularly on the South-Korean side. This stems from the relative importance of 
the sector in terms of total trade between the two entities. The sector has also been critical in the process of 
industrialisation in many EU countries and in South-Korea as well as in the emergence of South-Korea as an 
internationally competitive global player. In particular, and given its many linkages with other industries, the 
mechanical engineering sub-sector (or industry) has played and still plays a critical role in both economic 
development and economic growth.  
The 2009 generalised fall in the output of the mechanical engineering and transport sector was felt more 
acutely in EU countries such as Germany. It is however expected that the entry into force of the EU-Korea FTA 
(in 2011) will help reverse these negative trends in the near future. Designed to allow both South Korea and the 
EU benefit from a number of manufacturing complementarities, the EU-Korea FTA aims at dealing with a number 
of subtle non tariffs barriers. Of particular significance to the case of the mechanical engineering industry are 
regulatory obstacles such as technical regulations and standards, restrictions to access raw materials, and 
intellectual property rights issues. Because of the current period of profound economic recession in the EU, some 
countries or regions have been tempted to rely increasingly on regulatory measures such as standards and 
technical regulations, measures that are of utmost importance to the industrial sector analyzed here, and that are 
therefore the focus of this chapter.  
The objective of this paper is therefore to assess the extent and impact of these regulatory obstacles in 
the mechanical engineering industry, in the background of mounting pressures (such as for example in steel 
production, an important raw material for the industry under review) created by the current crisis. The rationale for 
focusing on the mechanical engineering industry stems in particular from its relative importance in terms of two 
way trade between the two entities.  
This study will start by depicting first the relative importance of the sector to both the EU and South-
Korea (Section 1). The ensuing section will analyse the main regulatory measures existing in the mechanical 
engineering industry; this analysis will be embedded in the current discussion on regulatory measures in the 
framework of international and bilateral cooperation. Section 3 will provide some analytical conclusive avenues, in 
particular in terms of policy recommendations.  
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1. IMPORTANCE OF THE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING SECTOR TO THE TWO ECONOMIES 
 
For convenience purposes, the broad mechanical engineering and transport sector (SITC 7, Revision 3) can be 
subdivided into machinery (NACE 26-28) and transport (NACE 29 and 30). NACE 26 -28 refers to: Computers, 
Electronics and Optical Products; Electrical Equipment; and Machinery and Equipment. These industries include 
inter al.,: power generating machinery and equipment; machinery specialised for particular industries; metal 
working machinery; general industrial machinery and equipment n-e-s; office machines; communications 
equipment; and electrical machinery. As much as possible, the emphasis in the chapter is on the NACE 26-28 
group of industries which will be referred to as the ‘mechanical engineering sector’ throughout; the transport sub-
sector will be used as a comparator.   
 
1.1. BROAD PERFORMANCE INDICATORS OF THE EU AND KOREAN ME SECTORS 
In the case of the European Union, the mechanical engineering industry, defined more narrowly, is still a relatively 
important industry within EU-27 manufacturing as a whole, contributing to around 9 per cent of total 
manufacturing production, 10.4 of total manufacturing VA and 9.6 per cent of total manufacturing employment in 
2010 (Table 1). Table 1 also shows the higher productivity levels (VA per capita) achieved by the industry in the 
EU-27 in 2010, and its higher performance in terms of production and productivity before the 2008 crisis, 
compared with the manufacturing sector as a whole. The current recession has led to job losses in this industry  
(-4.8 per cent over the 2008-10 period) as well as substantial declines in both production and value added terms.   
 
Table 1 - Key Figures of the EU-27 mechanical engineering industry 
Sector Indicator 2010 Annual average growth rate in % 
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2008 2008-2010 
Manufacturing  Production, in 
current prices € bn 
5.885,0 5,3 2,1 6,7 -5,2 
ME1) 502,0 4,0 2,3 10,4 -8,4 
Manufacturing  Gross value 
added, at 2010 
prices € bn 
1.504,0 2,1 0,0 1,5 -5,2 
ME1) 157,5 2,4 0,3 6,0 -9,3 
Manufacturing  
Employees 
1.000 
30.063,0 -0,6 -1,3 -0,3 -4,8 
ME1) 2.900,1 -1,6 -2,2 1,8 -4,8 
Manufacturing  
Productivity2) 
€ 1.000 
50,0 2,7 1,3 1,8 -0,4 
ME1) 54,3 4,0 2,6 4,1 -4,7 
1) ME= mechanical engineering; NACE 28 only; 2) Value added per capita and annum at 2010 prices 
Source: Ecorys (2012) page 6. 
NB: In the Ecorys Report, the ME industry is narrowly defined and excludes therefore Computers and Electrical 
Equipment. 
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Table 2 - Regional distribution of Mechanical Engineering in the EU (NACE 28 only, 2008) 
Member State Production Value added Share of EU-27 Employment 
Germany 38.0% 41.5% 34.1% 
Italy 19.1% 15.6% 15.1% 
United Kingdom 6.3% 7.1% 6.6% 
France 7.9% 7.9% 8.6% 
Spain 3.9% 3.9% 4.1% 
Poland 1.9% 2.3% 4.8% 
Czech Republic 2.0% 1.9% 4.5% 
Slovakia 0.5% 0.4% 1.3% 
Source: Eurostat; Cambridge Econometrics; Ifo Institute. 
 
As clearly shown in table 2, EU mechanical engineering firms are regionally concentrated in Central Europe 
encompassing Germany, Austria, northern Italy, the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland. Clusters of mechanical engineering firms can also be found in Switzerland (an EEA county) as well as in 
the Basque region of Spain. Owing to their size, the main EU producing countries are Germany, with 38 and 34.1 
per cent of total EU production and employment respectively, Italy (19.1 and 15.1 per cent respectively), France 
(7.9 per cent for both production and employment) and the UK (6.3 and 7.1 per cent respectively). Cross-border 
links, through trade and investment are important, conferring the industry a pan-EU dimension/character. 
On the Korean side, the structure of the ‘other machinery’ industry (SITC 71-74 and 77) shows a 
preponderance of SMEs focusing on products in the mid-range technology and price category, that is below 
European or Japanese competitors, albeit significantly higher than Chinese machinery firms. This is in contrast to 
EU mechanical engineering (ME) firms who supply high-tech machinery. The quality gap between EU and Korean 
machinery (and transport) products has nevertheless diminished considerably in the last few decades making 
Korea-sourced products increasingly more desirable on the EU market. 2  The Korean ME SMEs have a 
significantly lower level of internationalization than their EU competitors. The Korean machine-tools industry still 
has an import dependency of over 40 per cent, especially for high-tech equipment such as laser cutting devices 
(Korean-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2010). In the Korean market, foreign products in this 
sector are mostly concentrated in the area of ‘other machinery’, such as pumps/compressors and 
processing/lifting machinery. Table 3 shows how production in the Korean machinery industry (referred to as 
capital goods here) had been hit by the 2008 crisis but how it recovered quickly surpassing consumer goods 
industries over the period 2005-2011. Table 4 depicts the different labor costs trajectories of the different Korean 
ME industries over the period 2005-2010, with labor costs in computers and motor vehicles going in opposite 
directions.  
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Table 3. Manufacturing Production Index, 2005-2011 (2005 = 100) 
Item / Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All Items 100,00 108,70 116,40 120,30 120,00 140,10 149,90 
 A. Capital Goods, of 
which: 100,00 108,00 117,20 124,60 120,00 139,80 145,60 
1. Manufacturing 
Equipment 100,00 113,00 118,70 121,10 109,10 161,00 166,00 
2. Electricity 100,00 107,00 121,80 152,50 164,70 164,50 165,90 
3.  Communication 100,00 109,50 124,60 138,10 130,00 119,70 108,00 
4. Transportation 
Equipment 100,00 107,50 118,60 134,20 137,30 128,00 142,70 
5. Agriculture 100,00 90,80 89,70 85,30 77,10 89,60 108,50 
6. Construction 100,00 111,60 135,50 134,30 69,60 139,40 173,80 
7. Office 100,00 93,70 98,40 86,90 83,10 98,40 88,60 
8. Others 100,00 109,50 118,20 120,50 123,00 139,40 143,90 
  B. Intermediate Goods 100,00 111,70 121,70 126,10 128,50 153,70 169,50 
  C. Consumers' Goods 100,00 102,90 105,40 106,40 102,70 112,60 112,30 
 
Source: Bank of Korea: ECOS Economic Statistics System. 
   
Table 4. Labor costs developments in the Korean ME sector compared with 
manufacturing (2005 and 2010; base 100 in 2005) 
Sector / Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Manufacturing 100,00 95,10 96,20 94,50 92,20 86,90 
Machinery and 
Equipment, of which: 100,00 105,70 112,10 111,60 119,40 99,90 
1. Computers and 
Office 
Machinery 
100,00 84,60 73,00 66,00 56,20 62,60 
2. Electrical 
Machinery and 
Apparatus 
n.e.c. 
100,00 103,10 108,90 96,10 95,40 89,90 
3. Electronic 
Compo-nents, 
Radio, 
Television and 
Communi-
cation 
100,00 89,10 75,80 75,60 68,00 68,40 
4. Medical, 
Precision and 
Optical 
Instruments 
100,00 107,80 120,70 128,20 116,50 112,50 
5. Motor Vehicles, 
Trailers and 
Semitrailers 
100,00 98,80 104,40 122,40 113,80 118,50 
6. Other 
Transport 
Equipment 
100,00 96,10 115,60 95,80 83,30 85,30 
 
Source: Bank of Korea: ECOS Economic Statistics System. 
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The relative importance of the mechanical engineering sector to the EU and Korea economies needs to be 
appraised also in indirect terms. Despite the fact that, in terms of their direct contribution to total output, value 
added, employment and trade, mechanical engineering industries are moderately significant, the indirect macro-
economic impact of these industries is notable. This stems from the strategic importance of the mechanical 
engineering sector in terms of industrial and economic development. The term ‘strategic’ ought to be understood 
primarily in the sense that the sector occupies a crucial role in the diffusion of technological change to other 
industries and in that it commands both productivity and efficiency gains in downstream industries. This is 
explained by the fact that much of the demand for mechanical engineering products is a derived demand; 
mechanical engineering firms supply capital goods for investment in other manufacturing and service industries, 
who themselves produce final products and services. Figure 1 depicts the multiple synergies of the mechanical 
engineering sector with the rest of the economy in a typical country such as Germany by showing the share of 
total investment in mechanical engineering by each industry. As can be seen, mechanical engineering 
represented for example substantially more than 80 per cent of all investment by agriculture, forestry and fishing 
industries in 2008. 
In particular, the transport sector (including aerospace) is a very active source of demand for mechanical 
engineering products. High levels of automation in transport after WWII explain the intimate technical connection 
between the two sub-sectors.  
Consequently, the crucial role of the mechanical engineering sector explains much of the industrial 
policy choices made in the past by countries such as Germany, Sweden, France and Italy in the EU as well as 
Japan, South Korea and increasingly China in Asia.3 The Japanese mechanical engineering breakthrough in the 
1970s was due to the strong positioning of the country on office machines and automatic data processing 
machines as well as on the strong integration of these newly-born numerical systems into machinery per se, 
giving birth to numerically controlled machinery. In the case of South Korea, a radical policy change centered on 
a rapid industrialization of the country through capital and technology accumulation led to the ‘Korean economic 
miracle’ from the late 1960s, with a growth rate culminating to 16.9 per cent in 1973 (Hakwon Sunoo, 1994).   
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Figure 1 – Synergies between the mechanical engineering sector and other industries in  Germany  (investment 
in mechanical engineering products by industry, 1991 and 2008) 
 
Source: . Strobel, T., S.  Sauer & K.  Wohlrabe (2012) Investorenrechnung - Dokumentation von Quellen, 
Verarbeitung und Methodik, Ifo Institut, München. 
1.2. TRADE PERFORMANCE IN THE ME SECTOR 
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The EU relative trade specialisation in the broad mechanical engineering & transport sector and in the two major 
components of this broad sector is shown in table 5. The table shows how the mechanical engineering sector, 
rather than transport, contributes to EU trade with the world in general and with South Korea in particular. In 
2011, the broad ME and transport sector represented more than 42 per cent of EU merchandise exports to the 
world; this compared with a smaller share (26 per cent) in total EU merchandise imports. The mechanical 
engineering sub-sector represented in the same year more than 21 per cent of all EU mechanical exports to the 
world.  
 
Table 4. EU trade in mechanical engineering and transport (year 2011; in million € and % of EU total 
merchandise trade) 
SITC 7 Rev.3 (UN, 
WTO/ITS) 
Exports to the 
world 
Imports from 
the world 
Exports to 
South Korea 
Imports from 
South Korea 
Mill € % Mill € % Mill € % Mill € % 
1. Machinery and 
Transport Equipment 
(SITC 7) 
of which: 647,511 42% 438,645 26% 16,146 50% 23,123 64% 
1.1. Office and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment (75&76) 80,438 5% 178,402 11% 1,264 4% 7,820 22% 
1.2. Transport Equipment 
(78&79) 243,239 16% 102,056 6% 5,590 17% 10,187 28% 
1.3. Other Machinery (71-74 
and 77) 321,428 21% 158,187 9% 9,262 29% 5,116 14% 
Total (0000) 1,531,122 100 1,683,931 100 32,419 100 36,057 100 
Source: Derived from EUROSTAT, Comext, Statistical Regime 4, Luxembourg. 
NB: Small discrepancies in the sum figures (Nace 2400) are due to rounding errors in the raw figures released by 
EUROSTAT. Intra-EU trade excluded.  
 
First, EU-South Korea bilateral mechanical engineering trade shows how South-Korea is relatively important for 
EU trade in this group of industries. Mechanical engineering and transport represents 50 per cent of EU 
merchandise exports to South-Korea, whereas this figure is 29 per cent for the mechanical engineering sub-
sector.   
When assessing EU trade with the world, the table shows that both the mechanical engineering and 
transport sub-sectors are still comparatively sound areas of productive activity for the EU. The EU trade balance 
with the world is indeed positive in all cases except for office and telecommunication equipment where the trade 
balance is persistently negative.  
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The picture in terms of EU-Korea bilateral mechanical engineering and transport trade is nevertheless 
rather different. The EU revealed comparative advantage at the global level in this broad sector (with a trade 
surplus of €208.8 billion in 2011) is somewhat annihilated by its bilateral trade with Korea, a country with which 
the deficit has been growing over time. The EU deficit with South Korea (€-6.9bn in 2011) in the sector as a whole 
is somewhat compensated by a trade surplus in the ‘other machinery’ category (€4.1bn in 2011). A longitudinal 
analysis using UN Comtrade data over a long period shows that the growth rate of EU machinery and transport 
imports from South Korea has been consistently greater than the growth rate of EU machinery and transport 
exports to the same country, widening thereby the negative EU trade balance over time (Guerin. et al., 2007).  
Conversely, the analysis of the Korean ME trade position globally and with the EU over the last decade 
shows that although South-Korean total trade vis-à-vis the EU (and globally) is positive in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole, this is not the case for machinery products stricto sensu, that is when excluding office 
equipment machines (and transport). The Korean trade balance with the EU (and globally) is negative in the 
group of ‘other machinery’ industries and the relatively weak position of Korea has been growing over the decade 
under review. From a Korean perspective, trade specialization in machinery (again excluding office equipment 
and transport) measured by the RCA (Balassa) Index has deteriorated from -125.1 in 2000 to -147.3 in 2010 vis-
à-vis the EU (Ecorys, 2012). However, when office machines are included in the data, the ME trade balance is 
advantageous to South Korea, as has been noted above.   
 
1.3. IMPACT IN TERMS OF FUTURE TRADE GROWTH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FTA 
It clearly follows from the above analysis that the Korean ME sector is particularly strong in the electronics-
telecommunication segment (as well as in transport) and weak in the ‘other machinery’ industry. In the 
electronics-telecomm industry, Korea has a strong position in semiconductors, display panels and mobile phones 
which are the top three export commodities of this industry. Conversely, the reasons for the dismal EU 
performance in the ME sector as a whole, and in particular in electronics-telecomm and transport stem from 
qualitative as well as quantitative features of EU production and trade with such a partner country (Ecorys, 2012). 
From a quantitative viewpoint, customs duties and other trade barriers (particularly on the Korean market) have 
been noted as important deterring forces to exporters; the South Korean market is still perceived as a relatively 
sheltered market. According to the European Commission (2010), the removal of customs duties after the 
entering into force of the EU-Korea FTA agreement in July 2011 would allow the machinery and appliances 
sector to be the sector benefiting the most in absolute terms from the agreement (some €312 million of duties 
would be removed immediately after the agreement enters into force, out of a total of €450 million of duties 
affecting this sector). Products falling in the office and telecommunications equipment category, as well as those 
in the transport sector would benefit from a gradual liberalisation (over 5 years) on the Korean market.4 These 
estimates concur with the results of a number of studies that have highlighted how the mechanical engineering 
sector would benefit from a complete elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 
2009; Breuss and François, 2011). 
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As in all studies on all trade liberalisation, the welfare impact of trade barriers removal can easily be 
estimated, whereas that of non-tariff barriers such as the many regulatory measures is a much more arduous 
task. Given the high level of technical sophistication characterising the mechanical engineering sub-sector (as 
well as the transport sub-sector), the tackling of these regulatory measures in the ambit of the EU-Korea FTA 
should theoretically lead to substantial additional gains, in particular for EU manufacturers. To this issue we now 
turn, by keeping the emphasis again on mechanical engineering.  
 
2. REGULATORY MEASURES IN THE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING SUB SECTOR 
 
2.1. REGULATORY MEASURES DEFINED 
From the viewpoint of a mechanical engineering firm, accessing a tariff-free foreign market implies tackling the 
sensitive and laborious issue of regulatory measures such as standards and technical regulations as well as 
market entry administrative procedures. Whereas the latter can be listed as generic regulatory measures that 
affect all imports in the same way, standards and technical regulations are product-specific. By setting out the 
specific characteristics of the product (size, labelling, performance, etc.), standards and technical regulations are 
therefore more prevalent in some industries, in particular in the technology-based industries such as those under 
review here. At the concept design phase, the designer of a product must therefore consider different technical 
requirements or constraints to which the manufacturer must comply throughout the whole product life-cycle, that 
is from conception and design to recycling and disposal (Kim et al. 2012).Whereas conformity with standards is 
voluntary for the exporter, compliance with technical regulations is mandatory making the latter more constraining 
and onerous. This subtle distinction implies that, prima facie, an exporter of a specific type of machinery should 
find it easier to sell his product in a destination country where standards, rather than technical regulations, 
predominate. However, although products not complying with standards will be allowed to enter the destination 
market, the standard-aware consumer will ultimately opt for the standard-compliant (domestic) product, resulting 
in shrinking market shares for the foreign produce. In the mechanical engineering sector, many of these 
standards and technical regulations are issued in order to protect consumers’ safety and health and to preserve 
the environment. The significant growth of these regulatory measures during the past few years can indeed be 
explained by increasing consumers’ demand for highly performing, safe and environmentally-friendly products 
and processes of production in the context of rising standards of living and increasing consumers’ awareness in 
terms of water shortages and soil erosion.  
For the typical ME firm, the rise in both the number and the sophistication of regulatory measures 
involves higher costs, in particularly for SMEs.5 Whereas most manufacturers in the transport equipment industry 
are large firms, the mechanical engineering sector in the EU comprises a myriad of firms that are either small (up 
to 250 employees) or medium-sized (up to 2000 employees). They are indeed rather small compared to their 
global, in particular Asian and Korean, competitors. At EU level, restructuring has therefore been one way of 
dealing with these additional cost pressures. More specifically, the EU mechanical engineering industry has been 
consolidating since the early 1990s, with cross-border mergers and acquisitions leading to larger entities. Smaller 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
114 
firms have therefore been merged and in some instances private equity firms and financial investors have been 
involved in the creation of sustainable units particularly in the aftermath of economic downturns. However, even 
the large firms might find it difficult to cope with some new regulatory measures stemming for example from the 
current economic crisis. For example, the 2010 Korean regulations establishing new fuel efficiency and green 
house emission requirements for motor cars could have been perceived as a measure undermining market 
access for EU and US competitors. These measures could easily be viewed as a protectionist move in disguise. 
Owing to the gradual loss of competitiveness of EU mechanical engineering firms,6 and of the potential threat 
represented by the FTA with South-Korea, according to some estimates (Copenhagen Economics, 2007), the 
remainder of this section will deal primarily with regulatory measures (in particular, standards), in the Korean 
mechanical engineering market.   
 
2.2. REGULATORY MEASURES AND REGULATORY COOPERATION IN THE ME SECTOR  
Economic integration at both the regional and global levels since the 1980s has triggered a noticeable growth in 
the number of international and regional standards. The fact that these standards are devised at a supra-national 
level implies a convergence or harmonisation of standards worldwide and this should in theory foster trade (Fliess 
et al., 2010). It is in this vein that the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the WTO (or WTO TBT 
Agreement) was devised (Mattli and Büthe, 2003).7 Using panel data analysis at the industry level,  Chen and 
Mattoo (2008) show that regional agreements on standards increase trade between participating countries but not 
systematically with the rest of the world. Before looking at EU-Korea cooperation in the area, this sub-section will 
attempt a summary of the main regulatory measures in the case of the two economies.   
 
2.2.1. REGULATORY MEASURES IN THE KOREAN ME SECTOR  
For an EU exporter in Korea, the CE label implies that the product normally enters the Korean market without any 
difficulties. However, for high technology applications, such as laser cutting machines, additional testing and 
certification requirements might be necessary.  
The Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS) is the main body that technically regulates 
industry in Korea. Another agency is the Telecommunications Technology association (TTA) which establishes 
standards in the area of telecommunications, information technology, radio communication and broadcasting. 
KATS classifies standards into three types: (i) product standards are related to product measurement and quality; 
(ii) procedure standards specify the testing/analysis/inspection/measurement methods and process standard; (iii) 
horizontal standards relate to terminology, etc. The agency divides the standards into 21 sectors and categories 
starting with basic standards. For our purpose, the classification encompasses inter alia mechanical engineering, 
electrical and electronic engineering, as well as transportation machines.8 
Table 6a - Increase in the number of 
standards in South Korea (1962-2011; all 
sectors) 
Year n 
1962 300 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
115 
1970 1,846 
1980 7,029 
1990 8,552 
2000 10,845 
2005 21,251 
2007 22,760 
2009 23,372 
2010 23,622 
2011 23,923 
Source: KATS website, Seoul. 
 
Table 6a depicts the increase in total industrial standards in Korea since 1962. These regulatory measures 
stipulate the testing and certifying of products with Korean requirements, activities that are carried out by 
domestic non-profit organisations. Of particular note is the impressive increase of technical standards since the 
Asian crisis, and in particular the doubling of the number of standards between 2000 and 2005. Table 6b shows a 
breakdown by industry as of December 2011  
 
Table 6.b - Breakdown of Korean standards by industry/area (as of December, 2011)  
Sector 
No. of 
Standards Sector  
No. of 
Standards 
Total 23,923 
Basic Standards(A) 744 Ceramics (L) 475 
Mechanical Engineering(B) 4,149 Chemistry (M) 3,465 
Electrical & Electronic engineering (C) 3,832 Medical (P) 760 
Metals (D) 1,633 Quality management (Q) 123 
Mining (E) 440 Transportation machine (R) 1,067 
Construction (F) 858 Service (S) 113 
Necessities (G) 383 Logistics (T) 319 
Foodstuffs (H) 526 Shipbuilding (V) 834 
Environment (I)  672 Aerospace (W) 522 
Organism(J) 78 Information (X) 2,039 
Fiber (K) 891 
Source: KATS website, Seoul. 
 
The table clearly shows that the mechanical engineering sector represent more than 33 per cent of all standards; 
when transport is added (including aerospace) the broad mechanical engineering and engineering sector 
accounts for nearly 40 per cent of all Korean standards existing in the country in 2011.  
 
2.2.2. REGULATORY MEASURES IN THE EU ME SECTOR   
The EU mechanical engineering sector, and in particular the machine-tool industry, has been a critical sector in 
the making of the Single European Market (SEM). By late 2002, less than 50 per cent of all harmonized 
standards had been adopted by all EU countries, with an average time lag for a technical standard to be 
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successfully adopted being some eight years. In spite of a great deal of intra-SEM harmonization, some national 
regulatory measures (in particular in the area of health and safety provisions in the workplace) still hamper today 
the free circulation of mechanical engineering products in the EU. 
Standards’ harmonization at EU level has led to the “New Approach of the European Union” materialised 
under a number of directives shaping the SEM, such as the Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC), replacing 
Directive 98/37/EC and applicable from 29th December 2009. Covering a broad range of machinery products such 
as wood-working machines, robots, lifting equipment, hydraulic presses, control and measuring equipment and 
construction equipment, this directive stipulates that the European Commission, - the central authority 
responsible for proposing technical harmonisation in the EU - ,9 can prohibit or restrict the placing on the market 
of a type of machine presenting a risk in terms of health and safety by virtue of its technical characteristics. 
Technical standards that are in conformity with the Machinery Directive have been harmonized, and a revised list 
of such Machinery Directive Harmonized Standards can be found in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJ) of 29 February 2012.  
Article 21 of the Machinery directive stipulates that products that have received the CE marking “should 
be fully recognized as being the only marking which guarantees that machinery conforms to the requirements of 
this Directive”  (EC, 2006: L157/26). The affixing of the CE marking implies that a manufacturer has fulfilled all 
obligations according to all the Directives applicable to the product. Other EU directives need indeed to be taken 
into account by ME producers and traders on the EU market, such as the EU exhaust gas Directive (Directive 
2000/25/EC).10 Complying with this directive implies heavy investments in the development of internal combustion 
engine and these investments are particularly onerous for smaller firms. In this industry, whereas sub-contracting 
activities of intermediate products are paramount, larger mechanical engineering firms are consequently 
confronted with multiple regulatory requirements at different stages of the manufacturing and assembly 
processes.  
The dual objective of the Machinery Directive and of other related Directives is to enable the free 
movement of machinery products with the EU market, and to guarantee a high level of protection in terms of 
health and safety. For the would-be (Korean exporter), these Directives create an harmonized market where 
scale economies can be reaped. In spite of their technical stringency, these directives facilitate the export and 
sale of Korean ME products on the entire EU market.  
2.2.3. SUMMARY 
Greater integration at both the regional and global levels has led to a degree of harmonisation in the area of 
standards and regulatory measures. For example and as noted by the EIU (2011), Korea’s FTA strategy has led 
to simplified export procedures and documentation. Exported products do not require any more an export license 
issued by a foreign exchange bank and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy helps exporters by making the 
information about trade restrictions readily available.  
During the negotiations relating to the EU-Korea FTA, concessions such as reduced tariffs in the EU were 
made to the Korean negotiators in the transport sector. Interestingly, a plethora of EU directives aimed at 
harmonizing the EU market in the ME area can be seen as facilitating Korean exports of ME products onto the 
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EU market. On the Korean side, a greater awareness and sophistication in the regulatory process has led to 
increased standards over time, particularly in the ME and transport sector. Given the Korean relative strength in 
the electronics-telecommunication segment and the EU relative strength in the ‘other machinery’ category, further 
collaboration in the regulatory area should help the two trading entities capitalise from their mutual 
complementarity in this broad sector.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS - POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The mechanical engineering industry has played (and still plays) a crucial role in terms of economic growth and 
development in both South Korea and a number of EU countries. During the negotiations leading up to the 
signing of the EU-Korea FTA, this industry was singled out as a key player in EU-Korean trade; in particular, trade 
liberalisation between the two entities would allow this industry to be the major industrial beneficiary from the 
agreement. Indeed, this is an industry characterised by a myriad of standards, technical regulations and market 
entry administrative procedures. Although standards and technical regulations are issued in the interest of the 
final consumer, they are product specific (and are therefore prevalent in this type of industry) and they generate 
numerous costs for mechanical engineering firms, in particular for SMEs, as well as for importers. These costs 
represent additional market entry barriers, particularly since the advent of the current economic crisis. Evidence 
here shows the major progress in harmonising standards and regulatory measures within the EU market, in 
particular through the new Machinery Directive as well as a formidable increase in the number of technical 
standards (in South Korea) particularly in the past 10 years or so. Although some of this increase can be 
attributed to the greater technical sophistication of the South Korean productive fabric, this proliferation calls 
clearly for the delineation of common strategies in the area, so as to make the EU-Korea FTA effective. Policy 
implications include for example: allowing the EU and South Korea to develop their own standard and technical 
regulations in harmony with an internationally agreed approach and allowing the EU Commission and regulatory 
bodies to take more fully into account the problems of smaller firms when they adapt to new (EU-based) 
regulatory measures and when contemplating to export abroad such as in South Korea. These ways forward 
imply efforts in increasing the transparency of data and information related to standards and regulatory measures 
in the ME sector and in the case of the two economic entities.  
 
Endnotes
                                                          
1 Jean-Monnet Chair of Economics, Euro-Asia Centre, Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, and Visiting Chair, 
Ruhr Universität Bochum (RUB), Fakultät für Ostasienwissenschaften. Many thanks are due to Georg Koernig (RUB) for 
statistical help on a revised version of this work. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 We deliberately use the expression ‘Korean-sourced products’  for, since the more systematic opening of the Korean 
economy to foreign direct investors after the 1997 Asian crisis, an increasing share of Korean exports to the EU are from EU 
firms. Korean firms are well embedded in a number of global systems of production; this implies that it is a major trader in 
intermediate products and that its exports have a relatively high import content particularly in the telecommunication 
component of the machinery engineering sector. 
3 The USA (with 44% of EU output in 2010), Japan (30%) and China have been mentioned as the most important competing 
economies for the EU-27 ME. Chinese firms are increasingly active on the EU market. Examples illustrating the penetration 
of Chinese firms include the takeover in 2005 of the German Dürkopp Adler by the Chinese Shanggon Group (SGSB) in the 
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sewing machines industry and in more upstream activities the takeover in 2011 of the Norwegian firm Elkem by the Chinese 
Bluestar specialized in materials and alloys used in foundries and ME firms (Ecorys, 2012).  
4 Under the EU-Korea FTA, the EU motor vehicles industry benefits from a safeguard clause. The agreement stipulates that 
the two contracting parties undertake to remove more than 98 per cent of duties in trade value over 5 years from July 
2011(some agricultural products are excluded).    
5 These costs are typically connected with the translation of these measures, with the hiring of technical experts and with the 
adjustment of production facilities in order to comply with these measures. 
6 In terms of price competitiveness and labour productivity for example (see Ecorys, 2012: 208). 
7 However, and as reminded by Zuñiga Schroder (2009), the concept of international standard does not have a clear 
definition since, unlike in the case of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, the bodies entitled to issue these 
standards have not been clearly defined by the WTO. 
8 See the appendix for the details under each category. 
9 Note that the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) is the body for the planning, drafting and adoption of 
European standards in all areas of economic activity with the exception of electro-technology (CENELEC) and 
telecommunication (ETSI). 
10  Other such EU directives include the following: the Electro-Magnetic Compatibility Directive (2204/108/EC, EMC); 
Directives 2002/88/EC and 2004/26/EC on the emission of gaseous and particulate pollutants from internal combustion 
engines to be installed in non-road mobile machinery; Directive 1999/5/EC on radio and telecommunications terminal 
equipment; Directive 2005/88/EC on the noise emission in the environment by equipment for use outdoors; Directive 
2002/95/EC on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment; Directive 
2005/32/EC establishing a framework for the setting of eco-design requirements for energy-using products. 
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Appendix – Classification of Korean Standards (Source: KATS website, Seoul) 
 
Major Sub-major 
Mechanical Engineering (B) 
General/Machine elements/Tools/Machine tools/Measuring instrument·physical 
appratus/General machinery/Industrial machinery Agricultural machinery/Thermal 
apparatus·gas apparatus/Metrology·measurement/Industrial automation/Etc. 
Electrical & electronic 
engineering (C) 
General/Measurement & testing apparatus/Electrical & electronic materials/cable 
and conduit/Electrical machines/Electrical appliances 
Electrical·electronic·communication component/Lamp·lighting 
devices/Wiring·electrical accessories/Semiconductor·display/Others 
Transportation machine (R) 
General /Testing and Inspect method/Common parts/Bicycle/Engine and parts/Car 
bodies·safety/Electric & electronic system·instrument/Repair Tools/Railway 
/Motorcycle /Etc. 
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THE POWER TO KNOW IS THE POWER TO AFFECT. TARIFF CONCESSIONS IN THE FTA BETWEEN THE EU AND KOREA 
 
BART KERREMANS 
JOHAN ADRIAENSEN 
YF REYKERS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The free trade agreement that the European Union and South Korea concluded in 2009 (henceforth FTA 
KOREU) has entered into force on July 1, 2011 and caught a lot of attention from economic and political 
scholars. Karel De Gucht, current European Commissioner for trade, labels the FTA KOREU as “the most 
ambitious trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU” (Commission, 2011).  
A large part of the research focused on the geo-political drivers of this trade agreement and noted the 
deep economic motivations behind this trade agreement. Cooper et al. (2011) label the agreement as a reflection 
of “(…) the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home 
regions.” Ho-Jin Lee (2010) rightly refers to the agreement as the first of a new generation of free trade 
agreements pursued by the EU that “fulfils [the EU’s 2006 Global Europe Initiative] mandate by guaranteeing 
access to Korea’s dynamic market in which European businesses can compete on equal footings against local 
and foreign businesses.”  
Other studies, looking more into the content and the process of the negotiations, have largely focused 
on politicized issues. More particularly, attention has been dedicated to the debates about automobiles, services, 
and chemicals. Elsig and Dupont (2012) for example explained how the European Commission was able to 
neutralize the concerns of automobile manufacturers as it had garnered support in other areas. Similarly, the 
importance of the safeguard clause and the involvement of post-Lisbon European Parliament was also 
emphasized by Horng (2012). Finally, Gabriel Siles-Brügge studied how the European Union’s discourse 
‘constructed an ideational imperative for liberalisation in „Global Europe‟, enabling it to overcome opposition to 
the EU-Korea FTA’ (2011:1). 
While the focus on the (geopolitical) context or the political process that led to the eventual agreement 
being ratified provides us many insights in how certain policy outcomes came about, it also leaves our 
knowledge on all other issues negotiated in the agreement obscured. For instance, how can we explain policy 
outcomes for the many issues in which little politicization or societal mobilization drove the policy process? How 
to understand the exemption of certain tariff reductions that were not being subject to a heated public debate? It 
is here, that the functioning of the domestic trade administration becomes more important. Much of the existing 
IPE literature, however, has focused on either the macro-political dimension or generalized the behaviour of 
specific mobilized interests in society. Although valuable in and of itself, in order to fully understand policy 
outcomes, we believe that acquiring an understanding of the functioning of the trade administration can inform 
and stimulate more valuable insights. This will be discussed in the first part of the paper. 
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To address the critique formulated, we study one specific aspect of the trade agreement of which we 
believe that politicization is limited and where the administration plays an important role i.e. the tariff 
implementation schedules that are included in each FTA. The research design supporting our case is explained 
in the second section. We basically conduct a sequential mixed method inquiry, From qualitative data-gathering 
we derive three motivations -or hypotheses if you will- that can explain the outcomes. When testing these 
hypotheses in a quantitative assessment, we also find deviating results in the schedules of Korea and the 
European Union. That will be part of the third section of this paper. 
In the fourth and final section we present our interpretation of these results and come back to the 
importance of the functioning of domestic trade administrations for trade policy outcomes. Besides drawing some 
lessons for the scholarship on the political economy of trade, we also derive a number of policy 
recommendations in the conclusion 
 
2. INTRODUCING THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 
 
Negotiating a free trade agreement is not always easy. Different economic sectors may be affected differently, 
and especially the potential losers from trade liberalization will experience strong incentives to mobilize against 
any concession that could potentially hurt them. As Erixon and Lee-Makiyama (2010: 4) observe succinctly: “(…) 
all trade agreements create winners and losers, and the political motivation is often aimed at minimising the 
number of losers.”  
International political economy (IPE) has tended to focus disproportionately on these losers. There is a 
plausible theoretical reason for this: loss aversion and its positive impact on collective action. Indeed, the fear to 
lose something that one already has is a more powerful incentive for action than the hope to win something in 
the future (Freund and Özden, 2008; Tovar, 2009). This is certainly the case when the anticipated losses are 
highly concentrated, meaning that the expected per capita losses are high. Confronted with this assumed impact 
of loss aversion, IPE scholars have increasingly tried to explain why in spite of loss aversion, massive trade 
liberalization takes place.  
One such explanation questions the presumed link between loss aversion and protectionism (Dür, 2007; 
Manger, 2009). In these studies, it is stressed that exactly in the context of free trade agreements – particularly 
the proliferation of such agreements – loss avoidance may be tantamount to trade liberalization. In the case of 
the FTA KOREU,  this loss avoidance played an important role for the European exporters, as they feared that in 
the absence of a FTA, they would be at a disadvantage to their American counterparts who were awaiting the 
ratification and implementation of Korea-US FTA.  
Notwithstanding the importance of business associations within the trade policy process, there are only 
a limited range of products and sectors for which mobilization has been observed. For all other products where 
no peak association exists or where such associations have not been very vocal, the question remains: What 
determines a policy position in the absence of interest group pressure? This question has partly been dealt with 
in the literature. In the absence of mobilized interests, the argument is suggested that policymakers are expected 
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to take decisions that promote aggregate economic welfare, given that they are confronted with the effect of 
economic growth on voting behaviour (Milner, 1997; Gawande et al., 2009). In the worst case this concern is 
translated into a preference for liberalization, in the best case it is deduced from discourse by political elite (see 
e.g. Siles-Brügge, 2011). But in both cases the ideological preferences are considered a default position that 
explains all choices in the absence of political pressure. 
What all these studies tend to have in common is their focus on highly politicized issues and with it, an 
emphasis on political dynamics as opposed to the more bureaucratic administrative processes that characterize 
the main part of what trade policy actually consists of.1 This is understandable, as it concerns the most visible 
part of the negotiations. Mobilized business associations are vocal in trade discussions and the rhetoric and 
discourse used by e.g. the Commission is publically available. However, the mere assumption of a liberal bias or 
the deduction of  the ideology from discourse makes abstraction of the policy process as it is developed within 
the administration. And while it might well be that ideology and discourse is reflected in decisions on less salient 
issues, it still remains to be assessed whether that really is the case. Similarly, the assumption that policy-
makers respond to the aggregated vector of the pressures to which they are exposed is merely that: an 
assumption. Recently, scholars have tended to pay some attention to this question in their emphasis on the 
active search that policymakers undertake for societal input on trade or other issues (Woll, 2006). Elsig and 
Dupont (2012) did so with regard to the FTA KOREU, as they showed how the Commission actively “builds 
permeability” for industry groups that share its own preferences. 
Much of the IPE literature on trade has overlooked these bureaucratic processes that are vital in our 
understanding of what really matters to explain policy outcomes: How do the trade experts draft negotiating 
positions? At which stage and to which extent does the ideology of the trade ministry (or commissioner) influence 
policy outcomes? Through which ways are the business associations actually involved in e.g. the determination 
of a tariff schedule? Our research into the drivers of tariff commitments in the FTA KOREU is an attempt to 
address these questions by focusing on the functioning of the administration as a starting point. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To showcase the merits of an administrative focus in the political economy of trade, we will focus on the 
schedules in which the reduction of tariffs are articulated. Three reasons guided our decision. First of all, in tariff 
schedules the liberalization has to be defined on a product-level basis and thus on thousands of individual tariff 
lines. This implies that we will have both politicized and less politicized issues. The reduction of tariff barriers on 
goods has been of relatively low salience in the whole FTA KOREU negotiations. However, the debate on car 
imports indicate that the length of the implementation period has also been sensitive for a number of products2. 
Secondly, each contracting member to a trade agreement has its own tariff reduction schedule. In this case, that 
implies we can study both the concessions granted by the European Union and those by South-Korea, also 
enabling a comparative research design. And finally, the determination of tariff schedules represent a simple and 
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straightforward discussion, as it reflects “traditional trade policy” and not regulatory, behind-the-border, barriers 
(Young, 2006).  
To conduct our research, we will proceed in two stages. In a first stage, we inquire into the 
administrative process that is followed to draft the tariff schedules. More specifically, we conducted interviews 
with the responsible expert within DG Trade of the European Commission and a Korean negotiator. Based on 
these interviews we then derive a number of hypotheses that are tested in a second stage on a quantitative 
dataset.  This allow us to assess the validity and relative importance of the different hypotheses generated. As 
both the EU and Korea negotiated their own tariff schedule, we also contrast the findings in both cases and 
inquire into the causes and consequences of such differences. 
 
4. THE TRADE ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE DRAFTING OF THE TARIFF SCHEDULES 
 
Trade negotiations occur at both an abstract as well as at a specific level. The former corresponds to the scope 
and time horizon of the liberalization pursued in the agreement, whereas the latter concerns the inclusion of a 
specific good within the liberalization scheme and its implementation period. In a gentlemen’s agreement at the 
earliest stage of the negotiations, trade statistics (e.g. applicable rates) are exchanged, some targets are 
determined, and applicable staging categories are being discussed (Interview, DG Trade, August 3, 2011, 
Brussels). The target refers to both the scope and timing of the liberalization pursued. In GATT art.XXIV:4, 
reference is made to the idea that substantially all trade should be liberalized in a free trade area or customs 
union. The EU interprets this “substantially all” to reflect at the least 85% of the tariff lines (reflecting more then 
85% of trade value) within a time frame of 10 years. However, in many trade agreements more ambitious goals 
are pursued. 
Based on such a target, negotiators (often in collaboration with associated ministries e.g. agriculture) try 
to draft a proposal which is then returned to the trading partner. Both sides study each other’s offer and make 
their objections and aspirations be known. It is important to highlight that the largest part of the formulation of the 
schedule is done at home by the responsible administrations. In both the European and Korean case, this occurs 
through the use of a general formula using the applicable MFN rates as a factor in determining the appropriate 
base rates. Both of the administrations, however, put these formula’s up for discussion and input is provided by 
both public and private actors to adjust the offer (Interview, DG Trade, August 3, 2011; Interview Korean 
diplomat, August 1, 2011, Brussels). In the European case, the member states also play an important role in this 
process as they ensure that the eventual offer does not hurt their domestic economy excessively. The role of the 
Commissioner or ministry in this process is rather limited as they are only involved once specific sensitivities 
need to be resolved either internally or with the trading partner. 3 
Three hypotheses can be generated from the above discussions. First of all, as to the domestic drivers 
of the chosen staging category, it is important to note that longer implementation periods allow for longer periods 
in which the producers of competitively weak products can adjust themselves or disappear. Such periods also 
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allow governments to postpone the political pain associated with such changes. In the tariff schedules of an FTA, 
this should translate itself in longer implementation periods for products that are comparatively less competitive.  
Secondly, there is the role of path dependencies. As implementation periods are often assigned as a function of 
the applicable (MFN) base rate, past decisions on this base rate continue to drive current policy choices. 
However, assuming that not every product has a rate that matches the strength of the sector, a strong 
dependency on the base-rate can give rise to sub-optimal decisions. The larger the base rates deviate from the 
actual competitiveness, the greater the scope for such deficiencies. Through the articulation of interests, the 
applied implementation period can be adjusted, hence mitigating the threat of inefficient path-dependencies. The 
more such interests are articulated the better the tariff scheme offer can be made.  
Thirdly, through reciprocity and bargaining, adjustments are made to the basic schedule proposed in 
accordance to foreign demands. This does not occur on each individual tariff line. Based on the interviews 
conducted, we would expect these dynamics to play only a minor role. 
In this paper we want to assess to which extent these three explaining factors explain the concessions 
granted in the Korean and European schedule. Three explanatory variables are thus of particular interest to us. 
First of all, the base-rates from which liberalization starts reflect path dependencies. Secondly, the 
competitiveness of the producers in the home market to assess the degree of calibration and finally, the 
competitiveness of the negotiating partner in producing or exporting that particular product. The general models 
tested will therefore take the following form: 
 
FOREIGNHOME enessCompetitivenessCompetitivBaserateegoryStagingcat "#$ %%&  
 
In what follows, we will go into more detail on the dependent variable and the explanatory variables used to 
estimate this model. 
 
5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis is based on two kinds of data. The first part consists of data included in the schedule of 
commitments on tariff barriers for goods by respectively the EU and Korea in their FTA, this at the eight-digit 
level. The second part consists of UN Comtrade data at the six-digit level. The data was extracted through the 
Hercules Database of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies4. We will focus first on the dependent 
variable. 
Dependent variable 
Tariff schedules have been used in prior research by Estevadeordal (2000 ) and Damuri (2009) and has been 
incorporated in the determination of the ‘flexibility’ measure incorporated in the database of Dür et al. (2012). In 
each trade agreement, several staging categories are provided for in the schedule of commitments of the two 
parties to the agreement. As such, liberalization commitments can be categorized according to the different 
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lengths of the tariff elimination periods, ranging from the immediate liberalization at the entry into force of the 
agreement to an implementation period of twenty years. For a limited amount of products, no complete 
liberalization is provided for. Korea provides for twelve different implementation periods in its schedule of 
commitments, whereas the EU provides for four of them. Both parties to the agreement provide for an immediate 
liberalization of more than three-fourths of the tariff lines for which a base rate higher than zero is provided. In the 
case of Korea, it concerns almost 79% of these tariff lines, in the case of the EU, more than 92%. In case the 
zero base rates are included, immediate liberalization is granted on about 81% of six-digit tariff lines by Korea 
and on about 94% of such lines by the EU. Overall, on the bases of the base rates and implementation rates, a 
picture emerges of two parties who committed themselves to substantive and rapid tariff elimination, although 
Korea seemed to have been more reluctant here than the EU. 
 
 Table 1: Implementation periods applied to tariff barriers in the EU-KOREA FTA 
Source: Authors calculations 
The asymmetry between the EU’s and Korea’s commitments becomes most apparent in the product lines for 
which trade liberalization has been granted a phasing out period. Differences do not just pertain to the number of 
different categories identified in both schedules, but also the length of the implementation period and the number 
of products that fall under such a regime. 
Explanatory variables 
Two types of explanatory variables are used in our analysis. The first consists of the base rates and the second 
of the competitiveness of individual products. 
A] The Base Rate 
As the table above indicates and t-tests on the means indicate, average Korean base rates tend to be 
significantly higher than EU average base rates (t = -16,4365, p > 0,00001). F-tests indicate that they 
significantly differ in their variances too (F = 16,97, p > 0,00001), also when zero rates are excluded (t = - 
14,9668, F = 14,59, both significant at the 0,00001 level). Korea also applies more peak tariffs (' 15% ad 
valorem) than the EU does. About 9,1% of its tariff lines represent such tariffs. For the EU, this proportion stands 
European Union South-Korea 
Category Number (percentage) Category Number (percentage) 
Already Free 2378 (24,5%) Already Free 1860 (15,6%) 
0 6758 (69,5%) 0 7675 (64,5%) 
3 275 (2,8%) 2-3 711 (6,0%) 
5 275 (2,8%) 5 864 (7,2%) 
  6-7 178 (1,4%) 
  10 393 (3,2%) 
  >10 147 (1,2%) 
No Elimination 39 (0,4%) No Elimination 45 (0,37%) 
TOTAL 9721 (100%)  11873 (100%) 
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at 4,5%. The picture with respect to zero rates is the reverse. Whereas zero rates represent almost 16% of 
Korea’s tariff lines, it does represent almost 27% of such lines in the case of the EU. 
Table 2: Base Rates in the EU-KOREA FTA 
 
BaseRate  |       Mean   Std. Dev.     Min             Max           N. Obs 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
KOR<-EU, with zero |    12.7154    51.6710       0     887.4             11709 
EU<-KOR, with zero |     4.8375     5.2541         0        74.9  8964 
 
KOR<-EU, no zero |    15.1152    56.0139       1     887.4               9850 
EU<-KOR, no zero |     6.6132     5.0985       0.7        74.9  6557 
 
 
Against higher Korean base rates, one can put the EU’s higher reliance on specific tariffs rather than ad valorem 
tariffs, as the next table indicates. Specific tariffs are less transparent and tend to be higher on average than ad 
valorem tariffs are. 
Table 3: Specific Rates in the EU-KOREA FTA 
 
Specific Rates  |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
KOR<-EU |         8        1.41547       2.6129        .0011       11.10 
EU<-KOR |       776    58.76907     65.7391        .1700      311.80 
 
(Calculated on the basis of UNCOMTRADE data and the average exchange rate KRW-euro 2007-09, ECB 
reference exchange rate) 
 
The analysis in the paper here is based on both ad valorem rates and specific rates. The specific ones 
have been transformed in ad valorem values for that purpose, based on average import volumes and values 
from the period 2007-2009. 
B] Competitiveness at home and abroad 
With respect to the UN Comtrade data, we have calculated averages over the duration of the negotiations of the 
KOREU FTA (2007, 2008, and 2009). The data concerns the value of the exports and imports from the EU to 
Korea and vice versa, the quantity of such exports (in kg, metric tons, litres, gallons, or barrels), and in cases 
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where relevant, the number of units of such products. All UN Comtrade data used in this paper represents the 
averages of 2007, 2008, and 2009, so as to reduce the impact of outliers in specific years. The averages of 
these three years used in our analysis prevents that idiosyncratic factors in one year would affect our 
competitiveness indices strongly. When working with data at a very disaggregated level, the risks for outliers in 
the trade data increases. We used the UN Comtrade data for the transformation of specific tariffs into ad valorem 
rates, and for the computation of the RCAs, the dRCAs and the RCA ratios. 
In our regressions, we used several kinds of competitiveness indicators. We started with the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) as developed by Balassa in 1965 which indicates the ratio between the 
importance of a good or sector in a country’s total exports, and the importance of a similar good or sector in 
overall world exports. When RCA > 1, the country exports that specific product more than the average country in 
the world, and hence we consider it to have a comparative advantage in that good or sector. In our analysis, we 
include therefore, the competitiveness of the EU products in the world market (RCA_EU) and those of the 
Korean products (RCA_KOR) as well. 
We also tested the effect of RCA differentials on the tariff elimination rates (as reflected by the 
implementation periods) in the schedules of commitments. It may indeed be the case that policymakers were not 
driven by the overall competitiveness of their products in the world market, but rather by the difference between 
their and their counterpart’s competitiveness in the world market. Such a concern may be plausible as the risk of 
winning or losing in an FTA between the EU and Korea will be first determined by their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
each other. The differences (diffRCA) are calculated on the basis of the ratio between the Korean RCA and the 
EU RCA. 
A more refined measurement of competitiveness may be in order, however. We therefore proceeded 
with the directional Revealed Comparative Advantage (dRCA) developed by Yeats (1997). It may indeed be the 
case that political leaders don’t focus in the first place on the overall comparative advantage of their products or 
on the relative competitive standing of their products in the world market – but on the competitiveness of their 
products in the specific market that they try to open through an FTA. Therefore and in this case, dRCA_EUKOR 
reflects the competitiveness of a EU product in the Korean market, whereas dRCA_KOREU reflects the 
competitiveness of a Korean product in the EU market. Directional RCA was calculated through the ratio 
between the relative importance of a product in the total exports of a country to its trading partner, and the 
relative importance of such a product’s exports in world exports overall. 
The focus on the directional revealed comparative advantage is useful for two reasons. As indicated, it 
allows us first, to focus on the markets of the parties to the agreement. Second, it allows us to distinguish 
between the role that offensive and defensive interests may have played in the determination of the 
implementation periods, and thus the tariff elimination rates. An offensive interest of a party (party A) may be 
detected on the basis of the directional RCA of a product from party A in the market of party B, when we focus on 
the implementation periods defined in the tariff schedule of party A. The directional RCA of a product from party 
B in the market of party A may reveal the defensive interests of party A with respect to the products produced in 
party B, again when we focus on party A’s tariff schedule. In our analysis, we include therefore both 
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dRCA_EUKOR and dRCA_KOREU when we study the tariff schedules of both parties. In the case of the EU’s 
schedule, dRCA_EUKOR represents the EU’s potential offensive interests and dRCA_KOREU its defensive 
interests. For Koreas’s schedule, it is dRCA_KOREU that reflects its offensive interests and dRCA_EUKOR that 
does so for its defensive ones. 
We calculated the RCA’s, the dRCA’s, and the RCA differentials (diffRCA) on the basis of UN Comtrade 
data. A pitfall here, is that this data is only available at the six-digit product level whereas the implementation 
periods are coded at the eight-digit level giving rise to the risk of ecological fallacy. The next table provides the 
summary statistics for the different kinds of competitiveness indices.  
 
Table 4: Competitiveness Indices in the EU-KOREA FTA 
 
Competitiveness  |       Obs                  Mean           Std. Dev.            Min                  Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCA_KOR |      9354     .7272             1.7517       5.29e-09   24.988 
dRCA_KOREU |      8461    .6222             2.1108       7.28e-07   79.474 
RCA_EU |      9626   1.1431            1.1673       1.39e-04   30.925 
dRCA_EUKOR |      9626   1.3670            3.2177  0   68.154 
diffRCA  |      9354   2.6848          24.1556        4.68e-09        1529.53 
 
In our models, we also include the base rates. As has been indicated, in most cases, these rates reflect 
the applied MFN rates at the moment that the agreement was negotiated. It is plausible to assume that these 
would weigh significantly on the length of the implementation periods. Applied MFN rates reflect the sensitivities 
– in terms of import-competition – that existed at the moment that these rates were defined, mostly in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, but also in decisions on (lower) applied rates later.5 We include the base rates in 
our model therefore, in order to control for these sensitivities and to disentangle them from competitiveness 
sensitivities that existed at the moment of the FTA negotiations between the EU and South Korea. We exclude 
from our analyses the tariff lines where the applied MFN rate already equals zero. We do this in order to avoid 
confusion between products that were duty-free irrespective of the outcome of the FTA negotiations, and those 
that became immediately duty-free because of these. 
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To sum up, we will test the following four models: 
 
M1: Impl_KORi = #0 + #1baseratei + #2RCA_KORi + #3RCA_EUi + #4RCA_KORi2 + #5diffRCAi + (i 
M2: Impl_KORi = #0 + #1baseratei + #2dRCA_KOREUi + #3dRCA_EUKORi + #4dRCA_KOREUi2 + #5diffRCAi + 
(i 
M3: Impl_EUi = #0 + #1baseratei + #2RCA_EUi + #3RCA_KORi + #4RCA_EUi2 + #5diffRCAi + (i 
M4: Impl_EUi = #0 + #1baseratei + #2dRCA_EUKORi + #3dRCA_KOREUi + #4dRCA_EUKORi2 + #5diffRCAi + (i 
 
To estimate these models, we made use of the Tobit regression model as our dependent variable is censored to 
zero. Implementation periods cannot be lower than zero and in addition, a substantial amount of tariff lines face 
an immediate elimination of their ad valorem duties. A Heckman Selection Model would be appropriate in case 
the decision to instantly liberalize or not was distinct from the choice of an appropriate implementation period 
(Sigelman and Zeng, 1999). However, respondents indicated no such process taking place. We also dropped all 
the products from the analysis that were already liberalized at the time of the negotiation. Including them would 
be inappropriate as no political decision had to be made for these products. We replicated our estimations by 
using ordered logit regressions. This should allow for a better fit with the categorical nature of our dependent 
variable.  Negotiating partners do not pick the desired implementation period from a continuous domain but 
restrict their choices to a limited number of periods. What matters is only whether one implementation is longer 
than another, i.e. where such a period stands in the ranking of implementation periods. 
 
6. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
For all four models, we report both non-standardized and standardized coefficients, in order to probe for the 
relative significance of the different factors. Because of the high correlation between RCA and dRCA, and thus 
multicollinearity problems, separate regressions where conducted for both factors.6 We also included quadratic 
terms in order to investigate non-linear effects. 
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Table 5: Results of the Tobit Regressions (non-standardized), ad valorem and specific duties 
Variable Model 1 : KOR<-
EU 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 2: KOR<-EU 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 3: EU<-KOR 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 4: EU<-KOR 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Constant -6.9339 (.3240)*** -8.2849 (.3044)*** -12.096 (.8359)*** -20.371 (1.1852)*** 
baserate .0453 (.0022)*** .0432 (.0021)*** .0012 (.0002)*** -.0003 (.0010) 
RCA_KOR -.5630 (.1736)***  -.0763 (.2422)  
RCA_EU -1.2416 (.1437)***  -7.7941 (.6705)***  
RCA_KOR2 .0406 (.0113)***    
RCA_EU2   .2373 (.0335)***  
diffRCA .0177 (.0051)*** .0195 (.0044)** -.0028 (.0135) .0046 (.0132) 
dRCA_KOREU  -.6111 (.1403)***  .2480 (.1620) 
dRCA_EUKOR  -.0226 (.0503)  -2.3074 (.3605)*** 
dRCA_KOREU2  .0080 (.0030)**   
dRCA_EUKOR2    .0324 (.0081)*** 
 
N 8022 7233 5135 4645 
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .04 .01 
Prob > chi2 .00 .00 .00 .00 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Table 5 contains the results of our non-standardized Tobit regression. Four observations can be made 
here. First, the base rates have a significant impact on the tariff schedules set by Korea. Higher base rates result 
in longer implementation periods. This was in line with the first hypothesis. Weak products have been shielded 
more in the past and hence are liberalized at a slower pace. The picture is more blurred in the case of the EU. In 
model 3 (the model with the RCA’s), base rates have a statistically significant impact on implementation, in 
model 4 (the one with the dRCA’s), there is no such impact. 
As regard to the second hypothesis, we observe that the length of the implementation periods is 
significantly affected by the level of competitiveness, and this for both the EU and Korea. Those products that are 
competitive in the world market are granted shorter implementation periods and vice versa, lower levels of 
competitiveness result in longer periods. The statistical significance of the squared term in the case of the EU 
(given the maximum values of the EU’s RCA and dRCA) indicates that the impact of the competitiveness on the 
length of its implementation periods tends to decline as EU products become more competitive in the world 
market. 
Thirdly, the more competitive the EU’s products, the shorter Korea’s implementation periods tend to be. 
This is equally the case for the difference between the Korean and the EU’s RCA. The larger the ratio between 
Korean RCA and the one of the EU, the longer Korea’s implementation periods tend to be, and vice versa, with a 
lower ratio (and thus a comparatively stronger EU competitiveness), the periods tend to be shorter as well. This 
runs counter to what could be expected on the basis of endogenous tariff theory. With stronger competition from 
the EU, one would expect Korea to engage in more protection, here in the form of longer implementation periods. 
This is clearly not the case. In the European schedule we could not find such an effect. Here, Korea’s 
competitiveness in the world market (its RCA) does not seem to matter. 
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One can fourthly observe that both the EU and Korea when setting their implementation periods are 
affected by the strength of their products in their counterpart’s market. In both cases, the impact of this strength 
declines as their products become more competitive (as indicated by the coefficients for the squared dRCA’s, 
and given the maximum values of the dRCA’s). What is remarkable in these models is that the competitiveness 
of their counterpart’s products in their domestic market (Korean products in the EU market, EU products in the 
Korean market) has no impact on the implementation decisions that both the EU and Korea take. When they look 
at import-competition, they tend to look at it from the perspective of the world market rather than from each 
other’s markets. 
 
Table 6: Results of the Tobit Regressions (standardized), ad valorem and specific duties 
Variable Model 1 : KOR<-
EU 
Beta Coefficient 
Model 2: KOR<-EU 
 Beta Coefficient 
Model 3: EU<-KOR 
Beta Coefficient 
Model 4: EU<-KOR 
Beta Coefficient 
Baserate .2269*** .2335*** .0920*** -.0107 
RCA_KOR -.0943***  -.0081  
RCA_EU -.1517***  -.6620***  
RCA_KOR2 .1075***    
RCA_EU2   .4359***  
diffRCA .0436*** .0567*** -.0049 .0076 
dRCA_KOREU  -.1244***  .0365 
dRCA_EUKOR  .0079  -.4076*** 
dRCA_KOREU2  .0670**   
dRCA_EUKOR2    .2213*** 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
From the standardized coefficients in table 6 we can derive some additional findings. They first reveal 
an important difference between Korea and the EU. Whereas in the Korean case, the base rates are the most 
important factor for the length of the implementation periods, in the case of the EU, they barely matter. 
A second observation is here that the competitiveness of the EU’s products is by far the most important 
factor for the length of the EU’s implementation periods. This is the case both for the world competitiveness of 
the EU’s products and the EU’s competitiveness in the Korean market specifically. The ordered logit regressions 
yield about the same patterns as tables 7 and 8 indicate. Table 7 provides the non-standardized estimates 
whereas table 8 provides the standardized ones. 
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Table 7: Results of the Ordered Logit Regressions (non-standardized), ad valorem and specific duties 
Variable Model 1 : KOR<-
EU 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 2: KOR<-EU 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 3: EU<-KOR 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 4: EU<-KOR 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
baserate .0161 (.0009)*** .0160 (.0010)*** .0002 (.000)*** -.0000 (.0001) 
RCA_KOR -.0607 (.0345)  .0099 (.0365)  
RCA_EU -.2823 (.0344)***  -1.2991 (.1107)***  
RCA_KOR2 .0017 (.0024)    
RCA_EU2   .0386 (.0064)***  
diffRCA .0049 (.0013)*** .0064 (.0012)*** -.0005 (.0019) .0006 (.0014) 
dRCA_KOREU  -.1403 (.0325)***  .0416 (.0193)* 
dRCA_EUKOR  .0021 (.0096)  -.3570 (.0592)*** 
dRCA_KOREU2  .0017 (.0006)**   
dRCA_EUKOR2    .0049 (.0013)*** 
     
Pseudo R2 .06 .06 .06 .02 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Table 8: Results of the Ordered Logit Regressions (standardized), ad valorem and specific duties 
Variable Model 1 : KOR<-
EU 
Beta  Coefficient 
Model 2: KOR<-EU 
Beta  Coefficient 
Model 3: EU<-KOR 
Beta  Coefficient 
Model 4: EU<-KOR 
Beta  Coefficient 
baserate .4032*** .4198*** .1054*** -.0087 
RCA_KOR -.0507  .0071  
RCA_EU -.1718***  -.7426***  
RCA_KOR2 .0227    
RCA_EU2   .4776***  
diffRCA .0607*** .0829*** -.0058 .0079 
dRCA_KOREU  -.1381***  .0487 
dRCA_EUKOR  -.0036  -.5002*** 
dRCA_KOREU2  .0713**   
dRCA_EUKOR2    .2698*** 
     
Pseudo R2 .06 .06 .06 .02 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
7. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
So how can we explain these results?  Why does the Korean schedule exhibit stronger path dependencies than 
the European one and how can we explain the impact of the EU’s offensive interests? A realist argument might 
suggest that this is the consequence of differences in market power. This seems unlikely, however. First of all, 
based on the implementation categories used, it is clear that Korea has used longer phase-out periods. 
Predominant EU market power would make this unlikely. Second, the fact that the base rates matter much more 
in the Korean case than in the case of the EU is important. It points at the fact that the EU’s tariff schedules are 
more adapted to the competitiveness of its products during the negotiation of the FTA with Korea. The high 
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coefficient for the EU’s RCA in the setting of its own implementation period suggests that the EU adapts its tariff 
schedules to the competitiveness of its products across the whole collection of tariff lines at the six or eight digit 
level and not just at the limited number of highly politicized products. To be sure, the estimates also indicate that 
Korea adapts itself as well to the specificities of the Korea-EU negotiating setting. But the stronger impact of its 
base rates indicates that its level of adaptation is significantly lower than the one of the EU. In other words, EU 
tariff schedule setting is calibrated. It is more fine-tuned with respect to the competitiveness of its products. 
Bringing the administration into the limelight 
Our findings thus pertain to the calibration of the implementation schedules. This calibration is largely an internal 
domestic political process. As a result, we believe a plausible explanation can be found in the functioning of the 
domestic administration. Recall that for the determination of the appropriate implementation period at the product 
level, administrations do not always suffer from an oversupply of information. They are in need of a lot of input 
from both private and public actors to help refine and calibrate the tariff schedule that they offer. The different 
levels of calibration between the EU and Korea might then be the result of EU policy makers having access to 
more information on the different domestic interests than does the Korean administration. We identify three 
reasons to support this explanation. Firstly, due to the multilevel political economic context, the different member 
states each contribute to the formulation of the EU’s position in trade negotiations. The member states are 
involved in intense coordination with the Commission through the Trade Policy Committee during the trade 
negotiations. Far from being a system where the member states  push the Commission out of a concern for 
control on what their negotiator is doing, it is a system where the Commission tries to draw the member states 
into the exchange, concerned as it is about information and about the risk that member states could reject the 
ultimate agreement whenever they fail to sufficiently realize the need for the concessions that the Commission 
ultimately made (Kerremans, 2006; Delreux and Kerremans, 2010).  
In devising the implementation schedule, the Commission requests information from all the member 
states on which products require a deviation from the formula suggested (interview, Official DG Trade, August 3rd 
2011, Brussels). As each member state organizes its own consultation process with business associations and 
civil society, the Commission can obtain a lot of feedback that allows it to calibrate the schedule in accordance 
with societal concerns. 
The second reason is that the Commission itself has built up a large experience in negotiating trade 
agreements. Through the different trade agreements preceding the accession of new member states, the 
negotiation within its immediate neighbourhood and -since the 2000s- its active pursuit of bilateral free trade 
negotiations across the globe, the EU has obtained by far the most experience in negotiating trade agreements. 
This experience has led to the development of a good working administrative machinery that provides the 
formulation of detailed positions on a wide range of topics.  
And finally, over time the European Commission has started a number of initiatives to improve the knowledge 
gathering process. Of particular interest is the Market Access Strategy initiated in 1996 and revised in 2007 to 
better support the goals as formulated within the ‘Global Europe Communication’ (EC, 2006) of Peter 
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Mandelson. Through the launch of the market access database (EC, 1996) the advisory market access 
committee and local market access teams (EC, 2007) the European Commission has strived to improve the 
articulation of exporters interests in the identification of market barriers abroad.  
This could be contrasted with the Korean administration that has – historically – been viewed as more 
insulated from societal pressures. That is not to say that it has been completely cut-off from societal input. 
Research on Korea as a developmental state has indeed indicated that a specific linkage existed between the 
Korean administration and the large Korean industrial conglomerates, the Chaebol. In this context, the Korean 
relationship vis-à-vis society has been coined as “embedded autonomy”. In this term, emphasis is put on two 
elements: the autonomy of a state’s bureaucracy on the one hand, and the existence of institutionalized channels 
through which it is connected with society on the other hand. As Evans (1995: 12) phrased it: “(…) these 
[bureaucratic] apparatuses (…) are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and 
provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies.” And as 
Rodrik stresses it (2008: 25), these institutional channels “(…) must be designed carefully to ensure that there is 
a productive dialog between the private sector and the government, information flows adequately in both 
directions, needs are well identified, policy instruments are appropriately targeted, and self-correcting 
mechanisms are in place.” 
Whereas Evans and others that followed him stress the existence of this “concrete set of social ties”, we 
stress the possibility that the breadth of such social ties may have an impact on the diversity of information that 
trade policymakers are able to collect and from there on trade policy outcomes themselves. A challenge in the 
“embedded autonomy” of public administrations is indeed the risk of capture. For that reason, “embedded 
autonomy” is supposed to lie “(…) in between the two extremes of strict autonomy, on the one hand, and private 
capture, on the other” (Rodrik, 2008: 19), and as such to depart from the notion of the “supposedly superior 
knowledge of one group versus another” (Aiginger, 2007: 314; see also Livesey, 2012: 353). However attractive 
the concept of “embedded autonomy” may be on paper, it cannot do away with the reality that industrial policy (of 
which trade policy is part) is often selective in nature in the sense that it generates winners and losers, whether 
deliberately or not. This is even more the case with trade negotiations, and certainly those that deal with the 
treatment of individual sectors and products. There, policymakers almost literally engage in the picking of 
winners and losers, whether willingly or not. In such a negotiation, tariff treatment for individual products needs to 
be defined, and here, the comparison between South Korea and the European Union becomes interesting, and 
with it a risky downside of embedded autonomy. 
From a theoretical point, two interesting conclusions can then be drawn from our discussion. First, that 
embedded autonomy as a possible panacea for effective industrial policies is exposed to network bias risks that 
may result from path dependencies rooted in institutional inertia. One can argue that both the European and the 
Korean policy-making process experience a similar degree of autonomy and embeddedness. However, the key 
difference pertains to the breadth of the network through which societal input is solicited . We argue that it is due 
to this factor that the European implementation schedule is more calibrated to the competitiveness of its 
products. 
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Second, that even if the price in terms of efficiency losses may be high in multi-level systems like the 
one of the EU, the benefits in terms of informational advantages and resulting policy efficacies may be high as 
well. The ultimate question is then how these benefits weigh up to the losses. 
 
Policy recommendations 
 
A number of policy recommendations can be linked to our findings. First, the management of information and the 
institutional channels through which such information has to flow is of crucial importance. Political systems can 
learn in this regard. Both the EU and Korea for example face the challenge of incorporating the interests of Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises in their policy process.  The threat of capture by big business remains equally 
prevalent in both political systems. Each has their own experiences, successes and failures in engaging with 
private actors and an exchanges of best practices   Also inside the EU, the ability of member state 
administrations to connect to a wide array of industrial sectors varies, and with it the ability of member states to 
learn from each other. The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on administrative cooperation provide an opportunity here, 
to exert leadership on cooperation among member state administrations with these informational advances in 
mind. 
Second, a system of informational checks and balances is in order (Altenburg, 2011: 21). This applies 
particularly to the EU. It may be the case that the Commission as trade negotiator may benefit from the extensive 
inflow of information that originates in institutionalised ties that several member state administrations have 
developed within their own societies, the Commission needs to carefully guard its own autonomy with respect to 
such information. This requires a two-fold approach. The Commission needs to develop and maintain its own 
informational channels, both within the member states and at the EU-level so as to remain able to assess the 
bias in the information it gets from the member states. The Commission also needs to play a leadership role with 
respect to the member states that fail to invest adequately in their own information gathering capabilities. There 
are two reasons for this. It will reduce the Commission’s burden to collect all the information itself, and it will 
reduce the probability that member state behaviour will exclusively be led by domestic mobilization on a trade 
agreement and the bad surprise that late mobilization on such agreements may entail for member state 
behaviour in the Trade Policy Committee or even the Council. If member state representatives understand the 
full panoply of domestic interests as they are affected by trade negotiations and the concessions the Commission 
is making in these, there is a lower probability that a domestically politicized issue would hold a member state, 
and ultimately the EU hostage (Baldwin, 2006). 
Thirdly, path dependencies created through the use of formula’s or templates carry the inherent risk that 
decisions are not responsive to a changing economy. This problem is particularly pertinent if such path 
dependencies go back a substantial period in time. In the case of trade policy, the last great negotiation round in 
the WTO dates back almost 20 years by now and the economy underwent substantial changes since then. 
Without discrediting the merits associated with the use of policy short-cuts, it is opportune for policy-makers to 
occasionally update the raw information on which the path dependencies are scripted.  
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Overall therefore, information and the breath of information-gathering is crucial for policymakers’ ability 
to calibrate trade policy outcomes to the preferences of more than just the politicized interests at home. The 
power to know is indeed the power to affect. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper we set out to study the EU-Korea FTA with attention for policy areas that have been less politicized. 
In doing so, we tried to fill a gap that often exists in the study of trade policies. We did so by linking all tariff lines 
in the EU’s and Korea’s tariff schedules with the competitiveness of the concerned products, whether the issues 
were highly or lowly politicized. In doing so, we found that the EU seems to be better able to calibrate its 
commitments to the interests of both its defensive and offensive industries and to use the resulting moderation in 
the length of its implementation periods as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Korea. Korea seemed to be 
less able to do so. We looked for the explanation in the information gathering system that the administrations in 
both political systems have at their disposal. The EU’s multi-level administrative system, in combination with 
major Commission efforts to attract continuous input from EU export-oriented industries through its market 
access strategies and the intensive interactions between the Commission and the member states and among the 
latter, seemed to have resulted in an EU that is better able to identify the myriad of interests – whether politicized 
or not – that will be affected by the KOREU FTA. As such, the main conclusion can be indeed, that calibration in 
this FTA shows that the power to know is the power to affect. For trade policy administrations the message of 
this conclusion is twofold. First, it shows that the breadth of the social ties between societal interests and trade 
policymakers – in the first place those active in the administration – is important for the ability of such 
policymakers to adapt what they include in trade agreements to the characteristics and needs of different sectors 
in society, also the non-politicized ones. Second, it indicates that even if the existence of a multi-level system like 
the EU’s – where intensive interactions take place among a multitude of players and this on an institutionalised 
basis – can be burdensome in terms of administrative and coordination costs, it also brings a significant 
informational advantage for the EU as a whole, particularly in policy areas where most topics remain below the 
radar of politicised issues. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1 We conceptualize a product (or issue) to be politicized when private and public actors have expressed their interests in the 
public arena.  In the situation of business associations, this boils down to the voicing of interests through press releases or 
public statements. Inside lobbying where the trade administration consults or is consulted by business associations, by 
contrast, will not fall under our conceptualization of politicization. 
2 Whereas tariff commitments are usually determined at the 4-8 digit level, separate categories had to be defined within the 
FTA KOREU to resolve the car dispute by distinguishing between different type of cars. 
3 One exception though, was Pascal Lamy, who –as commissioner for trade- was also interested in smaller details like the 
concrete formula being used to derive appropriate staging categories (Interview, DG Trade, August 3, 2011) 
4  
5 Applied rates are specifically important in the case of Korea, as it is a more intensive user of applied tariffs than the EU 
(see WTO Trade Policy Review on Korea, 2008). For the EU, such tariffs show up in the agricultural sector only as the EU 
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negotiated high MFN tariffs in the Uruguay Round (the so-called practice of dirty tarification) in order to create additional 
policy space if adaptation of its applied tariffs in response to world market prices would be required. 
6 Spearman’s rho of .62 in the case of Korea, and .65 in the case of the EU. 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO ARMS TRADE AND CONTROL 
AND TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
RAMON PACHECO PARDO 
SHIN DONGMIN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Arms trade and control and counterterrorism are two areas of central concern to both the European Union (EU) 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The European security strategy ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, adopted by 
the European Council on 12 December 2003, and the report on the implementation of the European Security 
Strategy ‘Providing security in a changing world’, adopted by the Council on 12 December 2008, highlight 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as one of the major threats to the security of the EU. They 
both refer to arms trafficking as a particularly dangerous risk. The internal security strategy of the EU ‘Towards a 
European security model’, adopted by the Council on 26 March 2010, also emphasizes arms trafficking as a 
threat to the EU.  
In the case of the ROK, annual diplomatic white papers published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT) emphasize arms controls and the fight against the proliferation of WMD as the key elements of 
the country’s foreign and security policy. Furthermore, domestic legislative actions such as the Foreign Trade Act 
(enacted in 1986), the Defence Acquisition Programme Act (enacted in 2006) and the related subordinate 
statutes regulate and control trade and trafficking of arms, including WMD, that can pose a threat to international 
peace and public safety. Multiple international treaties relating to WMD, conventional weapons and export 
controls, which the ROK is a member of, have the same juridical effect as the ROK’s domestic law and thus 
complement the regulatory framework related to arms control.  
With regards to counterterrorism, the three aforementioned security “white papers” place terrorism at the 
top of the list of threats to the security of the EU. The ‘European Union counter-terrorism strategy’, adopted by the 
Council on 20 November 2005, is the document laying out the counterterrorism strategy of the EU. Related joint 
action plans, codes of conduct, legislative documents and external action instruments form an increasingly well-
developed regulatory framework. Most notable is the ‘Council framework decision on combating terrorism’ of 13 
June 2002 and subsequent amendments. 
As for the ROK, the diplomatic white papers referred to above highlight terrorism as a major threat to 
domestic and international security. Furthermore, a few domestic legislative actions such as the National Anti-
Terror Action Directive (enacted in 1982, last amendment in 2012) provide a regulatory framework for the ROK to 
deal with terrorism. The multiple international treaties related to terrorism which the ROK has joined are also 
important elements constituting the ROK’s legal framework.  
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
144 
The present paper aims at laying out the main features of the regulatory frameworks of both the EU and 
the ROK in the areas of arms trade and control and counterterrorism. This will serve to compare their respective 
regulatory frameworks, showing the similarities and differences between them. This will subsequently serve to 
sketch some recommendations that can form the basis of possible future cooperation between the EU and the 
ROK. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we will offer an overview of relevant literature on 
regulatory cooperation. The third section will examine the EU’s legal framework in relation to arms trade and 
control and counterterrorism. In the section after we will do the same for the ROK, highlighting some differences 
with the EU. In the fifth section we will compare the regulatory frameworks of the EU and the ROK. We will then 
use a very brief concluding section to put an end to this paper. 
 
2. REGULATORY COOPERATION 
 
Regulatory cooperation at the multilateral level has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. New 
agreements, treaties and institutions have sprung, both within and outside the UN umbrella. Concurrently, less 
formalised regulatory cooperation through regular consultations and meetings has also grown. Regulatory 
cooperation today covers a wide range of issue-areas, including but not limited to trade, finance, the environment, 
intellectual property and aviation. Security matters are also part of this trend towards greater regulatory 
cooperation. 
 
Formal cooperation 
Traditionally, regulatory cooperation among states has been formal and based on international law. The treaties 
of Augsburg (1555), Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713) are considered the three cornerstones of international 
law.1 Thereon developed an increasing number of treaties and, eventually, intergovernmental institutions created 
to regulate inter-state cooperation. These are based on consent and obligation; states that sign a treaty or join an 
intergovernmental institution are implicitly consenting to respect the legal documents underpinning said treaty or 
institution, thus being obliged to abide by them.2 
The EU essentially is an intergovernmental institution itself. Member states voluntarily decide to join and 
abide by the treaties that give shape to it. Thus, they exercise formal cooperation at the regional level. And even 
though the EU is not an state but an intergovernmental institution, it is party to a growing number of treaties and 
institutions. The greatest example is the enhanced observer status that the EU has had in the United Nations 
(UN) since 2011. This status gives the EU a number of state-like rights, which means that it can potentially be 
part of the treaties and institutions falling within the remit of the UN. Therefore, the EU can engage in formal 
regulatory cooperation with states, including the ROK.  
 
Informal cooperation 
Regulatory cooperation among states can also be informal in nature. This cooperation takes the form of 
transgovernmental networks, or regular transnational interactions among government officials from more than 
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one state. Already noted in the 1970s, transgovernmentalism has become the “most widespread and effective 
form of international governance” since the 1990s.3 Transgovernmental networks are made up of government 
officials working on a specific issue-area. These officials work on domestic policy problems, but they interact 
directly with those of other countries rather than indirectly trough foreign policy bureaucracies.4 
Effective transgovernmental networks impact policymaking. They can be divided into four types, 
according to the degree of cooperation involved and considering that any ceding of sovereignty becomes formal 
cooperation. These four types are as follows: ‘cross-fertilisation’ or information exchange networks, ‘coordination’ 
or networks in which regulation is at the state level but national treatment is granted to others, ‘mutual recognition’ 
or networks in which domestic laws are mutually recognised, and ‘harmonisation’ or standardisation of 
regulations.5 As we will see in section 5, the nature of the regulatory approaches to arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism of the EU and the ROK make informal cooperation of these types more feasible than formal 
cooperation at this stage. 
 
3. EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The legal order of the EU follows a multi-level structure. The EU founding treaties act as the primary legislation 
and set the constitutional framework for the EU, including its objectives, organisation and modus operandi. 
International agreements with non-member states and international organisations are a second source of EU law. 
Association, cooperation and trade agreements are the three most notable of these agreements. Secondary 
legislation, namely legislative acts, non-legislative acts, delegated acts, implementing acts and other acts, are 
another important source of EU law. These acts are issued by EU institutions when exercising the powers 
conferred to them by member states. General principles of law and conventions between the member states are 
the two final layers in the legal order of the EU. They are unwritten law which serve to fill the gaps not covered by 
written rules.6 Table 1 summarizes the sources of EU law. 
 
Table 1. Sources of EU law 
Primary Legislation (Union Treaties, General principles of law) 
The EU’s international agreements 
Secondary Legislation (Legislative acts -Regulations, Directives, Decisions-, Non-legislative 
acts, Delegated acts - Implementing acts, Other acts - Regulations, Directives, Decisions 
General principles of law 
Conventions between the member states (Coreper decisions, International Agreements) 
Source: European Union, ‘The legal order of the EU’, 16 December 2010, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/editorial/abc_c04_r1.htm>, accessed on 30 May 2012. 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
146 
With regards to secondary legislation, developed by EU institutions and which applies to all or specific 
member states, there are three binding and two non-binding legal instruments. Regulations, directives and 
decisions are the three binding instruments. Regulations lay down the same law across all EU member states 
and are subject to direct applicability, meaning that they confer rights or impose obligations in the same way as 
national law. Directives aim at harmonisation rather than unification. Thus, directives are binding regarding the 
objective to be achieved, but member states have leeway to decide how to incorporate the objective into 
domestic legal systems. EU criteria are used to assess whether national legislation complies with EU law. 
Decisions are legal acts of individual applicability, meaning that the member state or person(s) to whom it is 
addressed must be named. They are binding in the same way that regulations are. Recommendations and avis, 
or opinions, are the two non-binding instruments. They are used to express a view to member states or a person, 
without placing any legal obligation on the addressee. Recommendations call on a party to behave in a particular 
way. Opinions are used to give an assessment on a give situation.7 Table 2 summarizes the secondary legislation 
instruments of the EU. 
 
Table 2. Secondary legislation of the EU 
 Addressees  Effects  
Regulation All Member States, natural and legal 
persons  
Directly applicable and binding in their 
entirety  
Directive All or specific Member States  Binding with respect to the intended result. 
Directly applicable only under particular 
circumstances  
Decision  Not specified All or specific Member 
States; specific natural or legal persons  
Directly applicable and binding in their 
entirety  
Recommendation All or specific Member States, other EU 
bodies, individuals  
Not binding 
Avis All or specific Member States, other EU 
bodies 
 
Not specified 
Not binding 
 
 
Source: European Union, ‘The legal order of the EU’, 16 December 2010, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/editorial/abc_c04_r1.htm>, accessed on 30 May 2012. 
Resolutions, declarations and actions programmes are secondary legislation instruments used by EU 
institutions to create and shape the legal order of the EU. Resolutions are jointly issued by the European Council, 
the Council of the EU (the Council) and the European Parliament. They reflect the jointly held views and 
intentions of these three institutions on the integration process and specific tasks within and outside the EU. 
Declarations are issued by all or individual Council members to express an interpretation of the Council’s 
decisions. There are also declarations on the further development of the EU, in which case they are similar to a 
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resolution. Action programmes are drawn up by the Council and the Commission. They serve to put into practice 
the general objectives and legislative programmes laid down in the treaties.8 
 
3.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO ARMS TRADE AND CONTROL 
With regards to primary legislation in relation to arms trade and control, article 69B.1 of the Lisbon Treaty 
includes illicit arms trafficking as one of the areas of crime in which the Council and the Parliament “may, by 
means of directives [...] establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions...”, 
given the cross-border dimension of this activity and the need to combat it on a common basis.9 This is the only 
reference to arms trade and control in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Three action programmes make up the secondary legislation laying out the general objectives of the EU 
with regards to arms trade and control. The first two relate to the fight against the proliferation of WMD. They are 
the ‘EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, issued by the Council on 10 December 10 
2003, and the ‘EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent 
implementation’, issued by the Council on 12 December 2006. The third action programme focuses on small 
arms and light weapons (SALW). With the title ‘EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW 
and their ammunition’, it was issued by the Council on 13 January 13 2006. 
 
Weapons of mass destruction 
The ‘EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ sets a three-pronged strategy for the EU 
to fight against the proliferation of WMD.10 The ‘EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD’ re-emphasizes this 
strategy.11 The three key policies to fight against the proliferation of WMD are as follows: 
 
1. Building on effective multilateralism 
2. Promoting a stable international and regional environment 
3. Cooperating closely with partners 
 
To promote the first policy, building on effective multilateralism, the Council emphasizes six instruments. These 
are the universalisation and strengthening of treaties, agreements and verification arrangements on disarmament 
and non-proliferation; fostering the role of the UN Security Council; enhancing support to verification regimes; 
strengthening export control policies and practices with partners in export control regimes; enhancing the security 
of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the EU; and strengthening identification, control 
and interception of illegal trafficking.12 
With regards to promoting a stable international and regional environment, the second policy from the 
EU to fight against the proliferation of WMD as outlined in the strategy, the Council focuses on two instruments. 
These are reinforcing EU cooperative threat reduction programmes; and mainstreaming WMD non-proliferation 
concerns into the EU’s activities and programmes.13 
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Finally, the EU also emphasizes cooperating closely with key partners, which is the third policy to fight 
against the proliferation of WMD as per the strategy. The two instruments advanced by the EU to enhance this 
element are ensuring adequate follow-up to bilateral documents on non-proliferation; and ensuring coordination 
and new joint initiatives.14 
 
Implementation actions 
The EU has been active in the implementation of the first two policies outlined in the strategy – building on 
effective multilateralism and promoting a stable international and regional environment. Implementation of the 
third policy – close cooperation with partners – has not been as intense. 
With regards to the first policy, the Council has adopted several decisions in support of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO), and the Hague Code of Conduct 
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Provision of funds to increase the effectiveness of these 
organisations and legal instruments has been forthcoming.15 In addition, the EU has actively supported UN 
Security Council resolutions on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) aimed at curtailing 
the risk of proliferation from both countries.16 
Implementing the first and second policies established in its strategy simultaneously, the Council has 
adopted several decisions to strengthen the fight against the proliferation of WMD. Particularly fruitful has been 
work conducted with Russia. The EU cooperates with Russia in a number of areas. These include support to 
destroy some of its chemical weapons, to protect its nuclear sites, to retrain former weapons scientists and 
engineers, or to train personnel working at facilities handling dangerous biological agents. The EU has also 
supplied equipment for the detection of nuclear and radioactive materials (NRM) at border check points and to 
enhance export control of dual use items.17 
Also implementing the first and second policies simultaneously, the Council has adopted several 
decisions to support non-proliferation of WMD activities in different regions. Joint work with Caucasus and Central 
Asia countries is common, including the supply of equipment for the detection of nuclear and radioactive 
materials (NRM) at border check points or training personnel working at facilities handling dangerous biological 
agents. The Council has also adopted decisions in support of non-proliferation of WMD activities in Southeast 
Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Most 
notably, the EU has worked to improve the capabilities to combat the illicit trafficking and criminal use of 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials (CBRN) in several regions.18 
To support and enhance its fight against the proliferation of WMD, the EU has launched two 
complementary initiatives aimed at creating permanent networks of experts. Firstly, the EU is in the process of 
creating a number of CBRN Centres of Excellence located in eight different regions across the world.19 Secondly, 
the EU has launched the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, formed by four European think tanks20 Together, the 
two initiatives may serve to bring together scientific and non-scientific experts on non-proliferation of WMD. 
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Small Arms and Light Weapons 
The ‘EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition’ lays out a five-
pronged strategy for the EU to fight against both.21 This strategy builds on a previous joint action adopted by the 
Council in 1998 and renewed in 2002.22 Adopted by the European Council in December 2005, the five key 
policies to combat the trafficking of SALW are the following: 
1. Fostering effective multilateralism 
2. Meeting requests by states seeking to reduce their surplus stocks of SALW and their ammunition 
3. Promoting the restructuring of industrial sites producing low-cost SALW in Eastern and Southeast 
Europe 
4. Allowing the implementation of measures to address the underlying factors favouring the illegal demand 
for SALW 
5. Supporting the strengthening of the rule of law in unstable countries 
 
Implementation actions 
The European Council refers to 38 different instruments to ensure development of these five policies.23 The EU 
has been particularly active with regards to a number of these instruments seeking to enhance the role of the UN. 
It has consistently supported the 2001 UN programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade 
in SALW, with a particular emphasis on the problem of their accumulation and trafficking. The EU has also been 
actively involved in the process to prepare an Arms Trade Treaty. Furthermore, the EU is working towards 
universalisation and effective implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(UNTOC).24 
The Council has also adopted a joint action “in support of the international instrument to enable states to 
identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW)” in the framework 
of the strategy.25 Launched by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the International Tracing Instrument seeks 
to achieve adequate marking of and record-keeping of SALW, as well as to strengthen cooperation in tracing illicit 
SALW.26 
Export controls are an instrument emphasized by the EU. The Council has adopted a position “defining 
common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment”, including SALW. 27  The 
common position is directed towards member states. Nonetheless, the Council has also adopted a decision to 
promote this position among third countries.28 Thus, the EU is working to promote arms export controls among 
member states in Eastern Europe, countries in the Caucasus, and EU candidate countries.29 
The Council has endorsed the inclusion of a SALW article in agreements between the EU and third 
countries. Thus, it has developed a text with three articles to be inserted in international agreements with third 
countries. The articles stress the threats associated to SALW, the agreement to implement obligations to deal 
with the illicit trade in SALW, and cooperation to deal with said illicit trade.30 The EU has negotiated or is 
negotiating inclusion or these SALW elements in its agreement with several countries.31 
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In addition, and still in regard to work with third countries, SALW issues are part of political dialogues 
with them and with regional organisations. The EU has also developed specific project assistance to countries in 
different regions. These projects include demilitarisation efforts in the field of SALW, marking and tracing of 
SALW, technical assistance or the development of expertise.32 
 
3.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
Primary legislation (i.e., the Lisbon Treaty) makes several references to terrorism. Article 28B refers to several 
tasks which can contribute to the fight against terrorism both inside the EU and in third countries. These include a 
number of tasks related to disarmament, humanitarian support, peace-keeping or peace-making. Article 61H 
gives the European Parliament and the Council the power to define administrative measures with regards to 
capital movements and payments to contribute to the fight against terrorism as well. Under Article 69B, the 
European Parliament and the Council may also adopt directives to establish a definition of criminal offences and 
actions in various areas, including terrorism. Meanwhile, article 69H confers Europol the task of supporting the 
activities of member states in fighting cross-border crimes, including terrorism. 
Title VII of the Lisbon Treaty makes several references to terrorism. Under the title ‘Solidarity Clause’, 
this section of the treaty enshrines cooperation among member states in case of one suffering a terrorist attack. 
Article 188.R.1 states that the EU and its member states “shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state 
is the object of a terrorist attack...” To this end, according to article 188.R.1.a the EU and member states should 
mobilise all their instruments to “prevent” terrorism, “protect democratic institutions and the civilian population” 
from a terrorist attack, and “assist” a member state in the event of an attack. 
Article 188.R.2 asserts that member states shall coordinate among themselves in the Council when a 
member state requests assistance following a terrorist attack. Article 188.R.3 states that the Council ought to 
define the arrangements for implementation of the solidarity clause with the assistance of the Political and 
Solidarity Committee, and after a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Article 188.R.4 establishes that the European Council shall regularly assess 
the threats facing the EU. A declaration included in the Lisbon Treaty concerning article 188R clarifies that 
member states have the right to choose the appropriate means to comply with their solidarity obligation towards 
other member states. 
‘The European Union counter-terrorism strategy’ is the main piece of secondary legislation explaining the general 
objectives of the EU with regards to the fight against terrorism.33 The strategic commitment of the EU is “to 
combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights”, thus making Europe safer.34 The strategy was adopted 
on 30 November 2005, and establishes four goals for the EU: 
1. To prevent people turning to terrorism 
2. To protect citizens and infrastructure 
3. To pursue and investigate terrorists within and outside the EU 
4. To respond to terrorism by making preparations to minimise the consequences of attacks35 
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The strategy states that member states have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism. However, the 
strategy highlights the role that the EU can play in strengthening counterterrorism efforts. The European Council 
can conduct political oversight of the strategy, and the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
can ensure inter-institutional governance.36 But the EU can also be more actively involved in counterterrorism. As 
per the strategy, the EU can do so through four policies: 
1. Strengthening national capabilities 
2. Facilitating European cooperation 
3. Developing collective capability 
4. Promoting international partnership37 
 
These four policies are interconnected and directly linked to the goals outlined above. The strategy establishes 33 
different instruments to achieve these goals. There are also 24 priorities that the EU should focus on to combat 
terrorism.38 The EU has prioritized attainment of these four goals and use of the four ways outlined in the strategy 
equally. 
 
Implementation actions 
With regards to the first goal, to prevent people turning to terrorism, the Council introduced a piece of secondary 
legislation in the form of ‘The European Union strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism’, 
adopted on 24 November 2005.39 The strategy was revised on 14 November 2008.40 This strategy emphasizes 
several instruments for the EU to achieve this goal. These are the disruption of the activities of the networks and 
individuals who draw people into terrorism; ensuring that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of 
extremism; and promoting more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity.41 
There are different member state-led projects to implement these instruments, projects which mix the 
four policies pointed out in ‘The European Union counter-terrorism strategy’. These projects include ‘De-
radicalisation – targeted intervention’, ‘Back on track’ (focusing on prison inmates), Community Policing and 
Prevention of Radicalisation (COPPRA), imam-training, ‘Check the web’ to counter the terrorist use of the 
internet, ‘Clean IT’ to counter the illegal use of the internet through a framework of general principles, 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalisation and 
Polarisation (PPN), and the Alliance of Civilisations.42 
As for the second goal, to protect citizens and infrastructure, FRONTEX, the European agency in charge 
of managing cooperation at the EU external borders, is engaged in joint operations, training, risk analysis, 
research, providing rapid response capability, assisting member states in joint return operations, and information 
systems and information sharing environment.43 A European border surveillance system (EUROSUR) exists to 
support member states to reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering their borders. 44 There are also 
secondary legislation and projects to ensure control over the visa issuing process (Visa Code and Visa 
Information System), to protect critical infrastructure (European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
and Critical Infrastructure Warning and Information Network), to strengthen cyber, transport, aviation and 
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maritime security, to protect supply chains and land transport, to ensure the security of explosives (EU action plan 
on enhancing the security of explosives), and to strengthen nuclear security.45 
Regarding the third goal, to pursue and investigate terrorists within and outside the EU, there is specific 
secondary legislation that predates the 2005 counter-terrorism strategy. This is the ‘Council framework decision 
on combating terrorism’ of 13 June 2002.46 The framework decision defines what acts should be considered 
terrorism. It was amended on 28 November  2008, to deal with specific aspects of prevention such as provocation 
to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment and training for terrorism.47 
Secondary legislation and projects related to this third goal include coordination of national structures for 
counter-terrorism, information sharing on threat/alert levels, data sharing, the ‘Prum decisions’ to strengthen 
cross-border cooperation, Passenger Name Records (PNR) agreements, and an EU-US Agreement on the 
Terrorist Finance tracking Programme (TFTP). Europol and Eurojust are also deeply involved in pursuing and 
investigating terrorists, including through joint investigation teams with third countries. On the legislative and 
judicial front, there is a move towards putting in common member states’ criminal law and mutual recognition, 
recommendations for Eurojust to become more effective, and a roadmap for strengthening procedural rights. 
There is also ongoing work to reinforce joint efforts in the areas of customs and terrorist financing.48 
As for the fourth goal, to respond to terrorism by making preparations to minimise the consequences of 
attacks, the EU is engaged in efforts to provide better support to the victims of terrorism. There is also an action 
plan on CBRN, which includes a civil protection mechanism.49 
 
4. REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
As with the EU, the legislative system of the ROK also follows a multi-level structure.50 The legislative system 
consists of the Constitution, acts and subordinate statutes such as presidential decrees and ordinances of the 
prime minister or ministries, administrative rules and so forth. International treaties and laws are also sources of 
ROK law. These legal categories carry binding force in hierarchical order. The Constitution has higher levels of 
legal effect than any act and accordingly any act which infringes on the Constitution cannot be enacted and 
exercised. This legal hierarchy also applies to the relationship between acts and subordinate statutes. Table 3 
summarizes the sources of ROK law. 
The Constitution sets legal standards for legislation and amendment of acts and subordinate statutes. 
Acts are legal norms stipulated by legislative principles approved by the National Assembly. As the main units of 
legislature, acts are the legal basis for restricting the rights and freedoms of the people in cases where it is 
deemed necessary to do so for the purpose of safeguarding national security and maintaining public welfare. 
Subordinate statutes are mainly prescribed by specific administrative powers for their respective jurisdictions. For 
example, the ROK President is able to issue a presidential decree and its jurisdiction extends over all 
administrative affairs. Normally subordinate statutes are enacted for the purpose of enforcing acts.  
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Table 3. Sources of ROK law 
Class Legislations 
I Constitution 
II 
Acts, Emergency Executive 
Orders, Emergency Financial and 
Economic Executive Orders 
Treaties, International Law 
III Presidential Decrees 
Rules of the National Assembly, the 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, 
National Election Commission 
IV Ordinances of the Prime Minister, Ordinances of Ministries 
V 
Administrative Rules (Directives, 
Regulations, Public Notice, 
Guidelines, etc.) 
Municipal Ordinances,             Municipal 
Rules of Local Governments 
 
Source: Korea Legislature Research Institute, ‘Korean Legislative System and Procedures’, available at                             
< http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng/introduce/intro_lawinfo.do>, accessed on 30 May 2012. 
 
With regards to international laws, article 6.1 of the Constitution states that “treaties duly concluded and 
promulgated under the constitution and the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same 
effect as the domestic laws of the ROK.”51 According to this article, international treaties signed by the ROK 
government and ratified by the National Assembly have the same effect as relevant domestic acts or subordinate 
statutes. Furthermore, generally recognized rules of international law including international customary laws have 
legal effects within the legal boundaries of the ROK. Although some treaties require legislative measures to be 
implemented as domestic acts, the basic principle is that international treaties are directly applied to the ROK 
legal system. 
 
4.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO ARMS TRADE AND CONTROL 
The MOFAT considers that the concept of arms control means regulating development, deployment and 
operation of weapon systems through consultations and agreements among related parties. According to the 
MOFAT, freeze, limitation, banning and reduction of armaments are considered to be the main policies related to 
arms control.52 In this respect, the ROK government considers arms control as a general concept which includes 
the notions of disarmament and control on arms trade.  
The diplomatic white paper published annually outlines the ROK government’s basic position on arms control 
and trade. According to the 2011 diplomatic white paper, the ROK government has contributed to strengthening 
the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, especially through following activities:53  
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1. Disarmament and non-proliferation activities related to WMD 
(e.g., hosting of the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit, participating in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
Conference and adopting UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK’s nuclear issue) 
2. International cooperation to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime 
(e.g., participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT), and the UN Arms Trade Treaty negotiations) 
3. Activities in the field of conventional weapons 
(e.g., participating in programmes related to controlling SALW such as the UN PoA and the ITI)54 
4. Disarmament and non-proliferation activities within the UN  
(e.g., annually co-hosting the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation) 
 
With regards to the ROK’s domestic regulatory system, the issue of arms trade and control is not referred to in 
the Constitution. Acts, subordinate statutes and relevant international laws mainly lay out the general objectives 
and binding rules for the ROK on this subject.   
 
Export Control: The Foreign Trade Act & The Defence Acquisition Programme Act 
The Foreign Trade Act (enacted on 31 December 1986) and related subordinate statutes form the domestic 
regulatory framework which establishes and exercises the arms control scheme within the ROK’s regulatory 
system.55 Article 11 of this act states that “the Minister of Knowledge Economy may place a restriction or ban on 
exportation or importation, if considered necessary for fulfilling the obligations under treaties signed and 
promulgated pursuant to the constitution of the ROK and generally accepted international laws and regulations, or 
for protecting biological resources, etc.” 
In particular, section 3 of this act (Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items) provides a detailed 
regulation by introducing the concept of ‘strategic item’. This act defines an strategic item as goods which the 
ROK government shall designate and publicly notify for the purpose of “placing a restriction, such as an export 
permit, in order to maintain international peace and security as well as national security [...] in accordance with 
the principles of the multilateral international export control system” (article 19). The Enforcement Decree of the 
Foreign Trade Act (Presidential Decree) prescribes the following international conventions and regimes with 
regards to arms control:56  
1. Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)57 
2. Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) 
3. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
4. Australia Group (AG) 
5. CWC 
6. BTWC 
The Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items, the subordinate statute of the Foreign Trade Act and 
the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act, provides lists of strategic items such as ‘dual use items’ and 
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‘munitions’.58 The notice controls trade of strategic items through providing a detailed standard for classifying 
items and regulating export licenses of whom exports and imports the strategic items.   
The Defence Acquisition Programme Act (enacted on 2 January 2006) also provides legal sources for 
exercising export control.59 Article 57 of the act states that “anyone who intends to engage in the business of 
overseas exporting or intermediation [...] of such trade in major defence materials and national defence science 
and technology shall report to the Administrator of the Defence Acquisition Program Administration, as prescribed 
by Presidential Decree” (57.1) and “anyone who intends to export abroad or intermediate the trade of defence 
materials and defence science and technology,  shall obtain permission from the minister of Knowledge Economy 
[...]” (57.2). Considering the fact that defence materials, science and technology normally include arms and 
related resources, this act legally enables the ROK government to control arms trade.  
 
Implementation acts  
There are several implementation acts which secure the exercise of international treaties on arms control and 
trade within the ROK’s legal system. Article 1 of the Act on the Control of the Manufacture, Export and Import, 
etc. of Specific Chemicals and Chemical Agents for the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons 
(enactment 16 August 1996) states that “the purpose of this act is to prohibit the manufacture, etc. of chemical 
and biological weapons and to stipulate necessary matters [...] in order to enforce the CWC and the BTWC and to 
fulfil other internationally shared obligations with the aim of prohibiting and controlling chemical and biological 
weapons.”60  
The Nuclear Energy Act (enacted on 1 April 1982) is also considered as an implementation act ensuring 
the exercise of the relevant international treaties. It defines ‘internationally controlled materials’ which this act 
regulates as “being subject to security measures in accordance with the treaty relating to research, development 
and utilisation of nuclear energy and other international treaties which are prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology (article 1.17).”61 Based on the definition, article 130.3 of the act states that 
“if the Minister of Education, Science and Technology finds [...] any matters violating this act and the international 
treaty, h/she may order corrective or complementary measures.”62 
 
International laws  
International conventions and regimes of which the ROK is a signatory are directly applied to the ROK’s domestic 
legislature system, according to article 6 of the Constitution. The ROK has joined a variety of international treaties 
with regards to arms control and trade. Table 4 summarizes the major international conventions and regimes in 
which the ROK participates. 
 
Table 4. The list of the ROK’s participation in international conventions and regimes 
Regime Entry into force /Establishment 
ROK 
participation 
International 
Convention 
NPT Mar. 1970 Apr. 1975 
CTBTO Not yet in force (adoption: Sep. Sep. 1999 
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1996) 
CWC Apr. 1997 Apr. 1997 
BTWC Mar. 1975 Jun. 1987 
Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) 
Dec. 1983 May 2001 
International 
Organisation 
IAEA Jul. 1957 Aug. 1957 
Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) Feb. 1984 Jun. 1996 
UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) 
Dec. 1959 Sep. 1994 
Export 
Control 
Regime 
NSG Jan. 1978 Oct. 1995 
Zangger Committee (ZC) Aug. 1974 Oct. 1995 
AG Apr. 1985 Dec. 1996  
MTCR Apr. 1987 Mar. 2001 
Wassenaar Arrangement 
(WA) Jul. 1996 Jul. 1996 
Others HCoC Feb. 2002 Nov. 2002 PSI May 2003 May 2009 
Source: MOFAT, ‘2011 Diplomatic White Paper’, Seoul, July 2011. 
 
Although the ROK is a member of most international treaties on conventional weapons, it has not joined 
the Convention on the prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to the security 
circumstances in the Korean Peninsula.63 Furthermore, the ROK joined the PSI on 26 May 2009, even though the 
PSI is not a binding international treaty.64  
 
4.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
The ROK government views that terrorism has emerged as a major security threat since the 9/11 attacks 
challenged the universal values of the international community.65 The 2011 diplomatic white paper outlines the 
ROK government’s basic position on the issue of counter terrorism as follows: terrorism cannot be tolerated or 
justified under any circumstances and the ROK government will not compromise or surrender to the threat of 
terrorism. To effectively counter terrorist threats, the ROK strives to strengthen its counterterrorism capacity, with 
a focus on:  
1. Cooperation with international organisations such as the UN 
(e.g., executing financial sanctions designated by the UN Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee) 
2. Bilateral cooperation 
(e.g., counterterrorism consultations with the US, Japan, China, etc.) 
3. Strengthening the domestic system  
(e.g., making efforts to organise domestic legal systems)66 
Furthermore, the ROK government actively participates in the framing and application of counterterrorism 
regulations and activities at the international level. Although the Constitution does not mention terrorism and 
comprehensive act-level legislation related to counterterrorism has not been adopted. By now, the National Anti-
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Terror Action Directive (Presidential Decree No. 47, enacted on 21 January 1982, last amended on 9 February 
2012), the Class III legislation, is considered as the highest level of legislation establishing a government-wide 
framework against terrorism.67 In addition, there are acts which partially and indirectly deal with this issue.68  
 
Counterterrorism acts and bills 
The Act on Prohibition against the Financing of Terrorism (enacted on 21 December 2007) is an implementation 
act. Article 1 of this act states that it “provides for matters necessary for prohibiting the financing of terrorism to 
implement the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.”69 The ROK ratified the 
convention in 2004. Another act concerning the ROK government’s preparedness and reaction to terrorism is the 
Framework Act on the Management of Disaster and Safety (enacted on 11 March 2004).70 Although this act does 
not refer to the term ‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’, it is considered as being related to counterterrorism because terrorism 
can be considered one type of disaster.71 Article 3.6 of the National Guidelines on Anti-Terror Activities states that 
this act provides a regulatory base for activities to recover from damages caused by terrorism.72 
In addition, two bills related to counterterrorism were proposed in the National Assembly in 2008. The 
first bill is the Framework Act on National Anti-Terrorism Activities, which aims to establish a coherent and 
effective national system against terrorism activities (article 1).73 The second one is the Act on the National 
Management of Cyber Crisis, which aims to protect national security and interests through early warning of cyber-
attacks and nation-wide prompt reaction to internet crises (article 1).74 In particular, proposition of the second bill 
reflects growing domestic demand for a legal framework to counter terrorist attacks in the cyberspace, following 
the outbreak of ‘the 1.25 Internet Crisis’ that took place in 2003. Although the two bills are yet to be adopted, it is 
possible to say that they reflect the ROK’s increased interest on the issue of counterterrorism.    
 
The National Anti-Terror Action Directive (Presidential Decree 47)75 
As mentioned above, the National Anti-Terror Action Directive functions as the highest level of legislation 
establishing a government-wide system to fight against terrorism. This directive was first enacted in 1982 and has 
been amended six times. It defines terrorism as an action which aims to threat national interests and public safety 
(article 2). To clarify which actions are considered to be terrorism, this directive refers to a variety of international 
treaties on terrorism.  
Sections 2 and 3 of the directive prescribe the establishment of a variety of organisms, including a 
Counterterrorism Council under the direction of the ROK President, a Permanent Counterterrorism Committee, a 
Terrorism Information Integration Centre, a Counter-terrorism Operation Headquarter, a Command Centre, anti-
terrorism special forces, negotiation teams and so forth. Section 4 introduces a variety of measures related to 
prevention and responding to terrorism, and section 5 divides roles and authority among organisms such as the 
National Intelligence Service, the MOFAT, the Ministry of National Defence and so forth. It should be noted that 
although this directive provides a basis for the ROK government to establish a comprehensive framework on 
counterterrorism, its legal status is lower than acts. Accordingly, the directive cannot take effect in case there are 
acts which conflict with it in terms of organisations, budget and so forth.76  
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World   
158 
 
International laws  
International conventions and regimes of which the ROK is a signatory are directly applied to the ROK’s domestic 
legislature system according to article 6 of the Constitution. The ROK has joined a variety of counterterrorism 
international treaties. Table 5 summarizes the major international conventions and regimes in which the ROK 
participates. 
 
Table 5. List of the ROK’s participation in international conventions and regimes 
No. Title Year of signature 
Year of  deposit 
of instrument of 
ratification 
Year of deposit 
of instrument 
of accession 
1 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1965 1971  
2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft   1973 
3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation   1973 
4 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation 
1988 1990  
5 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages   1983 
6 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic agents 
  1983 
7 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1981 1982  
8 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991 2002  
9 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1999 2004  
10 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation   2003 
11 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the safety of Fixed Platforms Located 
on the Continental Shelf 
  2003 
12 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 2001 2004  
13 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 2011  
Source: MOFAT, ‘Korea’s International Counter Terrorism Cooperation’, Seoul, 15 December 2006, available at  
<http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=103&seqno=30
2504&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=2&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du>, accessed 
on 30 May 2012.   
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5. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
The EU and the ROK have a well-developed regulatory framework in the areas of arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism. These frameworks are evolving through the introduction of new legislation and amendments of 
existing legislation. Table 6 summarizes the key legal documents thus far adopted by the EU and the ROK in the 
areas covered in this paper. 
 
Table 6. Regulatory frameworks of the EU and the ROK (key legislation) 
EU ROK 
Arms trade and control 
Title Adoption 
year 
Type Title Adoption 
year 
Type 
EU strategy against 
proliferation of WMD 
2003 Secondary Export Control Acts 
(eg., Foreign Trade Act/  
Defense Acquisition 
Programme Act) 
1986, 1989 
(relevant 
amendment), 
2006 (last 
amendment) 
Class II 
EU strategy against 
proliferation of WMD: 
Monitoring and 
enhancing consistent 
implementation 
2006 Secondary Implementation Act  
(eg., Act on the Control of 
the Manufacture, Export 
and Import, etc of 
Specific Chemicals and 
Chemical Agents for the 
Prohibition of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons; 
Nuclear Energy Act) 
1996; 1982 Class II 
EU strategy to combat 
illicit accumulation and 
trafficking of SALW 
and their ammunition 
2006 Secondary International Treaties  Class II 
Terrorism 
Title Adoption 
year 
Type Title Adoption 
year 
Type 
Lisbon Treaty 2009 Primary National Anti-Terror 
Action Directive 
1982, 2012 
(last 
amendment) 
Class III 
Council framework 
decision on combating 
terrorism 
2002, 2008 
(amendment) 
Secondary Implementation Acts (eg., 
Act on Prohibition against 
the Financing of 
Terrorism) 
2007 Class II 
The European Union 
counter-terrorism 
strategy 
2005 Secondary Related Act (eg., 
Framework Act on the 
Management of Disaster 
and Safety) 
2004  Class II 
The European Union 
strategy for combating 
radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism 
2005 Secondary International Treaties  Class II 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
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5.1. AREAS OF CONVERGENCE 
An analysis of the regulatory approaches to arms trade and control and counterterrorism pursued by the EU and 
the ROK reveals four areas of convergence. Three of these areas relate to the nature of the regulatory 
framework. The other relates to the practicalities of its implementation. The areas of convergence are as follows: 
1. Sources of law: Legislation introduced both by the EU and the ROK has mostly been at the second 
highest level of their respective legislative systems, i.e., just below the Constitution. Whilst some aspects 
related to terrorism are dealt with in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has developed its legislative framework 
via different acts. And even though the primary sources of comprehensive counterterrorism legislation of 
the ROK is the presidential decree (Class III), Seoul has mostly developed its legislative framework 
through the adoption of acts and the participation in most international treaties related to terrorism. The 
main reason seems to be that it is simpler to introduce secondary rather than primary legislation, yet 
secondary legislation conveys the message of an issue being prioritised. 
2. Application of international law: Both the EU and the ROK attach particular importance to the 
development and universal adoption and application of international law. The ROK has signed and 
ratified all the major international conventions and regimes related to arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism. The EU has not been able to do so because only states can be parties to them. But 
Brussels has adopted decisions supporting many of these regimes and related organisations, and 
encourages EU member states to become parties to them. This is the result of the similar political nature 
of the EU and the ROK. Both are democracies respectful of human rights and the rule of law, which 
explains their will to respect international law.  
3. Recent introduction: The regulatory frameworks of the EU and the ROK have been almost in their 
entirety introduced since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA). In the case of 
the ROK, pre-existing legislation has been amended since said attacks. This is explained by the 
relatively lower importance given to arms trade and control and counterterrorism at the global level in 
both of them prior to said attacks, as well as by their close working relationship with the USA since them. 
4. Instruments used: Implementation by the EU and the ROK of their respective regulatory frameworks is 
similar in terms of instruments used. Multilateral cooperation, sanctions, controls, capacity building, or, 
when necessary, the use of force are some of the instruments being used by Brussels and Seoul to 
implement their respective regulatory frameworks. The use of similar instruments is logical insofar they 
tend to be those most democracies prefer to employ. 
 
5.2. AREAS OF DIVERGENCE 
The regulatory approaches of the EU and the ROK to arms trade and control and counterterrorism also show 
some areas of divergence. Differently from the areas of convergence analysed above, the areas in which the EU 
and the ROK diverge relate to the stage of development of the framework or to the updating and monitoring 
process. These are the areas of divergence: 
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1. SALW framework: The EU introduced a strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW 
and their ammunition in 2006. In contrast, although the trade of SALW is directly and indirectly controlled 
by the ROK government through the Foreign Trade Act and its Enforcement Decree, which refers to the 
WA as one of its legal bases, the ROK is yet to adopt any specific legislation solely targeting the 
international trade of SALW.77 Both the EU and the ROK are supportive of international regimes to curb 
the trafficking of SALW, for example through the proposed Arms Trade Treaty. However, the ROK has 
not yet led efforts to universalize the curbing of the spread of SALW as the EU has done so, although 
the ROK has participated in international cooperation on this issue at diverse levels.78 Thus, it could be 
argued that the ROK government needs to attach as much importance to SALW as the EU. It can be 
said that the EU attaches more importance to SALW than the ROK because the latter does not suffer 
from SALW-related violence to the same extent that some members of the former do. More specifically, 
violence from gang, mafia and separatist terrorist groups is far less common in the ROK than in the EU. 
2. Counterterrorism framework: The EU adopted secondary legislation pertaining counterterrorism shortly 
after 9/11 and had a well-developed framework by 2005. Thus, whereas the regulatory framework of the 
ROK relies on amendments to the directive introduced in 1982, the terrorism-related treaties which the 
ROK has joined, and issue-specific acts, the EU has developed a holistic regulatory framework. The EU 
has been under the constant threat of terrorism for decades and very notably since 9/11, arguably 
making it more willing to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism framework.  
3. Monitoring and updating process: The EU has been publicly issuing regular reviews of its regulatory 
frameworks in the areas of arms trade and control and the fight against terrorism, as a means of 
monitoring implementation and discussing whether updating is necessary. Differently, the ROK domestic 
regulatory system has not yet articulated specific legislation solely focusing on the monitoring of 
legislation implementation, although the ROK has been using amendments of existing legislation to 
update its regulatory framework. Meanwhile, the EU has been more willing to publicly disclose 
information related to monitoring of existing legislation. Arguably, this could be the result of the EU being 
a union of sovereign member states, which necessitates all of them to download legislation into their 
domestic frameworks. As a sovereign state, it is less complicated for the ROK to monitor implementation 
without the need to make this public. 
 
5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Arms trade and control and counterterrorism are important issues. Although the ROK has less experience in 
handling them than the EU, it has substantial interest in them. As an example, the MOFAT of the ROK has 
established separate divisions to deal with each of them. Furthermore, the ROK held the 2nd Nuclear Security 
Summit in 2012, with the participation of most EU member state leaders. Accordingly, the ROK is likely to seek 
closer cooperation with the EU, which has experience in dealing with the two issues. 
Cross-fertilisation is the most feasible form of regulatory cooperation at this stage. As we have seen, the 
EU and the ROK are capable of reaching harmonisation, as shown by the bilateral free trade agreement that 
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entered into force in July 2011. As a new generation FTA, regulatory changes will eventually be implemented by 
both the EU and the ROK. Cross-fertilisation in arms trade and control and counterterrorism could eventually lead 
to coordination, mutual recognition and even harmonisation. Since the EU and the ROK have a similar regulatory 
approach to these issue-areas, it is possible to start with cross-fertilisation in the near future while preparing for 
greater degrees of cooperation. 
Nonetheless, there are two limitations to bilateral cooperation. Firstly, the ROK and EU are different 
types of political entity. Therefore, approaches to arms trade and control and counterterrorism which the legal 
system of the ROK emphasises and handles as a single, sovereign state can be different from those of the EU, 
which is a union of states that necessitates cooperation among its members.  
Secondly, it is undeniable that the ROK concentrates substantial diplomatic resources on issues related 
to the DPRK and Northeast Asia, the traditional areas of interest of its foreign policy. Therefore, the issues which 
the ROK would prefer to focus on can be different from those of the EU, which has already played a substantial 
role in dealing with arms control and counterterrorism at the global level. 
Nonetheless, given the areas of convergence and divergence between the regulatory approaches of the 
EU and the ROK, there are several recommendations that we think would help both of them to strengthen 
cooperation. These recommendations are: 
1. For both of them to jointly press for universal adoption and application of international law, thus 
strengthening existing and developing international regimes. 
2. For both of them to strengthen joint implementation of their regulatory frameworks, thus increasing 
efficiency, observing best practices and reducing implementation costs. 
3. For the EU to advise the ROK on its SALW framework, thus encouraging Seoul to consider the 
development of its own. 
4. For the EU to advise the ROK on its counterterrorism framework, thus encouraging synergies with the 
bills that have been proposed in the latter’s National Assembly. 
5. For both of them to discuss their respective monitoring and updating process, thus increasing efficiency 
and observing best practices. 
More specifically, there is significant potential for the EU and the ROK to initiate cooperation on the following 
issues in the near future: 
1. DPRK: As UN member states, EU countries have joined in sanctions against the DPRK – UNSC 
resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). There is scope for a ‘cross fertilisation’ network 
allowing the EU to be informed of the latest developments in the implementation of these sanctions. 
2. Iran: The US has requested the support of the ROK in implementing sanctions against Iran, which the 
EU already implements. There is scope for a ‘cross fertilisation’ network allowing the ROK to be 
informed of the latest development in the implementation of these sanctions and alleged links between 
Iran and the DPRK. 
3. Cyberterrorism: As a leading information technology country, the legal system of the ROK related to this 
area is relatively developed by international standards. Most notably, although yet to be adopted, an Act 
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on the National Management of Cyber Crisis has been proposed in the ROK. Since cyberterrorism 
legislation is still in the discussion stage in most states, there is scope even for harmonisation between 
the ROK, the EU, and other parties. 
Regulatory cooperation between the EU and the ROK can be advanced through mechanisms already in 
existence of relatively simple to initiate: 
1. In 2010, the EU and the ROK upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership. For example, they 
held a first high level political dialogue in November 2011, involving the EU's Deputy Secretary General 
for the External Action Service and the ROK's MOFAT Deputy Minister.79 Furthermore, the ROK and EU 
held a policy consultation on the DPRK at director-general level in May 2011. In other words, there is an 
existing mechanism for the EU and the ROK to communicate with each other. Consequently, they can 
include arms trade and control and counterterrorism as part of the agenda of this mechanism. 
2. Furthermore, the ROK has maintained a close cooperative relationship with the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a member of the OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation since 
1994.80 The ROK maintains permanent officers charged with matters related to the OSCE in Vienna. 
Accordingly, the ROK and the EU could deal with arms trade and control and counterterrorism through 
the OSCE channel.  
Two other mechanisms to enhance cooperation that would be relatively simple to implement are as follows: 
1. An annual (or half-yearly) policy consultation meeting on arms trade and control and/or the 
counterterrorism at the director-general level to share experiences, and to develop new areas to 
cooperate with each other, thus increasing ‘cross fertilisation’. 
2. The dispatching of ROK working-level officials as observers to a variety of EU arms trade and control 
and counterterrorism initiatives (e.g., EU cooperation with Central Asian countries or Russia). This could 
easily lead to ‘cross fertilisation’ and even closer cooperation as ROK officials better understand the 
rationale behind the EU’s regulatory framework and its implementation. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Both the EU and the ROK attach great importance to curbing arms trade and terrorism. Thus, they have a well-
developed yet constantly evolving regulatory framework to deal with arms trade and control and counterterrorism. 
These regulatory frameworks are very similar in many, important areas. Nonetheless, there are some differences 
as well. This suggests that there are both opportunities and possible limitations to mutual cooperation in 
harmonizing, and perhaps universalising, regulatory frameworks. Given that both the EU and the ROK emphasize 
multilateral cooperation as one of the cornerstones of their respective frameworks, they have the potential to 
influence and shape the international regulatory framework if greater convergence between theirs is achieved. 
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ASSESSING POSSIBILITIES FOR  
ENHANCED EU-SOUTH KOREA COOPERATION ON CHEMICAL REGULATION 
 
KATJA BIEDENKOPF 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates chemicals regulation in the European Union (EU) and South Korea. Both jurisdictions 
have shown an increased level of regulatory activity in recent years with the EU developments preceding the 
South Korean by only a few years. While the EU engaged in a major overhaul of its regulation, which was 
adopted in late 2006, South Korea has amended its chemicals law five times between 2004 and 2008 and issued 
a draft proposal for a major reform in 2011. Both regulatory developments have communalities but also 
differences. This paper argues that EU chemicals regulation had effects on policy developments in South Korea 
and it explores opportunities for enhanced, mutually beneficial EU-South Korean cooperation. 
Chemicals are an important part of everyday life. Most consumer products from toothpaste to 
electronics rely on the use of chemicals in their production process or contain chemicals. Given chemicals’ near 
ubiquity, ensuring their safe use and minimising the potential risk that they can pose to humans and the 
environment is important. Guaranteeing the exploitation of chemicals’ benefits while minimising their potential 
risks has been part of the environmental and industrial policy in most industrialised countries since the 1960s. 
The EU and South Korean reforms aim at improving previous efforts and bringing chemicals regulation up to the 
challenges of technological progress and economic developments. 
The EU has regulated chemical risks since 1967 when it introduced labelling and classification rules. In 
2007, an ambitious and comprehensive reform of European chemicals regulation entered into force – the 
Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).1 It goes beyond 
previous EU and international chemicals policy in its ambition and scope. South Korea has regulated chemicals 
since 1991, when it introduced the Toxic Chemicals Control Act (TCCA). In 2011, the South Korean Ministry of 
Environment (MoE) issued a draft proposal for a major revision of its chemicals regulation, entitled Act on the 
Registration and Evaluation of Chemicals. This legislative proposal would signify a deep reform of South Korean 
chemicals regulation. 
Both the EU REACH Regulation and the South Korean draft legislative proposal have many similarities. 
When zooming into the details, however, also differences can be detected, too. Nevertheless, the similarities 
between EU and South Korean chemicals regulation suggest that these are not entirely disconnected processes 
but rather that there are links, for example, in the form of learning processes and market interdependencies. 
Section two of this paper compares EU chemicals regulation and the South Korean draft proposal, showing that 
there are a number of similarities but also some differences. The ensuing section presents the analytical 
framework for the empirical investigation of the EU’s effects South Korean chemicals regulation, which is subject 
to section four. Section five explores possibilities for enhancing cooperation between the EU and South Korea in 
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the area of chemicals regulation. Especially since South Korea is currently in the process of revising its 
chemicals regulation, cooperation at this early stage of the regulatory lifecycle promises great potential for 
effective cooperation and synergies that could minimise regulatory divergences and inefficiencies. 
 
2. EU AND SOUTH KOREAN CHEMICALS REGULATION 
 
In 2006, the EU adopted the REACH Regulation, which introduces a number of elements that did not exist in 
previous EU or any other global chemicals regulatory framework. Given these novel elements, the EU REACH 
Regulation can be considered a pioneering effort. Pioneering is understood as entering unchartered waters by 
adopting a new approach or new requirements that had not been applied in that way or to that policy area before. 
This includes the setting of highly ambitious and stringent requirements as well as deregulation and the lowering 
of standards. The decisive characteristic of pioneering regulation is its novelty in the sense that no other 
jurisdiction has adopted it before. 
In February 2011, the South Korean MoE published a draft proposal for a far-reaching chemicals policy 
reform and made it subject to public consultation. The proposal is entitled: Act on the Registration and Evaluation 
of Chemicals,2 which suggests some similarities with the REACH Regulation. In 2012, MoE issued a revised 
draft. This law would significantly change current South Korean chemicals regulation. Its scope and requirements 
are however less ambitious than REACH. The legislative proposal is expected to be submitted to the South 
Korean National Assembly in late 2012 or early 2013 with anticipated adoption in mid-2013. The Act would enter 
into force in 2015 (Fallström Mujkic 2012: 12).3 While the National Assembly could alter the proposal, observers 
do not expect fundamental changes. Since the likelihood of adoption is very high, this paper focuses on the 
legislative draft because for an exploration of possibilities for the enhancement of EU-South Korea cooperation 
on chemical regulation it seems more relevant to focus on the developments expected for the near future rather 
than on the past. The subsections below compare the EU REACH Regulation and the South Korean draft 
proposal for an Act on the Registration and Evaluation of Chemicals. They highlight the (draft) regulations’ main 
novel elements. 
 
2.1 SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIOR CHEMICALS REGULATORY REGIMES 
EU pre-REACH and current South Korean chemicals policy encountered some shortcomings, which are mainly a 
lack of data on the hazards and the uses of chemicals, a slow progress of assessing chemicals and regulating 
risks, and a low degree of innovation activities for safer alternatives to hazardous chemicals. Schwarzman and 
Wilson (2009: 306) labelled these three shortcomings – that are common not only to pre-REACH and South 
Korean chemicals laws but can also be observed in other countries such as the United States (US) – the data 
gap, the safety gap and the technology gap. 
One of the reasons for reforming EU chemicals regulation was the lack of hazard and risk data for many 
chemicals although a number of them had been in commercial use for decades. This shortcoming was the result 
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of a distinction between existing and new chemicals. Substances newly placed on the EU market after 1981 had 
to undergo stringent testing requirements. Substances that were already in commercial use in the EU prior to 
1981 were considered existing chemicals and could be used without additional testing or registration 
requirements. Existing chemicals represented about 99% of the volume of all chemicals on the EU market. Only 
very few of high production volume chemicals had full data sets and for a significant number no data was 
available. Moreover, the way in which chemicals are used in production processes and products was not known. 
This made it difficult to assess the actual risk that a chemical can pose. The lack of data has as a result that the 
environmental and human health implications of a number of chemicals could not or only with difficulties be 
assessed. Assessing the risks of chemicals that were already in commercial use and regulatory responses 
addressing potential risks progressed slowly. The degree of innovation activities for safer alternatives to 
hazardous substances was low because using existing chemicals was less costly and time-consuming (Allanou 
et al. 2003a, 2003b; Biedenkopf and Park 2012: 783-84; Hansen and Blainey 2006: 270-71; Williams et al. 2009: 
554-55). 
South Korean chemicals regulation dates back to 1991, when the Toxic Chemicals Control Act (TCCA) 
was adopted. Like pre-REACH EU regulation, TCCA makes a distinction between existing (in domestic 
commerce before 1991) and new chemicals (brought into domestic commerce after 1991). Prior to placing new 
chemicals on the South Korean market, producers must provide the MoE with data on the respective chemical’s 
physical and chemical properties, its toxicity to human health and the environment, its degradability etc. On the 
basis of this data, the authorities determine whether more data should be generated and whether measures to 
protect the environment and human health should be introduced. Similar to the pre-REACH regulatory 
framework, TCCA does not impose the same data requirements on existing chemicals. The authorities have the 
right to regulate substances that are already in South Korean commerce but as previously in the EU this process 
is slow. Only 15% of existing chemicals have been evaluated under the TCCA framework.4 The shortcomings 
that South Korea faces are thus almost the same as the EU did prior to REACH, namely a lack of hazard and 
use data for existing chemicals, slow progress in assessing the risks of chemicals and a low degree of innovation 
for safer alternatives because the use of existing chemicals is less costly and time-consuming than the placing 
on the market of new chemicals.5 
 
2.2 SYSTEMATIC AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
Both REACH and the draft South Korean proposal are based on a systematic approach, composed of three main 
consecutive steps, that begins with the gathering of data. Both laws include as a second step the evaluation of 
prioritised chemicals, which can lead to the third step, the imposition of conditions for the continued use of 
chemicals that were found to pose a certain risk. REACH and the South Korean draft provide for a procedure in 
which producers6 must request prior authorisation before using a chemical. As alternative regulatory restriction 
measures can be adopted. 
The REACH Regulation established the Helsinki-based European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) that 
coordinates and centralises the main parts of the implementation of the Regulation. REACH is composed of 
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three main stages: registration, evaluation, and authorisation/restriction. By the end of May 2018, all chemicals 
put on the EU market in quantities over 1 tonne per year per producer must be registered in a central database 
by submitting defined sets of data to ECHA. Only registered chemicals are permitted on the EU market. In the 
evaluation stage, EU Member States analyse the data that producers submitted and assess the chemicals’ 
potential risks. As an evaluation result, the use of substances that were found to be of very high concern can be 
made subjected to authorisation requirements. In this case, producers may only put the respective substance on 
the EU market if they have received prior authorisation by the authorities to do so. As an alternative to mandated 
authorisation, EU-wide restrictions of substances can be imposed. 
The South Korean draft proposal would require all producers to submit every other year information 
about the volumes and types of the chemicals that they placed on the South Korean market the previous two 
years. Based on the submitted and on other available data, the MoE would select and designate substances as 
subject to evaluation. Producers of these chemicals would be required to submit applications for registration to 
the MoE. Chemicals that are designated as subject to evaluation could only be placed on the Korean market if 
they are registered. Based on the registration data, the ministry would conduct hazard and risk evaluations. In 
the case of a chemical substance being found to pose a risk to human health or the environment, the MoE could 
designate it as subject to approval. This means that its producer would have to obtain the approval of the 
authorities prior to placing the chemical on the South Korean market. The MoE could also restrict or prohibit 
substances that may severely impair human health or the environment. 
Both the EU and South Korea take a comprehensive approach by abolishing the distinction between 
new and existing chemicals that both jurisdictions’ previous laws made. In the EU, the cut off year was 1981 and 
in Korea 1991. Regulatory provisions address all chemical substances in an equal manner, if they fall into the 
specific categories such as the volume thresholds and, in the case of South Korea, determinations. The South 
Korean draft still uses the term new substances but it refers to chemicals that are newly placed on the market 
and have not been marketed before. REACH uses the label phase-in substance. The equal treatment of all 
chemicals aims at incentivising innovation because it abolishes the prior incentive to use existing chemicals 
because they were not as stringently regulated as newly developed chemicals and therefore less costly to put on 
the market (Scott 2009: 57; Williams et al. 2009: 555). 
The EU and South Korea include a broad range of chemicals into the scope of their (draft) laws. The 
REACH registration requirement includes all chemicals that are placed on the EU market in quantities over one 
tonne per year per producer. It is estimated that this represents about 30,000 chemical substances (European 
Commission 2007). The South Korean draft foresees two different types of registration requirements. All 
producers would have to submit basic data on the volume and classification of their substances every other year. 
There is no minimum volume threshold for this requirement. A South Korean application for registration, which 
would come closer to the EU registration requirements in terms of the type and extent of data requested, would 
only have to be submitted by producers of chemicals that are designated as subjects to evaluation and of 
chemicals that are newly placed on the South Korean market. It is anticipated that the South Korean registration 
requirement would (initially) cover about 2,000 substances (Fallström Mujkic 2012: 12).7 The South Korean draft 
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would introduce the concept of application for a registration, which means that the MoE would have to respond to 
the producers within 30 days to notify them of the result. The MoE could request additional data from the 
applicant before issuing a notification of successful registration. In the REACH framework, ECHA evaluates the 
completeness of the submitted registration files but there is no timeline and only (at least) 5% of the registration 
dossiers undergo a compliance check. The submission of a registration counts as fulfilling the market entry 
requirement until ECHA detects deficiencies and requests the registrant to submit the lacking data. 
 
2.3 REGISTRATION 
The REACH Regulation and the South Korean draft Act are based on the principle No Data, No Market. In 
neither of the two are producers allowed to place their chemicals on the market without prior submission of some 
data. The establishing of a publically accessible database that centralises most of the registration data – apart 
from some confidential business information – is a central element of the REACH Regulation. The South Korean 
draft also includes provisions on the disclosure of registration data, with the limitation of withholding some 
confidential data. The South Korean draft contains the provision that if data has been disclosed in other 
countries, it cannot be withheld in South Korea. Both laws provide thus for the possibility to protect confidential 
business information. The amount of registration data is more ambitious in the EU. The South Korean draft would 
require producers to submit 46 data items for the highest volume category while REACH requests 62 data items 
for the highest volume category.8 
Under REACH, producers must register their chemicals in a staged approach by 2018. The deadline for 
chemicals placed on the EU market in volumes above 1,000 tonnes per year per producer and for some very 
hazardous substances was December 2010. For volumes above 100 tonnes per year per producer the deadline 
is December 2013. All chemicals entering the EU market in volumes above one tonne per year per producer 
must be registered by December 2018. All producers that pre-registered their chemicals between June and 
December 2008 can benefit from these staged registration deadlines. Alternatively, they must register their 
chemicals immediately. Pre-registration involved the submission of basic data such as the substance name, 
company information and tonnage band. 
According to the South Korean draft, all chemical producers would have to submit to the MoE 
production and import volumes of the previous two years as well as information about the category of chemical 
they manufacture or import. The MoE would select and designate substances as subject to evaluation in 
accordance with standards that would be established by presidential decrees. The application for registration 
would include the submission of data on the use of the respective substance, its physicochemical characteristics, 
its hazards and its categorisation. For higher volumes and substances of great concern the data requirements 
would be more extensive than for lower volumes. The volume ranges that define the data requirement are the 
same as in REACH. 
Joint submissions by a group of producers that place the same substance on the market are included in 
both (draft) laws. The REACH Regulation and the South Korean draft foresee the joint submission of registration 
files when the pre-registration shows that several producers place the same chemical on the respective market. 
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In the South Korean draft, joint submissions are obligatory. In the REACH Regulation they are optional. REACH 
allows for the joint submission of registration dossiers by producers when they become member of a Substance 
Information Exchange Forum (SIEF). The aim of these SIEFs is to avoid duplications in testing, which helps 
keeping animal testing and costs to a minimum. 
 
2.4 RESPONSIBILITIES 
REACH and the South Korean draft shift the responsibility for generating data from the authorities to the 
producers of chemicals. Previously, for existing chemicals this responsibility lay on the side of public authorities, 
which was one of the reasons for the slow progress in conducting risks assessments. Insufficient data on 
hazards and uses of chemicals made it cumbersome for authorities to gather sufficient data to conduct risk 
assessments (Biedenkopf and Park 2012: 784). REACH requires extensive data sets and requests that 
producers conduct testing in case the requested data is not available. The South Korean draft takes a similar 
approach. In both (draft) laws, producers from third countries that are not established in the EU / South Korea 
and that wish to export chemical substances into the respective market are required to have a legal 
representative in that particular jurisdiction. This so-called Only Representative is legally responsible for fulfilling 
the regulatory requirements such as submitting the registration data. 
 
2.5 EVALUATION 
Both (draft) laws include evaluation processes in which the registration data is reviewed and assessed with 
regard to potential risks that would require regulatory responses. The criteria for chemicals to qualify as 
substances of high concern are virtually the same. Their wording differs only slightly. Yet, only once the South 
Korean authorities release further details on the specifications of their assessment procedures, would it become 
clear whether or not there are some more differences. 
In the REACH evaluation phase, ECHA checks the registration dossiers for their completeness. More 
importantly, the competent authorities of the EU Member States jointly evaluate chemicals with regard to 
potential risks that they might pose to human health or the environment, based on the data submitted in the 
registration phase. Chemicals that are found to pose such a risk are placed on an annex to the REACH 
Regulation, which means that they are subject to authorisation. The criteria for substances to be made subject to 
authorisation are: a) carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic for reproduction (CMR); b) persistent, bioaccumulative and 
toxic (PBT); c) very persistent and very bioaccumulative (vPvB); and d) substances, for example with endocrine 
disrupting properties, that have an equivalent level of concern to those of other substances listed in the previous 
points.  
Similarly, the South Korean MoE would conduct hazard and risk evaluations of chemicals based on the 
data submitted through registration. In this process, it would be able to request additional data related to the 
potential risks of the respective chemical substance. Evaluation could lead to the designation of a chemical as 
subject to approval if it is found to fall into a specified hazard category. These categories are: a) inducing cancer, 
mutation or impairment of reproductive functions (equivalent to CMR), b) easily building up in humans, fauna and 
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flora (equivalent to bioaccumulative), c) residing in the environment for extended periods of time (equivalent to 
persistent), d) suspected of disrupting humans’ endocrine systems (equivalent to endocrine disrupting 
properties), and e) inflicting an equal or greater level of damage than the other categories (equivalent to 
equivalent level of concern). The South Korean evaluation criteria resemble the ones applied in the REACH 
framework 
 
2.6 PRIORITISATION 
Both laws prioritise chemicals that are produced in large quantities and of high concern. South Korea would 
designate chemicals as subject to evaluation, which would then have to be registered, in addition to chemicals 
newly placed on the market, while for all chemicals on the South Korean market basic data would have to be 
submitted. In this way, South Korea would priorities an estimated 2,000 chemicals for registration. For 
substances that are manufactured or imported in volumes above 100 tonnes per year, additional risk-related data 
would have to be submitted. The REACH registration requirement encompasses all chemicals placed on the EU 
market in quantities above one tonne per year per producer, which is an estimated 30,000 chemicals. 
Registration prioritises greater volumes and high concern by applying earlier deadlines. The last registration 
deadline is in December 2018 for substance volumes between one and 100 tonnes. The EU evaluation process 
is also based on a prioritisation. ECHA draws up a so-called Community Rolling Action Plan with the substances 
that the Member States must evaluate in the following one to two years. 
2.7 AUTHORISATION AND RESTRICTION 
Substances that were found to pose a risk to human health or the environment can be made subject to 
authorisation in either of the two jurisdictions. The South Korean draft uses the term approval. Producers of 
substances that are subject to those requirements must receive the authorisation/approval by the authorities 
before placing the substance on the respective market. In both the EU and South Korea, authorisation 
requirements are use-specific. Both (draft) laws include the provision that if a safer alternative exists or becomes 
available, authorisation/approval are not granted or phased out. An application for authorisation under REACH 
must include an analysis of safer alternatives and a substitution plan. As alternative to the authorisation 
procedure, the REACH Regulation as well as the South Korean draft include the possibility to restrict substances 
that severely impair human health or the environment through regulatory measures. 
 
2.8 SUBSTANCES IN PRODUCTS 
Producers of products that contain certain substances of very high concern must notify this substance to the 
authorities in both (draft) laws. The South Korean draft stipulates that producers must declare restricted or 
prohibited substances that are contained in products. The REACH requirements are different in the sense that 
substances of very high concern, which were placed on an annex and which are considered candidates for 
authorisation must be notified if they are present in products in a concentration greater than 0.1% of the product. 
The South Korean provisions would be specified in a presidential decree. 
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2.9 COMMUNICATION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
Both the South Korean draft and the REACH Regulation introduce requirements on the communication in the 
supply chain. In the EU, information about the risks and safe handling of chemicals must be communicated 
between the different actors in the supply chain to minimise wrong handling and to promote awareness of the 
appropriate treatment of the different chemicals (Biedenkopf and Park 2012: 786). Information about the ways in 
which chemicals are used must be communicated to the producer who registers a chemical. The South Korean 
draft includes requirements on the provision of information to supply chain actors that receive chemicals. This 
would however only apply to substances designated as subject to evaluation and whose evaluation result the 
MoE would have communicated. 
 
2.10 LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE 
A fundamental EU-South Korea difference is the legislative structure that underlies the respective (draft) 
chemical regulation. While the consolidated version of the REACH Regulation spans over 800 pages (including 
annexes), the Korean draft Act comprises about 20 pages. In the EU, a large part of the regulatory requirements 
is set out in the law itself. Nevertheless, a number of additional technical specifications that were added to 
annexes and guidance documents contribute to the specification and implementation of the REACH Regulation. 
The South Korean draft Act would require a number of decrees, ordinances and rules, which are mentioned in 
the draft Act. 
 
Similarities Differences 
Comprehensive & systematic approach South Korean registration would apply to 
substances “subject to evaluation” (estimated 
2,000). EU registration applies to all chemicals 
above 1 tonne/producer/year (estimated 30,000). 
Successive steps: registration, evaluation, 
authorisation/restriction 
South Korea would require producers to submit 
data on the volume and name of the chemicals they 
put on the South Korean market every other year. 
In the EU registration is a nonrecurring event, only 
if additional data becomes available must 
producers submit it. 
No Data, No Market principle The South Korean MoE would have to respond to 
registrations within 30 days. ECHA only conducts 
compliance checks of about 5% of registration 
dossiers. 
Abolition of distinction existing and new chemicals  
Tonnage ranges for registration The South Korean draft would require producers to 
submit 46 data items for the highest volume 
category; REACH requests 62 data items for the 
highest volume category. 
Publically available database with registration data, 
apart from some confidential business information 
 
Partial shift of responsibilities to producers  
Prioritisation of high volume and high concern 
substances 
 
Evaluation criteria: CMR, PBT, vPvB, endocrine  
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disrupters and equivalent concern 
If safer alternatives for chemicals are available 
authorisation / approval is not granted / phased out 
 
Communication in the supply chain requirements  
Requirements for substances in products  
Foreign producers must appoint an Only 
Representative to fulfil their registration and other 
obligations 
 
Joint registration Joint registration is mandatory in South Korea and 
voluntary in the EU. 
 EU created ECHA, South Korea would implement 
the Act with existing institutions. 
 The REACH Regulation comprises about 800 
pages (including annexes) while the South Korean 
draft proposal has about 20 pages. A large number 
of detailed provisions would be implemented 
through decrees, ordinances and rules in the South 
Korean system. 
 In the EU producers had to pre-register their 
substances to be able to benefit from the staged 
registration deadlines. The South Korean proposal 
does not include pre-registrations. 
Table 9: Similarities and Differences between the REACH Regulation and the 2012 draft Act on the Registration 
and Evaluation of Chemicals 
 
3. POLICY TRANSFER AND CONVERGENCE 
 
The similarities between EU and South Korean chemicals regulation and the timing of South Korean regulatory 
activities only a few years after the adoption of REACH suggest an EU-South Korea connection. South Korea 
amended its TCCA five times in the 2000s,9 the period when the EU REACH Regulation was in the policy-
making process10 and shortly after its adoption. A significant amendment of the TCCA dates from December 
2007, one year after the adoption of REACH and six months after its entry into force. The first proposal for a draft 
Act on the Registration and Evaluation of Chemicals was issued in 2011, only three and a half years after the 
entry into force of REACH and only a few months after the first REACH registration deadline. This timing 
suggests that South Korea could have been inspired by or reacted to developments in the EU, in addition to 
domestic factors driving chemicals policy reform. 
Academic literature suggests that policy in one country can affect policy-making in other countries 
through different mechanisms that follow different rationales and ontological foundations. For the case of EU-
South Korea chemicals regulation, a jointly negotiated agreement on the adoption of the respective regulation 
and the EU exerting coercive pressure on South Korea can be excluded as explanatory mechanisms. Two 
groups of mechanisms were identified to bear the potential to explain a possible link between EU and South 
Korean chemicals policy. One is based on the economic interdependence between the EU and the South Korean 
market. Through the interweavement of chemicals manufacturing, chemicals-related industries and consumer 
markets in both jurisdictions, EU policy can have externalities on South Korea. The second group of external 
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effects is based on the availability of information about and resulting from EU policy, which can lead to learning 
and emulation by South Korean policy-makers and stakeholders. These two types of external effects are further 
elaborated in the sections 3.1 and 3.2 below. 
South Korean domestic factors are important additional elements to understand the policy output that 
can result from the EU’s external effects. They provide the frame for the type of policy measures that are 
possible and needed. Factors such as the South Korean industry structure and the capacity of the public 
authority might require different policy measures than the EU situation does. This can explain EU-South Korean 
differences in the design and scope of chemicals regulation. The domestic factors are further discussed in 
section 3.3 below. 
 
3. 1 ADJUSTMENT AND COMPETITION 
EU policy can have externalities that change the costs and benefits of adopting similar policies in other 
jurisdictions (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 39-42). Actors in these jurisdictions can respond to the altered situation 
and adjust their policy positions accordingly. This can lead to increased pressure for the adoption of policy similar 
to EU policy. Interdependence of markets through trade flows and connected supply chains are the scope 
condition for transnational effects based on adjustment. When jurisdictions compete with each other to attract 
internationally mobile capital and business, policy decisions in one of the jurisdictions can make its domestic 
conditions more or less attractive for investments. Policy decisions in one jurisdiction can thus generate 
externalities of on another that competes for the same investments (Simmons and Elkins 2004: 173; Simmons et 
al. 2006: 792-95). This dynamic is generally associated with a race to the bottom in which jurisdictions 
outcompete each other by scaling down social and environmental standards. 
International interdependence can however also lead to the trading up of environmental and health 
standards. Ambitious environmental and health requirements can create market opportunities for producers that 
provide compliant products and services. International supply chains and trade can lead to the creation of an 
incentive for producers to comply with ambitious requirements of a pioneering jurisdiction in order to continue 
selling products and services on this market (Drezner 2005: 846; Lazer 2001: 476-77). EU policy can thus have a 
direct effect on extra-EU manufacturers requiring compliance with EU rules for their activities in the EU market. 
In some cases, this can trigger further-reaching changes. In complex and globally entangled supply chains, 
manufacturers can decide to implement the stricter EU requirements to their entire production, not only to the 
production for Europe. Maintaining one single supply chain, production methods and product design can be 
economically more viable than separate processes because economies of scale can be exploited. 
Compliance with ambitious EU requirements can change cost and benefits of complying with similar 
rules in extra-EU jurisdictions. Since manufacturers made the initial investment in, for example, product design 
changes and production methods, the costs of compliance with similar or the same rules in other jurisdictions is 
significantly diminished. The investment that some extra-EU manufacturers made for compliance with EU rules 
can also motivate them to support ambitious policy in their home jurisdiction in an attempt to level the playing 
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field with their domestic competitors that are not active on the EU market and therefore not required to make the 
same compliance investment (Vogel 1997: 562). 
The avoidance of regulatory divergence and incompatible regulatory requirements can be a driver for 
business actors’ advocacy in favour of rules similar to the ambitious rules of the jurisdiction that first adopted 
them. In globalised industry sectors, different requirements increase the transaction costs for companies 
because they might be required to maintain separate supply chains, product designs and production processes. 
Global harmonisation of regulatory requirements to minimise transaction cost can be a motivation for business 
actors to advocate the bringing up of regulatory standards to the level of the first mover jurisdiction (Drezner 
2005: 846; Kelemen 2010: 336-39; Kelemen and Vogel 2010: 437-50; Lazer 2001: 447). This could be seen as a 
pre-emptive measure to avoid the adoption of divergent requirements. 
 
3.2 LEARNING AND EMULATION 
EU policy can also be a model and a source of information for actors from extra-EU jurisdictions. They can learn 
lessons from or emulate EU policy. State and non-state actors can use the experience of another jurisdiction in 
their own policy-making process. These actors can update their policy positions based on the lessons that they 
draw from information about EU policy. They can analyse policies and related information such as impact 
assessments, preparatory studies and data produced as a result of policy measures. Lessons from EU policy 
and EU data can help reduce uncertainties about different policy options (Gilardi 2012; Levy 1994: 290; Weyland 
2009: 392-93, 99-401). Learning can span the entire policy cycle from agenda-setting to policy evaluation or take 
place at one stage of the cycle (for a description of the policy cycle see Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 11-18). 
While learning involves the deeper analysis of policy or data from another jurisdiction, actors can also 
emulate policy originating abroad. Emulation is the support of policy similar to another jurisdiction’s policy based 
on legitimacy and normative grounds. Extra-EU actors change their policy positions in favour of policy similar to 
EU policy because they share the same norms or because they perceive the EU and its policy as successful. 
The former is normative emulation, which occurs when actors adhere to the same norms as the EU policy is 
based upon. Common norms make extra-EU actors assess EU policy as appropriate (March and Olsen 1989: 
160-62). The latter is mimetic emulation, which results from the fit of the perceived achievements of EU policy 
with the goals of extra-EU actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901, 06; Shipan and Volden 2008: 842-43). 
 
3.3 DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Some jurisdictions are more receptive to EU effects than others. This can be explained by domestic variables. 
The overall political agenda, the political majority constellations and the ideologies of relevant actors can make a 
jurisdiction more or less receptive to effects of EU policy. The more opponents there are to a certain policy, the 
less likely its adoption becomes (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 805; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2004: 664-65). Culture, norms and traditions that are embedded in a jurisdiction determine what kind of policy is 
acceptable to the majority. They create a path dependency determining what is considered desirable and 
acceptable. Formal rules and procedures determine the roles and influence of the different actors involved in 
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policy-making. They are the rules of the games of politics (Gurowitz 2006: 310-11; March and Olsen 1989: 18; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977: 341). 
Structural factors such as the capacity of the regulator to implement legislation, the structure of 
domestic industry and the existence of a policy problem play another important role in explaining the design and 
scope of policy output. Extra-EU actors might be affected by EU policy through adjustment, learning or emulation 
but structural factors can limit their policy design options. Ambitious policy might require a strong and large 
government agency to implement and enforce the rules. Complex issues require the technical capacity to cope 
with them. The structure of the economy and especially of the affected sector might preclude some options 
because they would be too damaging or a certain policy design options might provide opportunities to strengthen 
certain areas. The existence a policy problem related to the EU policy can contribute to making a jurisdiction 
more receptive to EU effects. When a jurisdiction faces a policy problem, it is more likely to adopt a policy that 
targets the particular issue area (Hays 1996: 634-35; Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1121). 
 
4. LINKS BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN AND EU CHEMICAL REGULATION 
 
This section demonstrates that the REACH Regulation affected regulatory developments in South Korea. This 
results from the empirical investigation based on the analysis of policy documents and statements by South 
Korean officials as well as interviews with experts that are involved in the process. As a result of market 
interdependence between the EU and South Korea, the REACH Regulation affected the policy positions of South 
Korean policy-makers and industry actors. Fostering South Korean industry’s competitiveness and growth was 
linked to the ability to comply with requirements that REACH introduced such as data generation and innovation. 
South Korean policy-makers also learned from and emulated REACH elements. In parts of this process, industry 
actors played the role of transmitters of lessons learned. Domestic factors in South Korean provide insights into 
the reasons for South Korean actors to choose policy design elements that differ from REACH and show that 
adjustment, learning and emulation are conditioned by such factors. In most cases adjustment, learning and 
emulation will not lead to the taking over of entire pieces of legislation but rather of elements of it. South Korean 
domestic factors also provide receptive conditions for effects of the REACH Regulation, for example the 
existence of a related policy problem and the general trend of strengthening environmental policies. 
 
4.1 ADJUSTMENT AND COMPETITION 
The interdependence of the EU and South Korean chemicals markets is strong. EU-South Korean trade in 
chemicals has intensified in past years. It is one of the areas in which EU exports to South Korean exceed its 
imports from the country. Table two below shows, that South Korea ranks 13 in the EU’s chemical exports and 
nine in the EU’s chemical imports. The share of EU exports to South Korea as part of the EU’s total chemical 
exports is 2.1%. This relatively small number is nevertheless significant since international trade in chemicals 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  179
takes place to a large extent between the EU and the US and the rest is distributed amongst a number of other 
countries including South Korea. In 2009, 31% of EU chemicals import came from the US and 28% of the EU 
chemicals exports went to the US. The second biggest export market for EU chemicals was Switzerland with 9% 
in 2009. This shows that, besides the US, there are a number of countries including South Korea, which have a 
small but noteworthy export market share for EU chemicals. Additionally, the EU-South Korea chemicals-related 
trade is expected to grow in size and significance. A 2010 DG Trade study forecasts that the South Korean 
production of chemicals and manufactured products is to increase and it predicts that the EU will increase its 
chemicals exports. South Korea exports significant amounts of manufactured goods such as textiles, clothing, 
cars and electronic equipment to the EU. These are products in whose production chemicals are needed. Tables 
three and four below show that chemicals and chemicals-related products such as rubber and plastics but also 
products in whose production process chemicals are important such as electronic equipment and machinery 
make up large shares of EU-Korea trade (Decreux et al. 2010). The condition for external effects through 
adjustment and competition, namely market interdependence, is thus given. 
 
Machinery 26.1%  Electronic equipment 36.1% 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 12.6%  Cars, trucks  17.5% 
Electronic equipment 7%  Machinery 15.2% 
Business services 6.8%  Transport equipment 7.6% 
Metals 6.3%  Chemicals, rubber, plastics 5.8% 
Cars, trucks 6.2%  Textile 3.8% 
Sea transport 6%  Business services 2.9% 
Other manufacturing products 5.1%  Metals 2.9% 
Air transport 4.5%  Other manufacturing products 1.9% 
Leather, clothing 2.5%  Air transport 1.3% 
Trade 2.4%  Leather, clothing 1.2% 
Other food products 2.2%  Trade 0.8% 
Transport equipment 2.2%  Finance 0.8% 
Textile 1.8%  Sea transport 0.8%% 
Other 8.3%  Other 1.4% 
 
Table 10 (left): Main EU Exports to South Korea (source: Decreux et al. 2010) 
Table 11 (right): Main South Korean Exports to the EU (source: Decreux et al. 2010) 
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 EU Exports EU Imports 
EU 
Balance 
Product 
Group 
Rank Value 
Share 
of 
Product 
in Total 
Share 
of 
Korea 
in EU 
Imports 
Rank Value 
Share 
of 
Product 
in Total 
Share 
of 
Korea 
in EU 
Exports 
Value 
2200 - 
Chemicals 
13 
2,225 
Mio € 
6.2% 1.5% 9 
5,332 
Mio € 
16.4% 2.1% 
3107.1 
Mio € 
Table 12: Rank of South Korea in EU Trade, 2011 (source: DG Trade 2012) 
 
Considering the market interdependence, South Korean exports to the EU are covered by requirements 
of the REACH Regulation. REACH Regulation does not only apply to EU chemical producers but also to any 
other economic actor that places chemicals on the EU market. Chemicals of South Korean origin that are placed 
on the EU market in quantities over one tonne per year per producer must be registered by 2018 at the latest, 
depending on their volume. South Korean manufacturers of, for example, electronic products that contain 
substances of very high concern must notify these substances if they fall into the scope of REACH. South 
Korean upstream and downstream users of chemicals must comply with at least some of the communication in 
the supply chain requirements if they are part of a supply chain feeding into the EU market. South Korean 
producers can potentially be covered by authorisation requirements, if they sell substances into the EU that are 
identified as requiring authorisation prior to their placing on the EU market. Because of the market 
interdependence, a number of South Korean manufacturers are affected by REACH requirements and engage in 
some compliance efforts (Fallström Mujkic 2012: 12). 
Since the EU introduced ambitious and comprehensive requirements for chemicals on its market – 
which set further-reaching obligations than the South Korean TCCA – South Korean producers that are part of 
supply chains feeding into the EU must engage in REACH compliance efforts. This includes activities that are not 
part of the obligations under TCCA. Awareness of and compliance with the REACH Regulation is an important 
aspect for Korean chemical producers because a significant share of EU-South Korea trade is directly or 
indirectly related to chemicals. South Korean exports of fine chemicals to the EU are expected to grow as a 
result of the 2011 EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and as a consequence of South Korean 
expansion in high-tech areas such as nanotechnology (Guerin et al. 2007: 100). REACH is likely to affect most 
chemicals-related exports to the EU through one or a number of its requirements. Compliance with REACH is 
important for a significant number of South Korean companies.11 
Compliance with REACH and the related competitiveness of South Korean companies has been 
recognised by the South Korean authorities. The South Korean MoE operates a REACH helpdesk12 that is 
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operated by a REACH taskforce team comprising 12 experts and which was established in September 2006. 
Their task is to raise awareness amongst South Korean companies, to assist them in understanding their 
compliance obligations and to support them in implementing compliance measures. Additionally, on the MoE 
website information about the REACH Regulation can be found.13 The reason for the establishment of the 
REACH taskforce and the helpdesk that is mentioned first on the helpdesk website is that REACH “will be the 
strongest trade barrier among international environmental regulations that have been made”.14 This shows that 
the South Korean authorities consider REACH compliance an important factor for their domestic industry’s 
competitiveness. 
In recent years, imports of chemical substances into South Korea have increased by 20.4% while 
chemicals manufacturing decreased by 11.3%. For this reason, South Korean officials are concerned about the 
competitiveness of their domestic chemicals industry.15 The increase of chemicals imports is attributed to the 
“slack regulations on chemical substance”16 that make it easy to import potentially harmful substances into South 
Korea while “major trading partners have strengthened management of chemical substance to protect their 
people and industry”.17 Boosting South Korean competitiveness is thus connected to the ability of domestic 
industry to export to the EU and at the same time to keep potentially harmful chemicals out of the country.  
The REACH Regulation had effects on South Korean officials and industry actors through market 
interdependence. This led to the adjustment of these actors’ behaviour. Industry engages in adjusting their 
practices so that they comply with REACH and can continue exporting to the EU. Officials behold the 
externalities of REACH in terms of competitiveness and as potential trade barriers. 18  REACH led to the 
adjustment of their policy position so that they advocate reform of South Korean chemicals regulation with the 
aim of preparing domestic industry for global competition in a context that requires chemicals data, that 
disfavours risky chemicals and that favours innovation delivering safer alternatives to risky chemicals. The 
external effects of REACH contributed thus to the agenda-setting process in South Korea leading to the proposal 
of domestic chemicals regulatory reform. 
Adjustment also affected the policy formulation process. The South Korean MoE consulted with industry 
on the first draft legislative proposal that it issued in 2011. This draft contained a threshold of 0.5 tonnes for 
applications for registration. In the course of the consultations, industry requested the alignment of the tonnage 
thresholds with REACH, thus increasing the minimal registration threshold to one tonne and applying the same 
tonnage bands as in REACH.19 Market interdependence led thus to the adjustment of South Korean officials’ 
position with regard to the tonnage threshold for registration steering the policy formulation towards compatibility 
with REACH. 
 
4.2 LEARNING AND EMULATION 
South Korean officials show interest in learning from the EU’s experience.20 In an interview, Jee Yoon Lee, 
Director of the chemicals management division of the South Korean MoE referred to the South Korean 
authorities’ assessment of REACH and consequent lessons that they drew (Chemical Watch 2011: 25). South 
Korean officials and European Commission or ECHA officials met a number of times in the past years. For 
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example, a South Korean delegation visited ECHA in May 2012 to discuss various aspects of the preparatory 
work for REACH (Fallström Mujkic 2012: 12). They showed interest in the pilot project that the European 
Commission conducted in 2004 and 2005 to test the implications and implementation of REACH. South Korea 
started similar pilot projects in the summer of 2012.21 This can be seen as a lesson learned from the EU’s 
preparation for REACH. South Korea also develops guidance for industry. This is another aspect that seems to 
have been learned or emulated from REACH. ECHA developed numerous guidance documents for industry. A 
South Korean delegation that visited ECHA in 2011 was interested in the IT tools that ECHA uses for the 
registration of chemicals. South Koreans and Europeans discussed the use of the same IT tools. There are also 
some contacts between EU and South Korean officials at the margins of international meetings such as in the 
OECD context.22 The strong interest in exchanging information about REACH on the South Korean side is also 
expressed in the inception of a working group on chemicals by the FTA that the EU and South Korea concluded 
in 2011.23 A first working group meeting was held in April 2012 at which general issues were discussed.24 Details 
of the meeting are not publically available. 
In addition to contacts between South Korean and European authorities, EU chemicals industry closely 
follows regulatory developments abroad. The European chemicals industry association Cefic and individual 
companies engage in the South Korean stakeholder process. They met with South Korean authorities and 
commented on the draft legislative proposal.25 A European NGO that focuses on chemicals regulation was 
involved in some information exchange with South Korean industry and authorities. This dialogue ceased 
however. NGO-to-NGO cooperation could not be traced.26 While European industry actors seem to play a 
noteworthy role in transmitting data to peers and the South Korean authorities, European NGOs seem not 
involved in contacts with their South Korean peers. 
An indication for Korea’s openness to cooperation with and learning from other jurisdiction’s 
experiences can be found in TCCA Article 6 (3)5. It stipulates that the Basic Plan for Control of Toxic Chemicals 
– which the MoE shall formulate – shall include “plans for cooperation with organizations, international 
organization, etc. relating to toxic chemical control”. There is thus the awareness of the importance of 
international cooperation as well as the willingness to engage with international actors in the context of the 
current regulatory framework as well as in the context of regulatory reform. 
Strong indications that emulation and learning has taken place can be found in the observation that the 
2011 South Korean draft proposal contained provisions on a so-called interim registration. This was a registration 
with lighter data requirements prior to the actual registration, which is an approach that REACH took with its pre-
registration provision. In both the 2011 South Korean draft and the EU, pre-registration is not obligatory but it is 
required if producers whish to benefit from later registration deadlines. Without pre-registration, immediate 
registration is required. The 2012 South Korean draft does not contain provisions on interim registration 
anymore. They were removed because the EU experience was ambiguous. The deadlines under REACH were 
short, which led to a much larger number of pre-registration than anticipated. Companies pre-registered all 
chemicals due to insecurity of the need to pre-register and the lack of time to gather data. The REACH pre-
registration requirement also has an unintended consequence, which occurs in the case that a company decides 
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to use a substance that is already in commerce but that it has not used before. Without pre-registration, a full 
registration would be required immediately as condition prior to using the chemical. EU industry actors 
communicated this lesson to the South Korean drafters of the legislative proposal.27 It appears that they engaged 
in learning from the EU experience since the provision on interim registration is not contained in the revised 2012 
draft. Industry actors seem to have been the transmitters of the lesson. This appears to be a case of initial 
emulation of the EU pre-registration requirement that was revised based on learning. 
 
4.3 DOMESTIC FACTORS 
South Korean domestic factors explain the country’s receptiveness to adjustment, learning and emulation as well 
as the differences in the draft legislative proposal in comparison to REACH. As discussed in subsection 2.1 
above, South Korea faces similar problems to the ones that the EU addresses through REACH. These are, in 
particular, a lack of data, a slow system for assessing existing chemicals and a low degree of innovation activity. 
For this reason, South Korean policy-makers recognised the need to design a more efficient and preventive 
chemicals management system, in addition to the considerations based on adjustment and competition.28 Given 
the similarity of the shortcomings of the current South Korean chemical law TCCA with the shortcomings of the 
pre-REACH regulatory framework, it appears logical that the drafters of South Korean chemical regulation reform 
would turn to the EU experience in search for lessons. The existence of a similar policy problem, which is a 
domestic driver of South Korean chemicals policy reform process, explains parts of the receptiveness to drawing 
lessons from and emulating EU policy. 
South Korea has progressed and significantly expanded its environmental policy since the 1990s 
(OECD 2006). South Korean environmental and health policy has moved towards the incorporation of 
precautionary elements, for example in its policy regarding the mad cow disease, which also shifted the burden 
of proof for safe beef imports from the authorities to the producers (Kim 2012: 10-15). The precautionary 
principle and shifts of parts of the responsibilities to producer are elementary principles of the REACH 
Regulation. The reform of chemicals policy falls thus into a more general trend of developing South Korean 
environmental policy, which provides for a relatively receptive environment for the concepts that REACH is 
based upon. 
The capacity of South Korean authorities to implement an ambitious chemicals law is a main factor 
explaining the smaller scope of the draft proposal in comparison to REACH. For the implementation of REACH, 
ECHA with about 400 members of staff was created. Additionally, the competent authorities of all 27 Member 
States are highly involved in the process, in particular, in evaluating the risks of chemicals. South Korea does not 
possess the same capacity being a single country of about 50 Mio inhabitants in comparison to the EU with its 27 
Member States and about 500 Mio inhabitants. Implementation of the South Korean chemicals law is foreseen to 
be conducted by the MoE, other ministries and existing government agencies. This limited capacity, in relative 
terms, explains the South Korean approach of first requiring the registration of a subset of all chemicals, which is 
anticipated to figure around 2,000 substances (Fallström Mujkic 2012: 12).29 The limited capacity also contributes 
to South Korea’s interest in exploiting synergies and cooperating with the EU. 
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The structure of the South Korean chemicals industry and its declining exports to the EU are another 
domestic factor that contributes an explanation for reforming chemicals policy. In addition to the related 
adjustment effects as outlined above, the industry structure also explains some of the differences between 
REACH and the South Korean draft proposal. The capacity of South Korean companies, most of which are of 
medium or small size (Guerin et al. 2007: 100) was taken into account, which led to some different requirements 
than REACH. 99% of South Korean fine chemicals industry are SMEs of less than 300 employees.30 The South 
Korean authorities considered the use of the OECD data format IUCLID 5, which the EU uses for its data 
submission requirements. This IT tool is complex and requires some expertise to use. Concerns arose that the 
use of the same IT system and data submission requirements as ECHA uses would exceed the capacity in terms 
of staff and expertise of smaller South Korean companies. For this reason, the South Korean authorities are 
considering the development and use of a simpler, own IT tool and data format.31 
South Korea has a hierarchy of laws that is composed of various levels of regulatory measures with the 
Act on a second level below the constitution and above the levels of presidential decrees, ministerial ordinances 
etc., as shown in figure one below Acts generally require a number of lower-level decrees, ordinances and rules 
to be implemented. Together the Act and the lower-level regulatory measures adopted within its framework make 
up the regulatory regime addressing chemicals (Chemical Watch 2011: 25).32 This legislative hierarchy differs 
from the way legislation is designed in the EU and explains some of the differences in the design of the draft 
South Korean proposal and REACH. The South Korean draft is shorter and does not go into the level of detail 
that REACH does. Lower-level measures would implement the draft proposal and more provide details of South 
Korean chemicals regulation. 
 
Figure 1: South Korean Legislative Hierarchy (source: Korea Legislation Research Institute, 
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/struct.do ) 
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5. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR STRENGTHENING SOUTH KOREA-EU COOPERATION 
 
This section investigates possibilities for enhancing South Korea-EU chemicals regulatory cooperation. On the 
one hand, growing trade in chemicals and chemicals-related goods calls for regulatory preparedness on both 
sides for the respectively other regulatory regime and, on the other hand, chemical policy reform efforts in South 
Korea seem to make the exchange of experiences and lessons between EU and South Korean policy-makers 
useful. The EU and South Korea could engage in cooperation efforts on two different types of information. The 
first relates to the regulatory design and the second relates to chemicals data, risk assessment results etc. In the 
light of the high degree of staff- and expertise-intensity of implementing a comprehensive chemicals 
management system, observers predict that South Korea is likely to face resource constraints. In this context, 
the exploitation of synergies and cooperation on the implementation of chemicals regulation appears highly 
beneficial to both the EU and South Korea. The subsections below outline concrete options for strengthened EU-
South Korea cooperation. 
 
5.1 EXCHANGING EXPERIENCES AND BEST PRACTICES TO FOSTER LEARNING 
While the EU has introduced a fundamental chemical regulatory reform, South Korea is in the process of 
reforming its chemicals policy. This means that South Korea could learn from EU experiences and build upon 
them. With the direction in which its reform efforts seem to be moving, South Korea is entering an area that is 
new for its domestic regulation. Lessons from the EU that went through a similar process could help South Korea 
avoid some of the flaws and unintended consequences of REACH. While the South Korean capacity and 
industry structure might require some policy design decisions that differ from REACH, there are a number of 
elements that the EU adopted and South Korea seems likely to adopt as discussed in great detail in section two 
above. Once both jurisdictions have adopted their chemicals laws, there seems to be a vast array of issues on 
which both jurisdictions can cooperate to avoid duplications and benefit from each other’s work. EU policy-
makers could also benefit from lessons from South Korea since the EU is also in a process of implementing, 
refining and revising parts of its chemical regulation. There is thus still a lot of work ahead on which the EU and 
South Korean could cooperate and mutually draw lessons from each other. 
 
5.2 EXPLORING OF OPTIONS FOR THE SHARING OF DATA RELATED TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
The exchange of chemicals-related data could gain importance once South Korea has adopted its Act on the 
Registration and Evaluation of Chemicals. When South Korea begins requesting data from producers, the format 
and type of information requested becomes an important aspect. On the one hand, producers will find 
compliance with South Korean rules less burdensome if they are in the same format and the same type as they 
have to submit to the EU, since many companies operate in both markets or are part of a supply chain feeding 
into both markets. It should be kept in mind, however, that while hazard data remains the same, use data can 
vary between the EU and South Korea. On the other hand, authorities conducting chemical evaluations could 
benefit from sharing chemical data and results of risk assessments. Through such cooperation, economies of 
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scale could be reached. The sharing of data would prevent the duplication of testing, which could help minimise 
animal tests.33 
The sharing of data would require a guarantee of the quality and reliability of the results. This could be 
facilitated if both authorities would work, for example, with laboratories that comply with the OECD Good 
Laboratory Practices. This would guarantee good quality of the data. However, the sharing of data could 
encounter a legal obstacle. The data that companies and consortia submit to ECHA are intended for ECHA’s use 
only and not for other purposes. Companies retain ownership of the data. This potentially constrains the 
possibilities for South Korean authorities to use the data. It seems that the consent of companies prior to the 
sharing of data could be necessary.34 
Another concrete way in which cooperation could be facilitated is if South Korea would decide to use the 
IUCLID 5 data format for its registration processes. In this way the transfer of data between authorities would be 
facilitated. Chemicals producers invested significant resources in internal IT systems and processes to generate 
the data that REACH requires. Previous IT systems did not necessarily track the data that is required for REACH 
registration such as the volume of chemicals.35 In the light of these investments, aligning the South Korean data 
requirements, data formats and reporting schedules with what companies have implemented for REACH 
promises to facilitate the process and to generate efficiency gains for industry and authorities. 36  Yet, as 
discussed in section 4.3 above, the capacity of South Korean small and medium sized producers to used a 
complex IT system poses a great challenge and might motivate the MoE to adopt a different, simpler system. In 
this case, the compatibility of the two IT systems would be an area that EU and South Korean policy-makers 
could cooperate on in an attempt to avoid unnecessary complications for producers that are active on the EU 
and South Korean market. 
Another aspect of data-related cooperation could be the mutual recognition of registration dossiers at 
the respectively other authority. This would only work if the data requirements are the same. Data about the 
toxicity of chemicals is the same in the EU and South Korea and as long as the quality is guaranteed, they are 
interchangeable. The use of chemicals in manufacturing processes and products can differ between the EU and 
South Korea. For this reason, use data would still have to be collected separately to cover the respective 
market.37 This mutual acceptance is a far-reaching proposal, which would require close cooperation and mutual 
trust.  
 
5.3 STRENGTHENING RESEARCH COLLABORATION 
An additional area of collaboration is between research institutes and testing laboratories. The scientific dialogue 
and cooperation could be mutually beneficial for the EU and South Korea. Since chemicals management is an 
extremely complex area, there is a need for scientific research on testing but also on the search for safer 
alternatives. Joint and mutually complementing research can help use resources more efficiently. 
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5.4 DEVELOPING OF A STRUCTURE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE 
As discussed above, learning from REACH promises great benefit for South Korea and the EU. Chemicals 
management is a complex and resource-intensive policy area so that the exploitation of synergies and 
cooperation seems highly beneficial. The interviews conducted for this paper suggest that an effective dialogue 
is only in its infancy. An institutional framework that could be exploited for the purpose of effective sharing of 
experiences and best practices that could support the design of South Korean chemicals policy exists in the form 
of the working group that was established by the FTA. It met once so far. The stated aim of this group is to 
exchange information and to cooperate in an attempt to avoid regulatory divergences and non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Since the minutes of the first meeting are not publically available yet, it is difficult to assess what issues in 
what detail were discussed. It appears that the discussion remained at a general level. The working group 
comprises government officials from both sides. For the EU, DG Trade is in the lead but brings in representatives 
from DG Enterprise and other DGs if required.38 The working group could provide a good forum for the official 
exchange of information and for finding solutions for the harmonisation of regulatory requirements. The challenge 
seems to make efficient use of the opportunity provided by the working group. 
Given the complexity of REACH and chemicals management, focused and targeted discussions appear 
crucial. EU-South Korea meetings promise to be most effective if they focus on specific aspects of REACH or 
related issues.39 Depending on the issue, different participants might be chosen. The choice of specific topics 
enables a deeper discussion of the topic rather than addressing everything related to REACH at the same time. 
Specific topics could be the different stages of REACH, registration, evaluation and authorisation but more 
effective seem more specific issues such as IT tools, data submission formats, substance information exchange 
forums, guidance documents, communication in the supply chain, enforcement, the involvement of stakeholders 
etc. 
However, since the working group meetings take place only once a year or every other year, 
complementing it with less formalised venues of cooperation seems helpful. In times of intense regulatory activity 
in one of the two jurisdictions, the demand for information- and experience-sharing can be higher than at other 
times. Collaboration can take place at different levels of hierarchy and detail. While the exchange of information 
on broad concepts and fundamental ideas of regulatory design could be discussed in a few high-level meetings, 
technical details are more numerous, occur more frequently and are dealt with by technical level experts. 
Cooperation on a more frequent and ad hoc basis appears more conducive in these cases.  
Especially, the latter kind of cooperation appears not well developed. It seems however an important 
point for the coming years since in South Korea subordinate rules to the (draft) Act on the Registration and 
Evaluation of Chemicals are important. These rules would specify many aspects of the law. For this reason, 
cooperation in this process appears promising to generate mutual benefit in terms of sharing lessons from the 
EU with South Korea, working on compatibility and minimisation of trade barriers. This seems likely to be 
situated at the level of experts in the administrations rather than at the higher political level. In addition to the 
design of regulation, coordination on the implementation and enforcement of regulation could be beneficial. 
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A concrete step that could help fostering closer and more efficient cooperation between South Korea 
and the EU on chemical regulation could be the designation of a regulatory cooperation person in ECHA, DG 
Enterprise, DG Environment, the Korean MoE and other Korean authorities involved. These persons would be 
tasked to be the contact point for outside requests from their counterparts, they would be in charge of promoting 
awareness of chemical regulatory developments in other jurisdictions and they would put individual experts in 
contact with their counterparts in other bodies. So far, it seems that funding for such positions is limited in the EU 
institutions. ECHA has an international outreach manager but it seems that the resourcing is relatively restricted. 
ECHA’s workload with regard to the implementation of REACH is high. For activities that are not part of ECHA’s 
legal requirements, which would be many of the cooperation activities, there are no resources available.40 
The EU and Korea could consider signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the sharing of 
knowledge, experience and best practice on matters of mutual interest. Such an agreement would frame the 
above-described cooperation into a mutually expressed willingness at high political level. Such a MoU could 
provide the grounds for instruments of enhanced cooperation such as regular meetings at different hierarchical 
levels. Yet, the establishment of the working group on chemicals by the FTA fulfils this role partially. In the case 
of efficient implementation of the intention behind the working group and of increased informal contacts at 
different levels of the hierarchy, a MoU might not be necessary. It could however help setting the process in 
motion by demonstrating a high-level political commitment. 
 
5.5 INCLUDING EU MEMBER STATES 
EU-South Korean cooperation on the evaluation of chemicals would only work if Member States were included. 
Under REACH, the competent authorities of the Member States conduct the assessment of chemicals in the 
evaluation stage. ECHA is only involved in the compliance checks of the dossiers, in the testing proposals and in 
managing the processes. Technical risk assessments are conducted by the Member States. For this reason, 
their involvement in parts of the EU-South Korea cooperation should not be neglected. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper started from the observation that the EU has fundamentally reformed its chemical regulation in 2006 
and that South Korea is currently in the process of introducing a significant chemicals regulatory reform. Both 
(draft) laws expose significant similarities but also some differences. These similarities appear to be a (partial) 
result of market interconnectedness, mutual awareness and lesson-drawing. Regulatory cooperation between 
South Korea and the EU, as opposed to a one-sided or non-steered process, was found to be in its infancy. It is 
relatively ad hoc and patchy. There seems to be scope for enhancing cooperation at all levels of hierarchy. The 
working group on chemicals that was established through the FTA is a start and demonstrates the recognition 
that regulatory cooperation is important. It bears the potential to provide a formal framework for strengthened 
EU-South Korea cooperation.  
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However, in an attempt to further enhance and foster cooperation, additional structures and personal 
links are needed. These do not need to be highly formalised but a designated person in the main involved 
institutions would help setting up and fuelling such dialogue. Such persons could act as link-makers between 
technical and regulatory experts in South Korea and the EU. Large parts of regulatory cooperation depend on the 
persons that deal with detailed policy-related questions and their implementation rather than on high-level 
political appointees. The high-level political commitment seems an important component preparing the grounds 
for regulatory cooperation but it is equally or even more important that the individuals that work on the policy on a 
day-to-day basis fill the political commitments with concrete actions. This paper outlined areas in which and 
options for how this could be done. 
The early stage of South Korean chemical policy reform provides a good opportunity for cooperation at 
an early stage of the policy cycle. This could help avoiding the adoption of barriers to trade and regulatory 
differences, which would be more difficult to iron out at a later stage of the process.  
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DIFFERENT PATHS TOWARDS THE SAME GOAL? 
COMPARING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CO2 EMISSIONS REDUCTION REGULATIONS IN THE EU AND 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
STEFAN NIEDERHAFNER 
CHAN SONG LEE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
    
On the following pages we comparatively analyse the European Union’s (EU) and the Republic of Korea’s 
(hereafter referred to as Korea) greenhouse gas emissions reduction systems. Both the EU and Korea 
implemented regulatory frameworks to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions within their territories to support 
the shift towards a low-carbon, green economy. Two of the most important policy instruments towards these ends 
are the Emission Trading System (ETS) set up by the EU and the Target Management System (TMS) 
implemented by Korea. The two systems show several similarities beyond their common goal to reduce carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions. Both systems focus specifically on big emitters – around 11,000 installations in the EU, 
equalling approximately 50% of the total EU CO2 emissions, and around 480 installations in Korea, responsible 
for 60% of the total Korean CO2 emissions. Likewise, both aim for specific CO2 reduction goals by the year 2020 
– a 21% reduction against the 2005 emissions in the EU and a reduction by 30% compared to the business as 
usual scenario in the Korean case2.  
How they intend to change the behaviour of the big emitters is, however, addressed in quite different 
ways. The EU, belonging to the Annex I group of the Kyoto Protocol, had to quickly initiate a binding programme 
to reach her mitigation goals. An ETS, relying primarily on a market mechanism to achieve GHG reduction, was 
seen as the best alternative considering the previous failure introducing a common EU carbon tax in 1992 (more 
in section 2).  
Korea is a non-Annex I country, but the world’s 7th largest GHG emitter in 20103. The country took a 
different approach to the mitigation issue. Building on a regulatory framework introduced in 1998 to steer Korean 
companies towards a reduction in their energy consumption, Korea initiated the government-led GHG TMS. The 
centralized TMS relies on reductions made against a business as usual (BAU) baseline, with the amount of 
reduction subject to negotiations between the government and the operators (more in section 3).  
The main purpose of this paper is twofold. This paper compares the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) and 
South Korea’s Target Management System (TMS), with two goals: evaluate the potential for successful CO2 
mitigation in each system and investigate the compatibility of the EU ETS and the Korean TMS to assess 
possibilities for regulation transfer and co-operation. 
The Korean National Assembly, however, decided recently to transform Korea’s GHG mitigation 
regulations into an ETS in 2015. That means the question of how the Korean TMS could be connected with the 
EU ETS, e.g. how to create trade of emission allowances between the two systems is hardly of practical interest 
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anymore. But the Korean TMS can now with good reason be seen as a predecessor to an ETS or, in other words, 
as the first stage on the way to an ETS. Therefore, a comparison of the early stages of both systems allows us to 
draw generalizations and conclusions on the feasibility and potentials of each to inform other actors in elaborating 
their own CO2 reduction regulations. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 outlines the theoretical concepts and the analytical 
framework we apply to make the comparison operable. Section 3 discusses the EU ETS and section 4 the South 
Korean TMS. Section 5 presents a comparative analysis, while section 6 provides conclusions.  
 
2.THEORETICAL CONCEPT AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To facilitate the comparison and provide a framework that allows a description of similarities and differences 
between the two systems with the aim of identifying areas of co-operation and potential for regulatory transfer, we 
introduce the following theoretical concept.  
 
2.1 THEORETICAL CONCEPT 
The analysis of the regulatory settings subject in this study is based on a neo-institutional concept in the sense 
that we concentrate on the regulatory, institutional settings of each system while also taking the behaviour of the 
actors into account (Scharpf 1999), both those responsible for and those targeted by these institutional settings. 
While the focus on the institutional frame is predominant in the sections that deal with the design and 
implementation of the systems, the role of the actors becomes important in the sections on the bargaining and 
decision-making phases preceding the systems. Furthermore, we introduce three general regulatory modes to 
analyze the institutional settings: the market, the governance, and the developmental state modes. 
The market mode refers to a system in which the role of the state is rather limited; market dynamics, 
created by the relation between supply and demand and informed by price signals, are at the heart of this 
regulatory mode. Private actors are at the centre. Besides guaranteeing the functioning of the market principle, 
regulatory activity is unnecessary. However, with this mode it is quite difficult to aim for specific political goals if 
they are not directly related to a profit, for example goals related to common goods.  
The governance mode refers to systems in which both government and private actors cooperate in an 
interdependent relationship with each other, because neither the governmental nor the private actors can realize 
their goals without the other. Even the goals are subject to negotiation and bargaining processes between the 
various actors. It is also possible to integrate not only private and governmental actors within this mode, but 
governmental actors from various levels of public administration, in particular those situated in the supra- or sub-
national levels. Especially within the context of EU Integration, governance approaches were often and 
productively applied, since the complexity of EU processes is not understandable when focussing on national-
level actors alone (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Peters and Pierre 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Bache 
2008; Benz 2008; Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008).  
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Finally, the developmental state mode was basically expounded to explain the pattern of Japan, South 
Korea, and other Asian states' economic development. This concept sees the nation state as the central actor 
which dictates the regulatory framework in a top-down, sometimes rather authoritarian fashion, with which the 
social actors, including corporations, have to comply. Market mechanisms are implemented, but in a state-
controlled fashion, often to boost exports. Non-compliance leads to significant penalties, which secures the 
implementation of the rules (Johnson 1995; Woo-Cummings 1999). 
Given that the EU’s regulatory approach implies the establishment of a carbon market, it is expected that 
this would be the guiding principle of the EU case.  However, given that the EU bodies have to rely on the 
national administrations to implement EU policies, strong elements of multi-level governance are expected as 
well. Given that Korea has frequently been cited as one of the main cases in support of the developmental state 
model (Kalinowski  2008), the TMS is expected to primarily be a top-down and state-centred policy. The more 
differences the two systems show, the less likely will co-operation or regulation transfer be.  
 
2.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
To facilitate a better understanding of the systems’ development over time and the role of the specific actors at 
specific times, we break both cases down into several policy phases. 
 
1. THE BARGAINING PHASE 
The first step is to focus on the political debate that led to the decision for a specific GHG mitigation regime. In 
particular, this process highlights how the different actors (especially government and business actors) influenced 
the policy decisions that were eventually taken. 
 
2. PHASE 0: PLANNING AND PREPARATION PHASE 
The second step is to focus on planning and design before the system is actually  implemented, phase 0, so to 
say. In the Korean case, however, this step is rather incremental, since the GHG mitigation system is built into a 
pre-existing regulatory setting. And since this previous system should be seen as the first phase in implementing 
the system, we fused phase 0 with phase 1 in the Korean case (indicated by 0/1 in the heading).  
 
3. PHASE 1: THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
In this step, we describe the implementation and in both cases the rather experimental first years. The focus is on 
the initial struggles, shortcomings and successes of each system.  
 
4. PHASE 2 AND CONSECUTIVE PHASES 
Depending on the case, the implementation phase is followed by two or more consecutive phases, in which the 
system is enhanced, adjusted, or even completely transformed. Both systems did already announce changes 
until 2020. We provide a brief outlook on the future plans of both systems and integrate the directions of planned 
future developments into our conclusions.  
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The next two chapters present the case studies. 
 
3. THE EU ETS 
 
The EU and her then 15 member states (MS) supported the Kyoto Protocol from a very early stage and ratified it 
in 2002, committing themselves to an 8% CO2e4 emission reduction target by 2012, with 1990 as the base year. 
With the European Burden Sharing Agreement of 1998, this total of 8% was broken down in specific national 
targets (EU Com 1999, 3). Germany, for example, agreed to a 21 % reduction, while Portugal agreed to limit its 
CO2e emission growth to a plus 28% (EU Com 2009, 14) until 2012, with 1990 as the base year. How the MS 
actually achieve their targets was their responsibility, but they agreed to coordinate national activities with and 
through the institutions at the EU level, namely the European Commission. Furthermore, the MS agreed to 
implement an EU-wide ETS as one the cornerstones of the EU level activities. 
The EU, supported by many developing countries and environmental NGOs, was primarily opposed to 
the idea of making market mechanisms the main strategy of a global CO2 mitigation regime, which had been 
pushed by the USA in the UNFCCC negotiations 1997 (Convery 2008, 7–9; Ellerman and Buchner 2007, 67). 
However, the EU and her MS began to accept the concept over a several-year discussion process. In what is 
often seen as an ironic development, the EU rather suddenly became the global champion of emissions trading 
after the USA under the lead of G.W. Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001. At this critical 
juncture, the EU accepted its leading role and moved ahead of the other Kyoto Protocol parties by implementing 
the EU ETS in 2005, which is now by far the largest and most international ETS, setting standards for all other 
future ETS efforts worldwide.  
 
3.1 THE BARGAINING PHASE DURING THE 1990S - FROM TAXES TO MARKETS 
One of the primary reasons5 given for the turn towards a market-based concept was the several successful 
national ETS experiences achieved at the time, such as the US Sulphur Dioxide cap and trade system and the 
ETS in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) (Ellerman and Buchner 2007, 68).  
Another reason that should be considered was the general zeitgeist at the time, after the breakdown of 
the communist Soviet empire, at the turn of the millennia, and before 9/11, when capitalism in general and market 
mechanisms in particular were seen by many as the prevailing and now unchallenged modes of social 
organization. In Europe, namely Germany and the UK, many so-called ‘new labour’ and ‘Neue Mitte’ (German: 
new centre) governments were in power, attempting to modernize their traditional socialist-leftist parties by 
introducing more ‘capitalism-friendly’ policy concepts. The integration of market concepts into the domain of 
environmental politics, traditionally a stronghold of market-critical or even anti-capitalist perspectives, can be 
interpreted as a sign of the success of these endeavours. 
Last but not least, various attempts to implement a CO2 mitigation regime that followed a classical 
regulatory command and control pattern or to introduce an EU-wide CO2/energy tax, such as proposed by the EU 
Commission in June 1992, failed to gain acceptance during the 1990s. European and national business groups in 
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particular displayed fierce resistance against an EU-wide CO2/energy tax. A carbon market, including the 
possibility of potential profits, had a far greater appeal to these actors. That the political leaders maintained their 
commitment towards the Kyoto targets and made clear that not adopting a GHG reduction policy was not an 
option facilitated the acceptance of the ETS as the lesser of two evils.  
By 2000, market-based concepts were seen by the most important actors, including the EU Commission, 
the MS governments, the European and the national business groups, and to some extent even environmental 
groups, as the best option for moving forward and actually implementing measures that would decrease the EU’s 
GHG output.  
 
3.2 PHASE 0: THE DESIGN AND PREPARATION PHASE 2000-2004  
The preparation phase starts around 2000 with the EU Commission’s Green Paper on GHG Emission Trading 
(EU Com 2000), and includes the 2001 EU Commission’s proposal for an ETS directive, the various amendments 
to the proposal by EU Council and European Parliament, the early allocation plans, and the so-called linking 
directive 2004/101/EC. Instead of analysing each decision in detail6, we will focus on the main developments of 
this period.  
One of the most remarkable observations is the speed with which the EU proceeded towards ETS 
implementation. The EU Commission published its Green Paper on Emissions Trading in March 2000. Usually, 
the EU community method requests a white paper that reflects the reactions on the green paper, then another 
reflection round on the white paper, before a first draft is submitted to the EU Council and the European 
Parliament. In this case, however, the EU Commission quickly provided its draft in October 2001, and already by 
October 2003, the directive 2003/87/EC establishing the EU ETS was adopted. Directive 2004/101/EC that linked 
the EU ETS with the Kyoto flexible mechanisms followed soon. On 1 January 2005, the EU ETS began operating, 
six weeks before the Kyoto Protocol itself went into force. This demonstrates that the EU ETS, though closely 
linked to and embedded in the Kyoto Protocol regime, is a stand-alone system. 
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that this planning phase actually included the first two phases of the EU 
ETS right from the start; all concepts were developed with a view to 2012, the year that the Kyoto Protocol 
expires – and actually beyond. The adjustments made between the specific phases were, as will be explained 
below, rather small and incremental, and did not change the overall principles of the system. 
Basically, the EU ETS was of a cap and trade design. The objects traded were not the emissions 
themselves, but permissions to emit one tonne of CO2 gas – the so called EU allowance (EUA). These 
allowances, as well as those generated by the Kyoto’s Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) mechanisms, are basically an accounting currency; each allowance has a specific numbering 
which makes it identifiable.  
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the actual subjects of the EU ETS were not the nation states. Instead, 
the system targeted the specific GHG emitting companies directly, and in the first two phases exclusively in terms 
of CO2. It was estimated that such a system would cover around 12,000 installations, responsible for more than 2 
billion tonnes of CO2 emissions what would equal approximately 46% of total EU CO2 emissions (Kruger, Oates, 
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and Pizer 2007, 115). Sectors included were coke, iron, and steel production, oil refineries, certain metal, mineral 
and cement industries, electricity generation as well as pulp and paper production (Dornau 2005: 420). Other 
sectors, like private households, transportation and aviation, or combustion facilities with less than 20 MW 
thermal power were not included. CO2 mitigation policies addressing these sectors needed to be implemented in 
parallel with the EU ETS. This meant that the EU ETS was not the only, but nevertheless one of the most 
important, EU instruments for CO2 mitigation7. 
Since the EU ETS design is closely related, though not dependent on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, it makes sense to start a multi-level analysis on the global level.  
 
THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
The total number of EUAs available within the EU – the so-called cap – was defined by the EU’s global 
commitment within the UNFCCC: the total CO2e emissions in tonnes that the EU reported to the UNFCCC and as 
of the Kyoto Protocol base year 1990, minus the amount necessary to realize the overall reduction of 8% EU 
CO2e emissions by 2012. It is worth keeping in mind that the Kyoto Protocol allows the EU and her MS to buy 
allowances stemming from CDM or JI activities, in case they fail to achieve adequate CO2 emission reductions 
within their territories.  
 
THE EU LEVEL 
To break the EU-wide amount of EUAs down in the shares each MS was allowed to issue, the following 
procedure was invented: 
Each MS agreed to submit a National Allocation Plan (NAP) to the EU Commission, reflecting its specific 
Kyoto Protocol target within the EU bubble as well as the strategies to realize it by 2012 (Kruger, Oates, and 
Pizer 2007, 115). The NAPs, operating with a timeline until 2012 as well, outlined the total amount of EUAs a MS 
planned to distribute annually and how these allowances were allocated to the specific single installations.  
The matter was further complicated by the EU enlargement in 2004. In 1997, when the EU MS agreed to 
share the burden within the EU bubble and the Kyoto Protocol was signed, the EU had 15 MS, all Annex I 
countries. They were the only members of the 8% EU-bubble agreement. As the EU ETS was being designed 
and implemented, the EU enlarged to 25 MS. Two of the new members, Malta and Cyprus, had no Kyoto 
Protocol reduction targets at all, while the eight other new MS, all former communist countries, as Economies in 
Transition (EIT), had specific reduction targets outside the EU bubble (EEA 2011, 18; UNFCCC 2008,13,117). 
They were all, however, included in the EU ETS and had to deliver NAPs in 20048. 
The EU Commission had the supervising role, ensuring an actual cap against the BAU projections of a 
given state. The Commission controlled whether the MS had planned a realistic strategy to meet its Kyoto 
Protocol targets and was supposed to ensure scarcity among the EUA supply, so that market dynamics could be 
initiated in first place. According to Convery et. al, “the Commission reduced 15 NAPs in the first allocation phase 
by 290 million ton(nes) annually and 23 NAPs in the second allocation phase by 242 million ton(nes) annually” 
(Convery et al. 2008, 10). 
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Furthermore, the EU Commission eliminated clauses from the NAPs that enabled the MS to increase the 
number of allowances, the so-called “ex-post adjustment”, in case of unpredicted increases in the total CO2 
emissions (Ellerman and Buchner 2007, 71) caused for example by economic growth or extreme weather, 
thereby ensuring an actual EU-wide reduction as well. A MS not able to stay within its total EUA budget could buy 
EUA from other MS or allowances stemming from CDM or JI activities to balance its account. Last but not least, 
the EU Commission set the standards for monitoring and reporting the GHG emissions within the EU and 
supervised the national EUA registries (see below) as well as the transactions within each and between the 
national registries.  
 
THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
The EUAs are actually created and issued by the MS. After the EU Commission approved their NAPs, they apply 
a two-step system to distribute their national EUA budgets. In the first step, the “macro plan,” the MS decided 
what EUA amount of the national total was distributed to the sectors included in the EU ETS, and therefore were 
actually tradeable within the EU ETS, and which share went to the excluded sectors excluded (German Federal 
Ministry for the Environment and Safety 2004, 12).  
The second step – the “micro plan” – within a NAP outlined how the EUA of the tradeable sectors were 
distributed to the actual actors in the ETS – the specific companies. The NAPs outlined the basic ways how the 
individual EUA amounts were fixed (e.g. according to “historical emission data”), how they were distributed (e.g. 
per auction or free of charge) and how new market entrants or closures were dealt with (for an example see: 
(German Federal Ministry for the Environment and Safety 2004, 21–46)). 
To provide the infrastructure for the actual trading, the MS had to establish competent authorities to 
administer and verify the CO2 emitters’ reports (see below), to operate the national EUA registry and report to the 
supervising EU Commission (Dornau 2005: 421). The MS could utilize the experiences gained and institutions 
established in the course of their CO2 emission reporting duties first within the UNFCCC and later under the 
Kyoto Protocol9. The challenge, however, was that the systems developed within the UN framework were 
basically reporting from a national perspective using aggregated numbers, while the EU ETS addressed 
thousands of individual CO2 emitting installations. That meant that much more and more precise data had to be 
collected and processed.  
Another part of the infrastructure was the establishment of trading places and spot markets where the 
companies involved could trade EUAs. 
 
THE COMPANY LEVEL 
Each installation that was subject to the EU ETS and thus allocated with a specific amount of EUAs, had an 
account with the competent authority, which, similar to a bank account, registered holdings and movement of the 
allowances. Each installation received a specific total amount for each phase, meaning that the overall amount of 
allowances was fixed for three and then five years, respectively. The operators of the EU ETS installations 
actually received their EUAs in so-called annual compliance cycles. 
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On February 28 each year, EU operators got their annual share of allowances transferred to their 
accounts. In terms of trading, this is important since EUA trading contracts, including many derivates like futures 
or options, are bound to EUAs from a specific year (see figure 1 below). Each operator had until March 1 to 
deliver a report on his annual emissions. The reports were verified by the competent authority, and by April 30 the 
operator had to surrender allowances equalling the exact amount of his verified CO2 emissions.  
If the operator emitted more CO2 than allowances were credited to him in first place, he had to borrow or 
buy additional ones. Borrowing meant that a surplus of CO2 emissions in one cycle could be balanced by 
borrowing against next cycle’s allocation of EUAs. At the end of a phase, however, the operator’s account had to 
be balanced and adequate numbers of EUAs had to be surrendered. Instead of borrowing against their own 
futures, operators could buy missing allowances from other EU ETS actors, or, after directive 2004/101/EC, 
purchase allowances that were created outside the EU via the Kyoto Protocol’s JI or CDM programmes. An 
operator who failed to deliver enough allowances at the end of a cycle or phase was subject to substantial 
penalties: a fine of 40 Euros per missing allowance until 2007 and 100 Euros for phase 2 (Dornau 2005: 423). 
The missing allowances, however, had to be surrendered in the next compliance cycle; therefore, the penalties 
imposed no price maximum on the allowances.  
If less CO2 had been emitted than allowances granted, the surplus EUAs could be sold or banked. Thus, 
if a company produced less CO2 in the first cycle, they could sell the extra credits or keep the overflow in their 
account to use in the next compliance cycle. EUA transfer from one phase to next, however, was not possible. On 
June 30, the surrendered allowances were deleted10 and the compliance cycle was completed.  
In the following sections, we explore the actual implementation of the EU ETS.  
 
3.3 PHASE 1: 2005-2007 
As mentioned, one of the biggest challenges was in the distribution of allowances, since company-based GHG 
emission data was not available11. That the 20 MW-threshold is relatively low; meaning thousands of rather small 
installations had to be included, contributed to the problem (Ellerman and Buchner 2007, 69). Therefore, in the 
first phase the competent authorities did not yet have the means to actually control and verify most of the data or 
follow up with operators that did not report (correctly). Overall, however, companies were “cooperative” and only a 
few cases of incorrect information were reported (Ellerman and Buchner 2007, 70). In any event, most MS 
governments did not really try to implement a significant cap on their industries and were rather generous with 
their estimations of their national quota of EUAs (see below).  
Once the system started on 1 January 2005, market dynamics did indeed develop, with the future12 price 
for 1 EUA rising to over 30 Euros in May 2006 (see the dark blue line called ‘EUA 2007’ in figure 1 below). 
However, in the middle of the first phase rumours spread about an EUA over-allocation and companies stopped 
hedging their EUAs, since they were not transferable to the next phase anyway (World Bank 2007, 12).  
During the first half of 2006 it became clear that there was a serious oversupply in the market. The spot 
price of EUA 2007 lost around 2/3 of its value in May 2006, eventually crashing to below 1 Euro in mid-2007 and 
never recovering. According to Carbon Trade Watch, there was “an overall surplus of 267 MtCO2e (Megatonnes 
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Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, the internationally recognised measure of greenhouse gas emissions), or about 4 per 
cent of the total emissions covered by the scheme. In other words, the ‘cap’ did not cap anything” (Carbon Trade 
Watch 2011, 2). The oversupply of EUAs had another implication: the amount of CDM or JI projects generated by 
EU demand was much lower than estimated, and therefore the EU ETS did not deliver the expected positive 
impact in the area of global development cooperation (World Bank 2007, 12).  
Even though the EUA 2007 price did not at all develop as intended, the futures based on phase 2 EUAs 
fared better, as the light green line (EUA 2008) and the orange line (EUA 2009) in Figure 1 indicate. The value of 
the EUA 2008 futures, being based on a phase 2 EUAs, even increased in value at the end of phase 1 (see figure 
1). That means that even though the market partially broke down, trading based on other EUAs continued and 
maintained a certain value. At the end of the phase, the EU ETS was globally by far the biggest ETS, especially 
in terms of volume, value, and transactions. According to the World Bank, in 2007, the EU ETS represented a 
market volume of 2,060 Mt CO2e of a global carbon trading system total of 2,108 Mt CO2e, and its value was 
49,065 million US-$ out of a global total of 49,361 million US-$ (World Bank 2007, 5), with strong expectations of 
further growth. 
 
Figure 1: Development of EUA future prices 2005-2011 
 
Source: own graph based on data from http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/eua-future-prices-
200520132011, 30 August 2012. 
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3.4 PHASE 2: 2008-2012 
Even though the EU ETS failed to create any market dynamics that led to actual emissions reductions in the 
phase 1, the programme was extended. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and were integrated into 
the EU ETS as well, bringing the total number of MS to 27.  Additionally, the three countries of the European 
Economic Area, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, also UNFCCC Annex I countries, decided to join the EU’s 
ETS, bringing the number of participating states up to 30. Furthermore, from 1, January 2012 on, aviation was 
integrated.  
Due to the failure to create a functional market in phase 1, the EU, mainly driven by the EU Commission, 
implemented several changes. First of all, the total amount of EUAs was reduced beyond the 2005 NAP’s plans. 
As was stated in the NAP II published in November 2006, the amount of EUAs in phase 2 allocated in the EU 15 
was reduced by 13.6% compared to the number allocated in phase 1. The decrease of phase 2 EUAs compared 
to the actual CO2 emissions of phase 1, by way the more important number, was -8.7% for the EU 15 (Ellerman 
and Joskow 2008, 33); the system was now actually set to decrease EU CO2 emissions. Additionally, the number 
of EUAs allocated for free decreased, even if only by a small amount. While in phase 1 almost all of the EUAs 
had been allocated for free, in 2010, 1,988 million were freely allocated and 92 million were auctioned or sold 
(EEA 2011, 45). These measures were supposed to ensure the functioning of the carbon market, which 
nevertheless remained highly volatile, as can be seen in Figure1. 
In contrast to phase 1, trade in CDM and JI allowances took off. In particular, the amount of CDM 
allowances grew continuously from 2008 to 2011, by which time the Kyoto allowances represented 19% of all EU 
ETS transactions (World Bank 2012, 18). However, even though the total number of EUAs was reduced in phase 
2, the EU ETS has again had to struggle with an oversupply problem. Many reports indicate that the impact of the 
2008 global financial crisis and its offshoot, the so called Eurocrisis since 2010, have destabilized the price 
mechanism once again. Decreasing EUA prices in late 2008 and early 2009 have been explained due to liquidity 
problems of companies who wanted to cash in their EUAs (World Bank 2009, 6). Moreover, the economic 
downturn and mild winters lead to a decrease in energy production and consumption, and therefore to a ‘natural’ 
decrease in CO2 emissions that might render the cap dysfunctional once more. As of August 2012, the EU ETS is 
not in safe water yet.  
 
3.5 PHASE 3: 2013-2020 
Even though phase 3 has not yet begun when this paper was written, some interesting facts are already 
discernible. First of all, this phase will be longer, lasting until 2020. Gases other than CO2 that contribute to the 
greenhouse effect will also be included (EEA 2011, 19), making the EU ETS more compatible with the Kyoto 
Protocol regime. And more sectors will be integrated, as was the case with the addition of aviation in 2012. The 
NAP arrangement will be replaced by a system in which the allocation of EUAs is centrally determined and 
organized by the EU, the MS will not be able to independently decide their EUA quotas. In other words, the 30 
national caps within the EU ETS will be replaced by one EU-wide cap (EU Com 2009, 17). In connection with that 
is a fixed reduction rate introduced, that will linearly decrease the number of available allowances by 1.74% 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  205 
annually (actually applied since 2011) until at least 2020, therefore leading to a total emission reduction of 21% 
compared to 2005 (EU Com 2009, 17). Furthermore, the free allocation of EUAs will be reduced continuously in 
favour of auctioning.  
Another change is that the EU Commission introduced a registry at the EU level, which has been used 
since January 2012 to manage aviation-related affairs. The EUAs in that system were issued by the EU and 
therefore named differently – EUAA, with the additional ‘A’ standing for aviation. In June 2012, all national 
registries were directly connected to the EU system, and all account details were fed in, creating a “unified and 
centralised Union registry” (UBA 2012, 5). Whether these changes achieve their intended aims and better 
prepare the EU ETS against external shock will be the subject of future studies. We now turn to the Korean TMS. 
 
4. SOUTH KOREA’S TARGET MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
Korea ratified the Kyoto Protocol but, as a non-Annex I country, does not have any specific GHG reduction 
obligations. However, it was one of the first non-Annex I countries to announce a quantitative GHG reduction goal 
and decided in November 2009 to reduce national GHG emissions by 30% by 2020, compared to a BAU scenario 
trajectory. That would correspond to a 4% reduction from 2005 (UNEP 2010, 20). One of the main instruments 
the Korean government created to this end is a specific regulatory setting to reduce GHG emissions as well as 
control and manage energy consumption, called the Greenhouse Gas and Energy Target Management System 
(TMS). Although an ETS was discussed to be a superior policy tool to achieve GHG mitigation, until recently it 
found no majority in Korea. One reason was that a TMS had already been established, as will be explained 
below.  
 
4.1 THE BARGAINING PHASE – TMS VS. ETS  
When the Korean TMS was initiated in 1998, its target was to reduce energy consumption within Korean 
industries. The Korean economy is heavily dependent on foreign fossil and nuclear fuel imports, comprising more 
than 97% of the total primary energy use. During the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1998, reducing the trade 
deficit and enhancing energy security ranked high on the agenda for policymakers. The Korean government 
introduced the TMS as a voluntary scheme, providing financial and technological support to those firms that 
pledged themselves to energy reduction goals. The system was maintained until 2008, at which time it was 
transformed to integrate GHG emissions reductions as well. 
One major reason to include GHGs in the system was a decision made by President Lee Myung-bak to 
set a specific GHG reduction goal for Korea, which should be seen in the context of his “National Green Growth 
Strategy”. The President wanted to establish Korea as a global leader in climate protection policy; as such, 
government and administration policymakers had to reflect the President’s commitment to green growth.13 The 
TMS appeared to be an effective and efficient policy tool to integrate the government’s new drive for emission 
reductions with the previous energy saving goal14. 
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Furthermore, Korea’s energy policy needed to be better integrated into a global system, particularly into 
a global ETS as implied in the Kyoto Protocol. Korea had already recognized the financial benefits of the 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms and emerging renewable energy markets, and had actively taken part in CDM 
projects. With the prospect of a global ETS as an important market regime, the Lee Myung-bak administration 
wanted to prepare for future participation not just as a target country for CDM projects, but as a fully integrated 
ETS member. The previous energy-focused TMS could not reflect such intentions without major modifications. 
Accordingly, the “Basic Law on Low Carbon, Green Growth” was passed by the National Assembly in December 
2009 and the enforcement ordinance of the law, set forth in April 2010, integrated a GHG reduction target into the 
pre-existing TMS15.  
The Korean government discussed introducing an ETS to regulate GHG emissions, entirely replacing 
the TMS. However, strong resistance from Korean business groups resulted in the policy of tightening the TMS 
and including a GHG target.16 Many CEOs expressed their concerns that the Korean economy was yet not 
prepared for the full operation of an ETS and that premature implementation of the system would negatively affect 
economic growth nationwide. The Ministry for Knowledge and Economy (MKE) also objected to an early adoption 
of the ETS in Korea, for the same reasons. Furthermore, the Energy TMS was already more than a decade old, 
and business groups felt more comfortable with modifications to the existing programme than introducing an ETS. 
Under the TMS, they could negotiate directly with government officials to determine their reduction targets, which 
would be based on the BAU scenario in the first phase. It also became clear that, besides publicizing the 
company name in the event of failure to achieve a target commitment, the new GHG TMS would set very low 
penalties: upon the first failure, the government would only give a warning. If a specific installation failed to follow 
the government’s commands, the latter would impose a three million won (approximately 2200 Euros) penalty. 
Further non-compliance would result in a penalty of six million won. From the third failure on, installations would 
pay ten million won. Overall, these were rather undemanding financial burdens for companies of the size the TMS 
addressed. 
Another point in favour of retaining the TMS was that the Korean government had not secured 
appropriate GHG inventories for companies and installations in the past, and consequently did not know to what 
extent the companies could reduce emissions. A modified TMS frame could serve as an instrument to gather 
such information, while also sending a clear signal to business groups about the government’s long-term 
commitment to reducing GHG emissions.  
Last but not least, Korea had to keep in mind its negotiating position in the global climate change regime. 
In that context, although Korea continued to present itself as a developing country, it was nevertheless pressured 
into substantive mitigation action by other major economies. The TMS was supposed to ease international 
pressure by displaying that ‘Korea is doing its best as a developing country’. To rapidly install an ETS, however, 
might have sent a signal that Korea, actually, was better placed among the Annex I than the non-Annex I 
countries, and the Lee Myung-bak administration wanted to avoid that. But at the same time, it wanted to gain 
benefits by participating in the global movement towards renewable and sustainable energy markets and green 
growth.  
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Figure 2: Phases of the Korean GHG mitigation regulation 
 
Source: own graph 
 
For these reasons, the Korean Government decided against the direct introduction of an ETS and to decided to 
first reform the established Energy TMS in 2009 (see figure 2 below), followed by the inclusion of GHG 
management from 2010. However in 2012, two years after the initiation of the GHG and Energy TMS phase, the 
Korean Parliament decided that the TMS would be replaced by an ETS by 201517. The following sections 
describe these developments in detail. 
 
4.2 PHASE 0/1: THE ENERGY TMS 1998–2008 
The TMS is a managerial approach following a clear top-down strategy in which the government is at once 
initiator, planner, manager, and supervisor. As mentioned , the Korean government first introduced the system in 
1998 in the middle of the Asian financial and economic crisis. The government decided to accept the assistance 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by acquiescing to harsh structural economic reform conditions, which in 
turn caused significant job loss and social turmoil. Therefore, the initial TMS was not to pressure and enforce 
companies to follow the government’s energy guideline, but more to encourage voluntary participation and 
compliance for mutual benefit. 
As of 2008, 1,355 installations had participated in the voluntary scheme, and about 0.7 trillion won had 
been invested in saving energy and improving energy efficiency. However, Korean companies had not shown 
much interest in this voluntary programme to initiate energy consumption reductions; the overall result was rather 
unimpressive. Most companies did not even have a special division to take charge of energy issues, which 
reflects the low priority given to the matter. Furthermore, there were significant institutional weaknesses: there 
was no governmental mechanism to evaluate and verify whether the companies had achieved the agreed-upon 
targets, and consequentially no penalty system. Therefore, by April 2009, the Korean government had decided to 
strengthen and advance the Energy TMS (Im et al. 2010, 161).  
 
4.3 PHASE 2: THE STRENGTHENED ENERGY TMS 2009 
The strengthened Energy TMS was very short-lived, less than one year. It was first devised when economy-
related ministers gathered in April 2009 and discussed how to overcome the global financial crisis that had begun 
with US mortgage defaults in 2008. The general plan to strengthen the TMS differentiated between three 
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implementation periods: an introduction (3 years) starting in 2010, followed by an expansion (5 years) and a 
stabilization period (5 years). The year of 2009 was set as an interim or experimental period for the system, 
before the ‘real’ implementation phase started. However, the regulatory setting established in this year was 
included in the GHG Energy TMS in 2010. Therefore, the strengthened Energy TMS set the policy infrastructure 
and institutional frame for future developments. 
During the interim year of 2009, companies had to choose between two methods of setting their targets: 
the absolute energy amount or the intensity-based method. There had been a serious debate regarding both 
methods, since they have a crucial impact on the function of the whole system and the actual reductions of a 
specific installation. The absolute energy amount method puts a cap on the energy consumption of an installation 
based on its average energy consumption over the past three years.18 It is very simple and easy to apply to all 
facilities. However, some operators, particularly in the power generation business, such as electricity or heat 
production companies, opposed this method because their production activities, and correspondingly their energy 
usage, depend heavily upon actual demand. Fixed energy caps based on previous consumption could be 
inappropriate to meet high future demand in the case of an economic boom. The operators argued that such a 
cap on the energy supply could choke economic activities as a whole.  
Instead, power plants argued that they should be allowed to apply the intensity-based method. This 
method counted energy based on the actual consumption in a given year. If energy demand increases, for 
example due to an economic boom, the energy target of a specific installation would become flexible. The amount 
of the increase can be established in two ways. Either growth in the national GDP is taken into account, which 
means all producers will generally have the same raise in allowable emissions, or actual energy input data is 
used, which allows installation-specific adjustments. As a compromise, the government planned to set the 
absolute energy amount method as a primary standard, but to allow specific types of installations, such as 
electricity and heat producing facilities, to apply the intensity-based method.  
During the interim year, the government allowed companies to submit their targets in a voluntary 
manner, and usually applied a 1~3% reduction compared to the average energy consumption over the past three 
years. The government planned to gradually tighten the targets later in order to align them with the nation’s mid- 
and long-term reduction goals. Also, the first time in the TMS’ history, the government tried to introduce on-site 
evaluation processes of companies’ implementation status and achievements. 
The MKE, in charge for the TMS, invited CEOs from 38 companies with 47 installations to discuss 
agreements on how to achieve the reductions. The operators had to agree on targets for their installations that 
followed the government’s guidelines and report on their management situations. To support application of the 
correct procedures, the government hired energy experts who visited each installation and verified the amount of 
energy consumption on site. Based on the data from these experts, the government and operators negotiated at 
least three times to set targets and finally agreed to a total reduction of 1,320,000 TOE in 2010, the first year of 
the introduction period (Im et. al. 2010, 165).  
In sum, in this one year experimentation phase, the voluntary and rather ineffective Energy TMS 
(1998~2008) was renovated to become the strengthened Energy TMS (during 2009). The government’s target 
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was, however, still focused solely on energy usage without specific concerns for GHG emissions. Yet, this first 
period established valuable infrastructure, systematic procedures, institutional settings, and a database on energy 
consumption at the company level, all highly useful for further development of the TMS. 
 
4.4 PHASE 3: ENERGY AND GHG TMS 2010-2014 
After 2009, the energy-only TMS of the previous years was transformed into a broad TMS covering both GHG 
emissions and energy consumption. As such, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) started to play a leadership role, 
competing with the MKE, who had been in charge of the original system. In line with the Korean business groups, 
the MKE did not want to proceed rapidly with GHG emissions regulation. However, due to pressure from the 
administration’s leadership, GHG reduction goals were added to the original scheme to some degree, and the 
MoE became a strong competitor of the MKE.  
In consequence, responsibilities for this phase were split. The manufacturing industries and electricity 
utilities came were overseen by the MKE, while the MoE was given the right to supervise activities in the waste 
sector. Construction and transportation were directed by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, and 
the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries was in charge of agriculture and livestock. Each 
governmental body was responsible for the selection of the relevant installations as well as building and 
managing the GHG inventories in their areas. They also lead the consultations that resulted in the setting of the 
reduction targets of each installation and yearly progress evaluations.  
The MoE was furthermore given the general responsibility for the system, particularly with a right to 
meta-evaluate other ministries’ management activities and appoint the evaluating companies to inspect and verify 
the managed installations’ achievements. The MKE, however, still possessed direct power and resources to 
control the manufacturing industries and electricity producers, which account for more than 60% of Korea’s total 
emissions. In consequence, bureaucratic struggles between the two ministries occurred and a higher authority 
was necessary to secure the collaboration and coordination of the various administrative branches. Therefore, the 
just in 2009 established Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) was given the authority to control the 
ministries. This new institution reported directly to the President and was co-chaired by the prime minister 
together with a civil expert appointed directly by the President19. The PCGG decided the overall reduction amount 
and allocated shares to each sector. It played a decisive role in securing the integration of GHG reduction goals 
throughout the Korean ministerial systems and to in ensuring coordinated decisions.  
Like the TMS in the past, the new GHG TMS applied the absolute energy amount method as the basic 
standard to evaluate an installation’s energy consumption. And as before, specific installations, especially from 
the electricity and heat producing sector with the potential to interfere with national growth, were allowed to use 
the intensity-based method. 
At the beginning of the introduction period in 2010, the reformed GHG TMS would include installations 
using more than 500,000 tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) a year. It would gradually expand to cover those 
consuming more than 50,000 and then 20,000 TOE as well. From June to August 2010, the Korean government 
collected and verified data on the average energy consumption and GHG emissions from the previous three 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 210 
years (2007-2009) for companies and installations that were, based on the information gathered in the 
experimental period of 2009, potential candidates for the TMS. In September 2010, the government first selected 
470 installations, but after receiving appeals the government ultimately decided on 458 installations. According to 
the planned three-year cycle, the appointed entities had to set their targets through negotiations with the 
government in 2011 and begin to implement them in 2012. When setting a target, the government took the 
particular individual situation of each business into consideration: past GHG emissions, energy consumption 
trends, current technological level, the degree of international competition in the sector20, etc.  
In 2011, the number of installations covered by TMS was extended. Based on the same standards as in 
2010, the government picked 483 entities whose total emissions amount was around 60% of the Korean total. For 
companies, the threshold for inclusion in the system was emitting a total of 125,000 tonnes CO2 or consuming 
500 Terajoules (TJ) of energy, while for single installations the threshold was 25,000 tonnes CO2 or 100 TJ21. In 
2012, around 540 to 570 entities are likely to be selected, and the thresholds will be tightened to 87,500 tonnes 
CO2 for companies and 20,000 tonnes CO2 for installations.22 
 
4.5 PHASE 4: ETS 2015-… 
According to the current plan, the Korean ETS will start in January 2015 and it will follow the EU’s path with a 
similar process of implementation. During the first phase (2015~2017) of the ETS, all of the allowances will be 
distributed for free. During the second phase (2018~2020) 3% will be auctioned, rising to more than 10% in the 
third phase (2021~2025).23  Once again, business groups strongly opposed the plan and requested that the 
government delay the allowance auctioning until 2020 at least. There were also renewed bureaucratic struggles 
between the MoE and the MKE for the leadership position in the new system; the MoE won and thus will be 
responsible for the ETS. How the Korean government actually implements the planned ETS will have to be the 
subject of future studies.  
 
5. COMPARISON 
 
The implementation of either an ETS or a TMS has to overcome several crucial problems. One of the most basic 
is the institutional resilience of the system as well as the resistance of specific actors against the introduction of 
such an innovation. More technical, but nevertheless critical, is the problem of how to integrate hundreds or 
thousands of operators of GHG emitting installations into a system that is actually able to successfully reduce 
CO2 output. Both the EU and Korea attempted to meet the challenge of these problems through regulations that 
must be explained in light of the different contexts in which the two systems operate.  
In the EU, environmental protection per se and as a public task appears to have been widely accepted 
when the decisions regarding an ETS were made. In particular, green parties had significant influence. In 
Germany, for example, a green party was in the coalition government at the time the ETS decision was made. A 
total rejection of climate protection policy, as demonstrated by the George W. Bush administration, was politically 
unacceptable for the great majority of EU citizens. To the European business representatives who resisted a 
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carbon tax during the early 1990s, the combination of environmental protection with a market-based approach 
made an ETS tolerable, if only as the lesser of two evils. The acceptance among the operators of the targeted 
installations was at least high enough to result in their cooperation during the implementation phase of the ETS 
through 2007. That they received the emission allowances for free and in unnecessary high numbers, obviously 
contributed to the comparatively smooth implementation. That the operation of the ETS would lead to further 
economic growth, new business opportunities, and more jobs, was also important, though secondary.  
If we apply the different regulatory modes introduced in section 2 to the EU case, the planning, 
implementation and running of the EU ETS clearly shows a multi-level pattern, with a certain amount of 
supervision and control competences at the supranational level, but with significant competences at the national 
levels as well. Even though the system was supposed to introduce a ‘carbon market’, one of the results of the 
competence sharing was, as described above, that the market mechanisms did not initially function well, due to 
the significant over-allocation of allowances. This rendered the system’s strong penalty regulations – possible due 
to the strong public demand for ambitious environmental targets – similarly useless. From a functional 
perspective, the system has failed thus far. It remains to be seen whether the centralisation of the system, as 
planned from 2013 on, can change this track record. However, the planned changes will not automatically solve 
the potential problem that economic volatility can also render the market mechanism dysfunctional.  
In Korea, environmental groups were much weaker and business interests much more influential than in 
the EU, comparatively. Without strong initial public support or opposition, President Lee Myung-bak took initiative, 
promoting his National Green Growth Strategy and pushing for a GHG reduction regime in 2009, which has 
turned out to be quite different from the EU ETS. Firstly, the government’s primary counterpart for communication 
and compromise was business groups, while the general public was generally excluded. Secondly, in the 
absence of strong public support for green policies, the potential in terms of economic growth, business 
opportunities, and job creation was emphasised much more strongly than in the EU.  In particular, official 
publications never fail to mention that the policies will assure future increases in Korean GDP and deliver new 
jobs24. Thirdly, reflecting the different mix of actors in support or opposition of a GHG reduction regulation, a 
competition within the national administration between different ministries occurred. That made it necessary to 
create a new body that outranked the others and secured the necessary administration-wide cooperation. 
Fourthly, instead of establishing a new regulatory framework, Korea remodelled the decade-old energy 
management system by adding GHG regulations. Without broad public recognition of the need for a strong 
climate protection regulation, the introduction of a completely new system against the opposition of business 
interests appears to have been politically impossible. By utilizing the familiar institutional structure of the TMS, the 
government minimized the cost of implementation and reduced resistance from the business community. That the 
strength of the penalty regulation in the new TMS remained disappointing further contributed to raise the 
acceptance of the system among its opponents.  
In reflection of the ‘developmental state mode’ however, as introduced in section 2, the Korean 
government clearly fails to exercise the influence defining the developmental state. The implementation of an 
ETS was blocked by the business interests, and the modified TMS was the compromise the Lee Myung-bak 
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administration had to accept. That later the decision was taken to implement an ETS in 2015 could be seen as a 
late victory. But given the strong role the Korean presidency exercises within the Korean system, it is not 
guaranteed that the next president, entering office in 2013, will actually follow through with such a system. 
Against this backdrop, the Korean system corresponds more closely to the governance mode as well due to the 
strong notion of direct negotiations between governmental and non-governmental actors. The system’s 
introduction of yearly ‘discussion circles’ comprising several negotiation rounds in which the government and the 
CEOs directly debate and agree on possible reduction targets is not the usual way decisions are made in Korea’s 
basically Confucianist-hierarchical culture. 
The effectiveness of the TMS in terms of actual reduction is, similar to the EU case, not yet empirically 
proven. The economic downturn following the global financial crisis reduced the energy consumption of Korean 
businesses, so the reduction goals based on the past do not currently impose heavy burdens on the participants; 
of course, a failure to meet the targets is not a burden either. Theoretically, however, a system like the TMS could 
react much faster to exogenous shocks than an ETS, as top-down target adjustment becomes easier the less 
market and the more hierarchy is given in a system25. 
The big difference between the EU and the Korean cases lies in the logic of the regulatory instruments 
that are supposed to achieve reductions: the EU utilizes market instruments, while Korea instead chose 
installation-specific reduction goals implemented in a top-down style. This has significant consequences, 
especially for any potential direct collaboration between the systems, as well as their cooperation at the global 
level, as will be further elaborated in the conclusions.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have identified two potential areas for cooperation between the EU and South Korea:   direct exchange and 
collaboration between the political and/or private actors of the two systems, as well as cooperation on the 
international and global, respectively, level. 
Concerning the area of prospective direct collaboration: 
a) Given Korea’s decision to implement an ETS in 2015, there are obviously many possibilities to learn from the 
EU case.  Because of different political and cultural backgrounds, it will not be feasible to transfer the EU 
system without modifications. However, the EU has developed valuable expertise, for example on ways to 
select installations, certify reduction achievements, and set up trading facilities. Furthermore provide the EU’s 
difficulties in beginning and maintaining actual market-based trading, especially the problems with allocations 
of allowances, securing the trading processes, and effectively reacting to exogenous shocks, useful lessons. 
The EU can supply experience on methods to integrate the Korean ETS into a global scheme as well, 
especially as concerning the allowances created by CDM projects. Furthermore, both systems can quite 
easily establish procedures that allow the trade of EUAs with Korean allowances, once the Korean ETS is 
solidly in place, and later with other ETS (see section g below).  
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b) Another possibility for direct collaboration would be to equip the Korean TMS with the function to create 
Korean allowances that are tradeable in the EU ETS, even before the implementation of a Korean ETS. Key 
pre-conditions would be the establishment of reliable monitoring and verification systems between the EU and 
Korea to ensure that allowances created under the Korean TMS actually stem from genuine CO2 reduction. 
The Korean TMS is already based on reductions against a BAU scenario, and the CDM works on basically the 
same method. As such, trade of Korean allowances within the EU ETS could essentially just follow the CDM 
procedures, but without the involvement of the UNFCCC oversight facilities.  
Furthermore, the EU could apply the Korean TMS as a regulatory model that can be transferred to other contexts: 
c) The EU could use the TMS model in its foreign relations, especially in the Enlargement Policy, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and Development Cooperation Policy. In the Enlargement Policy, the TMS 
could be used as a systematic tool to prepare the applicant state for the EU ETS. In the ENP and the 
Development Cooperation, the EU could integrate the TMS to its foreign policy instruments and help third 
countries in the neighbourhood and elsewhere mitigate CO2 emissions. Especially the ENP states could be 
potential sources for reduction units tradeable in the EU ETS as described in section b) above.  
d) The TMS could be used inside the EU as well. As a system that basically integrates actors from various social 
areas and provides them with a framework for negotiation and common target setting, it might be an 
interesting tool to foster CO2 mitigation activities among actors not included within the EU ETS in the first 
place. To use one concrete example, many EU cities are already active in CO2 mitigation (Niederhafner 
2012), the Covenant of Mayors26 is just one of the many networks founded to that end. The commitments 
possible within a TMS could enhance and foster their activities, and provide a reliable framework for mid- and 
long-term measures.  
There is also significant potential for cooperation at the global level. The EU’s leading role in climate protection 
was initially relatively unintended, developing by chance due to the conservative leadership in the USA. In 
contrast, the Korean intention to use its climate protection regulations to advance its interests and position in the 
global system is literally hardwired into its emissions and energy policies. One of the ten core policy tasks within 
the National Green Growth Strategy is to become a global leader and role model in these policy areas27. The EU 
and Korea could develop a strategic approach to strengthen each other’s influence and support common goals 
within the global climate change negotiations. Specifically, they could support each other in the following areas: 
e) The EU could promote the Korean TMS as a best-practice model to be implemented by developing/emerging 
states with insufficient market systems and weak institutions that are economically unable and/or politically 
unwilling to implement an ETS, for example as a Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) best 
practice. It would strengthen the argument, obviously, if the EU herself were to use the TMS model as 
described in sections c) and d) above. The EU could provide the funding and Korea the know-how, which 
might open new room for negotiations between developing, emerging and developed nations within the 
UNFCCC framework. 
f) Once the trade of Korean TMS allowances in the EU ETS is possible, as described in section b) above, other 
non-annex I countries could be integrated into EU ETS trading as well if they follow the same principles, 
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beginning with establishing a TMS. This would allow, if the regulations are set accordingly, integration of the 
emerging economies into a global trade system without forcing them to implement a fully-fledged ETS. CDM 
activities could be limited to the least-developed countries, meaning that CDM investments eventually would 
be channelled into the poorest nations which are so far hardly hosting such projects. To balance the problem 
that the competition of such ‘TMS credits’ would decrease CDM investments even further, the latter could be 
endowed with a credit bonus if they actually meet the sustainability/poverty reduction criteria.   
g) Korea could support the EU in international negotiations towards agreements that provide a better foundation 
for a global ETS – within or outside the UN framework. If a post-Kyoto agreement and with it a top-down 
regulation of the global carbon market stays out of reach, the market will be established in a bottom-up style, 
by connecting the separated systems with each other. This is assuming that the EU ETS will result in a 
functioning CO2 market while actually capping GHG emissions in its next phase and that the ETS’ in Australia, 
New Zealand, Tokyo, and Switzerland, are also functioning well. Given that many Asia-Pacific nations like 
China, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as some North American subnational territories decided to 
implement ETS’ as well, the fundamental condition – having separate systems that could trade with each 
other in fist place - for the establishment of a global carbon market is basically set in a few years. To be 
among the first-movers to support such a system will benefit both the EU and South Korea, both in terms of 
shaping the necessary regulations in their interest as well as enhancing their global soft power. 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
BAU   Business As Usual  
CDM    Clean Development Mechanism  
CO2   Carbon Dioxide 
CO2e   Carbon Dioxide equivalent  
EEA   European Environment Agency  
ENP   European Neighbourhood Policy 
ETS   Emission Trading System  
EU   European Union 
EUA   EU Allowance 
EUAA   EU Aviation Allowance 
EU Commission European Commission 
EU Council  Council of the European Union 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
JI   Joint Implementation 
Korea    Republic of Korea 
Mt CO2e  Mega tonne (106) Carbon Dioxide Equivalent  
MKE                            Ministry of Knowledge and Economy, Republic of Korea 
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MoE                            Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
MS   Member States 
NAMA    Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
NAP    National Allocation Plan  
TJ   Terrajoule 
TMS   Target Management System  
TOE   Tonnes of Oil Equivalent 
Tonne   Metric Tonne 
GHG    Greenhouse Gas 
ROK   Republic of Korea 
UK   United Kingdom 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USA   United States of America 
US-$   US Dollar 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1This work was supported by the Research Settlement Fund for new faculty of SNU and the European Commission. We owe 
special thanks for valuable advice to Axel Marx, Chang Sang Cho, our interviewees, Sean Blakeley, and Ashley Hess. The 
reminding mistakes are solely the responsibilities of the authors. Comments are welcomed, please contact 
niederhafner@snu.ac.kr. 
2 All numbers from http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm, 17 Dec. 2012 and 
http://www.gir.go.kr/eng/og/hm/nc/a/OGHMNCA010.do, 12 Dec. 2012. 
3  The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), “International Energy Statistics,” 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=regions,&syid=2006&eyid=2010&unit=MMT
CD, accessed 28 Nov. 2012. 
4 Carbon Dioxide equivalent, the basic unit of the Kyoto Protocol reduction goals. In addition to CO2, the Kyoto Protocol 
addresses several other gases, like methane, which have specific global warming potentials. To simplify, emissions and 
reductions of these gases are transferred to their equivalents in tonnes of CO2 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/247.htm, 3 Sept. 2012. 
5Besides the rather than political and cultural reasons mentioned here, there are also numerous economic arguments as to 
why a market mechanism is better suited to achieve global CO2 emissions reductions than traditional regulatory approaches. 
For a discussion of these arguments, see e.g. Hepburn 2007; Grover 2008; Helm and Hepburn 2009; Mathys and Melo 
2011; Stavins and Aldy 2011. 
6 see e.g. Convery 2008 
7 An overview on EU climate policy is given by http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/oversight/index_en.htm, 30 Aug. 2012. 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/2005/index_en.htm, 30 Aug. 2012. 
9 The deadline to implement the latter was 1 January 2007, meaning that the ETS accounting infrastructure actually had to 
be in place years earlier (UNFCCC 2008, 47–54). 
10 http://www.dehst.de/DE/Emissionshandel/Termine/termine_node.html, 30 Aug. 2012 
11 Except for Denmark, since they implemented a company-level reporting system with their previous ETS.  
12 Due to limited data availability, we will refer in the following basically to the EUA future prices and to spot prices only where 
explicitly mentioned. Both prices developed very similarly and showed the same dynamics. 
13  For example, see the speech at the Korea’s Independence Day in 2008 
(http://www.president.go.kr/kr/president/speech/speech_view.php?uno=92&article_no=4&board_no=P04&search_key=&sear
ch_value=&search_cate_code=&order_key1=1&order_key2=1&cur_page_no=1&cur_year=2008&cur_month=08, 2 Nov. 
2008) or  his keynote speech at the Copenhagen UNFCCC 2009, 
http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/speeches/speeches_view.php?uno=2281&board_no=E03&search_key=1&search_
value=copenhagen&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=1, 20 Jan. 2010). 
14 Interview with a Director at the Ministry of Environment. Date: 25 May 2012. 
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15 Article 42.1 Basic Law on Low Carbon, Green Growth: “Mid- and Long-term targets should be set (…) and necessary 
implementation methods should be devised to achieve (…) 1. Greenhouse Gases Reduction Target 2. Energy Saving Target 
and Energy Efficiency Target”. 
16 Interview with a Director at the Presidential Committee on Green Growth. Date: 22 May 2012 
17 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-03/south-korean-parliament-approves-carbon-trading-system.html, 3 Aug. 2012. 
18 Companies can choose three out of the last four years to calculate their average usage. 
19 Presidential Committee on Green Growth, http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/english, 5 Sept. 2012. 
20 Information from a member of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth. 
21  Regarding the standard for managed entities in the following years, see 韥쁹ꙵ쀉쀂ꚩ붡뫭, 
http://www.gihoo.or.kr/portal/main/index.jsp, 3 Sept. 2012. 
22  끭ꩥꎙ넱, “꿝겙閵걙∙꾅骽덵 ꑞ븑隵ꍡ뇑 겑뼾넍 넍ꖭ”, April 27, 2012, 
http://www.iusm.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=245836, 4 Sept. 2012. 
23  鞭ꍥ鴥넱ꍡ, “ꗥ띑靁阥ꅍ뇑, 겑뼾ꇮ 鸅隕 볲볲,” August 22, 2012. 
http://www.greendaily.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=21004, 5 Sept. 2012. 
24 For a critical review of the Korean National Green Growth Strategy, see Kalinowski and Cho 2012. 
25 Another case in point is Japan’s energy efficiency programme (see Nordqvist 2006). 
26 http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html, 28 Nov. 2012. 
27 http://www.greengrowth.go.kr/english/en_information/en_news/en_trends/userBbs/bbsView.do, 31 Sept. 2011. 
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CAMPUS ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNIVERSITY COOPERATION IN ASIA AND EU: 
THE KOREAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
SANG-DUK CHOI 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the rise of the East Asian economy in the 21st century, regional cooperation between East Asian countries has 
become important agenda. The announcement of theTrilateral Cooperation VISION 2020at the 3rd Korea-China-
Japan Trilateral Summit in 2010 was suggested as a blueprint for future trilateral partnership in economic 
cooperation, environmental protection, and expansion of human and cultural exchange. 
The effort to bring the three major countries in East Asia together is an important move in securing the 
peace and prosperity of the region considering the recent bitter historical experiences. The Korean government, 
geographically located between the two powerful countries, acknowledges the critical role in producing any 
positive progress in the partnership. Hence, the Korean government believes in the importance of the expansion 
of personnel exchange in promoting friendly relations and mutual understanding. This is seen as a precondition 
for the enhancement of regional economic and social development. In this regard, the government made the 
initial effort to create CAMPUS Asia (Collective Action for Mobility Program of Universities Students). 
 
2. PRESENT SITUATION OF KOREAN HIGHER EDUCATION  
 
2.1 CURRENT ISSUES IN KOREAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
In many developed countries, the governments have stressed the wider economic role of higher education as a 
powerful source for national growth in the rise of a knowledge-based economy. In South Korea, the growth of 
higher education supported the national development by supplying educated elite. The growth of GDP, as seen in 
<Figure 1>, goes along with the steep increase of the progression rate from secondary to higher education (as 
seen in <Figure 2>). It is acknowledged that the rapid expansion of education in general and higher education in 
particular responded to the increasing demand for high skills successfully along with the industrial development. 
  
Figure 1. The growth of GDP between 1970 and 2011 
 
Source: http://www.kosis.kr 
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However, during the last two decades, the government made a particular effort to achieve a qualitative 
development in education. There have been a few changes within the Korean society, which raised attention to 
the improvement of the quality of higher education.  
Firstly, the arrival of a democratic government in 1993 turned the public attention to a better quality of 
social and educational systems. The Presidential Commission on Education reported Education Reform for the 
21st Century, stressing the idea of ‘globalization’ (Segyehwa) and the ‘information society’ as the main 
background for the proposal of an ‘open and lifelong education society’ in 1995 (PCER, 1997). By the 1995 
Education Reform, the government delegated power to individual higher education institutions in their admission 
and management. The government also promoted the diversification and specialization of higher education in 
order to improve the quality of teaching and research activities in universities. As a result, the deregulation of the 
university establishment and the improved autonomy of institutions’ management allowed the expansion of 
private institutions, supporting the growth of participation in higher education. 
Secondly, in the rise of a knowledge-based society, the Korean government emphasized the importance 
of research activities in universities. Many elite universities were asked to invest in research and development in 
order to increase the commercial use of R&D results. For example, the government supported the Brain Korea 
Project 21 (BK21) since 1999 in order to promote the research activities in universities and to improve the quality 
of research to meet the international standards. Especially in the last decade, Korean universities have 
benchmarked the world top universities and implemented a strategic policy to enhance the research activities.  
 
Figure 2. Progression rate from upper secondary to higher education 
 
Source: MOEHRD/KEDI(2011), Analysis of Educational Statistics 
 
Thirdly, there has been a change in the student population in recent years. The high growth of 
participation in higher education during the last two decades is remarkable. As seen in <Figure 2>, the 
progression rate from upper secondary to higher education dramatically increased from 33.2 per cent in 1990 to 
83.8 per cent in 2008. But, as can be seen in <Figure 3>, the falling school-age population due to the low fertility 
rate has lowered the freshman enrollment quota since 2002. While the total number of 18 year olds declined from 
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850,184 in 1999 to 644,962 in 2004, the freshman quota in higher education decreased from 642,188 in 2004 to 
552,633 in 2011. In 2020, it is estimated that the freshman quota of 2011 will exceed the total number of 18 year 
old. 
 
Figure 3. Changes in school-age population and freshman enrollment quota    
 
 
After the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8, the government acknowledged the rise of unemployment rate 
amongst university graduates. It was believed that the quantitative expansion of higher education in the previous 
decades led to a serious mismatch between the demand and the supply in the changing labor market. The 
increased job prospects of the graduates failed to meet the rapidly changing demand from industry.  
Therefore, the government sought ways to ensure both the quality of higher education and the quality of 
human capital. Then considering the increasingly competitive international market, the government promoted 
lifelong learning and cross-border higher education, to meet the needs of a knowledge-based economy and the 
age of globalization. Firstly, the government promoted life-long learning for adults. Although the progression rate 
from secondary to tertiary education is more than 70%, there is still a low rate of adult participation in Korea. For 
example, as of 2010, 27.3% of the adult population aged 25 years and above have not completed upper 
secondary education (KOSTAT, 2010). In particular, a high rate of the older population is low in skills and could 
benefit from upgrade training. In this regard, higher education is required to play an important role in promoting 
lifelong learning in order to enhance national competitiveness in the context of ‘globalization harnessed by 
information and communications technologies’. Secondly, the government promoted internationalization of higher 
education. Efforts were made to attract international students in particular as the government attempted to 
increase international cooperation in teaching and research.  
The government policy on internationalization of higher education will be discussed in detail in the next 
part.  
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2.2 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN KOREA 
Since the 1995 education reform, ‘globalization’ and ‘international competitiveness’ have been the driving forces 
behind the development of higher education policies. For example, the “Basic Plan for Opening Higher Education” 
in 1996 initiated several policies and legislation for the internationalization of higher education. Considering the 
imbalance between outbound and inbound students, the “Study Korea” plan was launched to attract foreign 
students in 2004. The announcement of the Vision for the Internationalization of Higher Education in 2007 
became the first comprehensive plan encompassing 11 related Ministries. It helped the government to develop 
several programs such as the Global Scholarship Program, ICI-ECP Program (Korea-EU exchange program). 
The Global Scholarship Program started to implement the “Global Korea Study” plan, integrating the Korean 
scholarship program into the “Study Korea” plan with some new programs in 2010. On the other hand, the ICI-
ECP Program benchmarked the US-EU student exchange program as the EU proposed to the Korean 
government to start a student exchange program for the development of economic and political relations between 
EU and Korea in 2007. The Program has been successful in increasing the number of projects and the Korean 
government is interested in expanding it.  
The trends in the flow of students have important implications for higher education in terms of cross-
border higher education. As shown in <Figure 4>, the number of Korean students studying abroad has increased 
rapidly since 1985. The “Study Korea” was successful and has recruited about 50,000 students from abroad by 
2010. However, despite the steady growth of the number of foreign students studying in Korea, the gap between 
the outbound and inbound is still large.  
 
Figure 4. Korean Students studying abroad and foreign students in Korea 
 
Source: MOEHRD/KEDI(2011), Analysis of Educational Statistics 
 
According to the destinations and the purposes of Korean students, shown in <Table 1>, most Korean 
students prefer to earn the doctoral degree abroad, particularly in the U.S., after completing their master’s degree 
in Korea. Another new trend is that many students want to study English abroad in English speaking countries 
such as Australia, Canada and the UK. Therefore, most Korean graduate schools find it harder to recruit excellent 
doctoral students than before. 
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Table 1. Korean Students Studying Abroad (2011) 
Region Total Degree Program Language School 
Asia 128,820 62,372 58,848 
Africa 744 412 332 
North America 89,169 75,825 13,344 
Latin America 266 82 184 
Europe 32,599 13,987 18,612 
Middle East 289 174 115 
Total 251,887 152,852 99,035 
Source: MOEHRD/KEDI(2011), Analysis of Educational Statistics 
 
Foreign students studying in Korea are described in <Table 2> by regions and types of programs. 
Recently, the government has been actively promoting internationalization of higher education, recognizing that it 
is a key challenge for Korean universities in the pursuit of international competitiveness. As a result, by 2011, 
there are 89,537 foreign students and 90% of them are from Asia.  
 
Table 2. Foreign Students Studying in Korea (2011) 
Region Total Undergraduate Graduate Language School Others 
Asia 80,766 42,783 16,774 16,366 4,843 
Africa 1,063 229 609 195 30 
Oceania 338 84 101 73 80 
North America 3,769 1,010 894 790 1,075 
Latin America 660 191 189 206 74 
Europe 2,941 344 445 794 1,358 
Total 89,537 44,641 19,012 18,424 7,460 
Source: MOEHRD/KEDI(2011), Analysis of Educational Statistics  
 
Thus the Korean government encourages universities to increase the competitive power in teaching and 
research, and to attract more international students.   
 
3. EMERGENCE OF CAMPUS ASIA PROGRAM 
 
With the growth of the East Asian economy as the biggest market of the world economy, creation of an East 
Asian Community based on mutual understanding and cooperation has emerged as a key issue. However, there 
are historical conflicts and mixed national sentiments toward one another. Therefore, it is necessary to build trust 
in fields less sensitive to national interest and requiring cooperation from eachother. In this regard, student 
exchange in university program has been recognized as a catalyst to promote mutual understanding and 
cooperation crossing the national border.  
Therefore, as shown in <Figure 5>, the growing mobility in the Asian region, especially between the 
three countries of Korea, China and Japan during the given years was encouraging. Considering the initial aims 
of the CAMPUS Asia Program, it is expected that the program can enhance the increasing mobility in the region 
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and therefore contribute to building peace and prosperity for the future of an East Asian Community by promoting 
student exchange and mutual understanding between Korea, Japan and China, and then by extending it to other 
Asian countries.   
 
Figure 5. Trends in international student flow of East Asian countries1997 vs 2007 
 
Source: Kazuo Kuroda et al.(2010), Cross-Border Higher Education for Regional Integration: Analysis of the 
JICA-RI Survey on Leading Universities in East Asia 
 
3.1 PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMPUS ASIA PROGRAM 
3.1.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE IDEA OF CAMPUS ASIA PROGRAM 
The Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) assumed a leading role in promoting 
university student exchange programs with Japan and China. As a part of the efforts, the MEST commissioned 
research on developing an Asian University Student Mobility Program to Korean Educational Developmental 
Institute (KEDI) ( Choi, D. et al., 2009). The research benchmarked the European Erasmus Program as a model 
to demonstrate the importance of university student exchange in the process of building an East Asian 
Community. This is because the Erasmus program has been so successful in promoting the university student 
exchange program, keeping academic standards comparable throughout the region as mandated in the Bologna 
Process intended to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The research highlighted the benefits of 
dual or joint degree programs in terms of internationalization and quality assurance of higher education in Korea 
and other partner countries, considering the increasing global job market in the East Asian region. The idea of 
“CAMPUS Asia” was influenced by the plan to create a European Higher Education Area given the fact that it 
would like to indicate the emerging Asian Higher Education Area (Choi, D. et al., 2009). In addition, the research 
proposed a framework of CAMPUS Asia and method to implement the program based on the experience of the 
Erasmus and Erasmus Mundus program. 
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Based on this research, the name of “CAMPUS-Asia Program” first appeared in March 2009 in a MEST 
document presented at the Presidential Commission on the National Brand. Soon after, the research paper titled 
“A study on CAMPUS Asia as an Asian University Student Exchange Program” was published in 2009. Therefore, 
it can be said that the CAMPUS Asia is modeled after the European Erasmus and Erasmus Mundus program. 
However, compared to the Erasmus program, CAMPUS Asia program has two distinguished 
characteristics. Firstly, from the outset, it has emphasized the creation of dual or joint degree programs at the 
graduate level focusing on regional cooperation. A dual or joint degree program might be most comprehensive 
and demanding given the fact that the program can’t be successful without trust-building between universities 
among Korea, China and Japan. It is the reason why this government initiative is required even though there 
have already been many student exchange programs at the university level among these three countries. By 
2007, respectively 12 and 2 Korean universities had dual degree programs with Chinese universities and 
Japanese universities . However, there are no trilateral exchange programs between universities from these three 
countries. In this regard, the Korea-China-Japan CAMPUS Asia program seems to contribute to removing 
systemic obstacles to earning dual or joint degrees by credit transfer among these three countries. Secondly, the 
CAMPUS Asia program is mainly focusing on trilateral exchange and cooperation. Therefore, it can be 
distinguished from other student exchange programs focusing on bilateral exchange. It is based on a consortium 
composed of the universities from the three countries. For example, one typical way of managing an MA study 
could be that a Korean student can start the first semester in Korea, and study the second and third semesters in 
China and Japan respectively and finally complete the MA degree program at home, in Korea. 
   
3.1.2 PROGRESS IN BUILDING CONSENSUS AND FRAMEWORK FOR CAMPUS ASIA 
Japan has played an important role in promoting student exchange and cooperation between the three countries. 
In August 2009, a director-general of the division of higher education, Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) visited Korean MEST to discuss student exchange and cooperation 
between Korean and Japan universities. More importantly, Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama proposed to 
establish an Expert Committee in order to conduct student exchange of high quality at the 2nd China-Japan-Korea 
Trilateral Summit Meeting held in Beijing in October 2009. China has also played a role in the process of building 
consensus and implementing the CAMPUS Asia. The leaders of these three countries adopted a joint statement 
stressing that they will conduct exchange programs among all sectors of the three countries, particularly youth 
and university student exchanges. 
Based on the proposal of the 2nd Summit Meeting, the “China-Japan-Korea Committee for Promoting 
Exchange and Cooperation among Universities” was composed of eighteen experts from three countries, and 
held the first meeting in Japan in April 2010. At the first Committee meeting, the title of the exchange program 
was decided as “CAMPUS Asia” (Collective Action for Mobility Program of University Students), a name proposed 
by the Korean delegation. Two Working Groups were also organized under the Committee in order to implement 
the CAMPUS Asia program. One was responsible for the University Exchange Program, and the other for Quality 
Assurance. The Japanese delegations emphasized the Quality Assurance and have played a major role in 
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developing “Guidelines for exchange and cooperation among universities in Korea, China and Japan with quality 
assurance”. It was at the 3rd trilateral Summit Meeting held in Jeju Korea in May 2010 that the leaders of the three 
countries adopted the “Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020”, and agreed to implement CAMPUS Asia as soon as 
possible, considering its extension to ASEAN countries. They also agreed to establish a Secretariat for the 
efficient promotion and management of trilateral exchange and cooperation in Korea. The Secretariat could 
provide an institutional platform to implement CAMPUS Asia. After the 3rd Summit, two Working Group meetings 
were followed to discuss the implementation of CAMPUS Asia and guidelines for Quality Assurance in Tokyo in 
August and in Beijing in December 2010.  
At the 3rd Committee held in Jeju, in May 2011, Korea agreed to a set of principles for the 
implementation of the pilot program. These principles, confirmed at the 3rd Committee, will be explained in the 
next part. The Committee approved the “Guidelines for exchange and cooperation among universities in Korea, 
China and Japan with Quality Assurance”. The main purpose of the guidelines is “to establish an effective 
operational mechanism for university exchange and quality assurance, to protect students and other stakeholders 
as well as to urge relevant stakeholders to fulfill the responsibilities and promote collaboration, thereby 
contributing to comprehensive educational cooperation and a good-neighborly partnership of mutual trust oriented 
among people in these three countries”. The guidelines stress the role of stakeholders such as governments, 
universities, quality assurance agencies and industry in implementing quality assurance.  
 
3.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM OF CAMPUS ASIA 
In this part, the principles of the pilot program of CAMPUS Asia are explained in detail. At the pilot stage, the 
principles for the implementation of the pilot program are shown in <Figure 6>.   
 
Figure 6. Principles for the implementation of the pilot program 
Exchange 
Subjects 
Undergraduates and Graduates of China, Japan, Korea Universities 
Participating 
unit 
A consortium by the universities of the 3 countries; application will be made at the 
level of departments or colleges, submitted through the participating universities; 
one university may participate in several consortia or multiple universities from one 
country may participate in one consortium 
Style and field 
of exchange 
project 
To be decided by each consortium autonomously 
Period of 
projects 
One year as the main form; no less than three months during the pilot stage 
(recommended) 
Number of 
participating 
students 
Each country will support 100 students per year (for one year exchange basis) to 
and from the other two countries on a basis of reciprocity 
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Duration of pilot 
program 
3-5 years 
Number of 
consortium 
About 10 
Selection 
process 
1st stage: Each country’s autonomous evaluation 
2nd stage: Joint trilateral evaluation 
Language To be decided by each consortium autonomously 
Support to 
university 
To be decided by each government autonomously 
Support to 
students 
Students pay tuition to their universities, tuition fee will be mutually exempted; 
support for Airfare will be decided autonomously by the home country, while all 
other costs (e.g., housing) will be covered by the host countries 
 
Based on the principles, a joint call for a pilot program application was announced, 58 consortia applied 
for it. The selection went through a two stage evaluation process. At first stage, each country selected 28 
consortia out of the total number of applicants. At second stage, 10 consortia were selected by a joint trilateral 
evaluation in 2011.       
The Pilot program was launched over the next 5 years (2011-2015). The list of 10 consortia is seen in <Figure 7>.   
 
Figure 7. The list of 10 consortia for the CAMPUS Asia Pilot program 
Korea China Japan Project Theme 
Korea U Fudan U Kobe U Risk Management on East Asia 
PNU SJTU Kyushu U Energy & Environmental S & T 
SNU Peking U Tokyo U International & Public Policy Studies 
SNU Peking U Hitotsubachi Asia Business Leaders Program 
KDI Tsinghua NGIPS Policy Studies 
KAIST Tsinghua TIT Science & Technology 
Dongseo U Guangdong Ritsumeikan East Asian Humanities 
SKK U Jilin U Okayama U Achievement of Common Good & 
Reevaluation of Classical Culture in EA 
SKK U 
SNU 
Renmin U 
Tsinghua 
SJTU 
Nagoya U Law and Political Science 
POSTECH 
SNU 
Nanjing U 
SJTU 
Nagoya U 
Tohoku U 
Chemistry and Materials 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 230 
As seen in <Figure 7>, these consortia are composed of universities from the three countries based on 
the principles. Universities can apply for more than one consortium. When more than one university in a same 
country applies for the same consortium, only one of them can submit the application.    
 
4. ANALYSIS OF KOREAN SURVEY RESULTS 
 
    In the previous chapter, the Korean experience in the creation of the CAMPUS Asia Program was described. As 
the Korean government recognizes the importance of the regional cooperation along with the growth of the Asian 
economy in an increasingly competitive international market, a survey was carried out to identify the challenges 
faced by universities during the implementation of the pilot program.      
 
4.1 PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE SURVEY 
This survey was conducted to identify the perspectives of Korean consortium universities in relation to the pilot 
program of CAMPUS Asia. The survey questionnaires were distributed to 12 university program managers of 10 
consortia and responses from 9 university program managers of 8 consortia were returned by e-mail in May 
2012. The questionnaire was structured and participants could choose more than one answer in order of 
importance. If they thought there was no answer suitable, they could write their own answers. For the analysis of 
the survey results, a frequency analysis method was used to the questions in case there was more than one 
answer in order of importance. However, as the cases were small, from the first to the third in order are classified 
and the rest are indicated as “other”.     
 
4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
To the first question, “what would be the most important reason for the university to take part in the consortium for 
the pilot program of CAMPUS Asia,” many participants responded (N=4, 44.4%) that the internalization of the 
university is the most important reason, and about 33.3% (N=3) answered that providing more opportunity for 
students’ overseas experiences was an important factor in taking part in the consortium (Table 1).  
 
Table 3. The most important reason for the university to take part in the consortium  
LIST 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Internationalization of the 
university  4(44.4) 2(22.2) 0 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 
Additional Financial support from 
the government 0 0 2(22.2) 2(22.2) 5(55.6) 
Academic advancement through 
increased opportunity for cooperation 
with other universities 
0 0 2(22.2) 2(22.2) 5(55.6) 
More opportunity for Students' 
overseas experiences 3(33.3) 3(33.3) 1(33.3) 0 2(22.2) 
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The second question wanted to identify the most difficult part in the selection process of the consortium for the 
pilot program of CAMPUS Asia. According to the responses, the formation of a university consortium, such as 
signing of the MOU treaty was the most difficult part in the selection process of the consortium (33.3%, table 4).  
 
Table 4. The most difficult part in the selection process of the consortium  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Formation of a university consortium - 
signing of the MOU treaty 3(33.3) 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 4(44.4) 
University infrastructure (i.e. dormitory) 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 0 0 6(66.7) 
Support for international programs 
(Language and culture education, 
counseling for students) 
1(11.1) 0 0 1(11.1) 7(77.8) 
Support from departments (opening 
new class in English) 0 0 0 2(22.2) 7(77.8) 
Support from departments (opening 
new class in English) 0 0 3(33.3) 0 6(66.7) 
other 3(33.3) 0 0 0 6(66.7) 
None 1(11.1) 0 0 0 8(88.9) 
 
The third question was to measure the most difficult part in the pilot program of CAMPUS Asia. As a result, 5 out 
of 9 participants responded that the “creation and management of new joint/multi degree program” was the most 
difficult part and 2 participants selected ‘creation of cooperation systems of the university consortium’ as answer.  
 
Table 5. The most difficult part in the pilot program 
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Language barriers 2(22.2) 0 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 5(56.6) 
Creation of cooperation systems  
of the university consortium 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 0 6(66.7) 
Supports for academic 
participation 0 1(11.1) 3(33.3) 1(11.1) 4(44.4) 
Creation and management of 
new joint/dual degree programs 5(55.6) 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 
Creation of supporting 
systems for students 
(Counseling office for study 
and living) 
0 0 0 3(33.3) 6(66.7) 
Raising international recognition 
of the university 0 1(11.1) 0 4(44.4) 4(44.4) 
Request by partner university 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 0 2(22.2) 5(55.6) 
Others  1(11.1) 0 0 0 9(88.9) 
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Management of the balance in 
the number of students 
among the three countries  
1(11.1) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 5(55.6) 
Others 0 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 7(77.8) 
 
To the question of “what would be the most important aspect for students to participate in CAMPUS Asia 
program”, the financial support for study and living abroad and quality control of the program were 
determined(see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. The most important for students to participate in CAMPUS Asia program  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Financial support for study  
and living abroad 4(44.4) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 2(22.2) 
Basic education before participation  
(language and culture education) 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 0 7(77.8) 
Availability of students' advice 
center  
for supports in studying  
and living during the participation 
0 0 0 2(22.2) 7(77.8) 
Quality control of the program 3(33.3) 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 
Further opportunity for advanced 
study 0 2(22.2) 0 0 7(77.8) 
Others ( ) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 0 6(66.7) 
 
Question 5 was to identify the main benefits to the university from participation in CAMPUS Asia. Based on the 
responses, better understanding about the Asian community of students was considered as the most beneficial 
factor, and contribution to internationalization of the university as next.  
 
Table 7. The main benefits to the university from the participation in CAMPUS Asia  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Contribution to  
internationalization  
of the university 
3(33.3) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 0 4(44.4) 
Quality improvement in 
teaching/research of the university  0 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 5(55.6) 
Better understanding about the 
Asian community of students 4(44.4) 1(11.1) 0 0 4(44.4) 
Enhancement of students' competency 
(improved employability of  graduates) 2(22.2) 2(22.2) 0 0 5(55.6) 
Others( ) 0 0 0 0 9(100) 
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In order to determine the primary task for the participant university to support the successful development of 
CAMPUS Asia program, development of various joint/multi degree programs and monitoring and feedback for the 
improvement of the program were addressed(see table 8).  
 
Table 8. The primary task for the participant university to support the successful development of CAMPUS Asia 
program  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Learning the language and 
culture of member countries 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 6(66.7) 
Development of various 
joint/dual degree programs 4(44.4) 1(11.1) 0 0 4(44.4) 
Creation of students' advice 
centers 0 1(11.1) 0 3(33.3) 5(55.6) 
Monitoring and feedback 
for the improvement of the 
program 
3(33.3) 0 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 3(33.3) 
Creation of a quality 
management system of the 
consortium 
1(11.1) 2(22.2) 2(22.2) 0 4(44.4) 
Others( ) 0 0 1(11.1) 0 8(88.9) 
 
Question 7: “what should be the main policy targets for the government to initiate successful promotion of 
CAMPUS Asia program” and the majority of them (N=6, 66.7%) considered securing financial support for 
development of the programs. Also, they determined the legal and systematic support for the management of 
joint/multi degree to be targeted.  
 
Table 9. The main policy targets for the government to initiate successful promotion of CAMPUS Asian program  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Establishment of a committee 
for the management of the 
pilot programs 
0 0 3(33.3) 0 6(66.7) 
Secure financial support for 
further development of the 
programs 
6(66.7) 2(22.2) 0 0 1(11.1) 
Creation of a committee for 
the pilot program of 
CAMPUS Asia 
0 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 6(66.7) 
Legal and systematic support 
for the management of joint 
/dual degree  
4(44.4) 2(22.2) 0 0 3(33.3) 
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Establishment of a credit 
transfer and accumulation 
system 
0 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 7(77.8) 
Creation of students' networking 
for further relationships 0 0 0 2(22.2) 7(77.8) 
Setting up database for 
sharing information and good 
cases  
0 2(22.2) 0 0 7(77.8) 
Others ( ) 0 0 0 0 9(100) 
 
To determine the main purpose for the success of the CAMPUS Asia program, questions were asked based on 
three categories: students, the university and the country. First for the students, the qualification for joint/multi 
degree from the participant universities (N=4, 44.4%), better understanding for language, culture, religion and 
social systems in Asia (N=2, 22.2%), and increasing mobility among student (N=2, 22.2%) were determined. 
Secondly for the university, the following purposes were addressed: the development of joint/multi degree 
programs and enhancement of competitiveness of Asian universities, for the success of the CAMPUS Asia. Lastly 
for the country category, the production of Asian elites was determined to be the main purpose for the success of 
the CAMPUS Asia Program, and the promotion of peace in the Asian region was next (see table 10).  
 
Table 10. The main purpose for the success of the CAMPUS Asia Program 
  
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Students 
Increasing mobility among 
students 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 0 5(55.6) 
Better understanding for 
language, culture, religion 
and social systems in Asia 
2(22.2) 3(33.3) 1(11.1) 0 3(33.3) 
Identity as a member 
of the Asian community 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 0 6(66.7) 
Qualification for joint/duai 
degree from the participant 
universities 
4(44.4) 0 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 
Others( ) 0 0 0 0 9(100) 
University 
 
 
Academics exchange of 
knowledge and information 
for education and research 
1(11.1) 3(33.3) 0 0 5(55.6) 
Development of joint/dual 
degree programs 3(33.3) 2(22.2) 0 1(11.1) 3(33.3) 
Creation of research networks 
for Asian Studies 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 6(66.7) 
Creation of quality assurance 
system for universities in Asia 0 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 0 6(66.7) 
Enhancement of competitiveness 
of Asian universities 3(33.3) 0 0 1(11.1) 5(55.6) 
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Others( ) 1(11.1) 0 0 0 8(88.9) 
Country 
Production of Asian elites 5(55.6) 0 1(11.1) 0 3(33.3) 
Cooperation in economic 
development in Asia 0 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 6(66.7) 
Promotion of peace 
in the Asian region 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 1(11.1) 5(55.6) 
Creation of Asian Higher 
Education Areas 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 0 1(11.1) 5(55.6) 
Others( ) 1(11.1) 0 0 0 8(88.9) 
 
To the question of “how can the CAMPUS Asia Program expand to other countries in Asia,” many participants 
responded that a gradual expansion to other countries was best after the completion of the main program of 
Korea, China and Japan (N=6, 66.7%). 2 out of 9 participants also suggested a gradual expansion to other 
countries during the main program of Korea, China and Japan.  
 
Table 11. How can the CAMPUS Asia Program expand to other countries in Asia? 
Responses N(%) 
Upon review after the completion of the pilot programs 1(11.1) 
A gradual expansion to other countries during the main program of Korea, China 
and Japan  2(22.2) 
A rapid expansion to other countries during the main program of Korea, China and 
Japan  0 
A gradual expansion to other countries after the completion of the main program 
of Korea, China and Japan  6(66.7) 
A rapid expansion to other countries after the completion of the main program of 
Korea, China and Japan  0 
Others ( ) 0 
Total 9(100) 
 
For the last survey question, “what should be the primary policy in the transition from the pilot to main CAMPUS 
Asia program of Korea, China and Japan,” the majority of participants pointed out that the expansion of the 
government budget for the programs in the 3 countries should be the next primary policy (table 12). 3 out of 9 
participants considered the systematic support for the development and the management of joint/multi degree 
programs as the next.  
 
Table 12. The primary policy in the transition from the pilot to main CAMPUS Asia program  
List 
Responses 
First 
(N,%) 
Second 
(N,%) 
Third 
(N,%) 
Other 
(N,%) 
NC 
(N,%) 
Expansion of the government 
budget 
for the programs in the 3 
countries 
6(66.7) 2(22.2) 0 0 1(11.1) 
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Establishment of an official 
center for the development 
and management of 
joint/dual degree programs 
0 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 1(11.1) 6(66.7) 
Systematic support for the 
development 
and the management 
of joint/dual degree programs 
3(33.3) 3(33.3) 0 1(11.1) 2(22.2) 
Creation of a credit 
accreditation system 
for the 3 countries 
1(11.1) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 5(55.6) 
Creation of the quality 
assurance system 
for the 3 countries 
0 0 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 6(66.7) 
Others ( ) 2(22.2) 1(11.1) 0 0 6(66.7) 
 
Overall, the response from the Korean consortium of universities in the pilot program of CAMPUS Asia has been 
positive. It was pointed out that the creation of successful education programs will be challenging and will be in 
need of stable financial and systematic support from the three governments. However, it is believed that the 
possible benefits from the CAMPUS Asia program on the academic development will be overwhelmingly positive 
to the internationalization of higher education, and aid in securing peace and prosperity within the Asian region in 
particular. A similar survey for both Japanese and Chinese universities is desirable in identifying specific areas to 
improve for the success of the program.  
 
5. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CAMPUS ASIA FOR UNIVERSITY COOPERATION IN ASIA AND KOREA-EU 
 
This paper described the Korean experience in the creation of the CAMPUS Asia Program and identified the 
features of the Korea-China-Japan CAMPUS Asia program and the contribution to the internationalization of 
higher education in the region and the world.  
From the outset, it emphasized the benefits of the development of dual or joint degree programs at the 
graduate level focusing on regional cooperation. The creation of dual or joint degree programs might be the most 
comprehensive and demanding task given the fact that the program can’t be successful without trust or quality 
assurance from all three countries. However, the successful experience of the Korea-China-Japan CAMPUS Asia 
program could lead to the building of a common ground for the creation of Asian Higher Education Areas by 
lowering the existing systematic obstacles and building a supporting system such as credit transfer system and 
quality assurance system. The active cooperation in teaching and research in higher education institutions in the 
Asian region could support the further growth of the Asian economies and as a result contribute to the peace and 
prosperity of the region. 
The cooperation of Asian universities could also be an opportunity for the enhancement of the overall 
quality of higher education in Asia. In addition, there would be many opportunities for Asian universities to 
contribute to the academic development by offering Asian perspectives and Asian experiences, which have been 
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ignored in the Western-led academia. The growth of Asian economies could also support the improvement of 
teaching and research centers in Asian universities and hence attract international students and academics.      
Finally, the development of high quality educational programs based on the cooperation of Asian 
universities could create further academic opportunities beyond the Asian region. For example, the CAMPUS 
Asia program could initiate cross border academic activities with EU countries. The Korean government in 
particular is keen to develop academic network with other regions in order to generate economic growth and 
employment. In fact, the improved mobility of students and academics over the national border and over the 
different regions could bring cultural, academic and economic benefits to the world.  
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KOREA’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY 
ASSESSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR EUROPEAN UNION COLLABORATION IN A NEW GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION ARCHITECTURE 
AXEL MARX 
JADIR SOARES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world of development cooperation is changing significantly. First, new players (donor countries) are 
manifesting themselves on the global scene. This does not only result in an increase of actors, but also in a 
diversification of models, each with their own objectives, for develoment cooperation (Walz and Ramachandran, 
2010). Second, an increasing attention for the building of partnerships emerges with a specific focus on trilateral 
North-South-South cooperation (Busan Declaration, 2011). Considering these changes this paper aims to 
analyse the role of the Republic of Korea in this new development context, making a comparison of its strategies 
and performance with that of the European Union. This analysis can feed into an assessment of the opportunities 
for cooperation between these actors on pursuing poverty eradication and the promotion of other values and 
norms such as human rights and good governance.  
The European Union’s (EU) desire to “improve the tools of global governance” (European Commission, 
2003) has led it to take a vested pursuit in becoming an active and leading actor in global economic development. 
The EU has had a role in development and development cooperation since the beginning of the European 
project. Over the years its role in development cooperation has steadily grown and its strategies have changed.  
Following the 2005 European Consensus on Development, EU development policy is required to improve the 
impact and effectiveness of global development assistance, progressing towards achieving the MDGs and the 
Paris and Accra Action Agenda targets. Article 21 (2)(d) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) lists as one 
of the objectives of EU external action to ‘foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development 
of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty.’ The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) stipulates that development cooperation is to be conducted in a framework of the 
principles and objectives of the EU’s external action, which includes the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights.1 In the last decade human rights has gained greater prominence in the external 
action of the EC/EU (DG DEVCO, 2011, p. 69), and in recent years, the EU has made efforts to explicitly tie 
together development and human rights goals (Bartels, 2008, p. 128).. The European Commission’s Agenda for 
Change recognizes that ‘the objectives of development, democracy, human rights, good governance and security 
are intertwined’2 and the EU acknowledges that ‘sustainable development includes good governance, human 
rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects.’3 Most recently, efforts to enhance the status of 
human rights in the EU’s external and development policy were reaffirmed through the adoption by the Council of 
the ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’.4 This action plan stresses the 
application of a ‘human rights-based approach’ throughout the EU’s development policy. The recent revision of 
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the EU’s policy on providing budget support to third countries should also be highlighted, as the new approach 
places greater importance in ‘good governance’ and respect for the principles of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law.5      
In order to achieve its development objectives the EU develops partnerships. In an increasingly multi-
polar and polycentric world the choice of partners increases. Partners, which in turn, are networked and linked to 
other partners. The Republic of Korea has emerged as an especially interesting partner to further develop 
partnerships in the context of development co-operation. The Republic of Korea is not only an exceptional 
example of sustained economic development (Evans, 1995; Amsden, 2002) which in a few decades moved from 
being a recipient country in the context of development cooperation to a donor country. The Republic of Korea 
has also taken a leading internal role in pursuing actively the advancement of the ‘(global) development agenda’.  
At its 2010 Seoul summit, the G-20, then led by the Republic of Korea, agreed to the so-called “Seoul 
Consensus” on development policy which aims to replace the Washington Consensus. The ‘Seoul Development 
Consensus for Shared Growth’ is a set of principles and guidelines aimed to improve economic development and 
the achievement of the  MDGs in the less developed countries. The core principles focus inter alia on economic 
growth, global development partnerships, private sector development and participation, complementarity of 
policies and tangible outcomes to address significant development problems. In 2011 the Republic of Korea 
hosted the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan which resulted in the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation. 
The ambitions of the EU and the Republic of Korea seem to align in the context of development 
cooperation. At the sixth EU-Korea summit in Seoul on 28 March 2012, the two parties agreed to conduct regular 
policy dialogue and exchange information on their respective development programmes, and also ‘coordinate 
their engagement in-country to increase their impact on poverty eradication’ (Joint Press Statement, 2012).  
In light of increasing exchanges between the EU and Korea, this paper will analyze Korean development 
cooperation policy  in order to gain a better understanding on how it relates to, and potentially differs from, EU 
development cooperation6. In the following sections, the paper first presents the context of the recent changes in 
the development assistance architecture caused by the entrance of new emerging donors (section 2), and the 
rapid deveplopment experienced by South Korea over the last half centure, moving from a poor recipient to a 
emerging DAC donor (section 3). Next, section 4 presents the Korean objectives on development cooperation 
and discusses the Korean approaches to perform its assistance through different channels and types, comparing 
it with the European Union. Further, the paper analyses the recipients of South Korean aid, both in terms of 
partners and sectors and discusses possibilities for further cooperation. Section 5  makes an assesment of the 
participation of South Korea and the EU in South-South and Triangular cooperation. Section 6 presents some 
tentative conclusions. 
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2. A NEW DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ARCHITECTURE 
 
The development cooperation arena traditionally deals with developed countries or multilateral agencies (donors) 
assisting developing countries (recipients) on pursuing development, especially through achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG). Parallel to this traditional development cooperation approach, several newly 
emerging countries have performed assistance to other developing countries for decades (Cabral e al., 2010; 
Denney et al., 2011; ECOSOC, 2008; Mawdsley, 2012; Woods, 2008). Example of  these emerging donors are 
the Republic of Korea, China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, India, Kuwait,  Brazil, among 
others (Kharas, 2007). Graph 1 shows spending for Official Development Assistance (ODA) per country in billion 
USD and the role of new countries in development cooperation. For some emerging countries data varies and 
lines indicate the difference between the lowest and the highest estimations. The emergence of new donors on 
the world stage has not only resulted in an increase of new actors but also in a diversification with regard to 
development cooperation strategies. Walz and Ramachandran (2010) identify three distinct models of 
development cooperation and aid delivery (the DAC model, to which the EU and Korea belong, the Arab model 
and the Southern model) which are not necessarily converging. This models differ on the modalities of giving aid 
and the sectors on which they are mostly focused. 
 
Graph 1: ODA per country in billion USD. 
 
 
Source: Walz and Ramachandran (2010). 
 
 
During several years, the amount of aid performed by these newly developing countries was modest. However, 
the volume of their activities have increased significantly over the past few years, representing up to 9,8% of the 
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total flows in 2006 (ECOSOC, 2008, pp. 10). This volume of flows makes these countries important players in 
development assistance scenario, and consequently, it increases their voices in the political arena. 
This participation of these new donors brings new challenges, but also new opportunities. Some 
traditional countries argue that emerging donors are lowering standards and increasing debt burdens in the 
countries they are offering aid (Woods, 2008). However, in a balanced assessment, Ngaire Woods concluded 
that the emerging countries are not trying to re-establish new rules for development assistance. But, by offering 
alternatives to developing countries, emerging donors are introducing competitive pressures into the existing 
system, weakening the bargaining power of the traditional donors on imposing their standards. New donors also 
offer new opportunities, especially in a context which emphasizes the building of partnerships and networks as is 
highlighted in the Seoul Consensus and the Busan Declaration. This form of network governance opens up new 
opportunities for policy-makers to achieve their policy objectives (Slaughter, 2004; Slaughter and Zaring, 2006; 
Marx et al., 2011). Especially relevant in the context of development cooperation are the opportunities which are 
offered through partnerships to develop triangular development cooperation which consists of a traditional donor, 
a ‘new’ donor and a recipient country. In this new networked global order (Slaughter, 2004; Keukeleire and 
Bruyninckx, 2011) many opportunities emerge to develop triangular cooperation since the new donors are 
important network hubs and links to other countries and regional organizations (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 2: A Network of New Regional Organizations 
 
Source: Keukeleire & Bruyninckx, 2011 
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In this new development cooperation architecture, EU and Korea play distinct rules. While EU represents 
one of the most powerful traditional donors, who have intensively influenced the OECD-DAC norms and 
standards, Korea was first a recipient country for decades and recently became a new DAC member. In this 
scenario, Korea could have a special role on acting as a bridge between the traditional and the new emerging 
donors, helping to straight the dialog among these actors, and better understand their values and objectives on 
performing assistance. 
3. THE RISE OF KOREA IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: FROM RECIPIENT TO DONOR 
Korean development in recent decades has been impressive (Evans, 1995, Amsden, 2002). The country was 
devastated after the Korean War (1950-1953) but, after a successful economic transformation, in half century the 
country became an OECD member, figuring among the most developed nations around the world. 
The recent Korean economic development, in part is due to a well managed development aid that the 
country received. According to the Korean government estimates, the country received US$ 12.7 billion between 
1945 and late 1990s, “which helped spur economic development and decrease poverty” (OECD, 2008, p. 9). 
According to the Korean Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Oh Joon, on his speech when Korea became 
member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on November 20097: “Half a century ago 
Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world, endeavouring to emerge from the ashes of the Korean War to 
rebuild itself”… “we worked hard to overcome poverty and achieve development”. This aid was mainly supported 
by the United States, Japan, and European Union DAC Members as illustrated in graph 2. 
 
Graph 2: Net ODA flows to South Korea by donor 
 
Source: OECD, 2012 
During the period Korea was a recipient country of aid, the Korean government had a strong 
commitment to use foreign aid effectively, and successfully managed to use this financial assistance to overcome 
various national challenges through state-led projects aimed to spur economic development. (Jiyoung Kim, 2011; 
Evans, 1995). 
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Following decades of sustained economic growth the Republic of Korea became a member of OECD in 
1996 and, one decade later, the country began its application to become a member of OECD DAC, which 
succeeded at the end of 2009. However, Korea’s Assistance started earlier, with the provision of technical 
cooperation in the late 1970s, during which Korea transferred its own development experience to developing 
countries (Chun et al, 2010, pp. 790). It was in the late 1990s that Korea made a more concrete effort to broaden 
and increase its assistance programs, which resulted in the creation of the Korea Eximbank’s Economic 
Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF) in 1987, and the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) 
in 1991 (OECD, 2008). 
This rapid movement from being a recipient to a DAC donor country is illustrated in graphs 3 and 4. 
Graph 3 plots Korean net official development assistance (ODA) flows, i.e., the difference of donors’ gross 
disbursements of grants and loans minus Korean repayments of principal on earlier loans, from 1960 to 2004. 
From the beginning of the 1990s the net ODA flows to Korea became negative, indicating that the Korean 
repayments to previous loans surpluses the assistance influx. Graph 4 shows the net disbursements from Korea 
(as a donor) to developing countries from 1987 to 2011. Note that it started modest but it is growing fast, mainly 
from the second half of the 2000s. In 2011, Korea net flows reached US$ 1.321,32 million (0,12% of Korean 
GNI). 
 
Graph 3: Total Net ODA flows to South Korea 
 
Source: OECD, 2012 
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Graph 4: Korean ODA (Net Disbursements) 
 
 
Source: OECD 
Even knowing that South Korean aid (% of GNI) is still modest when compared with top donor countries 
such as Sweden and Norway, and also when compared with the average of European Union DAC members (see 
graph 5), the Korean rate of 0,12% of GNI should not be underestimated. When, in 2006, the government 
announced an ODA/GNI target of 0,118% by 2010 in its “Vision 2030” (The Reality of Aid, 2008), it was 
considered a huge challenge by its DAC peers (OECD, 2008). Although Korean rates are low when compared 
with top donors (that reached more than 1% of its GNI), Korean ODA is increasing fast (see graph 4) and it is 
almost reaching other DAC traditional members such as Japan (0,18% in 2011) and US (0,20% in 2011). 
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Graph 5: ODA as % of GNI - by Donor 
Source: OECD 
Another interesting issue to be considered is the South Korea assistance to the northern part of the 
peninsula, estimated to be US$ 558 million in 2007 (OECD, 2008). This assistance cannot be reported as ODA to 
the DAC, since South Korea constitution still recognizes the whole Korean peninsula as part of its territory (Chun 
et al, 2010, pp.797). Consequently, it cannot be considered “foreign” aid. If we compute the assistance to North 
Korea, the South Korea ODA/GNI ratio in 2007 would increase from 0,07 to 0,13%. 
4. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PRACTICIES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
4.1. OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
The aim of the Korean Government on development assistance is to reduce poverty and promote sustainable 
development. In the words of President Lee, the country is “wholehearted committed to pay back its ‘debts’ to the 
world as an international donor” (Soyeun Kim, 2011, pp. 812). 
The Korean’ assistance structure is composed of mainly two actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT), responsible for grant aid policy, which is implemented by the Korea International Co-operation 
Agency (KOICA). Complementing, concessional loan policy is under responsibility of The Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, and implemented by the Korea Eximbank’s Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF). 
Additionally, a further 30 other ministries, agencies and municipalities are involved in providing small amounts of 
grant aid, mainly in the form of technical co-operation (OECD, 2008). 
The intentions of the Korean development assistance program on helping developing countries to 
pursue their development can also be illustrated by statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT): “Korea is fully committed to supporting the global efforts to alleviate poverty, promote sustainable 
growth, address global challenges, and achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG)8”. 
The European Union objectives on development assistance align to a large degree to these of the 
Republic of Korea but also include other objectives. The promotion of inclusive and sustainable growth for human 
development and poverty eradication are the primary objective of the EU development policy (European 
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Commission, 2011). As stated in the EU Agenda for Change (European Commission, 2011), the EU also places 
emphasis on support of human rights, democracy and other elements of good governance in its development 
cooperation. The recently adopted framework for human rights specifies that ‘Sustainable peace, development 
and prosperity are possible only when grounded upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.’9 
These elements of good governance are considered increasingly important, both as preconditions for sustainable 
and equitable development, for providing effective development assistance, as well as an objective in its own 
right (Hackenesch, 2011,pp.8). Accordingly, the EU approach on providing budget support to third countries 
explicidly requieres ‘good governance’ and respect for the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law as a pre-condition.10 In other words, the distribution of ODA of the EU institutions is increasingly determined 
by these conditionalities based on EU core values and human rights principles. This  contrasts sharply with South 
Korean development policy.11   
The following sections compare South Korean and European Union development cooperation. Several 
EU Member States are traditional DAC donors and have long-term experiences to share with South Korea. Apart 
from each Member State, the EU alone was the third largest DAC member in 2010 (OECD, 2012) and is one of 
the most important international actors on development cooperation and sustainable development in the current 
international debate. Although Korea and EU have a different backgrounds on development assistance, their 
policies on development cooperation share several principles, with the primary focus on poverty eradication and 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The main difference is the EU focus on promoting 
European values such as respect to human rights, freedom, peace, democracy, gender equality, among others 
(European Commission, 2006). 
Besides comparing South Korean and EU development cooperation the following sections will also 
highlight some criticisms which have been raised in the literature concerning South Korean Assistance program. 
Many of these criticisms, aligning development cooperation objectives with strategic political and economic 
objectives, mirror criticisms which have been voiced towards other countries including many OECD-DAC. First of 
all, some authors have criticized Korea’s performance on development assistance, much in line with a general 
criticism on the development cooperation policies of emerging donors, for being selective. Chun et al (2010) note 
that the Korean commitment to poverty alleviation and the MDG’s are probably not the only objectives of 
development cooperation policy, since a high amount of Korea’s ODA goes to relatively wealthier Asian countries 
with which Korea has strategic economic interests (Sri Lanka and Indonesia, for example), instead of least 
developed countries. Another critical issue found in the literature is over the high volume of ODA flow to Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Chun et al (2010); Soyeun Kim (2011)). Some authors link this with the objective of supporting the 
Korean strategic alliance with the US, instead of solely being focused on development and poverty eradication. 
Finally, lack of transparency is also an issue that is raised in the context of South Korean policy assistance. The 
country was ranked at 30 among 31 countries and multilateral agencies by Ghosh and Kharas 2011 
Transparency Index in Foreign Aid12. Some of the critics will be discussed along this paper when presenting data 
on Korea ODA. 
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4.2. APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
This section discusses the different approaches towards performing development cooperation and compares 
them with the EU and DAC countries. The following three questions are addressed: is development cooperation 
pursued via multilateral or bilateral channels? is the assistance made via grants or loans? is aid tied or untied? 
First, concerning the use of multilateral channels to implement development cooperation, some authors (Soyeun 
Kim, 2011; Kharas and Rogerson, 2012; Keohane, et al, 2009) argue that this kind of channel has some specific 
benefits. Multilateral channels contribute to a better coordination of resources, and can improve efficiency on 
spreading the aid burden and leverages experience, expertise, geographic reach, and other assets that can be 
better deployed through joint efforts (OECD, 2011). This channel can also be considered more neutral (Soyeun 
Kim, 2011, pp. 804), since it limits the influence of domestic interests on using assistance for political or 
commercial ends (Keohane et al, 2009). The multilateral aid share of Korea and European Union Institutions are 
presented on graph 6, together with DAC members averages.  
 
Graph 6: Multilateral Aid Share 
Source: OECD 
Graph 6 shows that Korea channeled its development cooperation mainly through the use of multilateral 
organizations until the mid 1990s. In this period, South Korea assistance was mainly through World Bank and 
Regional Development Banks. For example, in 1990, 61% of the Korean multilateral assistance was addressed to 
World Bank and 29% was addressed to Regional Development Banks. However, from the mid 1990s Korea 
changed its profile, and has increased its aid mainly through bilateral agreements. In the last decade, Korean 
multilateral share has been below the average of DAC members (around 30%), but the IDA and other World Bank 
Institutions (with 35%) are still the top destination of Korean multilateral aid, followed by the Regional 
Development Banks, with 30% (see graph 7). 
One possible explanation for the decline in aid channeled through multilateral organisations by Korea is 
that multilateral approaches can be difficult to implement due to problems in acquiring political or public support at 
home (Chun et al, 2010, p.798), since, as stated by Milner and Tingley (2010), the donor country (principal) loses 
control over the funds in favor of a multilateral actor (agent)13. However, the Korean government is aware of the 
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necessity to increase their multilateral share. For example, among the development goals of EDCF, there is one 
specific goal to “Promote global partnership with development institutions such as Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs)” (EDCF, 2010). Also note that a decrease in the percentage of aid channeled through multilateral 
organizations can also be partially be explained by the increase of the aid assistance volume in total if the 
additional volume of aid is exclusively allocated for bilateral use. 
With regards to the European Union, the multilateral share of its assistance is low, which is not surprising 
since the EU itself is a supra-national organization which receives significant funds from its member states.  
However, if we look at graph 6 we can see that the DAC EU members perform a high percentage of their aid via 
multilateral channels, representing around 30 to 40% of their total development assistance. If we look at graph 7, 
it is evident that the top destination of the DAC EU members multilateral assistance are the EU (48%). With 
regards to the destination of the EU multilateral aid, the top destination in 2011 was The United Nations 
Agencies, with 42% of the total multilateral share, followed by Regional Development Banks, with 11%. Other 
46% of the EU multilateral aid goes to other smaller agencies or are not specified in the DAC dataset. Given the 
high percentage of aid of the DAC EU members going to the EU one should be careful with comparing the 
percentages to Korea and the EU. 
 
Graph 7: 2011 Percentage of Multilateral Flows by Destination 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Secondly, we compare the use of loans versus grants. Grants are transfers in goods, services or cash 
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represents 39% of the Korean aid, a high proportion when compared with DAC EU members (15%), or if 
compared with the EU, that in 2010 performed 100% of its aid through grants. 
 
Graph 8: Grants x Loans 
 
 
Source: OECD 
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Graph 9: Tying Status of Bilateral Aid 
 
 
Source: OECD 
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Graph 10: Korean ODA by region and countries
 
 
Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators 
The recipients of European aid are more balanced across countries and regions. Graph 11 presents EU 
ODA by destination from 2000 to 2010. In this case one can observe a clear focus on Africa, followed by Asia and 
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other European recipient countries such as Kosovo, Serbia and Moldova, and 10% to the Americas. The pie chart 
shows that, EU aid is more distributed than the Korean one, which is mainly focused on Asia. Also, if we look at 
the top recipient countries over the last decade, the European distribution is spread more evenly across the 
world. 
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Graph 11: European Union Institutions - ODA by region and countries 
 
 
Source: OECD and World Bank Development Indicators 
Returning to the Republic of Korea, the increase of aid to Africa was expected, since Korea agreed to it 
in its Initiative for Africa Development, announced in 2006 (DAC Special Review of Korea, 2008, p. 16). But apart 
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high.  Both shares have oscillated during the last decade, but the trends shows that the figures for LIC countries 
have decreased faster than the LDC share, although it seem to have a setback in the LICs loan share since 2008. 
 
Graph 12: Aid to Africa and LDCs countries 
 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Graph 13: Korean Loan Share to LDC and LIC countries 
Source: OECD 
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4.4. AID TO WHICH SECTORS 
This section focuses on the sectors to which Korean aid is provided. DAC members are making efforts in a way 
that each donor country concentrates its assistance on a few sectors, increasing the “division of labor” in an 
attempt to increase aid effectiveness.  Korea committed to focus on seven sectors: education, health, 
governance, rural development, information and communication technology, industry and energy, and 
environment and gender (OECD, 2008, p.17). 
Korean ODA for each of these seven focus sectors from 2006 to 2010 are presented on graph 14. This 
graph also includes one extra sector, transport and storage, due to the high amount of investments. The graphs 
show a clear focus on Education, Health and Transport & Storage. Graph 15 highlights education and health and 
shows that Korean performance in these sectors is higher than the EU and the average of the DAC members. 
It is interesting to note that the third sector on which Korea has more intensively performed its assistance 
since 2006 is not included in the list of its focus sectors. The high amount of investments on economic 
infrastructure, such as transport & storage, is understandable due to the Korean own development experience, 
and the belief that economic infrastructure and development come together (Soyeun Kim, 2011). However, Korea 
is investing on economic infrastructure in detriment of other sectors on which the country have committed to 
focus, such as gender equality, rural development and environmental protection. This can create potentially a 
skewed investment in some sectors to the detriment of other sectors which in the context of the agreed division of 
work with other donors may become problematic for some sectors in the area of development cooperation. 
 
Graph 14: Korean aid by sector 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
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Graph 15: Korean ODA in Education and Health 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
 
Concerning environmental protection, the developed countries that signed the Rio Conventions in 1992 
committed themselves to assist developing countries in implementing the Conventions (Development Co-
operation Report 2011, p. 143). Korean assistance to environmental issues has been a small part of the Korean 
aid program as shown in graph 16. In graph 16 we compare Korean environmental performance with other DAC 
members. We can see that the share of Korean assistance to environmental issues, ranging from 1 to 1,5% of 
Korean ODA, has been below the average of DAC members (2-5%) and European Union Institutions (2-4%), and 
significantly lower than top environmental donor countries such as UK, France and Japan. 
 
Graph 16: Environmental share of Assistance 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
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Graph 17: ODA to Women equality and Rural development 
 
 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
 
Looking at the EU performance on their focus sectors (trade and finance, climate change, food security, 
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all recipient countries. In the European case, the figures show a steep increase from 2006 to 2010.  
 
000% 
000% 
000% 
000% 
000% 
001% 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Women's equality organisations and 
institutions 
Korea DAC Countries 
EU Institutions 
000% 
001% 
001% 
002% 
002% 
003% 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Rural development 
Korea DAC Countries 
EU Institutions 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 260 
Graph 18: European Union aid by sector 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
 
Graph 19:  Total number of recipient countries and sectors assisted by EU and Korea 
 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
 
Lastly, another important allocation of donor’s assistance is humanitarian aid. As shown in graph 20, 
there was a steep increase in the Korean humanitarian aid from 2000 to 2008. In 2008 there was a peak of US$ 
56 million addressed for this purpose. In percentage terms, Korea reached the peak in 2005, with 5,6% of the 
total ODA allocated to humanitarian aid, what is modest figure if compared with the EU (11%). Further, there was 
a setback on the Korean humanitarian aid since 2009, with allocation of only 1% of the total ODA to this important 
issue. 
$,0 
$500,0 
$1000,0 
$1500,0 
$2000,0 
$2500,0 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
M
ill
io
n 
US
$ 
EU Institutions - Top Sectors 
Government & Civil Society 
Transport & Storage 
Education 
Other Multisector (without environment) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
$,0 
$200,0 
$400,0 
$600,0 
$800,0 
$1000,0 
$1200,0 
$1400,0 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
M
ill
io
n 
US
$ 
EU Institutions - Priority Issues 
Trade and Finance (Trade Policies & 
Regulations + Banking & Financial Services) 
Climate Change (General Environment 
Protection) 
Food security (Agriculture + Food security 
programmes) 
Security (Conflict, Peace & Security) 
2195 
2540 
3006 
3350 
3713 
1586 
1101 
1268 1173 
1977 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU 
Korea 
Linear (EU) 
Linear (Korea) 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  261 
Graph 20: Korean Humanitarian Aid 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System 
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provides sizable export credit lines; Brazil’s Embrapa has spread the tropical soil management technology with 
which it transformed its agriculture to countries with similar environments (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012). 
Korea has been recognized as an important actor in South-South cooperation. The country was the fifth 
largest Southern contributor in 2006 (ECOSOC, 2008, pp.11), performing assistance through technical 
cooperation grants, program grants, bilateral loans, and other kinds of assistance, mainly to Asian neighbor 
countries as is highlighted above. The Korean allocation to South-South Cooperation in 2006 was estimated at 
10% of all Korean cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008, pp.19). Especially worth mentioning is the notable contribution of 
a 100% debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - HIPC (ECOSOC, 2008, pp.13). 
Korea also seems to invest in triangular cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008), i.e. cooperation between one 
donor from the global North, one donor from the global South and one recipient country, aimed to provide 
assistance to this recipient country. Usually in this kind of cooperation, the donor from the global South assists 
with its particular expertise and experience in the area related to the cooperation program, financially supported 
by the donor from the global North. For example, at the High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and 
Capacity Development in March 2010, the Korean government shared experiences in implementing the 
Knowledge Sharing Program, which aims to assist capacity building efforts of developing countries (EDCF, 2010). 
The participation in SSC and triangular cooperation seems to be a commitment of the South Korea 
government. As stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea aims to make “the best use of its 
unique development experience” and to “exert every effort to make meaningful contributions to the international 
community by playing a bridging role between developing and developed countries”15. The Korean government’s 
view on its rule on South-South cooperation is shared with some authors. For example, Jerve (2007, pp. 7) stated 
that “the Korean experience is relevant for shaping development policies as well as how to make best use of aid”. 
The author also argued that “Korea can play a crucial role on bridging the gap between donor countries and 
developing partners by sharing their development experience with the help of aid” (Jerve, 2007, pp. 8). Also, the 
South Korean commitment with SSC was reinforced by joining the “Building Block Proposal on South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation”, presented at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, 2011. The 
outcome document of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness calls for the development community to 
deepen efforts to maximize the impact of this modality of aid, to strengthen its institutions and to scale-up 
knowledge sharing to adapt and learn from these experiences (HLF4, 2011). 
Similar to the Republic of Korea, the EU and some of their member states such as Finland, France, 
Germany, Spain and Sweden have been closely involved as partner from the global North in triangular 
development cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008, pp.14). The EU also support SSC and triangular cooperation, as 
stated by the European Commission in its Agenda for Change (2011). The EU has also joined to the Building 
Block Proposal at HLF4.  
At this stage it is difficult to make any empirical assessment of South-South Cooperation and Triangular 
cooperation since there is no data available. Korea, as well as all other DAC members, report development 
assistance in terms of ODA flows to DAC. The DAC database organizes the assistance flows from all DAC 
members to all developing countries. However, this database does not report separately on the participation of 
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the DAC members in South-South cooperation or triangular cooperation. Currently, there is no institution that 
coordinates, compiles and disseminates data related to South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation. This 
lack of data limits the assessment of such South-South and triangular initiatives. 
Although the lack of data makes an assessment on SSC and triangular cooperation difficult, it could be 
argued that there are several opportunities for EU and South Korea collaboration in this context. Graph 21 shows 
the number of countries and sectors commonly assisted by Korea and the EU from 2006 to 2010, i.e., among all 
countries and sectors assisted by Korea and EU separately (see graph 19), graph 21 shows the subset of 
countries and sectors that are common for these two donors. These shared countries and sectors represent 
opportunities for collaboration.  
The number of common countries/sectors have increased since 2006, representing from 10 to 16% of all 
countries/sectors assisted by the EU. For South Korea, these common countries/sectors represent 19 to 31% of 
all countries and sectors. For example, the 603 common sectors assisted by EU and Korea in 2010, represent 
14% of the 3713 countries/sectors assisted by the EU and 19% of the 1977 countries/sectors assisted by Korea 
in this year. It seems that the trend is going to the opposite direction proposed in the guidelines for the division of 
labour, as discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, if one aims to promote triangular cooperation 
such overlap is inevitable and to a degree beneficial. This overlap also shows that there are real opportunities for 
triangular cooperation. For example, in 2010, both EU and Korea assisted Uganda and Kenya in agricultural 
development. If EU and Korea share information on the projects that each one is assisting in these countries, 
both EU and Korea could better coordinate their efforts and increase the aid effectiveness in these countries. 
Another example is that of Mozambique in 2010 where both EU and Korea have invested in agricultural 
development. Moreover, it creates potential opportunities with other new emerging donors such as Brazil, that 
have also invested in the agricultural sector in the Lusophone Africa (Vieira and Alden, 2011) 
 
 Graph 21: Common countries and sectors assisted by Korea and The European Union 
Source: DAC/OECD - Creditor Reporting System, 2012 
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6. CONCLUSION  
In this paper the development cooperation policies of the Republic of Korea were analyzed and compared to 
those of the European Union with the aim of identifying the differences and similarities between them. Such an 
analysis can contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of further cooperation in the 
field of development cooperation in order to further develop efficient and effective development cooperation 
policies which are able to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
The objectives of both actors were discussed highlighting a significant degree of alignment. In this 
sense, opportunities for further collaboration between these actors are possible. In addition, Korea can offer 
unique experience to the EU. As a recipient country it made good use of foreign aid in order to promote economic 
and social development. Today, the Republic of Korea is figuring among the most developed countries in the 
world. Its unique experience can be used to strengthen the efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
As a new donor, Korean development cooperation policy has undergone marked changes in its early 
history following some early criticisms which, to a degree, have been addressed by the South Korean authorities. 
First, with regards to the focus on Asian recipient countries one can observe that , although the share going to 
Asian countries is still high (65%), the share of Korean aid addressed to Africa and to the LDC countries has 
increased consistently over the last decade. Second, the use of concessional loans (versus grants) is an issue on 
which Korea has changed its policy. Although the percentage of loans  is still high, there was a very significant 
drop from 65% to 39% in one decade. Third, the concession of tied aid has also been reduced significantly and 
the Korean government has already created a plan to untie 75% of its overall ODA by 2015.  
Finally, the analysis showed that Korea is concentrating, following recent agreements on the division of 
labor in development cooperation, its aid to specific countries and sectors. However, here much remains to be 
done, as is the case for the EU. Both EU and Korea spread aid over a large number of countries and sectors. The 
OECD-DAC and the EU are engaged on efforts to achieve a better division of labor, recommending that each 
donor concentrates on a fewer number of countries and sectors in order to pursue aid effectiveness. This 
objective has not yet been achieved and some evidence points in the other direction. Notwithstanding that more 
attention should be put on this issue, it should also be noted that some overlap is not necessarily bad especially 
in a context which aims to promote triangular cooperation. For triangular cooperation to be successful there 
should be a minimal overlap in countries and sectors as was pointed out in the last section. This focus on 
triangular cooperation and the building of partnerships offers many opportunities for EU-Korea cooperation. 
Follow up research should try to identify some existing project on which collaboration is taking place with the aim 
of generating insights on how to multiply cooperation. This analysis has shown that there is a fertile ground to 
further collaborate. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Art. 208(1) TFEU states: ‘Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of 
the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the 
Member States complement and reinforce each other.’; Art. 21 TEU. 
2 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development: an Agenda for Change’, COM 
(2011) 673 final, Brussels, 13 October 2011. 
3 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ 
(2006/C 46/01), 2006, § 7. 
4 Council Of the European Union, Council Conclusions ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy’ Luxembourg, 25 June 2012. 
5 Council Of the European Union, Council conclusions ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries’ 
Brussels, 14 May 2012. 
6 Development cooperation is a shared competence of the Union and its Member States (albeit with the particular feature 
that the exercise of EU competence does not prevent the Member States from exercising theirs (Art. 4(4) TFEU), and 
strategies have been developed to ensure that the policies of the EU and the Member States are consistent and effective. 
7 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) welcomes Korean Membership, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_2649_33721_44141618_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed on: 10/May/2012. 
8 Available at: http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda. Accessed on: 14/Jun/2012. 
9 Council Of the European Union, Council Conclusions ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy’ Luxembourg, 25 June 2012. 
10 Council Of the European Union, Council conclusions ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries’ 
Brussels, 14 May 2012. 
11 At the sixth EU-Korea summit, the parties agreed to establish bilateral consultations to strengthen cooperation in the areas 
of human rights. This could potentially include exchanges on how Korea’s development policy could integrate human rights 
in line with the EU’s efforts to integrate human rights (Joint Press Statement, 2012) 
12 The Transparency Index is an attempt to measure the availability and accessibility of aid flow information in a timely, 
systematic and comparable manner. It rates 31 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies on six measures of transparency: 
membership in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); recording of project title and descriptions; detail of project 
descriptions; reporting of aid delivery channels; completeness of project-level commitment data; and the share of net ODA 
that donors give to recipients with good monitoring and evaluation framework,  
13 See Milner and Tingley (2010) for more details on a principal-agent model. 
14 Least Developed Countries are countries listed by the United Nations which are poor (GNI per capita less US$ 750), weak 
on human resources and are economic vulnerable. The list includes 33 African countries, 14 Asian and 1 Latin American 
country (Haiti). Low Income Countries are listed by the World Bank, and includes countries with GNI per capita of US$ 1025 
or less. The list also includes African, Asian and Latin American countries. Some countries (for exemple, Benin and Congo 
Dem. Rep.) are listed both as LDCs and LICs, but the data presented on graph 12 do not overlap the ODA received by these 
countries. However, the ODA to African countries that are in the list of LDCs and LICs in graph 12 are included in both lines. 
15 See: http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_11   
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 266 
References 
 
Amsden, A. (2002) The Rise of “The Rest”. Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Bartels, L. (2008) ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M. Cremona (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Chun, Hong-Min, Munyi, Elijah N., Lee, Heejin (2010). South Korea as an Emerging Donor: Challenges and 
Changes on its Entering OECD/DAC. Journal of International Development 22, 788-802 (2010). 
Council of The European Union (2009). Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). 
2974th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation/support-regional-
integration/asem/documents/council_conclusions_17th_november_2009.pdf 
Council Of the European Union (2012). The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries. Brussels, 
14 May 2012. 
Council Of the European Union  (2012). EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy. Luxembourg, 11855/12, 25 June 2012. 
Economic Development Cooperation Fund (2010). EDCF Annual Report. Korea, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/edcfeng/index.jsp. Accessed on: 14/Jun/2012. 
Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of Multilateralism. Brussels 10.9.2003. COM 
(2003)526 Final 
European Commission (2006). The European Consensus on Development. Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2006/C 46/01. 
European Commission (2008). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – Consolidated 
Version. Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/47, 9 May 2008. 
European Commission (2010). The Treaty on European Union  – Consolidated Version. Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 83/13, 30 March 2010. 
European Commission (2011). Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change. 
Brussels, 13.10.2011. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed on: 06/06/2010. 
European Commission (2011). Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Ref. 1298. Directorate–General Development and Cooperation, Evaluation 
Unit, Brussels, December 2011. 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  267 
European Commission (2012). Republic of Korea-EU Summit – Joint Press Statement. Brussels, 28 March 2012, 
Meno 12/224. 
European Parliament. 2012. The Role of BRICS in the Developing World. Directorate-General for External 
Policies of the Union. European Union, Brussels, 2012. 
European Commission (2007). EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy. Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 28.2.2007. 
Ghosh, Anirban; Kharas, Homi. 2011. The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid. World 
Development Vol. 39, No. 11, pp. 1918-1929, 2011. 
Hackenesch, Christine. 2011. European Good Governance Policies Meet China in Africa: Insights from Angola 
and Ethiopia. European Development Co-operation to 2020 (EDC2020) consortium project. Available at: 
www.edc2020.eu 
HLF4 – 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011). SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION: 
UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF HORIZONTAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR BETTER DEVELOPMENT 
OUTCOMES. 29 Nov. – 1 Dec. 2011, Busan, Korea 
Joint Press Statement (2012) ‘Republic of Korea-EU Summit’ Brussels, 28 March 2012. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-224_en.htm?locale=FR  
Kharas H 2007 ‘The new reality of aid’ Presented at Brookings Blum Roundtable 2007 
(http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08aid_kharas/08aid_kharas.pdf) Accessed 27 August 
2012. 
Kharas, Homi; Rogerson, Andrew (2012). Horizon 2025: creative destruction in the aid industry. Overseas 
Development Institute, July 2012. Available at: www.odi.org.uk/resources/. 
Keohane, Robert O., Macedo, Stephen, Moravcsik, Andrew. 2009. Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism. 
International Organization, 63, winter edition, pp. 1-31. 
Keukeleire Stephan & H.Bruyninckx Hans, (2011) The European Union, the BRIC’s and the emerging new world 
order. In: C. Hill, & M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kim, Jiyoung. Foreign Aid and Economic Development: The Success Story of South Korea. Pacific Focus, 2011, 
Volume: 26 Issue: 2 Pages: 260-286. 
Kim, Soyeun. Bridging Troubled Worlds? An Analysis of the Ethical Case for South Korea Aid. Journal of 
International Development 23, 802-822 (2011). 
Marx, A. Kitaoka, K. & A. MacGillivray (2011) ‘Private Sector Development, Knowledge Management and 
Networks’, in, UNIDO, Networks for Prosperity. Achieving Millennium Development Goals through Knowledge 
Sharing. Vienna: UNIDO 
Mawdsley, Emma. The Changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift 
theory. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Volume 37, Issue 2, pages 256–272, April 2012. 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 268 
Milner, Helen V. and Tingley, Dustin H., The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy 
(2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900147. 
Mungcal, Ivy (2012). For South Korea, aid to Uganda marks a trend. Devex. Available at: 
http://www.devex.com/en/news/south-korea-and-its-oda-spending-in-uganda/78856. Accessed on: 8th August, 
2012. 
OECD. 2008.  DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: DAC Special Review. 2008. 
OECD, Paris. 
OECD.  2011. DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. OECD, Paris. 
OECD. 2012. European Union: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2012. 2012. OECD, 
Paris. 
OECD. 2012. OECD.Stat (database). Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx. Accessed on: 3rd March 
2012. 
Slaughter, A. (2004) A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Slaughter, A. & D. Zaring (2006) Networking goes international: An update, in, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, 211 
The Reality of Aid (2008). Reality of Aid 2008 country report: Republic of Korea. Available at: 
http://www.realityofaid.org/  
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 2008. Trends in South-South and triangular 
development cooperation. April 2008. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/dcf%20bangkok%20meeting.pdf 
Walz, Julie and Ramachandran, Vijaya (2010). Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and 
the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance. Working paper 273, Center for Global Development, November 
2010. 
UNIDO and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (2011) Networks for Prosperity. Achieving Millennium 
Development Goals through Knowledge Sharing. Vienna: UNIDO 
YAMOUSSOUKRO (2008). Yamoussoukro Consensus on South-South Cooperation. Twelfth Session of the 
Intergovernmental Follow-up and Cooperation Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing 
Countries Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, 10-13 June 2008. Available at: 
http://www.g77.org/ifcc12/Yamoussoukro_Consensus.pdf 
 
 
 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  269 
EU-KOREA RELATIONS TO PROMOTE REGULATORY COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC POLICIES, IN PARTICULAR INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
 
WOLFGANG PAPE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Industrial policy is often simply associated with ‘picking winners’ and thus distorting competition, while exposing 
the government to capture by vested interest.1 However, free competition without rules is self-destructive and 
leads in the end to winner-takes-it-all monopolies. Also, the priorities given to overarching public interests, like in 
promoting clean technologies to combat climate change, have shown the need for regulatory approaches to 
industrial policy.  
Still, for many Europeans just putting these two notions of industrial policy and competition policy in one 
sentence still tends to conjure up a great ideological divide between Colbertian “dirigistes” and economic 
libertarians. On the one hand, there is faith in the ability of governments to successfully build, direct, and protect 
the supply side of the economy. On the other hand, we find a belief that markets should only be subject to rules to 
guarantee a level playing field, but that they are otherwise best left to their own devices2.  
In addition, the recent economic crises have strengthened the arguments for governmental intervention 
for reform and growth, thus overcoming the earlier trend towards market-fundamentalism, spearheaded in 
particular by the Anglo-Saxons in the era of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher when policy intervention into 
the economy had fallen into disrepute.  
In view of the fact that regulatory approaches to industrial development policies, however, differ not only 
over time but also considerably in concept and practice between Europe and Asia3 (and here in particular 
between the EU and Korea), it is important to first understand their divergent socio-cultural backgrounds and 
evolutions to date, before detailing their current situations, potential for cooperation and mutual learning as well 
as expected future directions.  
 
2. EU INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
 
2.1. BACKGROUND  
Many observers, predominantly in Asia, claim that Europe’s cultural homogeneity, in particular with Christianity as 
a more or less common basis, has facilitated also her economic integration. The concept of a common ‘European 
Economic Model’ became most eminent during the dynamic ‘Golden Age of European Growth’ from the early 
1950s to the mid-70s. Still today, the World Bank identifies six unique features of the European development 
model. They include elements like: more accountability of enterprises not only for profits by shareholders, but 
also for social and environmental consequences of their actions; recognition of innovation, research and 
development and tertiary education as primarily a responsibility of the state; workers enjoying the most effective 
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protection; and European governments being most representative, decentralised and distributive and with the 
most advanced supranational coordination.4  
As part of industrial policy, it is in the competition policy of the EU where all Member States come 
together under the ‘acquis communitaire’ of the relevant provisions based on the Lisbon Treaty’s articles 101 to 
109. These basic rules outlaw collusion and abuse of market power. The challenge for the Commission in 
applying these rules is to prioritise its enforcement resources to focus on remedying the most serious 
impediments to the functioning of markets. Targeted enforcement of this kind -centred on sectors which are key 
to competitiveness as well as behaviours which produce the most harmful economic effects- are at the core of EU 
industrial policy. 
a) However, apart from the internally common elements of European economic policy in comparison to 
other parts of the world, it has become increasingly evident during the current Euro-crisis, affecting 
mainly the Mediterranean members of the southern periphery of the Euro-zone, that the European socio-
cultural background of economic policies is as diverse as the various sub-models that still compete 
quite distinctly within the EU as a sort of sub-variety of capitalism. These models hardly follow national 
borders, but they rather form political and cultural clusters of Member States with similar approaches to 
economic policies. Their variety of economic institutions conditions levels of social protection, distribution 
of income and the availability of collective goods.5 However, behind this analysis lies the fundamental 
debate between political philosophies of neo-liberalism and social democracy.6 Accordingly, one could  
basically distinguish liberal market economies (LMEs) from coordinated market economies (CMEs) , or 
cum grano salis in geographical terms in Europe between north and south.  
It can be generalised that the Nordic Member States of Denmark (‘flexi-curity’), Finland and 
Sweden, plus also the Netherlands feature higher degrees of social protection and fiscal intervention 
with a variety of active policy instruments, while the more conservative Mediterranean region of 
especially Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain delivers less efficiency and equity. The more liberal Anglo-
Saxon islands of the UK and Ireland allow a higher incidence of low-paid employment (‘hire’n fire’), 
although activation measures are important. The so-called Rhine-Model of mainly Austria, Belgium, 
France and Germany focuses more on concerted actions (‘Mitbestimmung’) and keeping up 
employment.  However, unlike Germany, France owes more of its concertation to common career 
patterns of an elite that in addition has much closer ties to the states and less links to the rest of the firm. 
In view of these varieties even within Europe, some economists call the notion of one single “European 
social model” misleading.7  
Earlier works of political sociologists have grouped together three models with more emphasis 
on the welfare systems, namely the most liberal approach by the Anglo-Saxons, the social-democratic 
approach of Scandinavian countries, and the continental and Mediterranean approach combined as the 
conservative approach.8 In particular the last grouping that unites countries on both sides of the Alps is 
hardly tenable anymore today. Since the Germans insist on austerity reforms along their own experience 
under Schroeder to be imposed in Greece and other southern countries of the EU, the wide policy cleft 
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over the Alps has become more evident. Likewise, the commonality between France and Germany 
within the Rhine-Model seems to diminish in view of the new French President Hollande having taken 
office in May 2012 by calling for a new Growth Pact rather than austerity measures, in opposition now 
with the quartet of Germany, the Netherlands Sweden and Denmark.  
It remains to be seen if these recent tendencies are merely short-term political shifts reflecting 
the fluctuation of often personalised election results, or long-term trends in social modelling. It is 
extremely difficult to evaluate different models not only for the general voting public but also even for 
experts, because underlying cultural values9 as well as political and economic circumstances change 
over time. Furthermore, increasing interdependence beyond national and regional borders in the current 
wave of globalisation greatly affect the outcome of any model. In 1999, The Economist10 listed up seven 
models worldwide: America, Japan, East Asia, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the Netherlands.  
At that time, it could still conclude that the “American model is the most successful job-creating machine, 
but Germany and Japan are better at combining growth with equality.” Such a statement would certainly 
not be correct anymore in 2012.   
 
b) In the context of comparing the European economic model(s) with the Korean approach, it is instructive 
to also consider the distinction made earlier by the French author Michel Albert in his best-selling book 
“Capitalism contre capitalism.” He emphasised the differences between the two western models of 
Anglo-Saxon liberalism and of the countries along the Rhine (“en recul”) in comparison also to the 
Japanese model.11 The latter in turn has been very influential in Korea’s development, since it has been 
under strict Japanese occupation for some decades until the end of WWII and even afterwards still 
largely followed major elements of the neighbour’s regime thanks to the model’s success there until the 
bust of the Japanese bubble in the 1990s.  
Notably, distinctions made based on the relational firm as the actor in the centre of the 
economy12 lead to findings of common denominators in the economies of Japan and South Korea in 
view of their histories of zaibatsu/keiretsu and chaebol, which are enjoying a highly embedded 
autonomy.13 This coordination in company-groups with connectivity vertically as well as horizontally by 
labour-unions, value-adding chains and managerial oversight of big and widely diversified 
conglomerates like Samsung and Hyundai clearly divert from the continental European industry-based 
orientation not only of the blue-collar workforce but also of the management and public policy here. 
 
c) From the angle of legal systems, one has to also point out the differences amongst the EU Member 
States. On the one hand there is the continental system of codification and, on the other hand, the 
system of case law still widely practised on the Anglo-Saxon islands, with the UK eminently not even 
having a written constitution. These differences also have impacted the reception of legal systems in 
East Asian countries, including Korea, which basically adheres to the principles of continental style 
codifications of law.  
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In terms of industrial standard-setting, Europe’s multi-coordinated approach confronts a congeries of 
nationally coordinated market economies in Asia14, led by Japan and increasingly also China and South 
Korea. The latter’s economy is highly dominated by chaebol, they likewise exert an eminent impact on 
the standards in Korea.   
 
2.2. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE EU  
Against this socio-cultural background of increasing unity in diversity, the Member States agreed in the 2010 
Lisbon Treaty that the primary legal basis for industrial policies at EU level in article 173 TFEU should 
concentrate mainly on competitiveness issues ranging from entrepreneurship and SME promotion to fostering 
R&D and innovation. In this framework, the European Commission laid out a strategy in the Industrial Policy 
Communication of 201015 for sustainable growth, competitiveness and job creation in the context of the 
‘Europe 2020 Strategy.’  
Focusing on the long-term goals of competitiveness and sustainability, the Communication over 33 
pages sets out policies ranging from horizontal to sector-specific measures, and covers areas from raw materials 
and infrastructure to energy and space exploration. It highlights numerous action points addressed to the 
Commission itself as well as Member States, which become objects of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations for control 
of efficiency and effectiveness. ‘Competitiveness-proofing’ and moving towards ‘smart regulation’ are considered 
essential at all levels of regulatory intervention and across all of the different policy fields affecting industrial 
competitiveness. 
This 2010 Communication of ‘Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage’ is currently 
submitted to public consultation until September 2012 in order to filter out a limited number of new initiatives that 
are capable to deliver results as well as actions to correct problems emanating from the present implementation 
of industrial policy. 
However, recent developments in the wake of the current economic crisis and the fast changes in 
economic sovereignty of certain countries may lead to more extensive interpretations and stronger economic 
governance in general at European level. They clearly go beyond even the ‘European Semester’ and ‘Europe 
2020 Strategy,’ which can already considerably impact industrial policies strictu sensu, as for instance concerning 
competitiveness of industries sector-wise or horizontally.   
The economic situation in Europe since 2008 has revealed the importance of stronger economic 
governance and coordination at EU level.16 Hence, the Commission set up the so-called ‘European Semester’ 
as a new governance instrument based on proposals put forth already in 2010. Approved by the Member States, 
the European Semester has since 2011 allowed EU institutions to coordinate Member States’ budgetary and 
economic policies even before their adoption by their respective national parliaments in order to assure that they 
are in line with the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact as well as the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Each year, the EU Semester begins a new six-month cycle in January with the Annual Growth Survey by 
the Commission (as the basis for an analysis of the progress made towards Europe 2020 goals), as well as a 
macro-economic report and the joint employment report. It aims to establish an integrated approach to recovery 
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and growth, concentrating on key measures to be taken by the EU institutions and then by Member States 
following country-specific recommendations.  
Such ex-ante coordination of national budgets at EU level, while they are still under preparation and 
before national parliaments’ approval, can be considered critically as a significant interference into budgetary 
sovereignty of Member States, although they are still to be discussed by Council formations and the European 
Parliament. The Member States then explain their medium-term budgetary strategies through Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and, at the same time, draw up National Reform Programmes setting out the action 
they will undertake in areas such as employment, research, innovation, energy or social inclusion. Subsequent to 
an assessment by the Commission, the Council will issue country-specific guidance by mid-year, in particular if 
policies and budgets are “out of line” by diverging e.g. from realistic macroeconomic assumptions for fiscal 
consolidation, competitiveness of industries, imbalances and so forth.  
The Commission has also reinforced governance by a set of rules that do allow more rigorous 
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, complemented by a concrete "toolbox" following consultations with 
i.a. the Task Force on Economic Governance, which is chaired by the President of the European Council.   
In particular, the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ of December 2011 with five Regulations and one Directive allows 
fiscal surveillance as well as macroeconomic surveillance under the new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
and recalls the medium-term objective - so-called preventive arm – that the general government deficit must not 
exceed 3% of GDP and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, with the possibility of financial sanctions of up 
to 0.5% of GDP. 
The latest strengthening of economic governance at EU level in parallel with the ‘Six-Pack’ can be seen 
in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). In May 2012 it was still to be ratified by more 
Member States to reach the minimum of at least twelve "Euro-area Member States" in order to enter into force 
with its "Fiscal Compact." As an only intergovernmental agreement signed by just 25 Member States it will not 
become EU law as such, but it is more restrictive with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP. 
Independent institutions shall monitor over the compliance with these stricter rules of economic governance, 
which shall be implemented in national law as binding provisions, preferably in Member State constitutions.  
In addition, in the financial sector the Commission is overseeing a ‘rule-making spring’ for post-crisis 
regulation of hedge funds as a follow-up of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. Amid public 
anger over financial excess, the Commission proposed rules on governance standards, reporting requirements, 
stricter liabilities, minimum capital and pay constraints on an industry that had enjoyed relatively free reign. A draft 
of 110 pages of ‘supplementary rules’ relates to specialist issues. Some in the industry fear it would raise costs 
and shut out US-American and Asian fund managers. While there is concern that the openness of the EU market 
is maintained also for those from afar, the Commission is taking a tougher approach regarding financial services 
groups outside the EU in order to have them effectively work under similar rules and supervision.17   
Also, the exclusive competence of the EU for competition rules (article 3 TFEU) form part and parcel of 
industrial policy in the wider sense18. Likewise, Chapter 11 of the EU-Korea FTA comprehensively describes 
competition as a major field of cooperation. Furthermore, in the light of the FTA, sectoral EU policies beyond 
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space exploration (article 189 TFEU) come under industrial policy and thus are apt for cooperative efforts. 
Moreover, since non-tariff barriers (NTBs)19 are at the core of regulatory issues between the EU and Korea, NTB-
related questions of industrial development policy such as certain standard settings and IPR policies should 
become object of bilateral discussions and monitoring.  
Similarly, the areas of policies on entrepreneurship, innovation, clusters, sectoral regulatory policies and 
even the promotion of SME internationalisation belong to relevant EU industrial policies. Thereby, they are often 
hard to distinguish from trade policies, including export promotion, which still fall into Member State competence. 
This is also reflected in the often overlapping activities between the pertinent departments within the European 
Commission, in particular on SME internationalisation20 initiatives taken at the same time by the Directorate-
General for Enterprise and Industry (DG-ENTR) and the Directorate-General for Trade (DG-Trade). Lacking a 
legal basis for export promotion as such, the Commission nevertheless managed in connection with the ‘Small 
Business Act ‘of 200821 to gain agreement with Member states to establish an IPR-Helpdesk and SME Centres in 
China, India and Thailand etc., apart from setting up an Enterprise Europe Network that includes branches not 
only in neighbouring countries in Europe but also in Seoul and in provinces of China.   
An Action Programme for the improvement of the business environment by cutting red tape in Europe 
could only be reached in shared responsibility of the EU Institutions and the Member States. The joint target set 
in 2007 aimed to reduce administrative burdens for businesses by 25 % by 2012. The Commission has proposed 
measures by 2012 that reduce administrative burdens by up to 33% or more than EUR 40 billion, in particular for 
more than 5 million small companies. In February 2012, the Commission published the so-called ‘Stoiber Report’ 
under the title “Europe can do better.” This report by a High Level Group of Independent Stakeholders on 
Administrative Burdens shows examples of how Member States implement EU law in an intelligent way so that it 
is not hampered by unnecessary administrative burden at national level. Smart regulation should further improve 
the business environment following the 74 best practices listed for improving the implementation of EU 
legislation.22  
In this context, one might theoretically go as far as to include in this paper complementing industrial 
policies by individual Member States. However, examining all 27 Member States’ industrial policies for this 
purpose would overstretch the capacity of this exercise.23  
In terms of procedure, at least mention should be made of the EU procedural specificities of so-called 
‘Comitology,’ the particularly complex and intransparent way in which most of the implementation of rules of 
industrial regulation are decided.24  
  
3. KOREAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES  
 
3.1. BACKGROUND  
Unlike the diversity in the EU, the high cultural homogeneity of Korea25 and its coherent resistance against 
foreign powers, especially its neighbours China and Japan, has generated a strong identity as a nation. The 
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concept of government in the Korean tradition is principally derived from the Confucian doctrine that served as 
official state philosophy over half a millennium since the Choson Dynasty started at the end of the 14th century. 
 
3.2 HISTORY  
In this Confucian tradition, government is regarded as a secular authority conferred by the mandate of heaven, 
and thus it rules through an authoritarian hierarchical order. Here lies also the origin of the pervasive 
submissiveness of Koreans to an elite, formerly the ‘yangban’ class.26 Subsequently, the Japanese annexation 
regime radically transformed the agriculture-based Korean economy into a supply base for the  Japanese industry 
preparing for WWII. 
During this rapid industrialisation the share of manufacture in production grew from less than 4 percent 
to over 20 percent.27 After Japanese rule, the US-American military government retained the Japanese-style 
centralised bureaucracy in Korea to avoid a vacuum in the growing confrontation with the communist North.28  
Only in the late 1980s, constitutional reforms towards civilian government and wider freedoms were introduced 
along with elections for local councils throughout the country. Nevertheless, the role of local communities in 
economic governance until now remains limited. Recently, the self-reliance ratio of local authorities has even 
dropped considerably to 30 percent and less, while their debt burdens surge with municipal bonds having been 
used for infrastructure projects to build railways and residential towns. The central government has bought up 
most of the municipal bonds, thus raising the dependence of counties and localities.29  
Hence, South Korea, in terms of its industrial development policy at least, can de facto be regarded as a 
highly centralised country, where, in contrast to the EU’s internal differences, local deviations rarely occur and 
policies can be more easily generalised as common to the whole territory.  
Consequently, one can not only say that South Korea has already learned to a high degree from a 
‘Japan Model’ of developmental state and mercantilism30 during the period of occupation until 1945, but also that 
post-WWII military dictatorships 31  further exploited the historically strong authoritarianism and Confucian 
deference32 to impose top-down industrial development priorities33.  
In spite of considerable USA-aid earlier on, these initial industrial policies were hardly successful in 
South Korea in terms of GDP growth.  Only since the 1960s, the introduction of Five-Year Plans and strong 
leadership under the military government of President Park brought economic advance. He likewise turned 
commercial banks into de facto public enterprises by legally limiting private voting rights. 
Thus the share of public sector investment climbed to about 35 percent over the period from 1963 to 
1979.34 The government’s most visible instrument formed public enterprises, of which the value added during 
1963 and 1977 increased at an annual rate of 10 percent. But the Koreans remained flexible and pragmatic 
leading to high input-output interdependence. This adjustment is equally reflected in downward trends in 
allocations, as the need for direct government investment decreased in some sectors.  
Korea needed an outward-looking strategy in view of its poverty in natural resources and small 
domestic market. Thus government initiatives aimed at growth through export of labour intensive products. 
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Interestingly, different from the Japanese, the Koreans actively encouraged the inflow of foreign capital in order to 
supplement the shortage of domestic savings.  
Thanks to this policy, the country’s real GDP expanded by an average of more than 8.7 percent per year 
from 1960 to 1989, while GDP per hour worked more than tripled. In the early 1980s, government intervention in 
the economy was greatly reduced35 and liberalised to promote competition. This helped to achieve even double-
digit growth towards the end of the decade. However, in 1997 the Asian Financial Crises hit Korea hardest, but 
the Korean government could contain problems with a loan by the IMF, which partly resulted from the legacies of 
thirty years of government-led growth and close collusion with big business.36           
Government plans were mainly implemented through selective subsidisation of chosen chaebol, the fast 
growing family enterprise-groups modelled after the Japanese zaibatsu, but without internal banks. The ties 
between the political leadership and the conglomerates was more symbiotic than in ‘Japan Inc.’37 The chaebol 
often engaged in projects in risk sharing with the administration. Unwarranted heavy-handed government action 
and support of non-viable institutions by the administration only worsened the credibility of Korea abroad, leading 
to foreign capital flight.  
The tough reforms, introduced towards more economic freedom38 and strengthening the market, in 
addition to stricter prudential regulation of banks in the aftermath of the crisis, have allowed the Korean economy 
to swiftly bounce back to a fast recovery. Since 1997, a regulatory quality system has also been developed and 
consolidated and the commitment to a ‘participatory society’ has promoted more transparency in the regime of 
rules. These days, the Internet is increasingly used to reduce administrative burdens. The emphasis has shifted 
from quantitative reduction of the overall stock of regulations towards further promotion of regulatory quality.39  
Likewise, the need of innovative entrepreneurship in SMEs has increasingly found recognition in the Korean 
administration, gradually reversing some of the pro-big business policies and thus opening up chances for 
newcomers, including from Europe. EU and Member States’ policies in favour of SMEs can serve as examples 
here.40  
The main aim of the introduction of competition policy41 into the Korean economic system has been to 
deal with the evolving monopolistic industry structure of chaebol. Therefore, in 1981 the Korean government 
decided to strengthen the market through a competition law, namely the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
Current Korean competition policies have sought to curb the activities of the conglomerates and overhaul 
corporate governance, now often in favour of SMEs.  
 
3.3. CURRENT SITUATION IN KOREA  
Since the late 1990s, Korea’s industrial growth is increasingly fuelled by the information technology sector based 
on production of semiconductors and telecommunications equipment. The construction industry has also been 
aiding economic growth.  Today, Korea is a global leader in high technologies, especially in the areas of mobile 
phones and thin-film transistor liquid crystal displays. Its heavy industries such as car, steel and shipbuilding also 
have won worldwide recognition.42 
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In these sectors, the big chaebol are now globalising43 and their dominance is coming under stricter 
political scrutiny at home. At the same time, as austerity obligations limit government finances, it has become 
more difficult to enforce interventionist industrial policies. Nevertheless, the government’s share in total R&D 
expenditures increased to 26 percent in 2003, in particular in the sector of semi-conductors, which amounts to 
over ten percent of Korean exports.44   
Furthermore, like in the EU and even the USA, the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises 
in Korea has clearly grown over the last years, accounting for 99.9% of all enterprises and 88.4% of all 
employees. They also contribute 50.8% of value added in manufacturing.45 Hence, the Small & medium Business 
Corporation (SBC) functions as a powerful non-profit, government-funded organisation and provides financing for 
SMEs, also to enhance their global competitiveness along with KOTRA, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency.  
Korea’s first ever 'National Green Growth Strategy' of the 2009 Five-Year Plan investing annually 2 
percent of GDP for a low-carbon economy is leading internationally in the field and already delivers impressive 
results.46 Korea’s renewable energy sector has grown six fold over the past three years.  In addition, a low rate of 
the Korean currency helps to maintain economic growth and exports at the highest levels among OECD 
countries. In particular in the field of big nuclear plants, the success-stories in ‘policy-guided’ exports of Korean 
companies are impressive. In spite of the accidents in Japan, South Korea plans to export 80 such installations 
by 2030. 
 The OECD conducted two major Reviews of Regulatory Reform in Korea, in 2000 and 2007, as 
reforms are now moving Korea from a highly interventionist and authoritarian model of economic development to 
a market- oriented and open model based more on values of consumer choice, democracy, and the rule of law. 
However, the web of government intervention has only been partly reformed, and many important issues are still 
to be tackled.  
 The global economic crisis since 2008 gave a renewed impetus to implementing reform activities within 
Korea. The government introduced a new type of institution with the Temporary Regulatory Relief (TRR) and 
Regulatory Reform for New Growth Engine Industries. The TRR can waiver or mitigate the implementation of 
some burdensome regulations for a certain period of time, thus increasing investment in new business and 
reducing burdens for SMEs. In addition, the rental rate applied to leasing governmental properties for small 
business will be reduced from 5% to 3 %. This waiver has considerably contributed to the enhancement of 
business investment and employment level.  
 The Regulatory Reform for New Growth Engine Industries also cleared off various stumbling blocks that 
hinder the development of future growth industries such as new and renewable energy, tourism and green 
technology.  
 In 2009, with the adoption of the Regulatory Information System (RIS), an on-line system was introduced 
that covers the entire process of regulatory reform, ranging from regulatory review to registration, reform task 
management and access to regulatory information.  The new system provides a service monitoring the current 
status of each ministry's regulatory reform process.  
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 The Korean government has also expanded the Sunset Clause legislation since 2009. Now about 20% 
of the existing regulation47 is to be reviewed on a regular basis.48  
 
4. EU-KOREA COOPERATION BASED ON AGREEMENTS 
 
Better mutually understanding these areas of industrial development could open up highly beneficial cooperation 
for the EU as well as for Korea.  
Apart from bilateral agreements and the multilateral institutions of the UN etc., also in the context of the 
interregional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, there are first regulatory cooperation projects, in particular 
for SMEs. For instance, in the follow-up of the ASEM Forum 2010 on Green Growth the so-called ASEM SMEs 
Eco-Innovation Centre was established in Seoul.49 
Both, the EU as well as South Korea, originally showed little desire for bilateral trade agreements and 
gave clear preference to the multilateral negotiations of the WTO during the period of Pascal Lamy as 
Commissioner of Trade in the EU. 50  The recognition that bilateral FTAs rather privilege multinational big 
businesses over less internationalised SMEs also has supported this policy. However, the lack of progress in the 
Doha Round changed perceptions not only in Europe, but also in Korea.51 
Between the EU and Korea, regulatory issues are important as seen in the main two bilateral 
agreements signed in 2010. The EU-Korea Framework Agreement forms an overarching political cooperation 
agreement with a legal link to the FTA. It expressis verbis proposes cooperation on regulation in a wide range of 
sectors of various services, data protection, food safety, drugs to competition law and protection against 
terrorism, but hardly goes into details regarding their actual implementation.  
Clearly more concrete in terms of regulatory cooperation is the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
which has been provisionally applied since July 2011 while the process of ratification in Member States 
continues. In the context of regulatory provisions the FTA’s Chapter 12 on Transparency is of particular 
importance, as it obliges both sides to pursue an efficient and predictable regulatory environment for economic 
operators, especially small ones.  
Chapter 10, dealing with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), goes farther than the obligations under the 
WTO and its TRIPS Agreement. The provisions on Geographical Indications carry particular interest for EU 
business, notably in the food sector. But the sub-section on Trademarks is also still meaningful for the EU in view 
of continuing problems with counterfeits in Korea, although now “Korea is rich, so it can no longer grow fast by 
copying others”52.  
A particularly delicate issue is the European Commission’s recent inquiry into Samsung’s alleged 
withholding of “industry standard essential patent rights” and thereby breaching EU competition law.53  
Another major field of cooperation on economic regulation specifically dealt with in the FTA relates 
namely to competition policy. In Chapter 11 of the FTA, both sides recognise the importance of free and 
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undistorted competition54 in their trade relations. Beyond this agreement on basic concepts of competition policy, 
the FTA remains rather weak in its implementation, since both sides are willing to exchange only upon request 
and only public information concerning competition law enforcement activities and legislation. Equally limiting 
appears their denial to apply the general Dispute Settlement System of the FTA to competition law cases. 
The detailed Dispute Settlement System namely, which they introduced in the FTA itself, otherwise is 
of importance to the entire regulatory cooperation between Korea and the EU. Besides the general provisions in 
Chapter 14, under almost each and potentially problematic issue and sector treated in the FTA, specific rules 
were worked out to lead to solution of conflicts by entering into consultations in good faith with the aim of reaching 
a mutually agreed solution.  
Throughout the 1426 pages of the FTA, there are numerous proposals of detailed regulatory cooperation 
in specific sectors. Not all cases can be treated in this limited paper, but the following important cases should 
serve as an example how such cooperation could find concrete form.  
a) In Chapter Four of the FTA, the regulation of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) are mentioned for 
cases of cooperation in the framework of both sides’ rights and obligations under the TBT Agreement of 
the WTO. For “joint cooperation” in the field of standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures the EU and Korea “may establish regulatory dialogues” in order to increase the 
mutual understanding of their respective systems. More concretely, it is proposed to identify, develop 
and promote trade-facilitating initiatives such as the exchange of information, experiences and data and 
scientific and technical cooperation with a view to improving the quality and level of their technical 
regulations.  
b) In terms of trade involved and politically the most sensitive sector for the EU proved to be the car 
industry in Annex 2-c of the FTA as demonstrated already during the negotiations of the FTA and in 
last-minute delays of the ratification of the FTA in the European Parliament. Five of the twenty-one 
market access issues of the EU with Korea relate to the automotive sector55. The benefits for EU 
producers of automobiles and their parts in the FTA are in the provisions under which Korea accepts the 
equivalence of motor vehicles produced to EU specifications or Global Technical Regulations within a 
period of five years of the entry into force of the FTA. In practice, Korea is accepting international 
standards (UN-ECE) or EU standards. Both sides commit to ensure that their respective procedures are 
accomplished without undue delay for the marketing of automobiles and parts. Some observers go as 
far as expecting the possibility of a five times rise of EU exports of cars to Korea,56 as both sides commit 
to harmonise their regulations.  
c) Electronics, in Annex 2-B of the FTA, likewise provide an important industrial sector with concrete 
proposals for regulatory cooperation. Besides consulting each other on the development of international 
standards in multilateral bodies like the ISO, IEC and ITU with a view to establishing common 
approaches, bilaterally conformity assessment procedures shall not have the effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to trade with the other side. Regulation in electronics shall follow the shared 
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objectives and principles of i.a. gradually aligning their domestic regulations with existing international 
standards and implementing appropriate regulatory and legal enforcement mechanisms as to product 
liability and market surveillance. 
d) Another example of regulatory cooperation is the Cooperation on Trade and Sustainable 
Development as detailed in Annex 13 of the FTA. Both sides commit with an indicative list of areas of 
cooperation i.a. to set up an “exchange of views on the trade impact of environmental regulations, norms 
and standards”. 
e) In view of the fact that by the end of 2012 a formal regulatory dialogue has not yet been established 
between the EU and Korea other than in the so-called Working Groups under the FTA, it is useful to 
shed some light on the ongoing dialogue of the EU with Japan. This dialogue resulted originally from 
discussions at an EU-Japan Summit in 1994. Such exchanges are expected to take up extra momentum 
with the start of the negotiations of an FTA between the two sides in 2013. 
The first meetings of the EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue took place in Tokyo in 1994 and 
covered in particular areas of retail distribution, competition policy, sanitary and issues, financial 
services, public procurement, customs, transport and telecommunications. The EU requested to expand 
these rather ad hoc meetings with a view to longer-term dialogues. 
The Japanese administration then added 279 items for its list for deregulation or rather ‘relaxation’ of 
regulation (kisei kanwa in Japanese 57 ). This so-called Deregulation Action Programme was to be 
implemented over three years with annual reviews. At the same time, the EU accepted reciprocity in 
deregulation, i.e. also accordingly action in EU-Member States upon request by Japan. 
The 2001 Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation strengthened the mandate towards cooperation 
between the competent authorities in a variety of areas ranging from standards to conformity 
assessment in various sectors, notably telecommunications, environment, energy, transport services 
and construction. It added the intention to follow a consistent regulatory approach of Japan and the EU 
in the future”.  
f) In general, throughout all the sectors proposed for regulatory dialogue and cooperation between not only 
Korea and the EU, but likewise with any other trading partner, however, there are in praxi two major 
obstacles that often prevent fruitful cooperation of such sort to take place.  The more important the 
bilateral trade is in value, the easier it is, of course, politically and institutionally to overcome these 
obstacles.  
One obstacle is usually the absence of sufficient staff and/or budgetary means in DGs/Ministries and internal 
bureaucratic wrangling to take on the task of organising and providing the necessary content for such cooperation 
exchanges, especially for more horizontal cooperation like on TBTs.  
 In order to provide a concrete example of such intra-bureaucratic conflict within the European 
Commission, the case of an ‘Internal Working Document – Outline, Commission Communication “Shaping 
Globalisation with International Regulatory Cooperation”’ is illustrative. Drafting the document while the text of the 
Korea-EU FTA was already initialed by both sides’ negotiators (i.e by another Directorate-General) did not 
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prevent the responsible official (of a different Directorate-General) not only to ignore the cooperation proposals of 
that text, but even not to mention at all this possible regulatory cooperation in the future. The document outlined 
that regulatory issues are addressed in many ways internationally. At a multilateral level, the WTO/TBT 
Agreement provides certain tools, as do sectoral agreements in global fora such as UN-ECE, OECD, GHTF, etc. 
Bilaterally, trade and cooperation agreements (like “FTAs”), mutual recognition agreements (“MRAs”), and 
agreements to extend the internal market to neighbouring countries (so called “PECAs” and “ACAAs”) help 
support regulatory harmonization. The document listed the ‘major trading partners’ with which the Directorate-
General at the time conducted bilateral regulatory dialogues, including the USA, China, Japan and Russia. “As 
globalization increases further, these efforts are likely to increase over time” was the concluding perspective of 
the Directorate-General.  
 With only limited practical experience in Korea as a Research Fellow in the autumn of 2011, the author 
can only point out the more homogenous and big-business dominated scene in the country that renders the 
established bureaucratic channels of communication and decision-making in the country much smoother and less 
transparent than in multi-cultural Europe. Common denominators can be identified much more easily and faster in 
a single nation-state like Korea with only one language and tradition.   
 This is likewise true concerning the second obstacle for fruitful bilateral cooperation, namely cases of 
involvement of specific sectors of industry, where in Europe often the problem lies in the difficulty how best to 
bring to bear and balance the (vested) interests of industries concerned and other stakeholders. This has to be 
achieved in an equitable fashion that allows both sides to agree on an acceptable solution/compromise that at the 
same time respects also the common good in the public interest.  
 The difficulties in this context involve a long list of issues starting from the basic problems of 
transparency and accountability of lobbying with its only voluntary register in the EU. The political issues of 
lobbying, however, are not unique to the EU system of governance, but in a similar fashion concern single nation-
states like the EU members and Korea. Nevertheless, in addition to its supra-nationality one particularity of the 
EU democratic system in comparison to Korea stands out and needs to be mentioned here, namely the often as 
‘democratic deficit’ criticised monopoly of the executive branch (i.e. Commission) to propose legislation. This 
monopoly is still justified in view of the Commission being the only institution representing the EU interest as a 
whole, whilst European Parliament and Council rather mostly still serve national and even subnational interests. 
This fact gives the Commission particular powers in rule-making in the EU.  
 In addition, there is a de-facto dominance by the Commission and at the same time absence of the 
European Parliament 58  in the little understood process of so-called ‘Comitology’ that decides the bulk of 
implementing rules of EU legislation. The relevant Interinstitutional Agreements after the Lisbon Treaty sought 
among the Commission, the Council and the Parliament reflect the strong position of the executive in the EU 
system, which often is further strengthened by its expert capacity that is in particular missing on the side of the 
Parliament.  
 In this context of ‘Comitology’ and in relation to Korea, it is noteworthy that the EU recognizes as 
equivalent to Member States’ auditor public oversight the system of South Korea and vice versa, which is not yet 
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the case with the USA.   
 
 
5. GLOBAL CONTEXTS OF EU-KOREA RELATIONS 
 
The EU --beyond the continuing task of integrating its now 27 Member States into a Union-- is closely linked to its 
neighbourhood of the EFTA, to the Mediterranean Union through EUROMED, to the Eastern Partnership and 
through the Transatlantic Council to the USA.  
South Korea on a peninsula on the other side of the Eurasian continent is still under the tensions of the 
Cold War and occasionally hot conflicts with the DPRK, in spite of the Six-Party-Talks involving also its 
neighbours China, Russia and Japan as well as the USA.   
 
5.1. KOREA-USA RELATIONS 
President Obama of the USA recently announced to give a higher priority to Asia as a whole in view of the 
growing importance of the continent in the world economy as well as geopolitically. The initiative for a Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) underlines this intention by the Americans to shift more attention to Asia. Of course, 
South Korea is still stuck in the tensions of the Cold War, which has become history of the past for Europeans. In 
particular for reasons of security policy, South Korea remains militarily bound to the USA with American troops 
still very much present in the country. But also in terms of trade the relations with the USA have exerted and 
continue to maintain at present a high influence on Korean policies.   
Not only for the Americans, Korea was known for a long time as “one of the toughest places to do 
business.” The legacy of decades of Korean government promotion of manufacture and exports, an anti-import 
bias amongst the general consumers and  “frugality campaigns” have lingered in the public mind and in many 
government regulations and practices.59  
That is why in the mid-1990s in view of a continuing decline in bilateral trade following the peak back in 
1986, the US administration chose Korea as a test case and entered into a Dialogue for Economic Cooperation 
(DEC).  In parallel to the traditional bilateral market-access talks, the DEC was established in order to advance 
reform in the country, especially to allow better access for foreign investment in Korea. In the same vein, a 
dialogue with the Korean Fair Trade Commission was to improve government policies and regulation in order to 
ensure the promotion of fair competition and opening of the market to newcomers. For the Americans the one-
year DEC was only a modest success in view of their high expectations at the time towards economic 
liberalisation in Korea. They summed up their frustrations by stating that Korea’s non-tariff trade barriers are often 
compared to those of Japan ten years ago.60 
Since its peak in the mid-1980s at 31 percent, the share of the USA in total Korean trade has continually 
declined to only 9 percent in 2011 with Korea enjoying a surplus for the entire last decade. But at the same time, 
a vibrant Korean economy managed to avoid the middle-income trap61 and grew twice as fast as the OECD 
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average. After the Asian Financial Crisis it had resumed its rise to close up with the living standards of the rich 
countries like Japan and the West.  
These trends were reason enough for both sides’ Presidents already in 2005 to confirm their willingness 
to explore the possibility of a USA-Korea FTA. In direct reaction to the politicians’ announcement of beginning 
FTA talks, several anti-FTA organisations in Korea became popular with vested interests, particularly in domestic 
agriculture, and started vehemently to take their opposition also to the streets of Seoul. Nevertheless, after eight 
rounds of formal negotiations and other exchanges in 2009 the Korean and USA negotiators reached a first 
agreement on a text for an FTA. However, subsequent American requests for amendments62 and even a restart 
of discussions as well as last-minute wrangling in Parliament in Seoul postponed the ratification of the so-called 
“KORUS” until November 2011. Finally, “KORUS” came into force on 15 March 2012, more than nine months 
after the provisional implementation of the “KOREU” started with the EU, first negotiations of which began not 
until 2007.   
 
5.2. KOREAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 
While its FTAs with the EU and with the USA now have advanced to the process of parliamentary ratification and 
went into effect respectively, Korea had started work on an FTA with Japan already in 2004. But the two Asian 
governments had suspended such talks, and now Seoul will resume free trade negotiations with Japan only 
towards the end of 2012.  
Bilateral talks on an FTA with China likewise had been put on the back-burner since first foundations for 
it were laid in 2005. Similarly, these two continental Asian countries consider resuming the negotiations during the 
next half a year in 2012. 
Aside from bilateral trade links, China seems to be willing now to engage further even with both Korea 
and Japan as shown in May 2012 at their trilateral summit meeting with their joint declaration proposing to begin 
work on a China-Japan-Korea FTA and an investment agreement still within this year 2012.   
 
6. FUTURE POTENTIAL OF EU-KOREA REGULATORY COOPERATION 
 
During the month of July 2011, the initial month of the provisional FTA enforcement, for the first time in a decade 
the EU achieved a trade surplus with Korea, since European exports temporarily had jumped unexpectedly.63 In 
view of Korea’s sensitivity as a nation depending for 43 percent of its GDP on exports, the European Commission 
played down its short-lived success-story with the FTA as a bubble of held back deliveries to Korea.  
The actual implementation of the FTA on both sides and the consequent exploitation by business of 
the liberalisation of bilateral trade will take years, but the expected potential is slowly being realised by economic 
operators, including through the awareness of the gradually opening up of the legal system in Korea. In particular, 
European traders --even after months of the FTA in force—have not yet sufficiently realised the possibilities of 
becoming an ‘approved exporter’. Furthermore, problems still remain with the protocol on the Rules of Origin.64 
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The elimination of 98 percent of customs duties on goods over seven years and liberalising several 
services sectors, however, clearly provide new chances for European business in Korea. Notably, the services 
sector will open up important opportunities to Europeans, because its productivity in Korea is only two-thirds that 
in manufacture, the largest gap amongst OECD countries.65  
While for example some departments in the European Commission so far have remained reluctant to put 
South Korea on the list of strategist partners and for starting regulatory dialogues, it can be assumed that such 
attitudes will change rather fast towards a consensus in the business and political world as well as in national and 
EU bureaucracies in order to attach more attention to Korea in the near future. Regulatory cooperation seems to 
be most promising in the services sector where regulatory loopholes remain wide and multilateral supervision 
absent.66 
Korea’s main competitor for attention in the EU, Japan, will continue to remain under stress not only for 
reasons of adversary natural forces for years to come. Japan seems to remain politically inept to regain 
internationally the image of dynamism, which it enjoyed worldwide until the bubble’s blast in the 1990s. A debate 
in the EU Council in early June 2012 on relations with the island nation led to postponing the date to give the 
Commission a mandate (after the ‘scoping exercise’) to start the work for entering into negotiations of an 
“Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan.” It showed the difficulties the EU continues to have in 
communicating with Japan. Notably, vested interests in automobiles and railways and the general perception of 
Nippon’s NTBs block any advances towards a bilateral agreement on trade. The Regulatory Reform Dialogue of 
the EU with its fifth largest trading partner still needs to gain from discussions with Japan over a wide range of 
sectors. But the difficulties of attaining changes in the Japanese regime of NTBs caused mainly by domestic 
vested interests under the self-diagnosed ‘Galapagos Syndrome’ hardly breed optimism. Nippon’s insular 
mentality and continued weak international communication capacity -- exemplified lately by the Fukushima 
accident’s consequences67-- do not feed mutual trust either. 
China also has a ‘trust gap’ with the EU68. But now as the world’s second biggest economy (discounting 
the EU/Euro-zone as one single economy) certainly more assertive and traditionally more communicative, it is 
fully accepted by the EU as its second largest trading partner.  This includes regular dialogues on industrial policy 
topics of technical regulations, market access etc. Unlike fully regulated Japan, China particularly since its entry 
into the WTO is still newly setting up its legal regulations in many fields (“rule by law”) --including a basic 
Competition Law-- which the EU wants to influence from the very beginning. This renders the regulatory 
dialogues with China particularly important for the EU as the global soft power in industrial standardisation and 
regulation.  
The comparison with China and Japan shows clearly the chances of Korea as the pro-active third player 
in-between the two Asian giants. Korea can best serve as an international hub in East Asia that is closer to 
western mentality with 30 percent of its population being Christians and that has become a trusted partner in long 
and successful negotiations with the USA and with the EU. Not only for the USA, its FTA with Korea is perceived 
as a test case. Without ‘KORUS’ and ‘KOREU’ becoming long-term success stories, however, neither the USA 
nor the EU will find it easy to conclude negotiations of bilateral FTAs with Japan or China.    
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
A comparison of industrial development policies in the EU and South Korea cannot hide the striking difference of 
the originally great variety of market economy models within the integrating Europe on the one hand and on the 
other hand the most homogenous economy of ‘Korea Inc.’ Of course, we compare here a nation-state economy 
(”a shrimp”) on a peninsula pressed between the second and third biggest national economies (“two whales”) of 
the world with a partly already supra-national group of 27 Member States of a unifying market economy in 
progress.  Notwithstanding the diverging origins in geography, history and culture, the potential for regulatory 
cooperation in EU-Korea relations is significant. Common denominators in the legal infrastructure mainly based 
on continental concepts of law facilitated already the negotiations and now the implementation of the bilateral 
Free Trade Agreement of 2011. Its provisions give clear directions for priority sectors as well as the procedures to 
follow to better promote regulatory cooperation. Austerity policies and resulting budget restrictions due to the 
financial crisis, notably in the EU, as well as intra-bureaucracy wrangling in the relevant administrations might 
pose obstacles. But the overwhelming interest in such cooperation by business involved, additionally stimulated 
on the EU side by the jump in exports to Korea since the FTA, should nudge also officialdom on both sides 
towards action. 
A first recommendation for better mutual information ought to be addressed to the mass media in Korea 
as well as in the EU. The limited understanding of the EU by the general public and thereby also small business 
in South Korea is to a high degree due to the one-sided focus of any international reporting over the Pacific 
Ocean rather than over the Eurasian continent. Even the insular Japanese media carry more information about 
Europe than their Korean competitors. Also European media have room and now with the exemplary FTA in 
place more than ever reason to identify and better inform about Korea. 
A second recommendation is directed towards European businesses to recognise the role that Korea can play as 
a gateway to the huge Asian markets, in particular China and Japan. This potential will only grow with further 
FTAs the EU will launch with Korea’s neighbours.     
Thirdly it is recommended that European industrial associations and lobbies open their membership to 
Korean representatives, as most recently done by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association through 
admitting Hyundai as a member. Such openness can greatly improve the flow of information in both directions. 
Finally, more directly aimed at enhancing regulatory cooperation is the recommendation to start a regular 
Regulatory Reform Dialogue between the relevant Directorates General of the European Commission and the 
Korean Ministries and agencies involved. Such dialogues are ongoing with Japan already since 1994 and other 
trade partners more recently. With the EU-Korean FTA now being implemented the launch of formal bilateral 
exchanges on regulatory issues is urgent in order to fully exploit the opportunities of the FTA.  
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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 
AND ARMS CONTROL 
 
CHRISTOPH BLUTH 
NEIL WINN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the East-West confrontation, the Korean peninsula has 
paradoxically witnessed an increase in tension. Unlike the Central European countries and the former Soviet 
Union, the North Korean communist regime did not fall, but rather consolidated its hold on power as it became 
increasingly isolated. North Korea’s nuclear programme precipitated a major international crisis in the 1990s 
almost resulting in military conflict with the United States. This crisis was resolved by the Agreed Framework that 
involved a freezing of the nuclear programme in return for various economic benefits such as the provision of 
heavy fuel oil and light water reactors to alleviate North Korea’s chronic energy shortage. This was accompanied 
by a policy of engagement (the “sunshine policy”) pursued by South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and his 
successor Roh Moo-hyun that resulted in the development of economic cooperation between North and South. 
However, the Agreed Framework collapsed as a result of inconsistent implementation and evidence of North 
Korea’s pursuit of uranium enrichment. Conservatives in South Korea viewed the collapse of the Agreed 
Framework and nuclear tests by North Korea as evidence of the failure of engagement policy. The effort by the 
Lee Myung-bak government to pursue “conditional engagement” however also failed as North Korea engaged in 
military provocations that prompted the wholesale termination of all economic cooperation between North and 
South (with the exception of the Gaesong industrial complex). As the North Korean elite became preoccupied 
with the leadership succession the situation on the Korean peninsula has remained tense. There is increasing 
awareness in South Korea that a new approach has to be found to break the cycle of engagement and 
confrontation and find a more durable way of engaging North Korea. This paper will provide an analysis as to why 
previous approaches have failed, why the institutionalist approaches to collective security that have been 
successful in Europe are not appropriate in this case and then consider an alternative based on the concept of 
normative power that moves away from the focus on arms control and security as the main vector of engaging 
North Korea diplomatically towards a more holistic approach. 
 
2. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE WITH COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A MODEL FOR KOREA? 
 
The experience of seeking to engage North Korea over the last twenty years has demonstrated that a purely 
regulatory approach to arms control or even a “grand bargain” that focuses solely on security is not workable. 
Although the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks produced promising results, these were abandoned 
when the overall relationship between North Korea and the other parties came under stress.1 But the European 
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experience of collective security and projecting normative power through informational and procedural diffusion of 
norms could provide a basis for a new form of engagement through building institutions in which the six parties 
plus Europe develop a more dense network of engagement that gives the North Korean elite a greater stake in 
preserving such a framework. Among South Korean scholars the notion of constructing institutions of collective 
security in Northeast Asia using the European model of CSCE as a template has been a popular theme for a long 
time.2 This has gained more traction among the South Korean policy elite recently as other approaches to 
engaging North Korea have failed. Thus the leading presidential contender for the Grand National Party in the 
forthcoming presidential elections, Park Geun-hye, published a landmark paper in the journal Foreign Affairs in 
which she articulated the concept of “Trustpolitik”. In essence , she proposed a long term process of building trust 
between North Korea and the other states in the region based on the example of collective security in Europe.3 
Among liberal elite figures in South Korea there is also a realization that new approaches to engaging North 
Korea have to be found. However, building trust will require institutional engagement that is broader than that of 
the Six Party Talks that focussed only on the nuclear issue and proved to be unsuitable to overcome the zero 
sum game of security in the region. In order to understand this issue, it is useful to review the efforts to use the 
traditional instruments of institutionalism to engage North Korea and understand why they have not worked. 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING THE FUNCTION OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME IN ITS POLICY TOWARDS OUTSIDE 
POWERS 
 
North Korean foreign policy behaviour has seemed confusing and Pyongyang’s intentions have been subject to 
controversy and different interpretations. But contrary to these impressions, given the situation they find 
themselves in, there is a clear logic in the policies they pursue. During the Cold War period, the confrontation on 
the Korean peninsula was embedded in the East-West confrontation. Both Koreas were kept secure and at the 
same time restrained by their respective superpower allies. For North Korea the geopolitical situation was 
somewhat more complex than for the South, because Kim Il-sung did not accept Soviet dominance such as was 
exercised in parts of Eastern Europe. Consequently he pursued a policy of equidistance between China and the 
Soviet Union. At the same time he gradually built up North Korea’s military capabilities with a view to achieving 
unification under his leadership when the time would be ripe. Since the end of the Cold War and the loss of 
economic support and reliable security guarantees from its erstwhile sponsors, the top priority for North Korea 
has been regime survival. The Kim regime feels threatened by the changed geopolitical environment and in 
particular what it calls the ‘hostile policy’ of the United States, and its severe economic difficulties. 
The US concern with North Korea’s nuclear programme provided Pyongyang with the opportunity to 
engage the United States. This engagement came to be perceived in Pyongyang as the key for addressing the 
external security concerns and the economic predicament of the DPRK. Essentially North Korea wants the US to 
accept the legitimacy of the regime, normalize diplomatic relations, take concrete steps to end the military threat 
to North Korea, such as sign a non-aggression pact, and remove economic sanctions. It is important to not only 
understand the motivations that drive North Korean foreign policy, but also the tactics. Just as the United States 
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uses coercive measures (such as unilateral and multilateral sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions) as 
well as incentives (the provision of fuel, the lifting of sanctions, diplomatic visits), North Korea uses its own form of 
pressure tactics (developing and demonstrating military capabilities, refusing to attend talks, issuing verbal 
threats, abandoning previous agreements) alongside cooperative gestures (permitting inspections, implementing 
parts of previous agreements, attending talks, entering into new agreements). The principle is ‘action for action’.  
There are two reasons for this kind of negotiating behaviour. The first is that North Koreans want to negotiate 
each element of a package deal separately in order to extract the maximum concession at each stage. The 
second is that the nuclear and missiles programmes are the only cards that North Korea has. The Bush concept 
of ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament’ that was floated in 2004 is not workable from the North 
Korean point of view because once they give up this card they have no further bargaining leverage. Consequently 
North Korean concessions have amounted to very partial resolutions of the nuclear issue. Although prior to its 
first nuclear test North Korea at various times reaffirmed that it was prepared to denuclearize the Korean 
peninsula, the best that has ever been on offer is a freezing and the termination of the production of plutonium.  
North Korea experts generally emphasize the rationality and the effectiveness of North Korea’s foreign 
policy and diplomacy. 4   It is true that North Korea, a very weak state, has managed to gain significant 
concessions from very powerful states. The fact that the United States has decided not to use force against North 
Korea is an important achievement for North Korea’s asymmetric strategy of deterrence. However the overall 
results of seventeen years of diplomacy are mixed. Although Pyongyang has received enough external support to 
muddle through and even somewhat improve its economic situation, it has not achieved its major objectives.  
Despite all of the investment into the construction of two light water reactors, by the beginning of the Obama 
presidency North Korea was further away than ever from having LWRs provided. By mid-2009 all of the previous 
diplomatic gains had been lost, and North Korea was under the most severe sanctions since negotiations over its 
nuclear programme began. As a result of the Cheonan incident in March 2010, when a South Korean frigate was 
sunk by North Korean special naval forces, the South Korean government cut of all political and almost all 
economic links with the North. Its relations with Japan, the Republic of Korea and to an extent even China had 
reached its lowest point ever. 
The flaw in North Korea’s diplomacy is that its policymakers incorrectly assess what drives US policy and 
therefore the manner in which they employ the instruments available to them is to some extent ineffective 
because they project their own world view onto others and do not anticipate the reaction of the United States 
correctly. Thus efforts by North Korea to coerce the United States to change its policies have often had the 
opposite effect. After years of negotiation, Pyongyang may have nuclear devices, but it is further away from other 
benefits which were within its grasp previously. The regime’s constant refrain is that its main aim is to change the 
hostile policy of the United States towards it. But many of its actions do not promote this aim – quite to the 
contrary, it strengthens the hand of those in the United States who believe North Korea can never be trusted and 
that any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK are a waste of time.5 
The concepts of national autonomy and sovereignty play a key role in North Korean diplomacy. The 
application of international law, external inspections or the verification of agreements are seen as being in 
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fundamental contradiction to these principles. The launch of a Taepodong-2 (or Unha-2) missile on 5 April 2009 
to put a satellite into orbit is a good example. It was clearly designed to demonstrate North Korea’s missile 
capabilities and defiance of UNSCR 1718. It was a way for the Kim regime to demonstrate that it was standing up 
for its sovereign rights and was not cowed by international reaction.6 It is clear from the history of US-DPRK 
negotiations that diplomats are often under pressure to prove that they are standing up to the demands of the 
United States. This can mean that they become too inflexible and lose sight of the larger objectives and fail to 
obtain the results that they are seeking.7 
The decision to seek a nuclear capability was probably taken by Kim Il-sung in response to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis which made the Soviet nuclear guarantee appear unreliable. The decision to finally assemble a 
nuclear device and conduct a nuclear test was taken in 2003 after the 11th round of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly in September 2003. A decisive factor was the Iraq war, which seemed to demonstrate the need for a 
capacity to deter a US attack.8 The belief of the North Korean elite that the nuclear programme enhances the 
status of the DPRK, provides deterrence against external aggression and facilitates a security dialogue with the 
United States that enables North Korea also to obtain much needed economic support is deeply engrained. North 
Korea has been willing to freeze and limit its nuclear programme, but the leaders in Pyongyang have never yet 
reached the point where they will finally give it up, and it is difficult to conceive any circumstances under which 
this might happen. Even if the various demands were met and the US established diplomatic relations, signed a 
non-aggression pact and followed through with other promises about ‘changing its hostile policy’, this would not 
be enough to permanently guarantee North Korea’s security.  
On the other hand the external threat to North Korea is primarily created by the nuclear programme in 
the first place. There is a curious paradox that underlies North Korean foreign policy, which is that is 
fundamentally predicated on making North Korea appear dangerous to the international community. This 
motivates the United States and other countries to engage with North Korea in order to mitigate the threat, but in 
order for this to be sustained the threat has to be periodically revived. This creates the seemingly inescapable 
cycle of conflict and cooperation. It also accounts for North Korea’s diplomacy which to outsiders sometimes 
appears erratic and even irrational. 
 
4. UNDERSTANDING US POLICY TOWARDS THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
 
US policy towards North Korea has been dominated by the nuclear programme since the early nineties. This is 
because nuclear proliferation has been identified as a general problem of global security, and the perception in 
Washington is that states that renege on their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
threaten the treaty regime as a whole. Moreover, if North Korea were to acquire a significant nuclear arsenal this 
could embolden it to engage in more substantial military provocations against South Korea, whereas without the 
nuclear element the strategic balance on the Korean peninsula is considered to be stable. Policymakers in 
Washington have been faced with a fundamental disagreement among politicians and officials on how to deal 
with this issue, as well as the underlying paradoxes of the issue that they have to confront. The conflict over what 
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US policy should be is associated with different interpretations of the nature of the problem. Among conservatives 
there is a view that North Korea is a ‘rogue’, totalitarian regime that brutalises its own population and that its 
propensity for external aggression is a result of its ‘nature’ in common with totalitarian regimes elsewhere in 
history. The international community should use all coercive means at its disposal, from isolation to sanctions and 
military action to contain and deal with the threat that its poses.9 President Bush included North Korea in the ‘axis 
of evil’ of states that pose a threat to the international community by their support for terrorism and the 
development of weapons mass destruction.10 The term ‘evil’, of course, is just a label that says nothing about how 
the national interests of North Korea are constituted or the objectives of national policies. In fact, it discourages 
further analysis.  Apart from the fact that this particular approach substitutes name-calling for a real effort to 
understand North Korea, it does not provide a coherent basis for policy. Moreover, it embodies significant risks 
given the support for military actions against North Korea and the advocacy of total economic sanctions in order 
to bring about regime change. Although there is little chance that these objectives will be achievable given the 
refusal of China to cut off support for North Korea, it could have catastrophic consequences if they were realised. 
The liberal perspective on North Korea is grounded in a realist approach to international relations and interprets 
North Korean foreign policy behaviour as a rational response to the geopolitical situation that the DPRK finds 
itself in the aftermath of the Cold War. North Korea perceives the United States as constituting a real and present 
threat to its national security, threatening pre-emptive strikes and refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the North 
Korean state.11 Looking at North Korean actions in more detail, it is possible to explain many of them as 
countermoves to American political pressure or even military threats. The corollary is that if the external threat is 
mitigated, then North Korea’s behaviour will change. The more extreme version of this perspective, which is 
espoused by policymakers in China and many on the left in South Korea see the United States as the real source 
of instability in the region.12  
Those officials and politicians in the US who became directly involved in negotiations with North Korea 
were not necessarily located in one or the other camp. Unlike the Bush administration, the Clinton officials never 
attempted to provide an explanation for North Korea’s behaviour.  It came down to the pragmatic issue of how the 
nuclear programme could be stopped. Once the military option was ruled out, diplomacy backed up by sanctions 
was the only option. Ironically the Bush administration adopted a similarly pragmatic approach in its second term 
despite the ideological predispositions of the President who included North Korea in the ‘axis of evil’. The term 
“axis of evil” originated from one of Bush’s speechwriters David Frum, who had been given the task to provide a 
conceptualisation of the war on terror for Bush’s 2002 “State of the Union” address in terms that moved it beyond 
Islam and Al Qaeda to focus more generally on the phenomenon of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Frum drafted a memo in which he developed the idea of an “axis of hatred” that compared the Axis 
powers of World War II with contemporary “rogue states” and international terrorists. Michael Gerson, Bush’s 
chief speech writer, changed the expression “axis of hatred” to “axis of evil” reminiscent of President Ronald 
Reagan’s characterisation of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”. The first draft of the “State of the Union” 
speech referred to the “axis of evil” without mentioning North Korea or Iran. Those two countries were added in 
before the speech was delivered at the behest of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in order to avoid an 
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exclusive focus on Iraq, given the preparations for a military confrontation with Iraq. But in the original concept, 
there was no suggestion that North Korea was co-operating with other countries and Islamic terrorist groups to 
prepare attacks against the United States. The concept of the “axis” was just a figure of speech. The only 
collusion that US policymakers believed in was one between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, and that has turned 
out to be an illusion.13 
There is no doubt that the deep divisions in Washington about the nature of the problem and the 
appropriate means to deal with it seriously hampered US diplomatic efforts. The unwillingness of Congress to 
support the Clinton administration meant that there could be no treaty with the DPRK, only a so-called ‘agreed 
framework’. Moreover, Congress could not be relied upon to provide any funds, so the financial burden of 
implementing the agreed framework had to be assumed mostly by the South Koreans and the Japanese. The 
funds for heavy fuel oil promised by the US had to be found from discretionary funding, which caused supplies to 
be behind schedule and meant the United States was seen as an unreliable partner in the agreed framework.14  
The more fundamental issue is that the basic principles of whatever agreement is arrived at with the 
DPRK simply cannot be fully implemented. During seventeen years of negotiation neither side has come to the 
point where they were really willing to hold up their end of the bargain. Moreover, just as North Korea will never 
fully relinquish its nuclear card, the US will never fully accept the legitimacy of the Kim regime, and American 
policymakers are deluding themselves if they think otherwise. Consequently the manner in which the objectives of 
negotiations with North Korea have been framed defines ideals, rather than achievable goals. The two sides will 
have to settle for something in-between. 
 
5. DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
Much of the discourse in relation to North Korea has emphasized the threat that North Korea represents to the 
international community. Consequently the main focus of diplomatic engagement has been on the nuclear 
programme. While this was inevitable, given that North Korea sought to leverage its military capabilities in order 
for the international community and especially the United States to engage with it, this has prevented the 
emergence of a holistic approach to the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Thus all of the diplomatic resources of the 
United States have been devoted to stop North Korea from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Now that this has failed, 
the objective is to put the genie back in the bottle and persuade Pyongyang to eliminate its nuclear capabilities. 
However, there is little chance that this can be achieved. The United States has both tried to compel and 
persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programme. The results have been mixed, but in the final analysis 
North Korea did complete the development of a nuclear weapon and the North Korean elite has decided not to 
accept complete denuclearization.15 
The institutionalist approach to dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and the crisis on the Korean 
peninsula more generally, based on efforts to persuade North Korea to adhere to international norms and 
obligations in international law such as the NPT, or by providing a mix of sanctions and incentives has clearly 
proven ineffective. North Korea has defected from almost every treaty or framework it has ever been party to. 
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This includes all of agreements between North and South as well as the NPT, the Joint Declaration on 
Denuclearization, agreements between the DPRK and Japan and even many commercial agreements where 
goods were received but not paid for. The institutionalist concept does not work in the case of North Korea 
because the North Korean leaders never adopt and internalize the principles and values underlying any institution 
that the DPRK becomes a member of. Small violations in any agreement are used as an excuse to defect as 
soon as the North Koreans believe that the agreement no longer suits their purposes or that a better deal could 
be had.  Attempts to link various dimensions of relations with North Korea have also proven unsuccessful, as the 
leaders in Pyongyang will honour those provisions that are important to them and ignore others which are too 
insignificant or intangible to bring about a collapse of the agreement as a whole.16  
How to we explain this kind of behaviour? There are two different aspects to this. The first is that the 
North Koreans only respect power, and have absolutely no respect for norms or values. Moreover, they believe 
that others act in precisely the same way that they do. From this perspective, international law and institutions 
have no merit in and of themselves, but are just used as instruments of power to achieve certain objectives. This 
is why the notion that North Korea should permit intrusive IAEA inspections merely because they acceded to the 
NPT is incomprehensible to North Korean leaders, they see the IAEA just as an instrument of US policy. Efforts to 
negotiate and enforce agreements once they have been reached are just part of a continuous power play, in 
which North Korea seeks to extract the maximum advantage at every turn.  
The second aspect is that the confrontation over the nuclear programme is merely a symptom of a more 
fundamental problem for the North Korean state that is fundamentally irresolvable. The general concept of 
negotiations over the nuclear programme was that the international community would underwrite North Korea 
economically and normalise relations in return for the abandonment of weapons of mass destruction. However 
these efforts were based on faulty premises. The problem is that a resolution of the nuclear issue does not solve 
the underlying problem. The North Korean regime will continue to remain unacceptable to the United States and 
most of the international community. No matter what agreements are signed, the outside world will seek gradual 
regime change. On the other hand, the North Korean state is not viable politically, socially and economically. Its 
rulers reject internal reform, refuse to open the country up to the world and conduct its foreign policy on the basis 
of threats. Its projection of the external threat is a major element of its internal legitimation. This leaves the North 
Korean leadership with the dilemma that it needs to improve its relations with the outside world and especially the 
United States in order to mitigate the external threat and obtain the economic support it needs, while at the same 
time any such improvement undermines the regime and questions its very existence.  Thus, as we have seen, an 
unending cycle of confrontation and accommodation is inevitable while this regime endures, and this will last into 
the era beyond Kim Jong-il as his son Kim Jong-eun has taken over the reigns’ of power. The external projection 
of internal regime insecurity has been particularly evident since Kim Jong-il’s illness in 2008 which precipitated 
the process of succession. Subsequently the Six Party Talks were suspended, with the collapse of previously 
reached agreements, culminating in a second nuclear test and a missile test. The sinking of a South Korean 
frigate (the Cheonan) and the shelling of the island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010 brought relations between 
North Korea and most of the outside world to its lowest point since the end of the Cold War.  After the death of 
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the “dear leader” in 2011 the transition to the new leadership seemed to go more smoothly than feared. There 
was little evidence of any serious challenge to the position of Kim Jon-eun, supported by his uncle Jang Song-
taek, and the dismissal and execution of Ryu Kyong, a senior intelligence official and Kim Chol, a senior defence 
official in January 2012 and the purge Chief of the General Staff Vice-Marshall Ri Yong-ho on 16 July 2012 was 
further evidence of Kim’s consolidation of his leadership, but whether this means that he has the political room for 
maneuver or the intention to re-engage the West and initiate significant reform remains uncertain as of the end of 
2012.17 
Efforts to compel North Korea to eliminate its nuclear devices and materials or its ballistic missiles are 
doomed to failure.18 Sanctions have a limited effect as long as China  provides enough food and oil to maintain a 
basic lifeline for the regime. Diplomatic pressure and UN Security Council Resolutions produce a reaction of 
defiance. The use of force is so risky that no US president can contemplate it.19  
Another possible strategy would be to simply ignore North Korea and not to engage with it at all. This 
form of containment might look attractive, but there are significant dangers associated with it. First of all here 
would no longer be any constraints on the nuclear programme and the development of ballistic missiles. If North 
Korea restores the facilities at Yongbyon and completes the construction of the 50 MW(e) and the 200 MW(e) 
reactors, it will be able to produce significant stockpiles of plutonium. Alternatively, it could proceed with the 
production of HEU (highly enriched uranium) in order the manufacture nuclear warheads. Moreover, it is possible 
that in due course it will develop a ballistic missile of true intercontinental range, capable of reaching the 
continental United States.20 From Washington’s point of view, this would represent an unacceptable risk and shift 
in the balance of power which would constrain US options in dealing with North Korea.   For these reasons, a 
form of engagement which enables the international community to put some constraints on North Korean nuclear 
capabilities and reduces military provocations seems to be the only viable option, however unsatisfactory it might 
be. 
The concept of economic engagement with North Korea is predicated on the notion that even if there are 
no specific concessions from the regime in response to economic aid, it will create an increasing dependency of 
the regime on neighbouring countries. This dependency is a reality, but the regime has been trying to limit its 
impact and it has been almost impossible for either China, Japan, South Korea or the United States to translate 
this into tangible political leverage. The Lee Myung-bak government in Seoul proposed a very substantial 
investment in North Korea, mainly in the development of infrastructure to double North Korea’s GDP and 
modernise its economy in the hope that this would inevitably produce social and political change. So far this 
proposal has not gone anywhere due to the conditionalities (such as abandoning the nuclear programme) 
attached. But the grip of the regime is weakening very gradually. Government control in the northern provinces 
has weakened as the central government no longer has the resources to sustain the public distribution system 
consistently at a level that meets basic needs. The border has become porous, and North Korean border guards 
are easily bribed. Many North Koreans, especially in the northern provinces, have access to Chinese cellphones. 
While there is no political space for the emergence of an opposition or rebellion, the North Korean regime cannot 
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be sustained indefinitely. Change will come sooner or later. The problem is that it is really hard to conceive how 
there can be a soft landing. 
 
6. TRANSFERENCE OF NORMS: GOING BEYOND SIMPLE INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
As the preceding section has shown, the standard concepts of integrating North Korea into a collective security 
system or even building trust with North Korea are bound to fail due to North Korea’s failure to internalise the 
norms of any institution that it joins. Nevertheless the endurance of the Gaseong Industrial complex demonstrates 
that there are modes of cooperation that North Korea is interested in. Previous studies on collective security in 
Asia have focussed on traditional regime theory and institutionalism. However, in recent years the diffusion of 
international norms has come to be recognised to be one of the key determinants in the changes in the 
geopolitical environment in which the use of force or the threat of the use of force has become a largely irrelevant 
factor. To this purpose it would be useful to exploit the insights from the recent body of literature on EU foreign 
policy and norm diffusion (pioneered by Ian Manners) to develop new approaches to institution building in 
Northeast Asia. 
Neo-realism sees international relations to be primarily determined by material factors, whereas other 
approaches emphasize the importance of ideas and values, such as the constructivist approach, which is based 
on the notion that power in international politics is socially constructed. In other words, power relationships are 
not given in nature or determined by material factors alone and consequently can be altered by human practice. 
In the constructivist approach, elements of social reality such as perceptions of identity, norms and values, 
interests, fears and culture have a significant impact on the interactions of units (i.e. states) in the international 
system. In the words of Alexander Wendt: ‘The effects of anarchy are contingent on the desires and beliefs states 
have and the policies they pursue.’21 We can go further than that and state that the effects of anarchy are 
constrained by shared norms. Although the international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no world 
government and each state is considered to be sovereign, in reality many aspects of the interactions between 
states, in particular the use of force and international trade are highly regulated by treaties as well as international 
regimes and institutions. Recent work on norm diffusion has emphasized several mechanisms of for the 
transmission of norms.22 These include the spread of ideas in a globalizing world,23 the socialization through 
international  institutions 24  and the adoption of international norms in order to achieve legitimacy. 25  The 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is disputed in the literature. However, there is some level of agreement that in 
order for authoritarian regimes to adopt international norms it is important that such norms find significant 
acceptance in the population and that there is some political pressure for a greater acceptance of political norms 
by political leaders. The literature accounts very well for the failure of North Korea to adopt international laws, 
since the North Korean leadership has emphasized its national sovereignty and demanded the acceptance of its 
behaviour rather than adapting to international expectations. The international isolation of the country has 
minimized the density of interactions with the outside world, while the North Korean leadership derives its 
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legitimacy from the hostility of the outside the world rather than its acceptance. This is why a different approach to 
engaging North Korea is needed. 
 
7. NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE AND EU FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA? 
 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) was first coined by Ian Manners in his seminal piece on the subject that was 
published in 2002 .26 Manners’ more recent work characterises NPE as being ideational in scope involving 
principles, actions and impact that influence the conduct of European Union (EU) foreign policy .27 The impact of 
the revolutions of 1989, 9/11 and the recent global financial crisis have all had impacts on world order. Manners’ 
contends that these events tell us something about the power of ideas and processes of ideation in the conduct of 
international relations .28 What matters in this view is the power of ideas to potentially transform the world in a 
normatively sustainable manner. NPE operates according to a tripartite schema of principles, actions and impact. 
Principles comprise fundamental rights and freedoms in European and international law, the United Nations (UN) 
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and so forth. Principles follow from international law and treaties that have been in 
operation in the post-War period and can be said to be legitimate because of this.29 The EU’s greatest asset is 
constructive engagement and mutual dialogue in this regard.  
According to Manners European principles and persuasion are important for understanding EU actions 
in the world:  
Normative power should...be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative 
justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and 
the conferral of prestige or shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive 
engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multi- and pluri-lateral dialogue 
between participants...Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of prestige or shame 
by participants .30  
 
In recent times the EU has gone beyond its traditional policies in aid, trade and development broadening its remit 
to become a niche conflict prevention and crisis management actor responding to changes in post-1989 and post-
9/11 world politics. The EU’s engagement with other actors in the outside world is a key manifestation of this 
trend in that actions follow European principles and norms to a greater degree than ever before. 
Simplicity, partnership and consistency are important for EU foreign policy and its ideational context in 
projecting European values towards the outside world. European normative power impacts in the world are 
important for the projection and emulation of those values in the international sphere. Indeed: 
Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socialising in the impact of the actions taken to promote such 
principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must be involve socialisation, 
partnership, and ownership. Socialisation as an impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be 
seen as being part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact 
of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by the participating parties 
whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. Ownership as an impact of the promotion of 
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principles involves practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. 
However, such impacts of normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic 
socialisation is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational, and international support for international 
principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative justification conceived here.31 
 
The consequences of NPE in the world are linked to degrees of holisticity, justifiability and sustainability in EU 
foreign policy.32 The EU has in fact developed a holistic normative aspect to its foreign policy in the past twenty 
years in response to changes in world politics. The Union combines pacific normative values in its aid, trade, 
development, conflict prevention and crisis management policies and doctrines which are enshrined in key 
documents such as the European Security Strategy (2003) and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006). Yet 
the EU still often thinks in older pre-Cosmopolitan categories associated with Westphalian concepts of power and 
order in international relations such as, for example, determining EU foreign policy by competing with other Great 
Powers, developing military policies for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, and by 
aggressively pushing realist agendas in international trade for market share in a zero-sum fashion. 
Hence even though the EU represents a sui generis organisational alliance of new modes of 
international thought and action it still behaves in an inherently self-interested state-like fashion when the 
conditions on the ground matter. This has the disadvantage of undermining the project of NPE values and 
concepts beyond the borders of Europe which are supposed to be post-Westphalian in substance.33 In essence 
the EU is both a normative actor and a self-interested realist actor in global politics depending on the issue and 
context. One advantage of being seen to be a non-traditional actor that espouses NPE values is that the EU is 
not considered to be a threat in international relations in the traditional military sense. This has meant that many 
states and regional organisations have sought to emulate the Union in its organisation and policies if not always 
in replicating its values. This allows the Union to play the role of honest broker in world politics, being less of a 
threat than traditional military powers. This has benefits for the EU also for external actors’ which seek to forge 
deeper relations with the EU and also helps the EU to build normatively constructed relations from its own 
perspective with outside powers. 
EU norm diffusion practices in the post-Cold War world are predicated on the need to secure Europe and 
its stability in a time of momentous change after the fall of Communism and the rise of transnational security 
threats after 9/11. The post-1989 order in Europe was characterised by hiatus and uncertainty in the period 1989-
1993 with some doubts as to the role of Germany in the new Europe, the relationship between Paris and 
Bonn/Berlin, whether the former communist states in Eastern Europe would join the EU, and to what extent core 
European values formed around democracy and human rights would alter as a response to changes in the wider 
international system.  This formed the context for broader EU norm diffusion in Europe after 1989 and post 9/11. 
In fact, European values have been extended over the past two decades by an extension of the rule of EU law 
both in Europe and towards states wanting to join the Union. Successive EU enlargements since 1995 have 
emphasised strict Copenhagen criteria relating to democratic and capitalist norms that prospective members 
must take on board to join the EU. The rise of phenomena such as humanitarian intervention, the extension of the 
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rule of law, the right to protect, democracy promotion and good governance in Europe’s periphery have extended 
European norm diffusion both extra-territorially and ideationally outside of the borders of the EU.  
Specific EU policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have also sought to project 
European values in Europe and beyond via a mixture of hard conditionalities related to EU law and regulation 
from the centre in Brussels. In this sense this is similar to the asymmetrical process of EU enlargement in that 
Brussels sets the conditions and those wanting something from the Union (such as trade agreements, access to 
the Single European Market, or membership of the Union) have to accept Brussels political and economic 
conditionalities. This in itself spreads EU norms from above via elite regulation and laws as contained in the 
Union’s Treaties. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992) preamble emphasises `the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ in EU foreign and security 
policy and within the Union more generally. The Lisbon Treaty defines fundamental EU norms and values thus: 
The Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the EU aims to promote peace (Title I, Article 3-1) and that its 
role in the world would reflect the principles that have inspired its creation, development and 
enlargement (Title V, Article 21). The Treaty identifies the 
contribution to peace, the prevention of conflict and the strengthening of international 
security amongst its core foreign policy priorities (Title V, Article 2c).34  
 
However, this process of top-down elite democratic norm diffusion by the EU is also underpinned by an 
emphasis on the Union making connections with bottom-up grass roots movements in the civil society of third 
party states and groups. The Union especially tries to embed its norms in war torn and divided societies via its 
policies of conflict resolution to spread stability.35   
The EU’s values and norms and their diffusion are also linked to the EU’s conception of itself as a 
foreign policy actor. In the literature the EU is often said to be a soft power or civilian power as was first espoused 
by Francois Duchêne36 where the Union was characterised as a zone of legal and functional stability which 
operates in a non-threatening and non-military fashion. The obverse of this is that the EU is characterised as a 
military power, which does not fundamentally capture either its predominant economic identity in the world or its 
civilian modus operandi. Indeed, the military power Europe thesis is slightly odd in that it is derived from realist 
theory which is used to analyse the state as the key unit in international relations. The EU is not a state, it does 
not possess the legitimate monopoly of violence over its people like a state, and is a unique sui generis 
organisation that is largely built on the regulation of economic power. In fact the EU is a predominantly civilian 
power both practically and ideologically that emphasises economic power and legal regulation and shuns the use 
force. This is partially as a result of how the EU has developed internally and externally as an economic actor 
since the early 1950s and also due to a downgrading in Europe of military tools as a means for solving political 
problems after WWII. European norms and values came to embody the creation of a zone of peace, prosperity 
and stability in the post-War world which has mostly endured in Europe to present day.  
In the North Korean case the EU sought to engage normatively and practically with Pyongyang in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. The EU(3) of Britain, France, Germany and the then EU High Representative for 
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Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana sought to constructively engage with North Korea in talks on 
Pyongyang’s then embryonic nuclear arsenal. The case illustrates that there are real limits to the EU projecting 
normative power successfully with regard to isolated states, when Britain, France and Germany have different 
strategic priorities (Wagnsson, 2010).37 The disjointed intergovernmental diplomatic interactions between the EU 
and North Korea allowed the Kim Jong-il regime to pursue its nuclear weapons programme precisely because the 
EU itself was not directly engaging the Kim regime via its characteristic NPE-style norm diffusion techniques at 
the level of governmental, business/economic, military/security and educational/cultural élites. However, things 
have moved on since the early 2000s. An MBA programme was set up with the help of Korean-American money 
in 2009 at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST) which can only increase interactions 
between the West and North Korea. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited North Korea in the same year. 
On the governmental level the EU’s supranational institutions, particularly the European Commission, are held as 
being significant in South and East Asia (especially in world trade) and this can be built upon in different sectors 
of interaction at the governmental and non-governmental levels as has happened in the EU’s interactions with 
China over the last decade.38  
In order for an approach to engagement based on the diffusion and projection of norms to have any 
chance, it is important to start with two basic principles. The first is that engagement has to be holistic and must 
respect Kim Dae-jung’s principle of the separation of politics and economics. There has to be an acceptance that 
for the time being deterrence is the only way to address the security situation on Korean peninsula. The strategic 
situation is actually quite stable as neither the North nor the South and the US consider that anything can be 
gained from initiating a war. The Proliferation Security Initiative and the UN Security Council can be used to 
address the proliferation concerns in relation to North Korea. A dialogue on the nuclear issue can continue, but it 
is not prudent to link economic engagement to nuclear disarmament. There is now ample experience that the 
reinforcement of North Korea’s self-isolation with economic sanctions merely strengthens the control of the 
regime. Instead a more broadly based programme of economic engagement that involves not only South Korea 
but also the European Union, the United States and Japan could lead to a much higher density of interactions 
and interdependencies from which the North Korea elite would find it impossible to extract itself in the future. 
Moreover, it would reduce the DPRKs dependency on China and thereby radically reduce any benefits Bejing 
derives from the role of North Korea as a buffer state. China’s policy towards the Korean peninsula has so far 
been dominated by the fear of instability and the risk of a political and economic collapse that would result in the 
influx of a large number of refugees into China and the outbreak of uncontrollable conflict on the Korean 
peninsula that would provoke a major joint US-ROK invasion of the North. China’s strategy with regard to North 
Korea has been to use limited economic and political support in order to persuade the North Korean regime to 
reform its economy and to some extent its political system in order to follow China’s path as a way to escape from 
the current impasse. China has been prepared to pay a significant political price in terms of its relations with the 
United States, the Republic of Korea and its role as a “responsible world power” for its relations with North Korea. 
The political calculus might change for China if North Korea’s dependence on China is reduced and its economy 
reforms due to more direct engagement by other players such as the European Union alongside South Korea and 
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the United States improves domestic stability. It would also diminish the incentives for Pyongyang to use military 
threats as a means to extract economic and political concessions.39 The involvement of significant outside players 
in important elements of the North Korean economy and its infrastructure could in the medium term have a 
dramatic effect on opening up the country and weaken the hostility of the regime to the outside world. A complex 
network of political and economic relations would socialise North Korea into accepting political and legal norms 
on which such relations would have to depend.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The global security landscape has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold war. Clearly the major risk to 
international security in the time following the post-Cold war period resides in the so-called new wars, sub-state 
conflicts that arise from ethnic disputes, or failed states in regions of low development.40 For the vast majority of 
states, there is no significant risk of war. This is a fundamental reason why the nuclear non-proliferation regime is 
robust.  
There is a substantial recent body of literature which argues that major war is becoming obsolete as an 
instrument of foreign policy or as an activity of states. The most highly developed version of this thesis has been 
presented Steven Pinker who has sought to demonstrate, using a wealth of historical and contemporary statistical 
analyses, that not only interstate war, but all forms of violence (including homicide and other forms of criminal 
behaviour) have undergone a systemic, worldwide decline as cultural norms have changed. Pinker, Joshua 
Goldstein and Christopher Fettweis also demonstrate the dramatic decline in interstate warfare (to the point 
where this phenomenon has become exceedingly rare) and the precipitous decline in worldwide casualties of war 
and terrorism since the end of World War II.41 The work of Michael Mandelbaum, John Mueller and Christopher 
Fettweis is based on the observation that the costs of war have dramatically increased while its benefits have 
become marginal.42  The sources of wealth for knowledge-based economies in a world of global trade are no 
longer to be found in armed conquest. In the past, at the end of the 19th century, war was considered a normal, 
legitimate and necessary activity of states. But the norms governing international relations have changed. Now 
the use of force is no longer considered acceptable except under very exceptional and restricted circumstances, 
and war is considered to be akin to a form of criminal activity. 
Traditional international relations theory has viewed the distribution of power as the key variable that 
explains the sources of insecurity. This implies that major powers use military force to coerce smaller states, 
while smaller states enter alliances to either balance the major powers or bandwagon. But such a view of 
international security is anachronistic. In the contemporary international system, it is the asymmetry of the 
diffusion of norms rather than the asymmetry of power which accounts for the sources of insecurity. This is why 
both the United States and the European Union perceive the diffusion of norms as a critical instrument for 
promoting international security.  
However, the conceptualisation of the dynamics of nuclear proliferation in the academic community and 
by extension in the policy community continues to 
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relations, even though the empirical evidence on proliferation completely defies the concepts of neo-realism.43 
This has led to a political consensus that coercive measures such as sanctions and the threat of the use of 
military force are appropriate means to deal with aspiring nuclear powers, generally dubbed “rogue states”.  It is 
this conceptual narrative that has defined US policy towards North Korea since the early 1990s. The problem is 
that such an approach is not compatible with the projection of norms. Although the United States is justified in 
maintaining robust power projection capabilities, the strategic objective of US policy must be to induce North 
Korea to act within the rule of law both domestically and in its foreign policy, which entails abandoning the use of 
military threats and provocations as tools of diplomacy. Consequently the United States and South Korea need to 
be careful about the use of force and even the threat of the use of force, because otherwise the legitimacy of their 
cause will be undermined. This means that armed force should only be used in response to armed aggression or 
if otherwise sanctioned by the UN Security Council. But it also means that the successful diffusion of norms 
requires the construction of a network of relations with North Korea in which security is only one and not the 
dominant element. This where a new initiative involving the European Union together with the other five powers 
engaged with North Korea could be used to develop a fundamentally new approach to dealing with the crisis on 
the Korean peninsula.  
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NORTH KOREA’S REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (RCA) ON THE EU MARKET AND ITS IMPLICATIONS * 
 
DEOK RYONG YOON  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After the economic collapse in the beginning of the 1990s, North Korea continued to see negative economic 
growth until 1998, and from 1999, it was on its way towards economic recovery. North Korean trade has followed 
likewise. Its trade figures decreased from 1991 to 1998 and then started to increase from 1999. In 2010, North 
Korea’s trade volume recovered to its 1990 level. Although North Korea has had the most autarkic economy in 
the world, the country and its regime cannot survive without economic relations with other countries. 
Former socialist economies have been participating in international division of labor since their adoption 
of transition policies. After the severe production decline in the early 1990s, the countries were able to recover, 
increasing production, trade volume and investment. Their economic transition process has shown a significant 
correlation between production and trade. This relationship between trade and economic growth has been 
confirmed by many studies.1 Participation in international trade has become one of the key factors in economic 
growth, not only for developed economies but also for emerging and least developed economies. This driving 
component now stands true for transition economies as well. 
This paper examines whether or not North Korea’s trade recovery is based on changes in economic 
fundamentals as demonstrated by other transition economies. The research measures North Korea’s 
comparative advantage using Bela Balassa’s indices of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) to measure its 
structural change in trade. The revealed comparative advantage of a nation is measured by the relative weight of 
a percentage of total export of commodity’s in a nation over the percentage of world export in that commodity 
developed by Balassa(1965). Because North Korea does not publish data and statistics, this research uses the 
so-called, mirror statistics, which collects United Nations trade data reported by its trading partners.  
This paper analyzes North Korea’s trade patterns and comparative advantage from 2000 to 2010 and 
makes observations of any consistent and visible changes in international competitiveness in the period of trade 
increase in the 2000s. It also pays attention to the question of whether or not North Korea’s economic reforms 
thus far have changed the trade structure. The main research focus, however, lies in whether North Korea’s trade 
is being driven by market mechanisms or by political negotiation with trading partners. As is commonly known, 
North Korea does not have a diversified set of trading partners. China occupied over 80% of North Korea’s total 
trade in 2011. If the trade increase turns out to be based solely on political negotiation, trade would fail to have 
significant implications for North Korea’s economic development.  
The paper consists of three main parts following the introduction. It will first provide a review of North 
Korea’s current trade structure. Then it will calculate and analyze the RCA indices of North Korean trade to the 
world market and the EU. Subsequently, it will explain the implications of the RCA indices and the possible role of 
the EU in North Korea’s reform policies. Finally it will draw conclusions from gathered implications.  
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2. NORTH KOREAN TRADE: STRUCTURE AND TREND 
 
2.1. TRADE 
Upon the demise of the socialist bloc, the volume of North Korean trade has decreased continuously since 1991. 
Due to the disintegration of the soviet bloc, North Korea lost its trading partners and following economic collapse, 
has reduced its production potential as well as trade capacity. North Korea was not able to stop the trend of 
diminishing foreign trade. In 1998, the North Korean foreign trade volume plummeted to $1,442 billion, the lowest 
level since 1990. The decreasing trend has reversed in 1999. Expanded inter-Korean economic cooperation 
through the Mt. Kumkang tourism project and foreign aid has turned the trend around, thanks to increased foreign 
currency and input for production. 
In 2010, after two decades, North Korea finally recovered its 1990 level of foreign trade. Trade 
expansion has been headed principally through imports while exports have increased more slowly. However, both 
imports and exports increased consistently since 1999, with the exception of a few years due to political instability 
on the Korean peninsula. At this point the trade volume completes the typical U-curve, which implies the economy 
overcomes difficulties of structural changes. Then transition economies approached the J-curve, which appears 
commonly in most transition economies, accompanied by the J-curve in production.2 
<Table 1> shows North Korea’s trade development over 20 years. Important characteristics can be 
summarized as follows. First, North Korea has run a trade deficit over the entire period. Imports exceeded exports 
and recorded a huge negative trade balance. Second, North Korea’s foreign trade has stopped declining and is 
on the way to recovery. The volume of exports and imports are experiencing an increasing trend. Third, North 
Korean trade is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign economies such as China, Germany, Russia, India 
and so on. North Korea’s trade volume has now surpassed its 1990 level and even posted a record high in 2010. 
The current North Korean economy may be increasingly engaged in international trade. 
 
<Table 1> Trends in North Korean Foreign Trade 
 (Units: USD Millions, %) 
 Export Import Total Trade Trade Balance Amount Increase% Amount Increase% Amount Increase% Amount 
1990 1,733 ୉ 2,437 ୉ 4,170 ୉ ୉704 
1991 945 ୉45.5 1,639 ୉32.7 2,584 ୉38.0 ୉694 
1992 933 ୉1.3 1,622 ୉1.0 2,555 1.1 ୉689 
1993 990 6.1 1,656 2.1 2,646 3.6 ୉666 
1994 858 ୉13.3 1,242 ୉25.0 2,100 ୉20.6 ୉384 
1995 736 ୉14.2 1,316 6.0 2,052 ୉2.3 ୉580 
1996 727 1.2 1,250 ୉5.0 1,977 ୉3.7 ୉523 
1997 905 24.5 1,272 1.8 2,177 10.1 ୉367 
1998 559 ୉38.2 883 ୉30.6 1,442 ୉33.8 ୉324 
1999 515 7.9 965 9.3 1,480 2.6 ୉450 
2000 556 8.0 1,413 46.4 1,969 33.0 ୉857 
2001 650 16.9 1,620 14.6 2,270 15.3 ୉970 
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2002 735 13.1 1,525 ୉5.9 2,260 ୉0.4 ୉790 
2003 777 5.5 1,614 5.9 2,391 5.8 ୉837 
2004 1,020 31.3 1,837 13.8 2,857 19.5 ୉817 
2005 998 ୉2.1 2,003 9.1 3,002 5.1 ୉1,005 
2006 947 ୉5.2 2,049 2.3 2,996 ୉0.2 ୉1,102 
2007 918 ୉3.0 2,022 ୉1.3 2,941 ୉1.8 ୉1,104 
2008 1,130 23.0 2,686 32.7 3,816 29.7 ୉1,556 
2009 1,063 ୉6.0 2,351 ୉12.4 3,414 ୉10.5 ୉1,288 
2010 1,513 42.4 2,660 13.2 4,174 22.2 ୉1,147 
Source: KOTRA 
 
2.2 COMPOSITION OF TRADING GOODS 
(1) Export Products 
North Korea’s largest export sector in 2010 was mineral products, worth $695.8 million. This sector occupied 46% 
of total exports. The export of mineral products since has been steadily increasing. China is a major importer.3 
China’s development policy and high economic growth has increased the country’s demand for natural resources. 
North Korea, on the other hand, does not have other sellable goods to sell to finance its increasing import 
demand. The mineral production capacity has improved due to the 2002 reform that spurred the purchase of new 
mining equipment and the provision of strong incentives for mining workers. Thus, exports in mineral products 
have been able to consistently increase.  
The second largest export sector is metalloids. Metalloid products are used in natural resource-intense 
industries. North Korea’s two largest export sectors sell resource-intensive goods. North Korea has an 
increasingly strong incentive to export resource-intensive products, especially because the price of natural 
resources has risen greatly in recent years.  
The third largest export industry is textiles. Textiles have been one of North Korea’s main exports. Even 
though textile products experience ups and downs, this sector remains on the list of the top three exports. 
Textiles belong to the labor-intensive industry. North Korea has a strong comparative advantage in this area due 
to its abundantly endowed labor.  
 
< Table 2> North Korea’s Main Export Products 
(Units: USD Thousands, %) 
 HS Code 
2009 2010 
Increase 
Amount Proportion Amount Proportion 
Animal Products HS 01~05 59,427 5.6% 65,207 4.3% 9.7% 
Plant Products HS 06~14 27,687 2.6% 21,121 1.4% ᧩23.7% 
Mineral Based Products HS 25~27 445,727 41.9% 695,859 46.0% 56.1% 
Plastic, Chemicals HS 28~40 72,231 6.8% 88,440 5.8% 22.4% 
Wood Products HS 44~46 9,602 0.9% 5,965 0.4% ᧩37.9% 
Textile Products HS 50~63 149,470 14.1% 229,956 15.2% 53.6% 
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Precious Metals HS 71 24,738 2.3% 4,145 0.3% ᧩83.2% 
Metalloids HS 72~83 162,336 15.3% 264,239 17.5% 62.8% 
Machinery͑Electronics HS 84~85 54,560 5.1% 98,249 6.5% 80.1% 
Others HS Others 57,008 5.4% 40,451 2.7% ᧩29.0% 
Total 1,062,786 100% 1,513,632 100% 42.4% 
 
(2) Import Products 
North Korea’s major imports include mineral based products, machinery and electronics and textile products. 
Energy-producing, mineral-based products have emerged as the largest imports in recent years. North Korea has 
increased its import of mineral-based products due to energy shortage, which in the past has proved to be the 
biggest barrier to North Korea’s economic growth. North Korea has now expanded its source of energy imports. 
Presently, energy exporters to North Korea include China, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Greece and Iran.  
The second largest import sector is machinery and electronics. North Korea places emphasis on the 
improvement of production facilities. Old equipment cannot be used because of low productivity and energy 
inefficiency.  
The third largest import goods are textile products. Textiles occupy a large proportion in exports as well 
as in imports. Textile products are produced mainly by North Korea’s commission-based processing trade. Even 
though the trade volume varies somewhat according to the political situation, textiles have firmly maintained its 
position because this sector coincides with North Korea’s comparative advantage in cheap labor. 
 
< Table 3> North Korea’s Main Import Products 
(Units: USD Thousands, %) 
 HS Code 2009 2010 Increase Amount Proportion Amount Proportion 
Animal Products HS01~05 39,900 1.7% 30,781 1.2% 1.8% 
Plant Products HS06~14 155,064 6.6% 167,746 6.3% 1.8% 
Oil-Based & Crude 
Food Products HS15~24 220,938 9.4% 154,837 5.8% ᧩29.9% 
Mineral Based 
Products HS25~27 352,225 15.0% 547,678 20.6% 55.5% 
Chemical Products HS28~38 193,470 8.2% 175,551 6.6% ᧩9.3% 
Plastic Goods HS39~40 113,426 4.8% 144,605 5.4% 27.5% 
Textile Products HS50~63 362,538 15.4% 328,138 12.3% ᧩9.5% 
Metalloids HS72~83 204,831 8.7% 178,280 6.7% ᧩13.0% 
Machinery, 
Electronics HS84~85 344,829 14.7% 482,668 18.1% 40.0% 
Automobiles HS86~89 124,345 5.3% 212,773 8.0% 71.1% 
Others HS Other 239,466 10.2% 237,717 8.9% ᧩0.7% 
Total 2,351,032 100% 2,660,774 100% 13.2% 
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2.3. NORTH KOREA’S TRADING PARTNERS 
The disintegration of the socialist bloc majorly shifted the composition of North Korea’s trading partners. Firstly, 
trade with Russia decreased drastically. North Korea’s trade with Russia, its biggest trading partner, fell from 53% 
of total trade in 1990 to 14% in 1991. This trade collapse between North Korea and Russia resulted from the 
elimination of a friendly price system among socialist countries and a change in the payment system, moving 
away from a clearing system to hard currency payment. A similar trade collapse occurred with other trading 
partners from the former socialist bloc.  
After the trade collapse with ex-socialist countries, North Korea has made great efforts in finding new 
trade partners and in expanding its trade volume. Along with North Korea’s trade expansion with China, Japan, 
South Korea and other countries, North Korea’s top ten trading partners now include China, Russia, Germany, 
India, Thailand, Singapore, Bangladeshi, Hong Kong, Italy and Mexico.4  
The most prominently noted characteristic among the trading partners is the dominant trade weight of 
China, North Korea’s number one trading partner. Sino-DPRK trade has risen steadily since the collapse of the 
soviet bloc. China has become the main window into North Korea’s economic relations with the outside world 
after the restructuring of foreign trade. China’s imports from and exports to the DPRK have increased significantly 
over the past decade. In 2010, China occupied 83% of the total trade volume. China provided 85.6% of all North 
Korean imports and received 78.4% of North Korea’s exports. The trade between the two countries increased by 
22.6% comparing to the level of 2009. Bilateral trade is, however, highly imbalanced as China’s surplus exceeded 
$1 billion in 2010. Sino-DPRK trade explains the main trend of North Korea’s total trade.  
Recently Russia has also returned as North Korea’s second largest trading partner, steadily expanding 
its share despite its currently holding of just 2.6% of total trade volume. Among European countries, Germany is 
the DPRK’s third largest trading partner.5 Other major partners are comprised of Asian countries such as India, 
Thailand, Singapore, etc.  
 
<Table 4> North Korea’s Ten Largest Trading Partners 
                                                                                                                                        (Units:USD Thousands, %) 
Country 
Export Import Total Trade Proportion 
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
China 793,048 1,187,861 1,887,686 2,277,816 2,680,734 3,465,67 78.5% 83.0% 
Russia 20,628 26,960 41,060 83,619 61,688 110,579 1.8% 2.6% 
Germany 26,798 34,368 43,177 24,579 69,975 58,947 2.0% 1.4% 
India 8,108 32,976 52,331 25,500 60,439 58,476 1.8% 1.4% 
Thailand 14,017 21,527 30,273 29,759 44,290 51,286 1.3% 1.2% 
Singapore 1,860 720 55,385 47,777 57,245 48,497 1.7% 1.2% 
Bangladesh 28,730 36,788 7,277 97 36,007 36,885 1.1% 0.9% 
Hong Kong 29,974 12,358 26,331 18,476 56,305 30,834 1.6% 0.7% 
Italy 1,219 1,001 23,106 24,728 24,325 25,729 0.7% 0.6% 
Mexico 4,615 10,723 927 14,723 5,542 25,446 0.2% 0.6% 
10 countries 
Total 
928,997 1,365,282 2,167,553 2,547,074 3,096,550 3,912,356 90.7% 93.6% 
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Others 133,789 148,349 183,479 113,700 317,268 262,049 9.3% 6.4% 
Total 1,062,786 1,513,631 2,351,032 2,660,774 3,413,818 4,174,405 100% 100% 
 
3. NORTH KOREA’S REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (RCA) 
 
3.1. NORTH KOREA’S EXPORT RCA TO THE WORLD 
North Korea has undergone significant changes in trade performance since 1990. However, it is not clear whether 
or not the North Korean economy follows the normal transition route. After the liberalization of trade, transition 
economies experienced fundamental changes in trade structure. The countries initially exported resource-
intensive goods, followed by labor- intensive goods using standardized technology. After the countries 
accumulated capital and technology, they started to export technology-intensive goods.  
A well-known tool for analyzing trade patterns is the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The 
concept of revealed comparative advantage is based on the traditional trade theory, particularly the comparative 
advantage theory. RCA index shows the competitiveness of a country in a specific sector comparing to another 
country. However, the index finds also structural change in trade reflecting changes of competitiveness in sectors 
intensive in natural resources, capital and unskilled labour. Many studies have adopted RCA to measure 
structural changes in former socialist countries. 6  This study tries to find out evidence whether possible 
restructuring is giving rise to changes in North Korea’s comparative advantage. The study looks at the trade 
growth and evolving trade patterns to assess structural change in production. The RCA index is formulated by 
Balassa (1965) and defined as  
 
Xik = RCA index as a national export share of I industry in relation to the world export share of the same industry. 
If this index is bigger than 1, the country has a comparative advantage. 
= country k’s export volume of i industry products. 
= total export volume of country k 
Gi = Products of i industry   
= total export of i industry products of all related countries. 
 = total export volume of all the related countries. 
 
Data 
Because North Korea has not published its foreign trade data since the mid-1960s, an alternative way is to 
compile trade data from North Korea’s trading partners. This method of collecting data from trading partners is 
called mirror statistics. Mirror statistics has been used in analyzing North Korean trade patterns. This study uses 
the reports of North Korea’s trading partners to the United Nations, Comtrade of the United Nations Statistical 
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Division (UNSD), as its primary data source. The United Nations publishes detailed trade data and so this study 
uses trade data at the three-digit level of the UN SITC, Revision 3, with the given timeframe from 2000 to 2010.  
 
Commodity Categorization 
Several studies have measured transition progress through the assessment of the high-tech product share in total 
exports. This similar evaluation of trade performance has been undertaken for other emerging economies or 
newly-industrialized, Asian economies. Drabek and Smith (1995), Guerrieri (1998), and Movshuk (2001) have 
attempted to do this. They have classified commodities into different categories according to technological 
content and have calculated the RCA of the aggregate goods to analyze trade patterns. One of the major 
problems of these studies is the categorization of the commodities according to technological content, “because 
the correlation across goods of the intensivity of factor use is not unity.”7 
This paper, however, adopts the classification used by Lim (1997), derived from Hufbauer, G.C. and Chilas, 
J. G. (1974). They have divided the commodities into three categories corresponding to the nature and 
importance of natural resources for production and technological content. They categorize commodities into 
Ricardo goods, Heckscher-Ohlin goods, and Product-cycle goods.8 
- Ricardo goods are goods using natural resources in production. It usually applies to developing 
countries holding vast resources but low technological advancement.   
 Ex) Food, wood, fibers, minerals, paper, oils, raw fuels, etc.  
- Heckscher-Ohlin goods are goods using standard technology. It indicates midlevel technology.  
 Ex) Beverages, tobacco, glass, pottery, locomotives, books, jewelry, clothing, etc. 
- Product-cycle goods are goods using advanced technology. It applies to developed and technologically 
advanced countries.   
Ex) Chemicals, medicines, explosives, machinery, instruments, aircraft, munitions, etc.  
<Table5> lists the commodities according to the definition of Hufbauer and Chilas (1974) to create aggregate 
goods. North Korea’s RCA was calculated based on this classification. 
 
<Table 5> Grouping for Revealed Comparative Advantage 
Name of Group  Source Property of Group 
Commodities in 
Group SITC (Rev.3) 
1. Ricardo Goods 
Hufbauer 
& Chilas 
(1974) 
Goods using 
natural 
resources in 
production 
Food, wood, fibers, 
minerals, paper, 
non- 
ferrous metals, oils, 
ores, raw fuels 
011 012 016 017 022 023 
024 025 041 042 043 044 
045 046 047 048 054 056 
057 058 061 071 072 074 
075 121 247 248 251 261 
263 268 272 274 281 283 
284 285 287 289 321 322 
325 333 342 343 344 345 
411 421 422 431 667 681 
682 683 684 685 686 687 689 
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2. Heckscher-Ohlin 
Goods 
Hufbauer 
& Chilas 
(1974) 
Goods using 
standard 
technology 
Beverages, 
tobacco, cement, 
floor coverings, 
glass, pottery, 
ferrous metals, 
cars, metal 
products, 
locomotives, ships, 
domestic 
appliances, books, 
furniture, clothing, 
jewelry, stationary 
111 112 122 273 533 551 
553 554 611 612 613 621 
625 629 651 652 653 654 
656 657 658 659 661 662 
664 665 666 671 672 673 
674 675 676 677 678 679 
691 692 693 694 695 696 
697 699 761 762 764 775 
781 782 783 784 785 786 
791 811 812 813 821 831 
841 842 843 844 845 846 
848 851 892 893 894 895 897  
3. Product- 
cycle Goods 
Hufbauer 
& Chilas 
(1974) 
Goods using 
advanced 
technology 
Chemicals, 
medicines, plastics, 
dyes, fertilizers, 
explosives, 
machinery, aircraft, 
instruments, clocks, 
munitions 
511 512 513 514 515 516 
522 523 524 525 532 541 
542 562 571 572 573 574 
575 579 581 582 583 593 
711 712 713 714 716 718 
721 722 723 724 725 726 
727 728 731 733 735 737 
751 752 759 771 772 773 
774 776 778 792 871 872 
873 874 881 882 884 885 891 
Sources: Lim(1997:102); Lee(1996: 20-3) 
 
Results 
The RCA indices of aggregate goods show the biggest changes in Ricardo goods. North Korea did not 
demonstrate any competitiveness in Ricardo goods in 2000, as seen in its RCA index of 0.18. Since then, it has 
increased consistently and has acquired comparative advantage since 2004. The RCA index of Ricardo goods 
exceeded 5 in 2010. North Korea’s competitiveness in Ricardo goods have been strengthened largely in recent 
years.  
These changes in RCA indices of Ricardo goods imply the following: 
First, North Korea’s export in Ricardo goods increases more than that of any other product. This is most 
likely inevitable for North Korea since it cannot invest in producing other products. Additionally, due to a rich 
endowment in natural resources, the North is able to increase its exports in Ricardo goods. <Table 6> reveals 
that the proportion of Ricardo goods in total trade reached 42% in 2010, an increase from 33% in 2009.  
Secondly, North Korea must have expanded the production capacity of its resource-intensive goods. In 
the 1990s, due to energy shortage and outdated production facilities, the DPRK could not even increase 
production in Ricardo goods. However, in recent years the North has largely expanded export volume of Ricardo 
goods and has recorded a high growth rate. This reflects the improvement in North Korea’s production facility as 
well as increased energy provision.  
Thirdly, North Korea uses the export of Ricardo goods as an instrument for economic recovery. Rapid 
growth of exports enables the North to buy more goods needed for investment as well as for consumption. 
Increased energy provision and consumption goods production were mainly attained through the profits from 
higher exports of Ricardo goods. 
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The RCA index of Heckscher-Ohlin Goods (HOG) has not seen much change. It has oscillated between 
0.75 and 1.22 in the last eleven years. After the RCA index of Heckshcher-Ohlin goods reached 1.22 in 2000, it 
has shown ups and downs. The export volume of this category also experienced volatile changes, failing to show 
a consistent trend. The proportion of Heckscher-Ohlin good in total exports has varied as well. 
The RCA index of Heckshcer-Ohlin goods shows that the North Korean economy has not yet 
established a competitive production capacity using standardized technology. Even after the year 2000, North 
Korea’s production of Heckscher-Ohlin good has decreased. The RCA index moves along the benchmark 1, 
showing neither a strong increase nor a big decrease. North Korea has the potential to expand the export of this 
good due to relatively cheap labor costs. However, North Korea cannot exercise this potential because of energy 
shortage and the lack of new investments. It is possible that the increasing wage level in China may lead to 
bigger FDIs in North Korea and higher exports of this category. However, at the moment the potential remains 
merely as a possibility.    
North Korea’s RCA index of Product-cycle goods shows a significant comparative disadvantage 
throughout the 2000s. The index has moved within a narrow band, between 0.5 and 0.8, showing a decreasing 
trend since 2006. Export volume of Product-cycle goods in 2010 occupied a mere 13.4% of North Korea’s total 
exports.  
North Korea does not have any experience in being competitive in industries using advanced 
technologies. North Korea also does not have the capacity to expand the production of Product-cycle goods. The 
North does not possess a favorable condition to construct new industries with advanced technologies with its 
current stage of its economic development, level of technology, financial condition and international network. The 
RCA index shows that the North Korean government itself does not have the ambition to develop the Product-
cycle goods industry. Considering its current economic conditions, North Korea’s weakness in Product-cycle 
goods will persist over an extended period of time.  
 
<Table 6> North Korea’s Export RCA to the World 
<Ricardo Goods> 
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<Heckscher-Ohlin Goods> 
 
<Product-Cycle Goods> 
 
Source: COM Trade, Own Calculation. 
 
<Figure 1> North Korea’s Export RCA to the World 
 
Source: COM Trade, Own calculation. 
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<Figure 1> reveals North Korea’s export pattern more clearly. The export of Ricardo goods has 
consistently increased while the export of Heckscher-Ohlin goods and Product-cycle goods remains relatively 
unchanged. North Korea’s export recovery shown in <Table 1> relies mainly on the export increase of Ricardo 
goods.  
The principal reason for this increase in export was due to China. In 2010, North Korea’s main exports to 
China included mineral fuel, such as coal, ores, woven apparel, iron and steel, fish and seafood, and 
salt/sulfur/earths/stone. In recent developments, North Korea has increased exports in primary products, 
including fish, shellfish and agro-forest products, as well as mineral products, such as base metallic minerals. 
North Korea’s export increase depends on China because China provides energy and equipment to 
produce these export goods. China’s major exports to North Korea include mineral fuels and oil, machinery, 
electrical machinery, vehicles, knit apparel, plastic, iron and steel. Pyongyang reportedly has imported 
aquaculture technology mainly from China to increase production of cultivated fish, and agricultural equipment to 
increase output of grain and livestock. It also has imported equipment for its coal and mineral mines. Much of the 
coal and mineral exports have resulted from partnering with Chinese firms, through which the Chinese provide 
modern equipment in exchange for a supply of the product being mined or manufactured.9 China is also a major 
source for North Korean petroleum imports. In recent years, China has directly cultivated North Korea’s mining 
sector through direct investments (FDI) in North Korea. In 2008, the total foreign direct investment to the DPRK, 
as reported to the United Nations, amounted to $44 million, of which China supplied $41.2 million. Chinese 
companies have made major investments aimed at developing mineral resources located in the northern region 
of the DPRK.10   
 
3.2.NORTH KOREA’S EXPORT RCA TO THE EU 
RCA Indices 
In 2010, the EU, including CIS countries as a region, occupied 6% of North Korea’s total trade volume while Asia 
accounted for 90%. As shown in <Table 8>, the trade volume reached $226.5 million with $103.5 million of 
exports to the EU and $162.9 million of imports from the EU. North Korea’s major export items to the EU consist 
of clothes, machinery, steel products, soil, salt, and soap. North Korea’s major import items from the EU consist 
of machinery, medical supplies, measuring instruments, optical instruments, precision instruments, electronics 
and electric supplies. 
<Figure 2> shows North Korea’s export competitiveness in the EU market. <Figure 2> shows the 
opposite trend from <Figure 1>, which reveals competitiveness in the world market. In the world market, North 
Korea demonstrates strong competitiveness in Ricardo goods, while its RCA to the EU approaches zero. On the 
other hand, North Korea’s RCA has a better standing in Heckscher-Ohlin goods exports; although the RCA 
strongly oscillates between 0.2 and 1.8, it generally remains above 1. The RCA of Product-cycle goods moves 
between the band of 0.2 and 1.5, and only four years of the eleven, showed an RCA value greater than 1.   
This figure implies North Korea does not export natural resources to EU countries or that they export a 
small amount. This is most likely because China imports almost all the Ricardo goods from North Korea. China 
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has participated actively in developing natural resources directly due to the lack of capacity of North Korea to 
develop its resources. “Chinese investment in the DPRK has been based on combining China’s capital and skills 
with underused resources in North Korea to generate legitimate economic activity that benefits both sides.”11 The 
imposition of economic sanctions by UN security Council Rresolutions 1718 and 1874 shrank North Korea’s 
market in the EU as well, while China did not pay much attention to the sanctions.12 High transportation costs for 
natural resources may be another reason for the low volume of Ricardo goods’ exports from the DPRK to the EU.   
 
<Figure 2> North Korea’s Export RCA to the EU 
 
 
North Korea has a relatively better RCA index for Heckscher-Ohlin goods exports to the EU. Textiles 
take up the biggest proportion of DPRK exports to the EU because of the EU’s relaxed regulation concerning 
textile imports from North Korea, which was introduced in 2001. Although the EU countries do not import raw 
natural resources, they do import manufactured goods that are mostly composed of North Korea’s natural 
resources. That is, the EU imports resources after primary processing to make use of North Korea’s resources as 
well as cheap labor. <Table 7> shows the list of products for which North Korea shows competitiveness in the EU 
market. All the products on the list are manufactured goods that have used simple technology. This result is 
understandable in consideration of high wage levels in Europe.  
North Korea will continue to have a comparative advantage in exports of Heckscher-Ohlin goods to the 
EU market. However, even Ricardo goods may have to be processed once in order to save transportation and 
labor costs. That means that North Korea’s export RCA composition will differ according to the destination. North 
Korea’s current RCA is determined principally by the Chinese market. The Chinese market lies next to North 
Korea’s and the wage level in China greatly differs with that of the DPRK. All these have resulted in North Korea’s 
RCA structure as shown in <Figure 1>.  
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<Table 7> North Korea’s Products with Competitiveness in EU (RCA>1) 
Sector (SITC 1-digit) Code / Commodity 
Beverages and tobacco 111 NON-ALCOHOL.BEVERAGE,NES 
5. Chemicals and related products 522 INORGANIC CHEM.ELEMENTS 553 PERFUMERY,COSMETICS,ETC. 
6. Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
621 MATERIALS OF RUBBER 
671 PIG IRON,SPIEGELEISN,ETC 
691 METALLIC STRUCTURES NES 
693 WIRE PRODUCTS EXCL.ELECT 
694 NAILS,SCREWS,NUTS,ETC 
7. Machinery and transport equipment 714 ENGINES,MOTORS NON-ELECT 723 CIVIL ENGINEERING EQUIPT 
8. Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
841 MENS,BOYS CLOTHNG,XKNIT 
842 WOMEN,GIRL CLOTHNG,XKNIT 
893 ARTICLES,NES,OF PLASTICS 
 
Trade between the EU and the DPRK does not hold as important an economic significance for EU 
countries. Among the EU countries, Germany has had traditionally strong economic ties with the DPRK. Even 
though Germany accounts for 41.8% of the total EU-DPRK trade in 2010, the volume was worth a mere $58.9 
million, taking up only 1.4% of North Korea’s total trade (Table 9). Other than Germany, only Italy, the 
Netherlands and Denmark have recorded a trade volume exceeding $10 million in 2010. The EU-DPRK trade 
volume has fluctuated between $200 million and $400 million in the last two decades. The volume is negligible to 
EU economies, even as the EU stands as North Korea’s second largest trade partner, occupying 6% of North 
Korea’s total trade. 
Despite its small trade volume, the EU is the most important trading partner for North Korea after China. 
The EU provides North Korea a market with favorable conditions. European companies bring new investment and 
technology.13 Although these investments do not have significant meaning in magnitude, they introduce new 
technology and new product-widening bottlenecks in North Korean society. Therefore, North Korea’s export RCA 
indices to the EU show higher figures for Heckscher-Ohlin goods and Product-cycle goods.   
 
< Table 8> North Korea’s Trade by Region 
(Units: USD Thousands, %)  
 Export Import Total Trade Proporti
on 2009 2010 Increase 2009 2010 Increase 2009 2010 Increase 
Asia, Pacific 900,206 1,331,407 47.9% 2,096,471 2,433,245 16.1% 2,996,677 3,764,652 25.6% 90% 
Europe, CIS 88,783 103,547 16.6% 143,460 162,972 13.6% 232,243 266,519 14.8% 6% 
America 60,531 64,994 7.4% 103,832 61,295 ୉41.0% 164,363 126,289 ୉23.2% 3% 
Middle East,
Africa 13,266 13,683 3.2% 7,269 3,261 ୉55.1% 20,535 16,944 ୉17.5% 
Under 
1% 
Total 1,062,786 1,513,631 42.4% 2,351,032 2,660,773 13.2% 3,413,818 4,174,405 22.3% 100% 
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<Table 9> North Korean Trade with European Countries 
(Units: USD Thousands, %) 
Country 
Export Import Total Trade Proportion 
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Germany 26,798 34,368 43,177 24,579 69,975 58,947 45.5% 41.8% 
Italy 1,219 1,001 23,106 24,728 24,325 25,729 15.8% 18.3% 
Netherlands 21,804 21,779 5,302 2,124 27,106 23,903 17.6% 17.0% 
Denmark 272 553 4,862 11,650 5,134 12,203 3.3% 8.7% 
France 511 897 2,691 2,968 3,202 3,865 2.1% 2.7% 
Belgium 706 1185 4826 2044 5,532 3,229 3.6% 2.3% 
Greece 1,166 1,231 141 1,420 1,307 2,651 0.8% 1.9% 
UK 1,405 2,503 166 88 1,571 2,591 1.0% 1.8% 
Austria 306 1,382 1,482 536 1,788 1,918 1.2% 1.4% 
         
 
4. NORTH KOREA’S RCA CHANGES AND THE ROLE OF EU-DPRK TRADE 
 
4.1. NORTH KOREA’S RCA ON EU MARKET 
After the collapse of North Korea’s economy in the beginning of the 1990s, North Korea recovered its 
trade volume in 2010. The changes in trade volume and trade pattern have been used as an alternative indicator 
to show the economic restructuring in transition economies. North Korea’s RCA indices show that its trade is 
based on market mechanisms. North Korea sells Ricardo goods mostly because the country is abundantly 
endowed with natural resources. The rapidly increasing RCA index for Ricardo goods implies that the natural 
resources of North Korea contributed to the quick expansion of exports in recent years. 
Even though trade volume recovered to the level before the collapse, the GDP has not yet recovered to 
the 1989 level. This is because the manufacturing sector has not been reconstructed. The money earned through 
the extraction of minerals has not been channeled sufficiently into the manufacturing sector. Improvement of 
economic fundamentals presupposes the restructuring of the manufacturing sector. If North Korea continues to 
export Ricardo goods without the improvement in manufacturing, the North will catch the Dutch-disease and in 
turn, deter industrial restructuring. The existing macroeconomic instability and inflation pressure will grow as well. 
China’s monopolistic demand may distort North Korea’s industrial restructuring, moving it towards excessive 
growth in the production of Ricardo goods. 
Trade relations between the EU and North Korea show a different pattern in North Korea’s export from 
that of total exports. Heckscher-Ohlin goods have their strengths and even the Product-cycle goods have a better 
standing in trade with the EU compared to trade with other regions. European companies’ FDI has expanded the 
bottleneck in some industries, bringing new technology and new products into North Korea. These are reflected in 
North Korea’s RCA indices to the EU.  
Despite its small trade volume, the EU is significant in providing a source for new technology and 
production equipment to North Korea. The EU provides a favorable market and acts as a link to the western 
world. The EU does not have serious political tensions with the North, contrary to the latter’s strained relationship 
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with the United States and Japan. The EU has a wide network of bilateral diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. 
The former socialist countries in Eastern Europe still have good relations with technocrats in the DPRK.14 All 
these favorable conditions for economic cooperation may have already been reflected somewhat in the RCA 
indices. Due to sanction measures and political conflict, the United States, Japan, and even South Korea do not 
have open access to North Korea while the EU does not bear those restrictions. Every small investment from the 
EU may influence North Korea’s industrial structure as well as domestic society. The EU may capitalize on this 
advantage to open up new markets and lead the North to international division of labor.  
 
4.2. EU-DPRK TRADE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
In 2001, the EU had set up an active engagement plan in North Korea. According to the EU’s 2002 North Korea 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP)15, the EU had set aside 35 million Euros for technical assistance projects until 
2006. In addition, the EU’s National Indicative Program (NIP) delineated concrete framework and objectives for 
technical assistance projects in North Korea. The CSP and NIP regarded North Korea’s economy to be similar to 
the Eastern European economies due to the highly industrialized economic structure. The EU’s aid programs and 
technical assistance accordingly focused on North Korea’s industrial sector such as coal and heavy industries. 
The EU defined three main cooperation fields such as ‘institutional support and capacity building’, ‘sustainable 
development and use of natural resources including access to sustainable energy sources,’ and ‘sustainable 
transport sector and rural development.’16    
At that time, North Korea was willing to accept the EU’s financial aid as well as technical assistance for 
economic and structural reforms. Pyongyang and Brussels had exchanged delegations and had prepared to 
implement their programs. All the plans for technical assistance and cooperation between the EU and North 
Korea came to a halt after the detection of North Korea’s nuclear program in 2002. Following the detection, 
missile launches and nuclear tests have proceeded to take place, bringing about the lost opportunity to implement 
assistance programs delineated in the CSP and NIP. Since the DPRK first made its nuclear test in 2006, EU has 
followed the UN resolution regulating economic exchanges with North Korea. 
However, EU has not cut off the humanitarian aid to the DPRK even if the volume has decreased. EU 
maintains diplomatic ties with the country. European Parliament keeps regular parliamentary exchanges. EU 
member countries also continue their diplomatic relation with DPRK even after the nuclear tests and missile 
launch. France has newly opened its cooperation office in Pyongyang in October 2011. Although EU had to give 
up its active plan to bring the North to international society, still EU and European countries are the last window to 
the western society for North Korea. 
It is clear that the EU was prepared to cooperate with North Korea and to provide technical assistance to 
help the North transition. Considering the EU’s economic and political relationship with North Korea, the EU could 
take on the role to help North Korea reform its economy and society. As the Council has repeatedly declared in 
the past, the EU would be able to contribute to reduce tensions between the two Koreas and to enhance the role 
of the Union in support of peace, security and freedom on the Korean peninsula. 17 Even though the EU's 
economic assistance would be of moderate scale, the parallel assistance of both the EU and its member 
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countries would be a great help for North Korea especially in this current sanction period. The most desirable way 
to enhance the EU’s role on the Korean peninsula may be EU’s participation in the Six-Party Dialogue as a 
neutral mediator with no military interests in the region. The existing six parties may need EU as a game broker 
making a breakthrough from the current impasse. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
North Korea has undergone economic restructuring over the last two decades. Although the country has 
hesitated to reform until more recently, trade statistics show that its foreign trade, including Sino-DPRK trade, is 
based in market mechanisms. North Korea’s economic restructuring seems to be very slow compared to that of 
other former socialist countries. Although the trade volume has recovered recently to the level prior to economic 
collapse, it has recovered only through the export of natural resources to China.  
The North Korean government’s willingness to reform as well as external economic and financial 
conditions are prerequisites to rapid and successful restructuring. Considering its economic and political 
conditions, the EU is best qualified to be the potential donor of such technical assistance. According to the RCA 
indices of North Korea’s exports to the EU, the EU already influences North Korea’s industrial restructuring, 
despite its relatively small impact.  
The biggest hurdle to North Korea’s transition is North Korea itself. The North Korean government has 
been reluctant to reform its economic structure, thereby hindering changes by repressing market mechanisms, 
but ultimately failing. Now the new leader of North Korea must first and foremost take on the task of tackling the 
age-old problem of economic rehabilitation. At this moment the EU should revise the CSP and NIP from 2002 as 
well as cooperation policies, shaping them for North Korea’s participation in an international dialogue for peace. It 
could prove to be a strong incentive for the North in making decisions for cooperation and reform.  
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
* This paper was presented at the “Workshop on EU-Korea in a Changing World” on July 2 at Catholic University Leuven 
organized by Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. My special thanks are due to Dr Axel Marx, Dr Fraser Cameron, 
and all the participants of the workshop for the helpful comments and discussions. The remaining errors are all mine. 
1 Among others see Dritsakis( 2004), Awokuse(2006). 
2 All of former socialist countries have demonstrated GDP development corresponding to the J-curve behavior with a varying 
depth of the downturn. The J-curve is drawn by free-fall of production directly after the beginning of reform measures and by 
economic growth with the progress of transition to market economy. U-curve shows just a momentarily snapshot when the 
GDP level recovers the production volume before the transition. Refer Kitov(2009) on details regarding J-curve of production.  
3 “As the economy of the North Korea becomes increasingly isolated, it depends more and more on China for survival and 
development. China is North Korea’s closest ally; largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery; and arguably the 
country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang. For the DPRK, China is the partner of first and last resort. It is the first to 
provide outside validation of plans and often is both first and last at bat in attempts to mitigate the adverse consequences of 
North Korean provocations.” (Nanto, 2011, p.75) 
4 Trade with South Korea follows the trade volume with China as second largest trading partner even though it is not 
recorded as foreign trade officially due to the special relation between the two countries. 
5 Economic sanctions according to UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874(2009) imposed by Japan and the 
United States have reduced their respective trade with the DPRK to almost nothing with the exception of intermittent 
humanitarian aid after the missile and nuclear test in 2006.   
6 Among others, see Murrell(1990), Hare(2000), and Ferto and Hubbard(2002).  
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7 Murrell(1990), p.91. 
8 More detailed description and economic definitions can be found in Murrell (1990) p. 92. Murrell provides many more ways 
to build up aggregate goods.  
9 See Nanto and Manyin (2010), China-North Korea Relations. CRS Report for Congress. December 28, 2010.  
10 The represented companies are quoted in the above report by Nanto and Manyin (2010), p.17-18.  
11 Nanto(2011), P. 80.  
12 The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) was established on 14 October 2006 to 
oversee the relevant sanctions measures and to undertake the tasks set out in paragraph 12 of that same resolution. 
Additional functions were entrusted by the Council to the Committee in resolution 1874 (2009) due to the North Korea’s 
nuclear test and missile launch. For details on the sanctions, visit the website of UNSC 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/. 
13 Currently European-North Korean business cooperation include the PyongSu pharmaceutical joint venture, a polish North 
Korean shipping joint venture and a partnership in IT services between the Korea Computer Center(KCC) and a German 
partner company. The British American Tobacco(BAT) and a UK’s brewery company expanded North Korea’s consumer 
choices. Berkofsky (2010), p. 26.     
14 North Korea maintains its diplomatic relationships with most of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. On the 
DPRK diplomatic relations see http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations.  
15  European Commission, North Korea Country Strategy Paper, http://ec.europe.eu/externalrelations/north 
korea/csp/index.htm.    
16 See Berkofsky (2003), EU’s Policy Towards the DPRK-Engagement or Standstill? Briefing Paper, European Institute for 
Asian Studies (EIAS), Brussels, 2003.    
17 See the conclusion of European Council on 23 and 24 March 2001.  
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 322 
References 
 
Awokuse, Titus O. (2006), “Export-led Growth and the Japanese Economy: Evidence from VAR and Directed 
Acyclic Graphs,” Applied Economics  Vol.38. pp.593-602.  
Balassa, Bela (1965). “Trade Liberalization and ‘Revelaed Compartive Advantage”, The Manchester School of 
Economic and Social Studies Vol. 33. pp. 99-123.  
Berkofsky, Axel (2010), The EU’s Relations with China, Japan and North Korea. Implications for the EU’s Role 
and Engagement in Asian Security. ISPI Working Paper No.36. University of Pavia, Italy. 
Berkofsky, Axel (2003), EU’s Policy Towards the DPRK-Engagement or Standstill? Briefing Paper, European 
Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), Brussels, 2003.  
Drabek, Zdenek and Alasdair Smith (1995), Trade Performance and Trade Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Discussion Paper No. 1182. Center for Economic Policy Research.  
Dritsakis, Nikolaos (2004). "Exports, Investments and Economic Development of Pre-accession Countries of the 
European Union: an Empirical Investigation of Bulgaria and Romania," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis 
Journals, vol. 36(16), pp. 1831-1838. 
Ferto, Impre and Lionel J. Hubbard (2002), Revealed Comparative Advantage and Competitiveness in Hungarian 
Agri-Food Sectors. Discussion Papers MT–DP. 2002/8. Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Budapest 
Guerrieri, Paolo (1998), “Trade patterns, Foreign Direct Investment, and industrial restructuring of Central and 
Eastern Europe”. In: Zysman, J., Schwartz, A. eds., Enlarging Europe: The industrial foundations of a new 
political reality. University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, pp. 130–156. 
Hare, Paul G. (2000), "Trade Policy during the Transition. Lessons from the 1990s,"CERT Discussion Papers 6, 
Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. 
Hufbauer, Gary C. and John G. Chilas (1974): “Specialization by Industrial Countries: Extent and Consequences” 
in H. Giersch (ed.): The International Division of Labour: Problems and Perspectives. International Symposium. 
Tubingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 3-38. 
Kitov, Ivan (2009), From socialism to capitalism: 1989-2007. IDG RAS. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 28. April 
2009 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14914/ MPRA Paper No. 14914, posted 29. April 2009 / 10:16 
Lim, Kang-Taek (1997), “Analysis of North Korea’s Foreign Trade by Revealed Comparative Advantages,”  
Journal of Economic Development Vol.22, No.2. pp. 97-117.  
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  323 
Movshuk, Oleksandr (2001), International Trade, Technology and Changing Comparative Advantage: A 
Comparative Study of Transition Economies (1988-1998). The International Centre for the Study of East Asian 
Development(ICSEAD). Working Paper Series Vol. 2001-07. April 2001, Kitakyushu. 
Murrell Peter (1990), The Nature of Socialist Economies: Lessons from Eastern European Trade. Princeton, NJ. 
Princeton University Press.   
Nanto, Dick and Mark Manyin (2010), China-North Korea Relations. CRS Report for Congress. December 28, 
2010. 
Nanto, Dick (2011),” Increasing Dependency: North Korea’s Economic Relations with China”, US-Korea 
Economic Institute. Korea’s Economy Vol. 27. P. 75-83. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 324 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  325 
ENLARGEMENT OF ASEM:  
FOCUSED ON THE RUSSIAN ACCESSION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO KOREA 
 
SUNHEE PARK 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Once every two years since 1996, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) has been providing a region-to-region forum 
for multifaceted dialogue between Asia and Europe. Accepting new members in each Meeting from 2004, it has 
been widening its scope of enlargement (see <Table 1>, and currently ASEM is composed of 49 members, the 
European Commission, and ASEAN Secretariat. The enlarged ASEM, having 20 Asian countries and 29 
European countries as its members, takes 59.2% of the total world population, 58.5% of the GDP, and 65.5% of 
the world trade, constructing the channel for the close cooperation between Asia and Europe regarding major 
issues in the international community. As the Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong argues, the primary 
purpose of ASEM is to determine whether the missing links between Asia and Europe, weaker than those 
between Asia and North America or North America and Europe, could be bridged or not. On the other hand, not 
only focusing on this purpose, many other pundits also presented the following importance of the ASEM. Scholars 
have consequently argued that ASEM is primarily about the rise of the unprecedented inter-regional links that 
have been materialized through the “region-to-region” approach which has been the process of ASEM (see 
chapter 3). 
Based on the realist assumptions, inter-regionalism has been assumed by International Relations (IR) 
scholars to have arisen from the need to counterbalance the most notable superior power of the US, (in the case 
of ASEM) and also the economic power of the EU (in the case of APEC1) and East Asia (in the case of TAFTA2). 
From the institutionalist perspective, inter-regionalism is a way to cope with the opportunities and the risks that 
are inherent in the accelerating interdependence from globalization. Lastly, from the constructivist logic, inter-
regionalism is a way to encourage and build a regional identity. Focusing on the constructivist approach to 
comprehend the rationale of the ASEM, many scholars assert that the following achievements are regarded as 
the most crucial roles of ASEM. ASEM grew out of the explicitly inter-regional format (EU-ASEAN), developing a 
region-to-region dialogue which helped to influence and shape the Asian regional identity. The inter-regional 
forum ASEM has apparently contributed intra-regional awareness and influenced identity development in Asia. 
The peculiarity of ASEM is that it comprises the nucleus of Asian regionalization which is “ASEAN+3”. There had 
been no formal gatherings of “ASEAN+3” countries on a regular basis before the creation of ASEM. It was during 
the process of ASEM, which is a region-to-region dialogue, that the “ASEAN+3” formed a de facto regional 
structure and began functioning as a region. This is the reason why ASEM has been highlighted for its inter-
regional format from its inaugural meeting. Even though the Asian participants of ASEM do not constitute a formal 
group, their presence at a meeting with the EU, the most integrated region, plays a determinant role. Without this 
encounter with the EU, the Asian participants could not have existed as a ‘regional’ entity. Before the 2010 
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enlargement, ASEM has been generally analyzed as a bi-regional inter-regionalism (EU versus “ASEAN+3” and 
since the 2nd enlargement EU versus “ASEAN+3+3” which differs from the trans-regional model of that of APEC 
(see further below <Table 2> in section 3).  
 
<Table 1> Enlargement of ASEM 
 
Founding 
Members 
New Members 
from the 1st 
Enlarge-ment 
(2004). 
New Members 
from the 2nd 
Enlargement 
(2008) 
New Members 
from the 3rd 
Enlargement 
(2010) 
New Members 
from the 4th 
Enlargement 
(2012) 
Asian Side 
(Numbers of 
Asian 
participants) 
ASEAN +3 
(Korea,Japan,C
hina) 
(10) 
Cambodia, 
Laos, 
Myanmar 
(13) 
ASEAN 
secretariat, 
India, Mongolia, 
Pakistan 
(17) 
Australia, 
New Zealand, 
Russia3 
(20) 
 
 
Bangladesh 
(21) 
European Side 
(Numbers of 
European 
participants) 
European Union 
European 
Commission 
(16) 
10 new EU 
countries 
(26) 
Bulgaria, 
Romania 
(28) 
None 
(28) 
 
Norway, 
Switzerland 
(30) 
Driving factor  
Regionally 
induced with 
ASEAN & EU 
enlarge-ment 
Regionally 
induced with EU 
enlargement 
? 
 
 
However, the 2010 enlargement, including countries such as Australia, Russia and New Zealand, brings 
us to reconsider the bi-regional ASEM approach and its working process. The enlargement to such a diverse 
group, indefinite to be classified as neither Asia nor Europe, is expected to bring challenges to the region-based 
coordination process of ASEM. This is because the 2010 enlargement creates a Temporary Third Category which 
is too vague to be classified into either Asia or Europe, and the purpose of this is solely to include these three 
countries. Above all, Russia’s accession stands out, especially considering the fact that the Temporary Third 
Category is to incorporate Russia (which has an indefinite identity between Asia and Europe) and less so for 
Australia and New Zealand. Then, would this enlargement that is affecting the region-to-region approach, the 
modus operandi of ASEM, also bring the changes to the characteristics of ASEM? Followed by the one in 2008, 
the ASEM continuously progressed its enlargement two more times. This paper thus initially tends to explore if 
the ASEM enlargement policy which inevitably limits its bi-regional inter-regionalism, is heading more to a trans-
regional inter-regionalism or not. This can be seen as an important change. Secondly, the focus is centered on 
the implication of the 2010 enlargement with special emphasis on the Russian accession to ASEM and Korea’s 
position in this issue. This paper is structured in the following way: first it will highlight the fact that ASEM inter-
regionalism is presented as an important feature of the new regionalism. It then examines the shifting of ASEM’s 
bi-regional inter-regionalist nature to a trans-regional inter-regionalist one. This involves evaluating the new 
strategies and future perspectives of ASEM since the 2010 enlargement. Thirdly, this paper will observe the 
implication of Russia’s accession to ASEM. It is worth noting that ASEM did not mind the confusion in its working 
process brought by the accession of Russia. Considering the well-functioning working process, bi-regional inter-
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regionalism, it did not necessarily require the change to trans-regionalism. In other words, ASEM had no intention 
of fundamentally changing its working process to transregionalism, but was mindful of the benefits from accepting 
Russia’s membership. This is because Russia’s accession to ASEM can be seen as a bulwark against not only 
the US, which was the principal role of ASEM since its early stage, but also China, a rising potential superpower 
which threatens the existence of ASEM. Finally, this paper will seek to observe Korea’s stance on the Russian 
accession to ASEM including the consecutive enlargement of ASEM in 2008. In particular, it will analyze the 
outcomes of Russia’s accession, such as stabilized energy supply by the Russia-North Korea-South Korea 
natural gas pipeline and the easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula together with the changing perspective of 
ASEM through its enlargements.  
 
2. RESURGENCE OF REGIONALISM AND INTER-REGIONALISM  
 
Major trends of the post-Cold War which Björn Hettne defines as "global regionalization" (Hettne, 2004) explain 
the phenomenon of regionalism’s resurgence, such as ASEM. As the term "global regionalization" suggests, the 
two words –globalization and regionalization– appear as key words to understand the new structure of world 
order. This new structure of world order incorporates "global regionalization”. Regionalism is thus a strategy to 
adapt to globalization. The region tends to react under the pressure of globalization resulting in the emergence of 
“Region-State”. In addition to the emergence of regionalism, regionalism’s capacity to expand and along with it its 
inter-regional links, is one of the most important features of the new regionalism. The twin processes of 
regionalization and globalization can be strengthened by the inter-regional arrangement. Inter-regionalism is a 
structural product of both globalization and regionalization in the sense that more regionalization becomes a key 
factor in the new world where globalization spreads and inter-regionalism plays a role in and causes the regions 
to interact with each other in order to co-manage their increasingly complex interdependence. Inter-regional 
approach has been used by the EU to forge external relations which is in line with its "regionalist ideology" (Hette 
& Söderbaum, 1999, p. 9). The EU’s purpose for establishing ties with foreign countries was to establish group-
to-group relations, as in the case with ASEAN. In the context of the new regionalism in which the region emerged 
in various forms, the inter-regional link manifests in diverse forms. "While interregional relations had been limited 
to the EU’s group-to-group dialogues with other regional organizations in the past, inter-regionalism in the context 
of new regionalism took different forms of informal and multi-layered arrangements with a more diffuse 
membership. "(Hänggi, 2003, p. 201).  
Faced with this new global structure, the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting, proposed by Singapore and 
France as a new framework for inter-regional cooperation, encompasses the existing ASEAN-EU relations along 
with the three countries of Northeast Asia - Japan, China, South Korea. With the expansion of the ASEAN-EU 
relations to these three major Asian countries, ASEM was expected to generate wider impacts than those 
appeared in the ASEAN-EU relationship. The establishment of the inter-regional ASEM link is therefore a product 
which in itself embodies globalization and regionalization, factors that can cause a structural change in world 
order. 
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3. ASEM AS BI-REGIONAL INTER-REGIONALISM 
 
The various forms of inter-regional cooperation have emerged as a result of the new regionalism. Inter-regional 
cooperation multiplies itself without scholars being able to define the characteristics of the different types of inter-
regionalism, except for trans-regional relations and inter-regional relations. "While the group-to-group dialogue 
without common institutions were defined as inter-regional relations, trans-regional forum was seen as having a 
more diverse membership base." (Rüland, 2002, p. 2). It seems that in the following studies of regionalism, the 
authors all agree at least on the fact that a relationship between groups of countries in the absence of any 
common institution is an inter-regional relationship, while trans-regional relationship implies cooperation between 
more diverse members.  
Jürgen Rüland distinguishes the bilateral type of inter-regional relationship from the trans-regional 
relationship (Rüland, 2002). ASEAN-EU, MERCOSUR-EU, ANDEAN Community-EU, relations which are defined 
by a dialogue between groups, with a regional entity already established, are all examples of bilateral inter-
regionalism. Such relationships depend more on the existing institutions and do not require the creation of 
common institutions to manage the inter-regional link in focus. Unlike bilateral inter-regionalism, trans-regionalism 
can lead to infra-structural institutions of its own, such as the secretariat. In this context, Rüland, who restricts the 
inter-regional relationship to a dialogue between pre-existing groups, considers both ASEM and APEC as a trans-
regional relation. Rüland thus considers ASEM and APEC as trans-regional relationships between various 
members, but he does not do so without hesitation. In the same article, he questions the different ways trans-
regionalism can be defined. Can the same form of cooperation in APEC be equally seen in ASEM, which has, 
unlike APEC, no secretariat and which looks more like a relationship between groups with the emergence of the 
"ASEAN +3"?  
This concern is shared by Gilson, who classified ASEM in the same manner as Rüland did, as trans-
regionalism but of a “hybrid” form (Gilson, 2002). Although Gilson classifies ASEM as trans-regionalism, the 
adjective "hybrid" shows her hesitation. It seems that Gilson, while being fully aware of the development of the 
new form of counterpart consistency, feels obliged to take into account the diversity of the members of ASEM, 
thus the classification as trans-regionalism by default. It is therefore not surprising that Gilson, in her 2005 article 
(Gilson, 2005), looks for inter-regionalism, abandons trans-regionalism, and pays attention to the development of 
the relationship between regions within ASEM.  
The analysis of Hettne (Hettne, 2003, p. 40) is not much different from that of Rüland and Gilson, since it 
considers that the difference between trans-regionalism and inter-regionalism is that while trans-regionalism 
covers countries from more than two regions, inter-regionalism refers specifically to more organized and 
systematic interactions. In this way, Hettne considers that the difference between ASEM and APEC is that ASEM 
has the potential to function as a cooperation between regions, - EU and “ASEAN +3” - while APEC, consisting of 
various countries of more than two regions is therefore unable to serve such a function. The Asian participants of 
ASEM - "ASEAN +3" - are not yet fully formed as a region, but they are advancing in the process at the heart of 
ASEM. "It is interesting to compare the APEC to Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the first being an agreement 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  329 
between states while the latter is a sort of discussion club between the two formal organizations: EU and ASEAN 
+3. " (Hettne, 2003, p. 40) 
 
<Table 2>  APEC versus ASEM  
 APEC (1989) ASEM (Before the 2010 Russian accession) 
Composition US, Canada, Mexico, ASEAN4 
Australia, New Zealand, 
Hongkong, Taiwan, Chile, Peru, 
Russia, Papua New Guinea, 
China, Japan, Korea 
“ASEAN 
+“3”(Korea, China, Japan) 
+ 
+“3”(India, Pakistan, Mongolia)   
including ASEAN secretariat 
versus  
European Union(including European Commission) 
Form  Trans-regional type of inter-
regionalism 
Bi-regional type of inter-regionalism 
Existence of secretariat Yes No 
Possible impact of 
intra-regionalism 
No Rise of de facto “ASEAN+3” and Asian 
regionalization process with  “ASEAN+3+3” 
 
APEC includes twenty-one member economies including two non-states, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as 
well as several states geographically outside East Asia including the US, Canada, Mexico, and Russia. APEC 
includes members from dispersed regions such as North America, East Asia, Latin America and Oceania. Unlike 
ASEM which is based on the existing ASEAN-EU relationship operating in two formal organizations, APEC 
functions as an arrangement between states. Regional organizations like ASEAN cannot find its role within 
APEC. For this reason, APEC has not yet included the new members of ASEAN which is Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar. While recognizing that APEC could only discuss enlargement after 2007 because of its official position 
(which requires a ten-year moratorium (1997-2006) regarding the acceptance of a new member), it is clear that 
the functioning of APEC differs from that of the ASEM which takes a region-to-region approach. ASEM has the 
potential not only to improve relations between Asia and Europe, but also to develop two distinct regions that can 
produce more systematic and organized contact than in the trans-regional cooperation. In this case, one region 
can encourage or promote regionalization for another region that is not yet integrated. In other words, this 
particular concept lies behind the idea that a group of countries within the inter-regional relation (i.e. the EU) can 
serve as an external factor that stimulates the regionalization of another group - "ASEAN +3" - in interregional 
cooperation. In the case of ASEM, this pattern can be found where the EU encourages the process of "ASEAN 
+3"and further encourages the Asian regionalization process.  
Finally, it is with the classification made by Heiner Hänggi that further analysis of the type of inter-
regionalism of ASEM could be conducted (Hänggi, 2000, p. 5). Hänggi classifies the inter-regional form into three 
types: the arrangements between regional groupings (first type), the bi-regional/trans-regional arrangements 
(second type) and a hybrid form that refers to relations between regional clusters and a unique power (third type). 
The second type of inter-relationship distinguishing the bi-regional from trans-regional basis, provides a 
classification more relevant for research. Under this classification, Hänggi considers APEC as a trans-regional 
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relationship which brings together diverse countries from more than two regions while he classifies ASEM as a bi-
regional inter-regionalism which includes the countries of two distinct regions: ASEAN + 3 and the EU.  
As all the studies of regionalism that have been mentioned attest to the potential of achieving intra-
regionalization ("ASEAN +3") through inter-regional cooperation (ASEM), this is the key to understanding the 
differences between trans-regionalism and bi-regional inter-regionalism. Therefore, continuing from the analyses 
of Rüland, Hettne, Hänggi and finally of Gilson - who has shown the difficulty of distinguishing between the trans-
regionalism and inter-regionalism - this paper nevertheless identifies three types of interregional forms: group-to-
group (bilateral), region-to-region (bi-regional), and trans-regional. The addition of the bi-regional type of inter-
regionalism allows us to analyze more precisely the different forms of interregional cooperation and the type of 
inter-regionalism ASEM in particular.  
The group-to–group dialogue (inter-group) 
)
 i.e. bi-lateral inter-regionalism 
)
 traditionally favored by 
the EU, is considered a model of inter-regional arrangements that is closely linked to the old regionalism. The 
emergence of the second (bi-regional) and third (trans-regional) types reflect a more recent phenomenon which 
makes them more difficult to be defined. In both types of groups, members are more heterogeneous than in the 
traditional dialogue groups including Member States from more than two regions. But what is important about the 
distinction between bi-regional and trans-regional is the fact that in the bi-regional cooperation, heterogeneities 
tend to homogenize to achieve internal regionalization, while in trans-regional cooperation one cannot expect 
such an impact. The bi-regional cooperation is thus inter-regionalism more suitable to produce intra-regional 
dynamism.  
 
<Table 3> Inter-regionalism including group-to-group (bilateral), bi-regional and trans-regional arrangements  
Form of Inter-regionalism Inter-regional Trans-regional 
Bilateral (group to group) ASEAN-EU, MERCOSUR-EU, 
ANDEAN-EU 
 
Bi-regional ASEM  
Trans-regional  APEC 
 
Bi-regional ASEM thus not only promotes the proximity between regions, but also influences intra-
regional development. The idea of ASEM as a regional integration factor acting in favor of building a community 
identity in East Asia has been developed. Heiner Hänggi asserts that a regional external actor can play the role of 
an "extra-regional echo” (Hänggi, 2003, p. 198).5 His interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Singapore makes Asian regionalization - "intra-regionalism" - through ASEM - "inter-regionalism" – more 
plausible. «East Asian countries used ASEM not only for bridging the ‘missing link’ in the global triangle but also 
for bridging the ‘missing link within Asia’ between the ASEAN and the North Asian countries (Hänggi, 2003, p. 
212). 
ASEM’s inter-regionalism has blurred the distinction between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia in an 
Asian space by encouraging the EU to integrate the ASEAN, which is the core process of "ASEAN+3" towards 
East Asian Community. Requirements of engagement in region-to-region dialogues are a ‘classic approach’ 
adopted by the EU as seen in its agreements with ASEAN and with the other regional system. This inter-regional 
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and bi-regional coordination can be observed in the functioning of ASEM. ASEM coordinators, whose role is to 
facilitate coordination within the framework of this structure, are assisted by a smaller group of coordinators in 
Europe and Asia, four of them in total (two for each region), who meet periodically. The coordinators meet two or 
three times a year and discuss respectively: general, political and economic issues. The coordination between 
Asian and European participants requires internal coordination in advance. Although the European coordinators 
are chosen by the Presidency country and the European Commission, the Asian coordinators are based on ad 
hoc cooperation between a representative of the Southeast Asian countries (holding the ASEAN presidency) and 
a representative of Northeast Asia. Unlike the EU, that conveys a well-organized institutional framework, the 
Asian participants comparably have a harder time to coordinate. However, ASEM has become a unique place for 
drafting the Asian regionalization. ASEM coordinators play a crucial part and they remain part of an essential 
modus operandi of ASEM, which states that regional coordination is needed before the Senior Officials Meeting 
(SOM) of ASEM. 6  
 
4. 2010 ENLARGEMENT: SHIFT FROM A BI-REGIONAL TO A TRANS-REGIONAL INTER-REGIONALISM? 
 
However, the enlargement of 2010 with the joining of new member states such as Australia, Russia and New 
Zealand brings us to the question regarding the bi-regional ASEM approach. Could ASEM maintain its region-
based coordination mechanism of bi-regional inter-regionalism with its heterogeneous members such as Russia 
which is unclassifiable either to Asia or to Europe? Or, is it shifting towards a state-to-state dialogue process with 
a more diffuse membership without the regional coordination provided by the EU and ASEAN? This 2010 
enlargement is fundamentally different from the 2004 and 2008 enlargements which can be demonstrated as the 
region-to-region approach of ASEM process. The first enlargement which occurred in 2004 was regionally 
induced with the respective enlargement from ASEAN (Laos1997, Myanmar 1997 and Cambodia 1999) and the 
EU (10 Central and Eastern European Countries). The second enlargement of ASEM occurred in 2008 and can 
also be fairly seen as a region-to-region approach of ASEM by including the ASEAN Secretariat and three 
additional Asian countries ( Mongolia, India and Pakistan) in the face of the EU’s enlargement to 27 member 
states. It is worth noting that the enlargement of India, Pakistan and Mongolia can be seen as ASEM’s change of 
strategy to include not only the enlarged member states of the regional grouping of ASEAN and the EU, but also 
the individual states separately. However, the second enlargement was not arguable in the process since the 
Asian identity of those countries was not disputed, and the “ASEAN+3+3” combination later led to the creation of 
new subgroup:“Northeast and South Asia (NESA)”. Nevertheless, the 2010 enlargement is in fact more 
problematic since the “Temporary Third Category Arrangement” was created in order to accommodate the 
application of Russia and also those of the other two applicants. 
According to the ASEM’s principle of enlargement called the "two-key approach" set in Asia Europe 
Cooperation Framework (AECF) 20007, the admission of the new members should be initially accepted by 
members of their own region (Asian side or European side) and then accepted "on a consensual basis" between 
the leaders of both regions. The priority of the decision regarding enlargement lies with the members of the 
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corresponding region. For example, the decision to incorporate India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN 
secretariat into ASEM in the 2008 enlargement was initially decided by “ASEAN+3”, which was then an 
incumbent member from the Asian side. We must recognize that this principle of "two-key approach" to 
enlargement reflects the spirit of the region-to-region process. The 2008 enlargement of ASEM adequately 
demonstrated the region-to-region approach of ASEM by including the ASEAN Secretariat and the three 
additional Asian countries Mongolia, India and Pakistan. Thus, the birth of the new combination “ASEAN+3+3” 
(later on NESA) was feasible. 
However, the 2010 enlargement of ASEM which created the “Temporary Third Category Arrangement”, 
transgressed the region-to-region based approach of the ASEM enlargement process. Nevertheless, Australia 
and New Zealand as contested Asian member states can be yet understood because of their strong economic 
linkages with Asia. Their strong participation in various Asia-Pacific regional architectures (APEC and East Asia 
Summit) would also make it natural for them to participate in the ASEM process on the Asian side. However, 
Russian application was a little more complicated (Yeo, 2010, p. 109). This is due to Russia’s ambiguous position 
of not being able to be classified under either Europe or Asia, although Russia was a member of the APEC. The 
decision to incorporate Australia and New Zealand was initially discussed with the Asian members, but with the 
formal application request from Russia, a temporary third group (“Temporary Third Category Arrangement”) was 
created to accommodate both Australia/New Zealand and Russia. This implies the inevitable change in the 
working process of ASEM. How can Asian interest streamlining be managed before the ASEM Summitry? The 
urgent priority after ASEM’s enlargement would be to determine the status of members of the temporary third 
category in relation with the regional grouping. Then, should this third group of Russia, Australia and New 
Zealand be categorized as Asian side or European side? This regional grouping of Asia or Europe will be 
obviously more problematic for Russia. Considering the fact that the EU is even more resolute on its regional 
characteristics, it seems almost impossible for Russia to be grouped in the European side. If this is the case, 
does it indicate that ASEM’s original bi-regional process is shifting towards a state-to-state dialogue process with 
the accession of Russia? 
Immediately after the creation of forum in 1996, Russia expressed its desire to join ASEM as a 
representative of Europe and then later on, in 2001, applied for membership as a representative of Asia. This can 
be explained by Europe’s firm position of only accepting the member states of the EU. Consequently, the 
“Temporary Third Category Arrangement” was probably created to accommodate Russia’s application. Moreover, 
it is Russia’s accession that raises different questions: will ASEM abandon its region-to-region approach to a 
state-to-state dialogue process with a more diffuse membership without regional coordination provided by the EU 
and ASEAN? Can this be translated as ASEM’s shift from a bi-regional forum to a trans-regional forum? If so, 
what is the rationale of this shift to a bi-regional inter-regionalism to a trans-regionalism?  
According to the ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting held in June 2011, the official stance of ASEM was 
that it would stick to its function on bi-regional inter-regionalism despite the member states’ heterogeneity. “It 
must be assured that with the enlargement of ASEM the effectiveness and efficiency of the forum is increased 
and the bipolar (Europe-Asia) model of inter-regional cooperation is retained as it is set in AECF 2000.”8 As 
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mentioned above, even though ASEM highly values the central role of the EU and ASEAN and even though it 
seems hard to turn away from the region-to-region based approach, the accession of Russia holding 
heterogeneous identity will bring inevitable changes to ASEM’s working process. Then, what are the fundamental 
reasons that encouraged ASEM to accept the new enlargement process with extravagance, which does not 
follow the originally established enlargement process and accept Russia as its member? Why did ASEM include 
countries  withambiguous identities such as Russia? 
 
5. IMPLICATION OF RUSSIAN ACCESSION 
 
With the accession of Russia in ASEM, it is expected that ASEM’s geopolitical influence would be expanded from 
the two ends of Eurasia and make Central Asian states more interested in ASEM. The accession of Russia which 
is the representative country in Eurasia, can be interpreted as a means to counterbalance the US, one of the 
main rationales of ASEM since its very beginning, and also China, which is progressively gaining power in the 
international community and thus becoming a threat to the presence of ASEM. 
Regarding Russia’s membership in ASEM, this section proposes one of the crucial rationales of ASEM, 
which is to strengthen a bulwark against the US. According to Brzezinski’s argument (Brzezinski, 1997, Chap. 2), 
control of Eurasia is the key to global domination and control of Central Asia is the control of Eurasia. This 
approach originates from MacKinder’s theory (MacKinder, 1904, p. 435) of ‘Pivot Area’ which coincides strongly 
with much of the post-Soviet space, referring to a particular area on the Eurasian landmass that he deemed of 
critical geostrategic importance. Acknowledged as the father of geostrategy, MacKinder’s theory along with the 
previous approach of geostrategy emphasizes the importance of presence of hegemony in Central Asia. It 
furthermore deals with the ‘Pivot Area’ under the influence of the US, especially when the two ends of Eurasia — 
the EU as the Western end and countries around Japan as the Eastern end — are all within the sphere of 
influence of the US. Moreover, in comparison with the US’s excessively strong position on these two ends (Asia 
and Europe), relations between Asia and Europe were too weak. In this respect, since ASEM’s earliest phase of 
establishment, its objective of reducing the overdependence of both Europe and Asia on the US was extensively 
researched by numerous scholars (Camroux & Lechervy, 1996; Bobrow, 1999; Soeya & Roper, 1997). In other 
words, Russia’s entry to ASEM reminded of the fact that one of the implicit yet important objectives of ASEM is to 
counterbalance the activities of the US; in particular, it suggests ASEM’s objective to counterweight the power of 
the US in Central Asia. With the enlargement of ASEM to Russia, ASEM is expected to play a crucial role not only 
in economic matters, but also in non-economic and especially security matters in order to provide a counterweight 
to the US. It is worth noting that the US is gradually exerting its influence in Central Asia and the presence of the 
US forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, under the pretext of wars with Afghanistan and Iraq, is one of the 
epitomes.9 For Russia, the post Soviet space which includes the Commonwealth of Independent States was 
under its own sphere of influence for a long time. However, after having witnessed the US influence in Central 
Asia, Russia probably felt the necessity of joining ASEM to counterbalance the rising influence of the US. In 
particular, the willingness of Georgia and Azerbaijan to acquire NATO’s membership and the building of the 
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Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan(BTC) pipeline to transport oil from the Caspian Sea with support from the US (which does not 
necessarily pass through the Russian regions but through countries that are more pro-American such as 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey) clearly show that the US power is radically increasing in Central Asia. 
Therefore, it seems rather reasonable for Russia to join ASEM to counterbalance this threat.  
Russia’s entry to ASEM is also expected to create counterweight against unrivaled Chinese power. The 
recent ASEM summit has been analyzed as overshadowed by the Chinese bilateral meetings. During the ASEM 
summits instead of the interaction in the form of group-to-group which is the EU and Asian group, the bilateral 
state-to-state meetings in the margins of the ASEM summits turn out to be the focus. This indicates the rise of 
China’s sphere of influence in ASEM due to bilateral meetings with China. While many issues are supposed to be 
discussed within the ASEM framework, individual EU member states seemed to be more willing to talk with China 
bilaterally (Lai, 2010). 
Russia’s accession is also closely related to the energy cooperation that was initially discussed in the 
ASEM framework from 2008 onwards. In April 2008, the first ASEM forum on Energy Security Policy was held by 
Vietnam, followed by the First ASEM Ministerial Conference on Energy Security meeting held in Brussels in 2009. 
The EU particularly exposed the risks of long distanced pipelines, with the gas supply crisis at the beginning of 
2009 caused by a Russia-Ukraine row as an example. The importance of energy governance including the 
energy security stood out in the first general-level meeting. Since both Europe and Asia shared commonality of 
being dependent on imported Russian resources, the energy security issues became the important issues of 
inter-regional dialogue and cooperation of ASEM. Russia supports the supply in China with pipelined oil through 
the East Siberia Pacific Ocean project while also supplying Japan by 2015 (Dent, 2011, p. 138), thus Russia is 
the important major energy exporter that supplies both Europe and Asia. Although there may be competitive 
tensions due to the fact that all of ASEM Partners have to secure the same Russian energy resources, this 
becomes one material reason why the substantial ASEM energy cooperation can be the urgent cooperation field 
of ASEM. 
 
6. IMPLICATION OF RUSSIAN ACCESSION TO KOREA 
 
Even though Russia had been notifying its intention of joining the ASEM summit since 1996, Korea was not 
favorable to Russia’s accession from the beginning. This is because Korea promoted Korea-EU bilateral relations 
through the multilateral framework of ASEM process and put higher valuation on the process of “ASEAN+3”. Thus 
in regards of the establishment of regional integration of East Asia, Korea had no merits from supporting the 
accession of such disparate countries like Russia. Korea was more active in strengthening the process of 
“ASEAN+3” than any other country. In fact, when the East Asia Summit (EAS) was first held in 2005, Korea was 
not favorable to the accession of a heterogeneous country, Russia. President Kim Dae-Jung effectually 
contributed to vitalizing “ASEAN +3” by playing a leading role such as proposing the East Asia Vision Group 
(EAVG) and East Asia Study Group (EASG).  
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The momentum that converted Korea’s stance to supporting Russia’s accession to ASEM in 2010 was 
largely due to the thought that Russia’s accession derived benefits to Korea even if the bi-regional approach was 
diverted to trans-regionalism including Eurasia. Russian accession to ASEM could vitalize projects directly related 
to Korea. As one of the examples, the construction of a pipeline that sends natural gas from Russia to South 
Korea via North Korea, in terms of diversification of energy sources, conveys a very important strategic meaning 
from the perspective of Korea which has scarce natural resources and thus heavily depends on imports10. 
President Lee Myung-bak and Medvedev of Russia planned out concrete projects by reaching the agreement of 
the construction of pipelines in September 2009, and set the seal on the detailed roadmap of PNG project on 
November 2nd, 2011. This was bolstered by Russia’s permission to pass the Russian pipelines through North 
Korea when Kim Jong-il visited Russia in August 2011. Although the construction of Russia-South Korea 
pipelines was already mentioned in the Nordpolitik of President Roh Tae-woo in the early 1990s and this project 
was continuously mentioned throughout the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun Administrations in 2000s, the 
actualization of affirmative action such as determination of the roadmap was only now achieved. From Russia’s 
point of view, the main interests were diverted to the Eastern Siberian Region, due to the change of the existing 
Eurocentric strategies of natural gas exports to the diversification strategies of export markets. This was mainly 
because of Europe’s efforts of decreasing its dependency on Russian gas supplies and the development of shale 
gas in North America. For Russia who had been developing large gas fields such as ‘Sakhalin-3’ in order to 
promote economic developments in Eastern Siberia and diversification of export markets which were leaning too 
much on Europe, Korea was the market not to be lost. Since Korea was connected to both Russia and the 
continent, it had many advantageous geographical terms to promote the PNG project, the great asset to 
GAZPROM.  
From Korea’s standpoint, the construction of Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipelines was viewed 
as an economic boon because it could secure the stabilized gas supply chains for the next 30 years, diversify the 
origins of gas imports, and decrease transport costs. In addition, not only the cooperation between Russia and 
Korea gets strengthened, but also various other economic cooperation and consolidation of institutional 
framework of cooperation among Russia, North Korea, and South Korea can be achieved. Furthermore, political 
benefits such as appeasement of tensions in the Korean peninsula and stability due to the improved relations 
between South Korea and North Korea are expected. Of course, this argument is not only derived from the 
bilateral relation between Korea and Russia, but also reiterated in the multilateral framework such as APEC and 
East Asia Summit (EAS) of which Russia acquired membership in 2011. However, one clear practicality of the 
framework of ASEM is that, unlike in APEC, Korea succeeded in making security issues in the Korean peninsula 
such an issue through ASEM. As they adopted the Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula in the Third 
(Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula) and the Fourth summit (Copenhagen Political Declaration 
for Peace on the Korean Peninsula) of ASEM, the ASEM summits played a crucial role in breaking diplomatic and 
political ground with regards to the issues of the Korean peninsula, especially the relations between South and 
North Korea. Although the EU is not a member of the Six-party talks, the meetings specifically aimed to find a 
peaceful resolution to improve relations between North and South Korea. This is especially the case regarding 
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the absence of the US in ASEM, who insists on nuclear disarmament before having talks, the construction of 
North Korea-South Korea gas pipelines bore positive effects such as alleviation of tensions and peace stability in 
peninsula. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The 2010 ASEM enlargement with unclear modalities of enlargement (Temporary Third category arrangement) 
and unclear geographical status of the members brings us to to question the shift from a bi-regional inter-regional 
format of ASEM to a trans-regional format. However, ASEM will probably not abandon its region-to-region based 
approach since both sides still have an interest in maintaining ASEM’s bi-regional structure. Russia, Australia, 
and New Zealand which belonged to the Temporary Third category when they joined ASEM in 2010 were re-
categorized into the Asian group, since they were included in the NESA from the coordinator’s group meeting 
which prepared for the 9th ASEM summit of November 2012. This ASEAN+NESA can reveal the fact that the 
ASEM still wants to maintain the talks between Europe and Asia, that is to say the region-to-region format. 
Through its enlargement once more, the 9th ASEM Summit in 2012 accepted Bangladesh in the Asian group and 
Norway and Switzerland in the European group as new members. The fourth enlargement that has accepted 
Norway and Switzerland in the European group can be seen as an exception since the Europeans restricted 
European participants to only EU members. Although the European side is now beyond the confines of the EU, it 
is still no more than the region-to-region format of Europe versus Asia (ASEAN + NESA). In this connection, we 
can grasp that the objective of the 2010 enlargement was not aimed at changing ASEM’s working process. 
Rather, ASEM’s seeming inclination to trans-regional format can be interpreted as the means forced by 
circumstances to include Russia and further to include other countries in Eurasia. The accession of Russia, the 
representative country of Eurasia, thus can be regarded most persuasively as the principal rationales of ASEM: to 
counterbalance the US’ hegemonic stance, as one of the primary rationales of ASEM suggests, and also to 
counterweight against unrivaled China in ASEM which is becoming the potential threat to ASEM’s existence. 
Thirdly, Russia’s accession made the energy security, which is one of the main challenges of the 21st Century for 
Asia and Europe in ASEM framework, very discussable in-depth. This is especially the case for the situations 
where the EU is particularly exposed to the risks of long-distance pipelines. Many Asian countries are also 
exposed to risks related to long distance shipping through narrow and particularly exposed to security risks 
straits, such as the straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits. Discussions on the energy security can therefore 
be regarded as important issues of inter-regional dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe. 
Furthermore, in terms of the effects of Russia’s accession on Korea, stabilized energy supply as well as the 
alleviation of tensions in Korean peninsula can be expected.  
Concerning the recent enlargements, Korea was in favor of both enlargements, the one that included 
Russia, Australia, and New Zealand in 2010 and the recent enlargement in 2012.11 Compared to the other Asian 
countries, Korea has remarkably advanced its relations with the EU due to the ASEM process which dated from 
1996. Although the diplomatic relations between Korea and the EU were established in 1963, the very first Korea-
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EU summit was held at the margins of ASEM 2002 in Copenhagen. In addition, the first FTA that the EU has 
concluded in Asia was with Korea. In the 2010 Brussels Summit, Korea took the lead role to talk over the global 
economic crisis and won support from the member nations for the successful hosting of the G20 Summit. 
Furthermore, in the ASEM Summit held in Laos Vientiane in November 2012, Korea placed the emphasis on 
reporting Korea’s Green Growth policies such as Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGGI) and their results. On this wise, Korea is apt to take the ASEM as the diplomatic stage for enhancing the 
networks with major countries in Europe. With the intention of promoting its national interests through the ASEM, 
Korea endeavors through ASEM framework to devise means to help improve various forms of global governance 
by cooperating with the EU. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Created in 1989, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) has since the beginning been conceived as a forum for 
economic cooperation. 
2 Transatlantic Free Trade Area(TAFTA) has been proposed between the United States and the European Union in the 
1990s. 
3 These three countries did not belong to the Asian group since they were classified into « Temporary Third Category » when 
they joined as members in 2010. However, they are shown in the table as above since they were re-classified into the NESA 
(NorthEast and SouthAsia) in 2012. NESA has been created from 2008 with the joining of India, Mongolia and Pakistan in 
ASEM. Currently NESA includes countries such as Korea, China, Japan, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand 
and Russia.  
4 Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar excluded. 
5 HÄNGGI Heiner, « Regionalism through interregionalism » in LIU Fu-Kuo, REGNIER Philippe(ed.), Regionalism in East 
Asia : Paradigm shifting ?, Routledge, Curzon, 2003, p.197-219 (198). 
6 « Recommendations for ASEM working methods – Draft Proposals for FMM 6 » in Sixth Foreign Affairs Meeting, Kildare, 
April 2004. 
7 The AECF adopted by Heads of State and Government in ASEM 3 Summit in Seoul in 2000, sets out the vision, principles, 
objectives, priorities and mechanisms for the ASEM process for the first decade of the new millennium. 
8 The Tenth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM) Chair’s Statement, point 91.  
9 At the Astana summit in July 2005, Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) urged the US to withdraw its troops from 
SCO. Therefore, all of the US troops withdrew in Uzbekistan and some also withdrew in Kyrgyzstan. 
10 Following the 2005-2006 data, South Korea is the 10th largest oil consumer, 5th net importer of oil and 2nd largest importer 
of LNG in the world. 
11 Written Interview with a senior official in charge of ASEM from the Korean Foreign ministry on the 14th of November 2012. 
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THE FUTURE OF EU-KOREA RELATIONS  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Axel Marx and Jan Wouters 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This volume examined the economic, political and policy processes underlying current EU-Korea relations, 
following the implementation of the ambitous EU-Korea FTA. In so doing, we aimed to scrutinize the ways 
emerging EU-Korean regulatory regimes frame the pathways and possibilities for a more stable, cooperative and 
integrated collaboration. These regulatory frameworks have become a key area of political activity in international 
relations, and as they emerge, they become strongly interrelated to various transnational integration processes. 
The importance of these regulatory frameworks is highlighted by the extensive provisions concerning regulatory 
collaboration which are embedded within the FTA. From the perspective of regulatory harmonization, the creation 
of encompassing rules for both  economies could serve as a basis for further prosperity. What emerges are 
transnational regulatory networks (TRN). (Bruszt and McDermott, 2009; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; 
Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2012; Rodrik, 2011; Verdier, 2009) These TRNs consist of a myriad of agreements and 
collaborative structures and constitute structures of opportunity for achieving policy goals. They have proven to 
be crucial for generating learning effects, reducing uncertainty, increasing quality of decisions and performance 
and lowering of transaction costs. In leading publications Slaughter (2004) and Martinez-Diaz and Woods (2009) 
focused on regulatory networks as a key concept in order to understand current development processes in a 
global order. Martinez-Diaz and Woods (2009; see also Börzel, 2011; Torfing; 2012) identify five functions of 
networks, namely agenda-setting, consensus building, policy coordination, knowledge production and exchange, 
and norm-setting and diffusion.  
The rise of international network governance and the formation of transnational regulatory networks 
regimes takes place in a context of a more general and profound shift from government to governance which is 
redefining the role of states in market regulation.  This shift is inter alia characterised by increased participation of 
non-state actors in policy making, adaptability and constant learning and regulatory coordination. (Lobel,  2004; 
see also 2012; Rhodes, 2012) All these elements are present in the current development of EU-Korea relations 
as they were discussed in the present volume.  As a result, the EU-Korea FTA and EU-Korea relations in general 
constitute a primary case of transnational regulatory networks. This volume analysed in-depth the many 
dimensions of such a transnational regulatory network. In this concluding chapter we aim to take stock of the 
most important arguments in the contributing papers and provide some general recommendations emerging from 
the papers. The chapter ends with a conclusion 
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2. EU-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION: A REVIEW OF THE MAIN ARGUMENTS 
 
EU-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION: THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
 
A first set of papers discussed in depth the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. The papers build on an existing 
body of literature (Brown, 2011; Cremona, 2011; Horng, 2011) which aim to analyze in depth the Eu-Korea FTA 
and its implications. 
The paper by Chang-Sang Cho provided an extensive and in-depth discussion of the EU-Korea FTA. It 
is the most extensive treatment of the EU-Korea FTA and provides an excellent overview and discussion of the 
structure and provisions.  It fleshes out the main characteristics of the most ambitious trade agreement ever 
negotiated by the EU as was pointed by H.E. Karel De Gucht, current European Commissioner for Trade. In the 
paper Chang-Sang Cho argues that the Korea-EU FTA is a mutually beneficial trade pact, as well as an important 
global signal of commitment of Korea and the EU to free trade and trade liberalisation. The strategic values of the 
FTA go far beyond the sphere of trade and investment. Coupled with the Korea-EU Framework Agreement 
signed in May 2010, the FTA, it is argued, will pave the way for a solid institutional framework to the new 
relationship between Korea and the EU, and will contribute to the establishment of a “strategic partnership” as 
was declared upon at the Korea-EU Summit held in Brussels in October 2010. The paper makes clear that both 
Korea and the EU make good use of trade policy to pioneer overseas markets and to arrange investment 
protection mechanisms for their companies, coming up with appropriate policy agendas to adapt changing global 
economic environment. The FTA is of great significance in that it embodies the spirit of the renewed trade policies 
of both parties. By the end of the transitional periods, virtually all import duties between the two economies will 
have been removed. Additionally, the FTA breaks new ground in tackling significant non-tariff barriers to trade, 
with a specific focus on the automotive, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and electronics sectors. The FTA also 
creates new opportunities for market access in services and investments, and lead to major advances in areas 
such as intellectual property, government procurement and competition policy. As the first FTA the EU has 
concluded with an Asian partner, the FTA is expected to support the EU in securing a foothold in Asia and serve 
as EU’s springboard to the rapidly growing Asian market. In particular, once Korea successfully signs agreements 
with China and Japan, the EU will be able to substantially expand its overseas markets through the FTA. Lastly, 
the paper discussed the impact of the FTA on Korea's overall economic system. It is argued that the FTA will 
upgrade Korea's institutions and practices to the EU level, thereby enhancing Korean economy's transparency 
and predictability. As for the EU, the deal is in accord with its new trade policy direction aiming to promote internal 
economic growth and job creation. The paper ends with an exploration of different areas in which further 
collaboration can be pursued including inter alia green growth strategies.  
The paper by  Eugenia Laurenza and James Mathis focuses on the services component of the trade 
agreement. It compares the domestic regulation provisions in the field of international trade and services of the 
EU-Korea FTA with that of the US–Korea FTA (2011). The paper examines the subjects of transparency, 
regulatory cooperation, competition law and policy, and their institutional context, to assess the depth of 
integration generated and the resulting level of compatibility that results between the agreements. The paper 
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determines that many of the subjects are treated in a softer law manner that establishes on-going systems of 
cooperation in order to realize the agreements’ objectives of addressing regulatory barriers for foreign services 
and service providers. In some cases these softer law approaches may reflect the policy space parties choose to 
retain in their own domestic systems for balancing trade and regulatory objectives. For most of the subjects, the 
approaches employed are also similar, suggesting that the two agreements are rendered generally compatible for 
the types of regulatory activities incurred by the common signatory. The two subject areas of transparency and 
sector-specific domestic regulation present some more legally binding and actionable elements and there are 
some differences between the agreements in how these elements are addressed. For these, there is more risk of 
regulatory fragmentation as between the agreements and questions can be raised as to how this is resolved by a 
national regulatory system. The paper finally considers some implications for the multilateral trading system in the 
WTO presented by the provisions examined in these agreements. To the extent the softer regulatory approaches 
emphasise the building of agency relationships over time, one can question whether this is a likely possibility to 
model in the larger group of WTO Members. For those subjects that present somewhat more rigorous legal 
approaches, one can more easily consider how these models might translate to the WTO discussion as potential 
benchmarks for enhancing multilateral trade in services. 
The paper by Nicolas Croquet discussed at length the provisions with regard to climate change in the 
EU-Korea FTA and how they relate to the Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the EU and 
Korea. He starts by observing that before the conclusion of the EU-Korea FTA, the EU had already signed 
several preferential trade agreements covering climate change. Their climate change provisions fell under an 
environmental protection heading, an energy heading or a combination of both, and have been accompanied by a 
dispute settlement mechanism ranging from a mere consultation procedure to an arbitration procedure. He goes 
on to argue that despite the fact that the EU-Korea FTA is being presented as embodying a novel type of FTA by 
reason of its comprehensive nature, its direct climate change provisions still enjoy a low degree of normativity in a 
soft law/hard law continuum due to their generality, looseness and conditional language. In addition, its dispute 
settlement mechanism entails no judicial process and is limited to consultations and mediation. The soft law 
nature of the FTA’s direct climate change provisions stands in contrast with the higher degree of normativity 
attached to its indirect climate change provisions: (i) provisions on tariff schedules and the elimination of customs 
duties in import of goods; (ii) specific energy services commitments; (iii) general exceptions to the liberalization of 
trade in goods; (iv) general exceptions to trade in services, freedom of establishment and electronic commerce; 
(v) technical barriers to trade; and (vi) transparency standards and national procedural guarantees. The low level 
of normativity attached to the EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions is also counterbalanced by the 
medium level of normativity characterizing the Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the EU 
and its Member States and Korea of 10 May 2010 that is not yet in force. In short, the paper argues that the 
climate change relations between the EU and Korea are tainted by different levels of normativity that revolve 
around the precision of their contractual arrangements and the judicialization of their dispute settlement 
mechanism. These different levels of normativity in the soft law/hard law scale will influence the way in which the 
EU-Korea FTA’s direct climate change provisions, its indirect climate change provisions and the 2010 
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Cooperation Agreement normatively will interact. The FTA’s direct and indirect climate change provisions, on the 
one hand, and 2010 Cooperation Agreement, on the other hand, have regulated climate change at different 
functional levels: (i) by setting the ground for a general policy framework; (ii) by treating climate change as an 
integral part of trade in goods, trade in services and freedom of establishment, in other words, as the object of 
international trade; (iii) by treating climate change as a ground for legitimizing restrictions on international trade, 
whether on the import of goods, on trade in services or as a technical barrier to trade; and finally (iv) as a trigger 
of good governance and good administrative standards in the Contracting Parties’ respective laws, including 
therefore in their adoption and enforcement of climate change legislation. How these different approaches will 
converge is still an out-standing question which needs to be addressed in future dialogues. 
The paper by Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan analysed a specific case study on the regulatory 
implications of the EU-Korea FTA and its potential to harmonize standards. She focuses on the mechanical 
engineering industry since the mechanical engineering industry has played (and still plays) a crucial role in terms 
of economic growth and development in both Korea and a number of EU countries. During the negotiations 
leading up to the signing of the EU-Korea FTA, this industry was singled out as a key player in EU-Korean trade. 
In particular, trade liberalisation between the two entities would allow this industry to be the major industrial 
beneficiary from the agreement. Indeed, this is an industry characterised by a myriad of standards, technical 
regulations, market entry administrative procedures and rules related to intellectual property rights. The 
development of these standards, as the paper shows, has proliferated in the last decades. Paving the way to 
overcome these obstacles provides great opportunities for trade.  Although standards and technical regulations 
are issued in the interest of the final consumer, they do generate numerous costs for mechanical engineering 
firms, in particular for SMEs, as well as for importers. These costs represent additional market entry barriers. 
Within the EU several actions have been taken to harmonise standards and regulatory measures, in particular 
through the new Machinery Directive.   The objective of this paper was therefore to assess the extent and impact 
of these regulatory obstacles in the mechanical engineering industry. The paper starts with the observation that 
the increased integration through trade has led to a degree of harmonisation in the area of standards and 
regulatory measures. For example, she notes that Korea’s FTA strategy has led to simplified export procedures 
and documentation. Exported products do not require any more an export license issued by a foreign exchange 
bank and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy helps exporters by making the information about trade restrictions 
readily available. In addition, the paper notes that a plethora of EU directives aimed at harmonizing the EU 
market in the mechanical engineering area can be seen as facilitating Korean exports of mechanical engineering 
products onto the EU market. Overall the paper finds the FTA is a strong force in harmonizing standards and 
opening up markets. 
The paper by Kerremans, Adriaensen and Reykers aimed to better understand how specific policy 
outcomes in the FTA came about and the role of trade administrations herein. The paper starts with an 
assessment of the current literature on the EU-Korea and argues that a large part of the research focuses on the 
geo-political drivers of the trade agreement and stresses the deep economic motivations behind this trade 
agreement. Other studies, they show, have looked more into the content and the process of the negotiations, but 
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have largely focused on the politicized issues. While these studies provide us many insights in the FTA, they 
cannot explain the outcomes for the many issues in the agreement on which little politicization or societal 
mobilization drove the policy process. How to understand the exemption of certain tariff reductions that were not 
being subject to a heated public debate? It is here that the functioning of the domestic trade administration may 
be important, and its capacity to draft trade policy proposals that do not have to politicized at all. With such a 
capacity, trade administrations may be better able to calibrate their policies to what is economically optimal for 
both the winners and losers from trade liberalization, whether they have been politicized or not. In their paper, 
they explore to what extent the variation in tariff concessions made by both the EU and Korea reflect the variation 
that exists in the competiveness of the products covered by these concessions, and this for all eight-digit tariff 
lines. Since free trade agreements aim at liberalizing substantially all the trade between the parties, they focus on 
the length of the periods in which the tariffs are dismantled in the process of implementing the agreement. The 
authors observe an interesting difference between the EU and Korea that can be explained by the different ways 
in which their trade administrations are linked to sectoral interests. They particularly note the EU’s inherent 
advantage as a multi-level system in which both the Commission trade administration and the trade 
administrations in the EU member states jointly affect the EU’s ability to calibrate its trade policies to the 
competitiveness of its producers. Following from this thet provide several recommendations with regard to 
managing knowledge and information during trade negotiations. 
 
EU-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION: REGULATORY AND POLICY ISSUES 
 
A second set of papers focuses on political and regulatory cooperation with a focus on the areas of security (arms 
trade and control), chemical regulation, environmental regulation, education, development co-operation and 
industrial development. 
The paper by Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Shin Dongmin discussed arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism. For decades, European Union and Korea have been developing their regulatory approaches to 
establish domestic frameworks conductive towards better regulation of arms trade and control and 
counterterrorism. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both the EU and Korea have increased efforts to improve and 
fine-tune their regulatory frameworks. The paper discussed at length the emergence, development, convergence 
and divergence of these regulatory approaches. In a first part, they discuss the focus of each  party. They show 
that the EU focuses on multilateralism, helping states to reduce their stocks of arms, implementing measures to 
address illegal demand, and supporting strengthening the rule of law in unstable countries to curb the demand for 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). Multilateralism and cooperation are therefore the preferred tools for the 
EU in the area of arms trade and control. For Korea, disarmament and non-proliferation activities, international 
cooperation to strengthen the global regime, activities in the field of conventional weapons, and disarmament and 
non-proliferation activities within the UN are the key tenets of its efforts to address proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). As for SALW, Korea applies its Foreign Trade Act to deal with them. This act refers to 
the Wassenaar Arrangement as one of its legal bases. In the area of counterterrorism, the EU focuses on 
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strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation and developing collective capability. The EU 
also promotes international partnership to fight terrorism. Multilateralism and cooperation again emerge as central 
aspects of the EU’s approach to a security issue. In the case of Korea, cooperation with international 
organisations, bilateral cooperation, and strengthening domestic systems are the main tools in the area of 
counterterrorism. The paper shows in detail that the regulatory approaches of the EU and Korea to arms trade 
and control and counterterrorism have both similarities and differences. By building on the former while 
addressing the latter, Korean and European officials can strengthen the respective regulatory frameworks. In 
addition, the authors argue, collaboration between the Eu and Korea can help to develop, implement, and monitor 
a more sophisticated international regime in these areas. 
The paper by Katja Biedenkopf investigated chemicals regulation in the European Union and Korea. 
Both jurisdictions have shown an increased level of regulatory activity in recent years with the EU developments 
preceding the Korean by only a few years. Also here, regulatory approaches have communalities but also 
differences. The paper argues that EU chemicals regulation had effects on policy developments in Korea and it 
explores opportunities for enhanced, mutually beneficial EU-Korean cooperation.  The paper demonstrates that 
the similarities between EU and Korean chemicals regulatory developments are a (partial) result of market 
interconnectedness, mutual awareness and lesson-drawing. However, structural regulatory cooperation between 
Korea and the EU is found to be in its infancy. It is relatively ad hoc, patchy and driven by Korean demand. The 
paper outlines options for enhancing cooperation from the technical to the political level. A working group on 
chemicals that was established through the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement is a start and demonstrates the 
recognition that regulatory cooperation is important. It bears the potential to provide a formal framework for 
strengthened EU-Korea cooperation. However, in an attempt to further enhance and foster cooperation, the paper 
argues that additional structures and personal links are needed. These do not need necessarily to be highly 
formalised but a designated person in the main involved institutions would help setting up and fuelling such 
dialogue. Such persons could act as a bridge between technical and regulatory experts in Korea and the EU. 
Large parts of regulatory cooperation depend on persons that deal with detailed policy-related questions and their 
implementation rather than on high-level political agreements. High-level political commitments are an important 
component, preparing the grounds for regulatory cooperation but it is equally important that the individuals that 
work on the policy on a day-to-day basis fill the political commitments with concrete actions. The paper further 
explores areas in which and options for how this could be done. The early stage of Korean chemical policy reform 
provides a good opportunity for cooperation at an early stage of the policy cycle. This could help avoiding the 
adoption of barriers to trade and regulatory differences, which would be more difficult to iron out at a later stage of 
the process. 
The paper by Stefan Niederhafner and Chan Song Lee looks at climate policy. The paper compares the 
EU Emission Trading System (ETS) and Korea’s Target Management System (TMS) with two goals, namely to 
evaluate the potential for successful CO2 mitigation in each system and investigate the compatibility of the EU 
ETS and the Korean TMS to assess possibilities for regulation transfer and co-operation. Both systems address 
‘heavy emitters’, cover more than 50% of their total territorial CO2 emissions and try to realize their reduction 
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targets through an approach that goes beyond classic command-and-control policy. The paper explores the 
regulatory framework of both regulatory settings, explains the decisions that led to the different approaches 
against the backdrop of their institutional, political and cultural contexts, and evaluates overall performance. The 
analysis reveals that both systems have not reached their mitigation potential and explores the shortcomings 
responsible for this failure. The EU tried to secure its 8% Kyoto protocol reduction commitment by establishing a 
system that will help to reduce GHG emissions even further. The EU ETS aims to establish a cap-and-trade 
system, which utilizes market mechanisms to achieve the reductions. The paper shows that steering the system 
towards actual reduction, however, has so far been unsuccessful due to a GHG emissions cap that was set too 
high and slow reaction time to the global economic slowdown. Korea from its side tried to establish itself as a 
frontrunner in climate change activities by combining environmental efforts with an enhancement of its economic 
prospects and its global influence. The Korean TMS establishes a regulatory setting based on reductions against 
business-as-usual projections. At the centre of this system are annual negotiation cycles, in which the 
government and private operators closely co-operate to decide company-specific reduction targets together. 
However overall, the system’s performance has so far been unsatisfactory due to insufficient target setting 
exacerbated by a weak penalty system.  Subsequently the paper explores areas of possible collaboration and co-
operation, both in a bilateral and multilateral (global climate change regime) context.  Specifically, the paper 
describes how the EU and Korea could establish CO2 emissions allowances trade between the two systems and 
elaborates on how the Korean TMS could better be integrated into the global ETS, as promulgated by the Kyoto-
Protocol. Furthermore, the EU’s potential to support the adoption of the Korean TMS model as a pre-ETS system 
to mitigate GHG emissions are investigated, both within the EU and as an EU foreign-policy tool.  
The paper by Sang-Duk Choi focuses on transnational mobility policies in tertiary education and 
describes a major new initiative in the context of Asian higher education.  The purpose of this paper was to 
examine the Korean experiences in the recent formation of the CAMPUS (Collective Action for Mobility Program 
of Universities Students) Asia as a trilateral- university cooperation between Korea, Japan and China. It explored 
features of education policies under the influence of globalization in order to discuss the changing policy issues in 
Korean higher education as well as the government’s supports for the internationalization of Korean universities. 
Secondly, the paper investigated the features of CAMPUS Asia program, stressing the benefits of regional 
cooperation between Korea, Japan and China in the rise of East Asian economy. The Korean government has 
played a leading role in the creation of the CAMPUS Asia program which was launched by the agreement 
between Korea, Japan and China in 2011. Thirdly, it examined the responses from participating universities in 
Korea based on the recent survey in order to support further improvements of the CAMPUS Asia Program, after 
the pilot project (2011-2015). This assessment aims to contribute to a better understanding of how the system 
works and the potential to expand beyond the Asian context and foster collaboration with similar programs in the 
European Union.  
The paper  by Axel Marx and Jadir Soares on Korea’s development cooperation policy analysed Korean 
development cooperation and compares it to the EU in order to identify complementarities and differences. This 
analysis is framed in the broader post-Busan context of triangular cooperation and the OECD agenda on the 
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division of labor in development co-operation. The paper starts from the European Union’s desire to “improve the 
tools of global governance” which has led it to take a vested pursuit in becoming an active and leading actor in 
global economic development and development co-operation.  In order to achieve its development objectives the 
EU develops partnerships. In an increasingly multi-polar and polycentric world the choice of partners increases. 
Partners, which in turn, are networked and linked to other partners. Korea has emerged as an especially 
interesting partner to further develop partnerships in the context of development co-operation. Korea is not only 
an exceptional example of sustained economic development which in a few decades moved from being a 
recipient country in the context of development cooperation to a donor country. Korea has also taken a leading 
role in pursuing actively the advancement of the ‘(global) development agenda’.  At its 2010 Seoul summit, the G-
20, then led by Korea, agreed to the so-called “Seoul Consensus” on development policy which aims to replace 
the Washington Consensus. In 2011 Korea hosted the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan which 
resulted in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. The ambitions of the EU and Korea 
seem to align in the context of development cooperation. At the sixth EU-Korea summit in Seoul on 28 March 
2012, the two parties agreed to conduct regular policy dialogue and exchange information on their respective 
development programmes. In light of increasing exchanges between the EU and Korea, the paper by Marx and 
Soares analyzes Korean development cooperation policy  in order to gain a better understanding on how it 
relates to, and potentially differs from, EU development cooperation. The paper discusses the context of the 
recent changes in the development assistance architecture caused by the entrance of new emerging donors and 
the rapid deveplopment experienced by Korea over the last half centure, moving from a poor recipient to a 
emerging DAC donor. Subssequently, the paper presents the Korean objectives on development cooperation and 
discusses the Korean approaches to perform its assistance through different channels and types, comparing it 
with the European Union. Further, the paper analyses the recipients of Korean aid, both in terms of partners and 
sectors and discusses possibilities for further cooperation. Finally, the paper makes an assesment of the 
participation of Korea and the EU in South-South and Triangular cooperation.  
The paper by Wolfgang Pape  compared regulatory approaches to industrial development in Europe and 
Korea within the context of the literature on distinct forms of capitalism. He starts with the observation that, in 
spite of unified EU competition rules, there are considerable differences still amongst Member States. However, 
regulatory approaches to industrial development policies differ even more so in concept and practice between the 
EU and Korea in view of their divergent socio-cultural backgrounds and evolutions to date. Policies on industry at 
EU level concentrate mainly on competitiveness issues ranging from entrepreneurship and SME promotion to 
fostering R&D and innovation. Recent developments in the wake of the economic crisis have led to wider 
interpretations of EU economic governance beyond the European Semester and Europe 2020.  Industrial 
development policy of highly homogenous Korea is centralised throughout the entire country, having learned from 
a ‘Japan Model’ of the developmental state and mercantilism. Post-WWII regimes exploited further the historically 
strong Confucian deference to top-down imposition of industrial development priorities. These policies were 
hardly successful in terms of GDP growth until the 1960s when the Five-Year Plans for the systematic 
development of the economy started to help industries to expand from import-substitution and textiles towards 
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chemicals, machinery and shipbuilding in the 1970s, and then from heavy to technology-intensive industries. On 
the basis of a largely continental legal system, the main vehicle for the implementation of these plans through 
selective subsidisation were the chosen chaebol, fast growing family enterprise-groups. With the strengthening of 
democracy and competition also the need of innovative entrepreneurship in SMEs has increasingly found 
recognition in the Korean administration, gradually reversing some of the pro-big business policies and thus 
reforming and opening up chances for newcomers, also from Europe.  While the big chaebol are now globalising, 
their dominance at home is coming under stricter political scrutiny so that interventionist industrial policies have 
become more difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, along with success-stories in ‘policy-guided’ exports of energy-
technologies (especially nuclear plants), innovation promotion and the low rate of the Korean currency are 
keeping its economic growth and exports at highest levels among OECD countries. This fast industrial 
development in Korea, the paper argues, allows highly beneficial cooperation for the EU. In this contex the paper 
discusses the opportunities offered by the current EU Korea FTA. However, in order to fully exploit the 
opportunities offered by the FTA mutual understanding between EU and Korea should be significantly increased. 
The paper concludes that it is recommended to improve mutual information by the mass media in Korea as well 
as in the EU. The limited understanding of the EU in Korea is to a high degree due to the one-sided focus over 
the Pacific Ocean rather than over the Eurasian continent. Also European media have room and now with the 
exemplary FTA in place more than ever reason to identify and better inform about Korea. Secondly the paper 
argues that European businesses should recognise the role that Korea can play as a gateway to China and 
Japan.  In order to achieve this it would be an option that European industrial associations and lobbies open their 
membership to Korean representatives, as it would greatly improve the flow of information in both directions.  
 
EU-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 
 
In a final set of papers, the authors exlpore the broader geo-political context of current EU-Korea relations. The 
paper by  Christoph Bluth and Neil Winn focused on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a 
security threat.  They note that for many in the West, North Korea is a secretive, reclusive and enigmatic country, 
a “rogue state” that threatens the world with its nuclear programme and ballistic missiles. Unlike the Central 
European countries and the former Soviet Union, the North Korean communist regime did not fall, but rather 
consolidated its hold on power as it became increasingly isolated. North Korea’s nuclear programme precipitated 
a major international crisis in the 1990s almost resulting in military conflict with the United States. Since then 
there have been efforts by the international community, led by the United State and Korea, to engage North 
Korea and mitigate the perceived threat through multilateral negotiations to achieve disarmament in return for 
political and economic support for the DPRK. These efforts have failed to significantly change the foreign policy 
behaviour of the DPRK or transform the security crisis that still persists on the Korean peninsula. Different 
approaches to this crisis, combinations of sanctions, military threats on the one hand and generous economic 
support and efforts to involve the DPRK in a multilateral security framework, on the other hand, have failed to 
achieve the desired objectives. Hence, efforts to mitigate the North Korean security problem have not yielded any 
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results, and despite the very severe economic problems experienced by the DPRK its leadership has not followed 
a strategy that would maximize development aid. The analysis presented in the paper demonstrates that the 
primary security risk for the regime is it own survival that is threatened by its lack of legitimacy and the prospect of 
losing control over its population. It is caught in a trap that results from the inability to develop the economy 
without fundamental reform, which in turn is considered to threaten the survival of the regime. The authors argue 
that the existence of an external enemy in the form of the United States is critical for the legitimacy in the regime, 
but the leadership also needs to engage with the United States to mitigate the external security threat and gain 
access to economic resources. Another critical factor that impacts on the North Korean regime is its complete 
failure to internalise international norms, so that any engagement with international institutions remain purely 
tactical. The paper argues that one of the key problems of efforts to engage with North Korea is the 
preoccupation with the nuclear programme and security in which coercive means dominated. The concept of 
“normative power” that a significant body of literature has identified with the European Union offers the potential 
for an alternative form of engagement with North Korea. By participating in the creation of free enterprise zones 
like that currently in Gaesong and widening various elements of non-military engagement, there is the potential 
for the diffusion of norms through political and economic cooperation. In this vein, the paper proposes a new 
initiative involving the European Union together with the other five powers engaged with North Korea could be 
used to develop a fundamentally new approach to dealing with the crisis on the Korean peninsula. The paper 
further elaborates this normative strategy. 
The paper by Deok Ryong Yoon focused further on North-Korea and examined North Korea’s trade 
patterns. The paper shows that, even though North Korea has never attempted to transform the economic system 
from planning to market economy, market mechanism has spread gradually after the collapse of its economy in 
the beginning of 1990s. Since 1999 North Korea’s GDP and trade volume have increased continuously except for 
those during the crisis years. Recently its trade volume has recovered to the level before the economic collapse. 
This paper subsequently tries to analyze on which industries North Korean trade competitiveness is based and 
whether its trade pattern follows the general pattern of industrial restructuring and development in transition 
countries. Finally the paper discusses the implications for EU’s North Korea policy. To answer the first two 
questions, the paper applies the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The RCA index is calculated 
using mirror statistics based on UN COM-trade data over the time period from 1990 to 2011. North Korea has 
undergone economic restructuring over these two decades. The changes of RCA index reflect North Korea’s 
trade competitiveness as well as its industrial structure. Its trade statistics show that its foreign trade, including 
Sino-DPRK trade, is market-based. North Korea’s economic restructuring seems to be very slow compared to 
that of other former socialist countries. Although the trade volume has recovered recently to the level prior to 
economic collapse, such restoration was done only through the export of natural resources to China. The North 
Korean government’s willingness to reform external economic and financial conditions is prerequisites to rapid 
and successful economic rehabilitation. Considering its economic and political conditions, the EU is best qualified 
to be the potential donor of such technical assistance. According to the RCA indices of North Korea’s exports to 
the EU, the EU already has influence on North Korea’s industrial restructuring.  
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The third paper of this part by Sunhee Park focused on the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) which was 
officially established in 1996. ASEM is an interregional forum which consists of the European Commission, the 27 
members of the European Union, the 10 members of the ASEAN Secretariat, China, Japan, Korea, India, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Bangledesh, Norway and Switzerland.  This paper aimed to 
specifcally explore the ASEM’s enlargement policy centered on the implication of 2010 enlargement with special 
emphasis on the Russian accession to ASEM and Korea’s position on this issue. The enlargement in 2010 to 
include not only Australia and New Zealand but also Russia had significant implications for the bi-regional 
approach which upholds ASEM’s working process. The enlargement to Russia and less so for Australia and New 
Zealand, is expected to bring challenges to the region-based coordination process of ASEM especially 
considering the fact that Russia has an indefinite identity between Asia and Europe. As a consequence the paper 
addresses the question of whether this enlargement would affect the region-to-region approach, the modus 
operandi of ASEM. This paper argues that the 2010 enlargement was not aimed at changing ASEM’s working 
process nor its bi-regional inter-regionalist format. In other words, ASEM had no intention of fundamentally 
changing its working process to some form of trans-regionalism, but was mindful of the benefits from accepting 
Russia's membership. ASEM’s seeming inclination to trans-regional inter-regionalist format can be, according to 
the author, interpreted in a wider geo-political context. The accession of Russia can be regarded most 
persuasively in a context of counterbalancing the US' hegemonic stance and also to counterweight against 
unrivaled China in ASEM which is becoming the potential threat to ASEM's existence. The paper also observes 
Korea's stance on the Russian accession to ASEM including the consecutive enlargement of ASEM from 2008. In 
particular, it analyzes the outcomes of Russia's accession such as stabilized energy supply by the Russia-North 
Korea-Korea natural gas pipeline and the easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula together with the changing 
perspective of ASEM through its enlargements. 
 
3. EU-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
One of the specific goals of the project, on which this volume is based, was to develop a set of recommendations. 
As a result all contributors were urged to discuss the policy implications of their research and develop 
recommendations. This has led to a set of detailed recommendations at the end of most papers. In this section 
we aim to consolidate these recommendations in a set of overall recommendations. 
First of all, many authors develop specific proposals with regard to information exchange which can 
inform the policy-making process on a range of policy issues and reduce transaction costs related with 
information and knowledge generation. The importance of information exchange in transnational regulatory 
cooperation has been highlighted by several leading scholars and policy reports.  For example, two recent 
reports, jointly published by UNIDO and the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, on Networks for 
Prosperity (Marx et al., 2011; 2012) argued that information exchange and knowledge management play a key 
role in achieving development goals. Also scholars international relations scholars such as Slaughter (2004) and 
Haas (19992) point to the importance of information exchange in transnational regulatory networks. 
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Information exchange can be about many different issues ranging from scientific fact exchanges as in 
the case of environmental or chemical policy to more strategic information exchange in the context of the FTA. 
Concerning the former Biedenkopf, in the context of chemical policies, explores several concrete options for the 
sharing of data related to chemical policy implementation. The exchange of chemicals-related data could gain 
importance once Korea has adopted its Act on the Registration and Evaluation of Chemicals. When Korea begins 
requesting data from producers, the format and type of information requested becomes an important aspect. On 
the one hand, producers will find compliance with Korean rules less burdensome if they are in the same format 
and the same type as they have to submit to the EU, since many companies operate in both markets or are part 
of a supply chain feeding into both markets. On the other hand, authorities conducting chemical evaluations could 
benefit from sharing chemical data and results of risk assessments. Through such cooperation, economies of 
scale could be reached. The sharing of data would prevent the duplication of testing.  
The latter, more strategic information exchange, can occur with regard tot he FTA.  As Kerremans et al. 
point out information and the breath of information-gathering is crucial for policymakers’ ability to calibrate trade 
policy outcomes to the preferences of more than just the politicized interests at home. Hence, the management of 
information and the institutional channels through which such information has to flow is of crucial importance. 
Political systems can learn in this regard from each other. Both the EU and Korea for example face the challenge 
of incorporating the interests of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in their policy process as is also highlighted 
in the contribution by Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan.  Each has their own experiences, successes and 
failures in engaging with private actors and an exchanges of best practices.    
A final specific recommendation concerning information exchange concerns not so much information 
exchange between policy-makers and policy-stakeholders but more the general raising of knowledge and 
awareness through public media. As Wofgang Pape notes a special recommendation with regard to information 
exchange ought to be addressed to the mass media in Korea as well as in the EU. The limited understanding of 
the EU by the general public and thereby also small business in Korea is to a high degree due to the one-sided 
focus of any international reporting over the Pacific Ocean rather than over the Eurasian continent. Korean media 
covers only to a very limited extent information on the EU. This observation corresponds with findings Martin 
Holland and colleagues collected on the the presence of EU reporting in Asian newspapers. They showed that 
media coverage on the EU is very limited in Asia (Holland & Chaban, 2005). Also European media have room to 
better inform about Korea.  
Secondly, several authors identify the potential for different types of mutual policy learning. Several 
opportunities arise here. For example, while the EU has introduced a fundamental chemical regulatory reform 
(REACH), Korea is in the process of reforming its chemicals policy. This means that Korea could learn from EU 
experiences and build upon them. With the direction in which its reform efforts seem to be moving, Korea is 
entering an area that is new for its domestic regulation. Lessons from the EU that went through a similar process 
could help Korea avoid some of the flaws and unintended consequences of REACH. Also in other emerging 
policy areas addressed in this volume such as development co-operation, transnational student exchange in 
tertiary education and emissions trading opportunities for policy learning arise. In order to promote mutual 
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learning authors make several suggestions with regard to structuring cooperation ranging from institutionalized 
forms of structured dialogue to informal networking and exchanging policy makers to discuss policy innovation.  
The structured dialogue can take several institutional forms and build on existing initiatives. Cho argues in the 
context of the FTA, that the Trade Committee of the Agreement needs to play a pivotal role in the implementation 
of the FTA by consistently monitoring the implementation and generate mechanisms for learning with regard to 
implementation gaps. The Trade Committee and other lower level consultation groups should be run as defined in 
the Transparency Chapter of the Agreement. Sectoral committees and working level meetings are needed to be 
held at least once a year to consistently assess whether the FTA is implemented as agreed.  The importance and 
potential of the institutional mechanisms foreseen in the FTA is also highlighted in the context of chemical policy. 
Here, the FTA established a working group as an institutional platform for the sharing of experiences and best 
practices. The stated aim of this group is to exchange information and to cooperate in an attempt to avoid 
regulatory divergences and non-tariff barriers to trade. The working group comprises government officials from 
both sides. The challenge will be to make efficient use of the opportunity provided by the working group.  Pape 
also makes the suggestion to start an institutionalized Regulatory Reform Dialogue in order to fully exploit the 
opportunities of the FTA and enhance regulatory cooperation. All these recommendations correspond to more 
general arguments made by authors such as Slaughter (2004; Slaughter and Zaring, 2006) who stress the need 
to ’embed‘ and institutionalize social relations in networks in order to facilitate learning (Giraldi and Radaelli, 
2012). The purpose of these networks are to implement agreements and establish structured forms to address 
issues related to the implementation of these agreements. 
However, mutual learning can also take place via more informal mechanisms and meetings. Besides the 
existing venues for collaboration Pardo, in the context of regulatory approaches towards arms trade, suggest two 
further  mechanisms to enhance cooperation that would be relatively simple to implement in the context of arms 
trade control but possibly also other policy-areas. First of all, an annual (or half-yearly) policy consultation 
meeting on arms trade and control and/or the counterterrorism at the director-general level to share experiences, 
and to develop new areas to cooperate with each other, thus increasing ‘cross fertilisation’. Such policy 
consultation meetings are already taken place as is exemplified in the paper by Marx and Soares on development 
co-operation. In this policy area consultation meetings have taken place in order to exchange information on 
policy initiatives and strategies.  
Secondly, Pardo suggest to dispatch working-level officials of Korea as observers to a variety of EU 
arms trade and control and counterterrorism initiatives. This could easily lead to ‘cross fertilisation’ and even 
closer cooperation as Republic of Korea officials better understand the rationale behind the EU’s regulatory 
framework and its implementation. A similar argument, for exchanging officials is also made by Biedenkopf with 
regard to chemical policy-making. Since the working group meetings, embedded within the FTA, take place only 
once a year or every other year, complementing it with less formalised venues of cooperation seems advisable. 
This form of collaboration can take place at different levels of hierarchy and detail. While the exchange of 
information on broad concepts and fundamental ideas of regulatory design could be discussed in a few high-level 
meetings, technical details are more numerous, occur more frequently and are best dealt with by technical level 
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experts. Cooperation on a more frequent and ad hoc basis appears more conducive in these cases. The latter 
type of more informal exchange is still in its infancy and could be further developed. Similar arguments are 
forwarded in the papers by Niederhafner and Song Lee concerning climate change policies and emission trading 
systems and Sang-Duk Choi on higher education policies. 
Al these recommendations with regard to mutual learning are framed within a context of harmonizing 
policies and generate convergence of policies and standards. However, it should be noted that there are limits to 
regulatory convergence as David Vogel (2012) as highlighted in his recent book. Regulatory standards and 
frameworks are not only the result of international developments. Many factors come into play including the role 
of local domestic interests, attitutes towards the role of government, the role of political systems, the role of 
cultural values and different preferences. Hence, although a certain degree of policy convergence is preferable, 
one should not expect full harmonization on all policies. In addition, one should take into account an efficiency 
argument when setting up new collaborative institutions. Given the exponential growth of bilateral commitments in 
different forms and the bureaucractic and institutional commitments flowing from them it will become, capacity-
wise, impossible to comply with all commitments.  Hence coordinated and concentrated action will be of key 
importance.  How this will evolve in the coming years is an outstanding question. 
Thirdly, several authors focus in their recommendation on the role of non-governmental stakeholders in 
forstering and contributing to strengthening the EU-Korea relations. Since transnational regulatory governance 
implies an opening up of the policy process to different actors leverage can be gained from strengthening 
relations between stakeholders. This refers to broadening co-operation to non-state actors and developing 
mechanisms to support such cooperation. This can take many forms and involve a diversity of stakeholders. The 
Public Diplomacy program of the European Commission which supported this project is one form which 
stimulates this process.  Several authors suggest that besides official channels or dialogues, Korea and the EU 
could come up with various opportunities, such as programmes for exchange of private sector personnel or 
academic gatherings (workshops or seminars) to help understand each other better. Especially in the context of 
highly technical policy areas the support of scientific dialogue and cooperation could be mutually beneficial for the 
EU and Korea. Also with regard to business associations mutual cooperation could be achieved thourgh opening 
up memberships. Pape suggests that European industrial associations and lobbies open their membership to 
Korean representatives, as most recently done by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association through 
admitting Hyundai as a member. Such openness can greatly improve the flow of information in both directions. 
Finally, several papers explore possibilities to further strengthen international cooperation on several 
issues.  Many contributors stress the importance of bilateral cooperation in a multilateral or regional international 
context. Sunhee Park discusses at length ASEM as one such venue. Cho highlights cooperation in the context of 
the WTO and stresses that Korea and the EU should stick to the principles of free trade, cooperate to reject 
protectionism, and put joint efforts to achieve the conclusion of the WTO negotiation. Another front for 
international cooperation which is identified by Cho is the G20 summit. The G20, despite criticism, is one of the 
premier intergovernmental congregations deciding global governance and solutions for global economic issues. 
Korea chaired the 2010 Seoul Summit, dedicating to play a bridging role between developed and developing 
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nations as is mentioned by Marx and Soares. Pardo also suggest that regulatory cooperation between the EU 
and Korea can be advanced through mechanisms already in existence such as international organizations. His 
suggestion for closer collaboration with regard to arms trade and control policy is the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Korea has maintained a close cooperative relationship with the OSCE as a 
member of the OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation since 1994. Korea maintains permanent officers charged 
with matters related to the OSCE in Vienna.  Finally, with regard to climate policies there are serveral venues for 
collaboration on the international level as is highlighted in the paper by Niederhafner and Song Lee. They argue 
that there is significant potential for cooperation at the global level given that both the EU and Korea aim to play a 
leading role in climate mitigation and green growth strategies. The EU has a longstanding track record in climate 
policies. This ambition is shared by Korea. One of the ten core policy tasks within the National Green Growth 
Strategy is to become a global leader and role model in these policy areas. The EU and Korea could develop a 
strategic approach to strengthen each other’s influence and support common goals within the global climate 
change negotiations. In geopolitical terms the paper by Winn and Bluth propose for the EU to take leadership 
towards North-Korea and develop, together with the other five powers engaged with North Korea, a 
fundamentally new approach to dealing with the crisis on the Korean peninsula based on its normative power.  
This also corresponds to similar recommendations made by other authors (Lee, 2012) with regard to North Korea. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
EU - Korea relations constitute a prime example of what academics refer to as a new form of transnational 
governance, namely governance by transnational regulatory networks. These are emerging co-operative 
structures which are outside the realm of established multilateral frameworks.  This form of transnational co-
operation serves at least three functions. First, they provide resources and build capacity to enhance economic 
development. Key resources include financial resources such as (foreign) investments and lowering transaction 
costs related to trade. Secondly, these networks play a key role in harmonizing standards and policies. Thirdly, 
they facilitate policy learning, information exchange and dissemination on a range of policy issues.  Often, 
economic relations and integration, such as free trade agreements, form the backbone of this type of 
collaboration.  
The importance of the EU-Korea FTA to establish an institutional framework to develop closer 
collaboration and a genuine strategic partnerhip emerges out of this volume. This corresponds to the assessment 
of other authors (Yun, 2012; see Kelly, 2012 for a dissenting view). This volume also highlighted this potential as 
well as many other aspects related to EU-Korea regulatory and political cooperation. All contributions focus on 
the potential and importance for further collaboration.   
A key question for the near future will be whether these regulatory networks will endure and deepen. In a 
world which is witnessing a proliferation of trade and other economic agreements it is impossible to further 
deepen regulatory relations with each one of the strategic trade partners.  Some partners will become more 
strategic than others.  Hence, the challenge transnational regulatory networks in general and the EU-Korea 
network in particular pose is twofold. On the one hand, what is at stake is whether these transnational networks 
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are efficient and sustainable from an institutional point of view. On the other, the distributive consequences of 
such regimes should ideally be Pareto-optimal for partaking actors. It remains an outstanding question whether 
the latter is the case. In addition, these two aspects are interrelated as is suggested by many leading international 
relations scholars. Keohane (1984, pp. 51-52) noted three decades ago that „intergovernmental cooperation 
takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating 
realization of their own objectives” (see also Drezner, 2006 for a similar assessment). In other words, cooperation 
will be Pareto optimal and result in enduring institutions if it proves to be mutually beneficial. As a result, 
outstanding questions remain with regard to the efficiency of regulatory harmonization and the capacity to 
develop mutually beneficial supranational institutions, or alternative governance forms, for managing 
transnational regulatory networks such as the EU-Korea FTA and Framework agreement. Future research will 
shed light on this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
  357 
References 
 
Börzel, T. (2011) ‘Networks: Reified Metaphor or Governance Panacea’, Public Administration, 89,1, pp. 49-63 
 
Brown, C. (2011) ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements: A Case Study of the EU-Korea FTA’, pp. 
297-308, in, Herrmann, C. and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2011, 2, 
 
Bruszt, L. and G. A. McDermott (2009) “Transnational Integration Regimes as Development Programs”, in L. 
Bruszt and R. Holzhacker (Eds.) The Transnationalization of Economies, States, and Civil Societies, New York: 
Springer Political Economy Series, pp. 23-59 
 
Cremona, M. (2011) ’The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’, pp. 245-268 in, Herrmann, C. and 
J.P. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2011, 2, pp. 49-63 
 
Djelic, M.L. and K. Sahlin-Andersson (2006) Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Drezner, D.  (2006) All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
 
Gilardi, F. & C. Radaelli (2012) ‘Governance and Learning’ in, D. Levi-Faur (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Haas, Peter M. (1992) “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” International Organization. 
Vol. 46. No. 1. pp. 1-35 
 
Holland, M., and N. Chaban, The EU Through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media 
representations, NCRE Research Series No.4, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of 
Canterbury, 2005, 102p 
 
Horng, Der-Chin . ‘Reshaping the EU’s FTA Policy in a Globalizing Economy:The Case of the EU-Korea FTA ’ 
Journal of World Trade 46, no. 2 (2012): 301–326. 
 
Jordana, Jordana, David Levi-Faur. 2012. "Regional Integration and Transnational Regulatory Regimes: The 
Polycentric Architecture of Governance in Latin American Telecommunications", Paper presented at the EUI-IDB 
Conference "Fostering Regional Regulative Integration – Learning Across Regions", Washington DC, February 
2012 
 
Kelly, R. (2012) ’Korea-European Union relations: beyond the FTA?‘, in, International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific‘, 12, 1, pp. 101-132.  
 
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
 
Kwon, G. (2009) ‘A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks’, in Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 
No. 188. Available at: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/global_economics_paper_no_188_final.pdf  
 
Lee, M. (2012) ’A step as normative power: the EU’s human rights policy towards North Korea’, in, Asia Europe 
Journal, 10, 1, pp. 41-56 
 
Lobel, O. (2004) ‘The renew deal: The fall of regulation and the rise in governance in contemporary legal thought’, 
in, Minnesota Law Review, 89: 342–470. 
 
Lobel, O. (2012) ‘New Governance as Regulatory Governance’, in, D. Levi-Faur (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 358 
Martinez-Diaz, L. & N. Woods (2009) Networks of Influence. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Marx, A, Kitaoka, K., O’Reilly, C. & J. Fuentes (editors)(2012) Networks for Prosperity. Connecting Development 
Knowledge Beyond 2015. Vienna: UNIDO and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies.  
 
Marx, A. Kitaoka, K. & A. MacGillivray (eds.)(2011) Networks for Prosperity. Achieving Millennium Development 
Goals through Knowledge Sharing. Vienna: UNIDO and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. 
 
Rhodes, R. (2012) ‘Waves of Governance’, in, D. Levi-Faur (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Rodrik, D. (2011) The Globalization Paradox. Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Slaughter, A. & D. Zaring (2006) Networking goes international: An update, in, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, 2, pp. 211-229 
 
Slaughter, A.-M. (2004) A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Torfing, J. (2012) ‘Governance Networks’, in, D. Levi-Faur (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Verdier, P.H. (2009) ’Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits‘ in, Yale Journal of International Law, 
34, pp. 114-172 
 
Vogel, D. (2012) The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and 
the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Yun, SJ. (2012) ’The EU’s Common Commercial Policy and implications for Korea-EU relations‘, in, Journal of 
Korea Trade, 16, 4, pp. 57-71  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World 
 
 
The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the Humanities and Social Sciences 
recognized as a Centre of Excellence at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. It hosts researchers from law, economics, political 
science, history, philosophy and area studies.  The Centre carries out and supports interdisciplinary research on globalization, 
governance processes and multilateralism, with a particular focus on the following areas: (i) the European Union and global 
governance; (ii) trade and sustainable development; (iii) peace and security; (iv) human rights, democracy and rule of law; (v) non-
state actors and global governance;  (vi) space governance; and (vii) comparative federalism. It hosts the InBev Baillet-Latour Chair 
EU-China and the Leuven India Focus.  
In addition to its fundamental research, GGS carries out independent applied research and advises policy-makers on multilateral 
governance and global public policy issues. It regularly organizes conferences, seminars and debates on these issues, including a 
summer school. GGS works with academic and policy partners from all over the world, including the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Committee of the Regions, the OECD, UNIDO, UNCTAD, the 
World Bank and the WTO. 
 
For more information, please visit the website www.globalgovernancestudies.eu  
 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Huis De Dorlodot, Deberiotstraat 34, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel. ++32 16 32 87 25   
Fax ++32 16 37 35 47    
info@ggs.kuleuven.be 


LEUVEN CENTRE FOR 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STUDIES
House De Dorlodot
Charles Deberiotstraat 34
3000 Leuven, BELGIUM
Phone: + 32 16 32 87 25
Fax: + 32 16 37 35 47
info@ggs.kuleuven.be
www.globalgovernancestudies.eu
       Leuven Centre          for Global         Governance Studies
       Leuven Centre 
         for Global 
        Governance Studies
EU-Korea Relations
in a Changing World
EDITORS: Axel Marx, Jan Wouters, Woosik Moon, 
Yeongseop Rhee, Sunhee Park, Matthieu Burnay
A JOINT PROJECT BY:
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (KU Leuven) 
Graduate School of International Studies (Seoul National University)
Co-funded by the European Union under the EU-Korea 
Public Diplomacy Program
EU
-K
orea R
elations 
in a C
hanging W
orld  
A
xel M
arx, Jan W
outers, 
W
oosik M
oon, Yeongseop R
hee, 
S
unhee P
ark, M
atthieu B
urnay
The Leuven Centre for Global Governance
Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the
Humanities and Social Sciences recognized as 
a Centre of Excellence at the Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven. It hosts researchers from
law, economics, political science, history, philosophy
and area studies. The Centre carries out and
supports interdisciplinary research on globalization,
governance processes and multilateralism, 
with a particular focus on the following areas: 
(i) the European Union and global governance; 
(ii) trade and sustainable development; (iii) peace
and security; (iv) human rights, democracy and
rule of law; (v) non-state actors and global
governance; (vi) space governance; and (vii)
comparative federalism. It hosts the InBev
Baillet-Latour Chair EU-China and the Leuven
India Focus. In addition to its fundamental
research, GGS carries out independent applied
research and advises policy-makers on multilateral
governance and global public policy issues. 
It regularly organizes conferences, seminars and
debates on these issues, including a summer
school. GGS works with academic and policy
partners from all over the world, including the
European Parliament, the European Commission,
the European External Action Service, the Committee
of the Regions, the OECD, UNIDO, UNCTAD, 
the World Bank and the WTO.
For more information, please visit the website
www.globalgovernancestudies.eu
DOC_KAF_EU-KOREA RELATIONS_Opmaak 1  11/02/13  16:32  Pagina 1
